Minor v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0840 Travis Minor v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of DeKalb County No. 17CR35973 Decided: August 13, 2026 LAGRUA, Justice. Appellant Travis Minor appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Dedrick Davis. 1 On appeal, Minor argues that his convictions should be 1 Davis was shot and killed on June 8, 2017. On September 28, 2017, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Minor for the following counts: malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3); aggravated assault (Count 4); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 6). Minor was tried from June 21 to June 24, 2022, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Minor to life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1 (malice murder); five consecutive years in prison on Count 5 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony); and Counts 2, 3, and 4 merged or were vacated by operation of law. As to Count 6 (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), the trial court improperly merged Count 6 into Count 3 (felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) because Count 3 was vacated by operation of law. While the trial court could have sentenced Minor on Count 6, the State notes that it did not raise this issue in the motion-for-new-trial reversed because (1) the trial court erred by admitting improper lay opinion testimony from a witness who identified Minor in still photographs taken from surveillance video recordings; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Minor to be shackled during trial without making the necessary factual findings to justify shackling as a proper security measure; and (3) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in several respects. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The evidence presented at trial showed that, around 8:50 p.m. on June 8, 2017, Davis was seated inside a restaurant in DeKalb County when a man wearing “dark-colored bottoms,” a “dark-colored hat,” and black-rimmed glasses entered the restaurant and shot at Davis multiple times, exclaiming, “This is for my nephew.” As soon as the shooter opened fire, Davis started running toward the back of the restaurant, but having been struck by a couple of bullets, he soon fell and crawled into the kitchen, where he remained until law enforcement officers arrived. Davis was later transported to the hospital, where he died from his injuries. 2 The shooter fled immediately after the shooting and ran behind a nearby drugstore, where witnesses lost hearing or on appeal, and we have said that, “when a merger error benefits a defendant,” we “exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional circumstances,” which do not exist here. Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 617, 618 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). Minor filed a timely motion for new trial on June 27, 2022, which he later amended through new counsel on February 28, 2025, and March 26, 2025. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court denied the motion on November 24, 2025. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal on December 3, 2025. The case was docketed in this Court to the April 2026 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 The medical examiner testified that Davis sustained two gunshot wounds—a “gunshot of the face” and a “gunshot of the torso”—the latter of which was the “fatal gunshot wound.” 2 sight of him.3 Law enforcement officers responded to the shooting and collected multiple .40-caliber “Smith and Wesson Federal” shell casings inside the restaurant, as well as surveillance video recordings from the restaurant and the drugstore. 4 When investigating officers reviewed the surveillance video recordings from the restaurant, they noted that Davis’s shooting had been captured in one of the video recordings and showed the shooter and other individuals present during the shooting. Additionally, based on the surveillance video recordings from the drugstore, law enforcement officers determined that, moments before the shooting, a person wearing dark clothing parked a “black Dodge Charger” in the parking lot of the drugstore, exited the vehicle, and “then a couple of minutes later,” got “back into that vehicle, and the vehicle [took] off at a high rate of speed.” DeKalb County Police Detective Chris Tappan, one of the investigating officers in this case, testified that, after conducting a search for similar Dodge Chargers in the area through “Vigilant”—a license plate and vehicle monitoring system utilized by law enforcement—he located a black Dodge Charger registered to Minor that had been in the area around the time of the shooting. Detective Tappan then accessed a copy of Minor’s driver’s license and noted that Minor’s photograph “seemed to look like the suspect” from the restaurant’s surveillance video recording. Detective Tappan testified that, as he began investigating Minor, he learned that Minor had a nephew named Christopher Moore, who had recently been the victim of a 3 Witnesses at the scene said they had never seen Davis or the shooter before this incident occurred. 4 These surveillance video recordings were admitted at trial through the owners of these businesses and one of the investigating officers. 3 homicide. Detective Tappan also learned that Davis, the victim in this case, was under investigation in Moore’s homicide case. On July 5, 2017, after determining Minor’s place of employment, Detective Tappan met with Minor’s supervisor, Joseph Smallidge. Detective Tappan showed Smallidge still photographs from the restaurant’s surveillance video recording, and Smallidge immediately identified Minor as the person with the gun in those images. Smallidge, who testified that he had worked with Minor six days a week for three years, said that he “recognized [Minor] right away,” and he had “no doubt” Minor was the person depicted in the images. Smallidge also noted that Minor’s attire in the still photographs—i.e., dark-colored pants and a plain, dark-colored baseball hat—was consistent with his work uniform. Additionally, Smallidge told Detective Tappan that Minor drove a black Dodge Charger, which was parked outside in the parking lot, and that Minor was out of the office on a work call, driving a company-owned service vehicle. Minor was arrested later that day when he returned to the office. Investigating officers secured a search warrant for Minor’s Dodge Charger. Inside the vehicle, officers collected a pair of glasses that resembled those worn by the shooter during Davis’s shooting, as well as a box of .40-caliber Federal Premium bullets. Additionally, after collecting Minor’s cell phone and securing a search warrant to obtain the corresponding cell phone records and data extraction, investigating officers determined that, prior to the shooting, Minor searched the internet for information related to his nephew’s murder, as well as for information on Davis and Davis’s family members, including visiting Davis’s Instagram account. After Davis’s shooting, Minor also searched for news articles and other information about the shooting. Minor testified on his own behalf at trial and contended 4 that he was not involved in Davis’s shooting. Minor also testified that, although he owned the cell phone upon which the internet searches identified at trial were conducted, he did not conduct most of those searches, stating that he often let other people use his cell phone. 1. On appeal, Minor contends that the trial court erred by admitting improper lay opinion testimony from Smallidge regarding whether Minor was the shooter depicted in the surveillance video recording from the crime scene. Minor further argues that, because there was no independent basis to support the admission of Smallidge’s identification testimony regarding Minor, the admission of that testimony was clear error and seriously affected the fairness of the trial as it allowed a witness who was not present at the scene to identify Minor as the shooter. Minor concedes that he did not object to the admission of Smallidge’s lay opinion testimony at trial, so we review this claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d) (providing that, with respect to rulings on evidence, this statute shall not “preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court”). To establish plain error, Minor must demonstrate that the trial court made an error that was not affirmatively waived, was clear or obvious, likely affected the outcome of trial, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See Dees v. State, 322 Ga. 498, 500–01 (2025). “An appellant must establish all four elements of the test in order to demonstrate plain error, so satisfying this test is difficult, as it should be.” Wipfel v. State, 320 Ga. 84, 87 (2024) (quotation marks omitted). And “[a] trial court’s admission of evidence is not a clear or obvious error unless admitting the evidence was a blatant abuse 5 of discretion.” Render v. State, 320 Ga. 890, 899 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). After applying the plain-error test here, we conclude that Minor failed to meet the second part of that test to show clear and obvious error because Smallidge’s testimony was based on his own experience, knowledge, and observations of Minor and, thus, was admissible under OCGA § 24-7-701(a) (“Rule 701”). Under Rule 701, “a lay witness may testify in the form of opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of the witness, helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Mitchell v. State, 320 Ga. 673, 678 (2025) (citing OCGA § 24-7-701(a); cleaned up). “Such lay opinion testimony may include a witness’s identification of a defendant in surveillance photographs or video recordings, at least where there is some basis for concluding that a witness is more likely than the jury to correctly identify the defendant as the person in the photo or video.” Id. at 678–69 (citing Glenn v. State, 302 Ga. 276, 280 (2017); United States v. Pierce, 136 F3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 1998); cleaned up). And “[o]ne such basis is the witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance.” Id at 679 (quotation marks omitted). See also Pierce, 136 F3d at 774 (noting that “critical to [a] determination” of “whether a particular witness is better suited than the jury to correctly identify a defendant as the individual depicted in the surveillance photographs” is “the witness’s level of familiarity with the defendant’s appearance”). “[F]amiliarity derived from a witness’s close relationship to, or sustained contact with the defendant weighs heavily in favor of admitting the witness’s identification testimony.” Pierce, 136 F3d at 774 (citing United States v. Allen, 787 F2d 933, 936 6 (4th Cir. 1986) (observing that “testimony by those who knew defendants over a period of time and in a variety of circumstances offers to the jury a perspective it could not acquire in its limited exposure to defendants” because those “witnesses had interacted with defendants in a way the jury could not, and in natural settings that gave them a greater appreciation of defendants’ normal appearance,” providing “the jury with the opinion of those whose exposure was not limited to three days in a sterile courtroom setting”)). Similarly, factors such as the witness’s familiarity with the defendant’s appearance at the time the surveillance photographs were taken or dressed in a manner similar to the individual depicted in the photographs, and whether the defendant had either disguised his appearance at the time of the offense or altered his appearance prior to trial, would also have some bearing on whether the witness is better able than the jury to make a correct identification. Id. at 774–75. In this case, Davis’s shooting was recorded by the restaurant’s surveillance video camera. The shooting lasted only a few seconds, and the initial shots were fired while the shooter was outside of the surveillance video camera’s range, such that the video recording captured the shooter’s back side as reflected in a mirror mounted on the wall of the restaurant. When the shooter came into view, he did not stop moving or face the surveillance video camera directly, and he was wearing a black baseball hat and glasses that partially shielded his face. At trial, before Smallidge testified about his immediate recognition of Minor in the still photographs taken from the surveillance video recording, which were shown to Smallidge by law enforcement a few weeks 7 after the shooting, Smallidge testified about his familiarity with Minor based on Minor’s three-year employment with Smallidge and the frequency of their interactions—which he testified were “[d]aily” since they worked together “six days a week.” Smallidge also testified that Minor’s attire in the still photographs looked similar to his work uniform, particularly his baseball hat and pants, which employees purchased themselves. Additionally, Smallidge testified that Minor had a full beard at trial, which he did not have at the time of the shooting in 2017. Given how the shooter was depicted in the surveillance photographs—including his constant movement, the fact that he never directly faced the surveillance video camera, and the fact that he was wearing a baseball hat and glasses that partially shielded his face—the shooter’s attire; the fact that Minor had a full beard at trial but did not have a beard in the surveillance photographs; and the fact that Smallidge was very familiar with Minor—having seen Minor almost “[d]aily” over a three-year period—Smallidge was “in an even better position than the jurors to identify” Minor from the surveillance photographs, Mitchell, 320 Ga. at 679, and thus, Smallidge was permitted under Rule 701 to give testimony identifying Minor in those images. See id. Accordingly, Minor has failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed any error, let alone clear and obvious error, in admitting Smallidge’s testimony at trial, and this claim of plain error fails. See Render, 320 Ga. at 900 (concluding that “the trial court did not commit any error, much less a clear and obvious error,” in admitting testimony about the contents of Ring-doorbell footage because the record authorized the admission of that testimony, and thus, there was no plain error shown); Mitchell, 320 Ga. at 679 (concluding there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing a lay witness to testify as to whether the 8 defendant was the person in the video and still photographs); Pierce, 136 F3d at 775 (“Because we find that, under the circumstances, there is some basis for concluding that the witnesses are more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting [their] lay opinion identification testimony.” (cleaned up)). 2. Minor next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Minor to be shackled during the duration of the trial without making the necessary factual findings to justify the shackling as a proper security decision. While we observe that this is yet another case involving shackling in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, because the purportedly unconstitutional shackling here was ultimately harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we see no reversible error, and this claim fails. See Kam v. State, S26A0215, slip op. at 9, 12 (Ga. May 19, 2026) (2026 WL 1390694) (holding that, while any unconstitutional shackling of the defendant was concerning under the circumstances, the shackling of the defendant was ultimately harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Wallace v. State, 320 Ga. 272, 283 (2024) (holding that the State can overcome any presumption of harm by a showing that “the shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). At trial, Minor objected to wearing shackles, stating that he believed “some jurors ha[d] seen [him] with shackles on,” which was “unfair” and “against [his] due process,” because the jurors knew he was “locked up.” The State responded by pointing out the following: (1) “[b]oth of the tables in the [court]room have full curtains around them to hide the defendant’s feet and shackles”; (2) “the jury has been fully escorted out of the room before the defendant is ever taken back into custody”; and (3) “the 9 defendant is fully taken to his table before the jurors are ever brought back into the courtroom.” Minor’s trial counsel then noted that Minor had not yet decided whether or not he would testify, which could be an issue if he were shackled, but trial counsel did not object to the shackling. The trial court advised Minor that all detainees were required to wear and remain in shackles in the courtroom unless the detainee was a juvenile and explained that, if Minor decided to testify, the trial court would “address how he goes up to the witness stand and how he gets past the witness stand.” The trial court then observed that the jury was not made aware of Minor’s detention and had not “seen whether or not Mr. Minor [wa]s detained.” The trial court also noted the height of the jury box and the skirts around the defense table, which prevented the jury from seeing that Minor was wearing shackles. When Minor later testified at trial, his shackles were removed. In his motion for new trial, Minor argued that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring him to wear shackles during trial “without first making case specific and individualized findings justifying the decision to require shackles” and without “reference to any security plan,” which was “clearly unconstitutional.” In the trial court’s order denying Minor’s motion for new trial, the trial court explained that Minor’s legs were shackled during trial “pursuant to the Sheriff’s policy, which is no longer followed in DeKalb County courtrooms.” Additionally, the trial court determined that, even if it was error to require Minor to wear shackles during trial, any such error was harmless because the shackles were never visible, “the efforts taken to prevent the jury from finding out that [Minor] was [shackled] were successful,” and “the jury never knew” Minor was wearing shackles during trial. 10  We have said that “no person should be tried while shackled except as a last resort.” Kam, S26A0215, slip op. at 10 (citing Hill v. State, 308 Ga. 638, 644 (2020) (quotation marks omitted)). To that end, “[a] trial judge has the discretion to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling, but any such determination must be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And, when we consider a “trial court’s decision to shackle a defendant,” we subject that decision “to close judicial scrutiny to determine if there was an essential state interest furthered by compelling a defendant to wear shackles and whether less restrictive, less prejudicial methods of restraint were considered or could have been employed.” Id. In this case, the trial court did not provide a basis for its decision to shackle Minor, nor does the record otherwise reflect that Minor was wearing shackles because of any “special security needs,” “escape risks,” or to further any “essential state interest[s].” Kam, S26A0215, slip op. at 10. Instead, the decision to shackle Minor was apparently based on the routine practice and policy of the trial court with respect to defendants being held in custody during trial. Nevertheless, even assuming that the shackling of Minor was “constitutionally impermissible,” we conclude that the shackling was harmless under the circumstances of this case. Kam, S26A0215, slip op. at 11 (“On direct appeal where unconstitutional shackling has occurred, there is a presumption of harm that can be overcome only upon a showing by the State that the shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citing Wallace, 320 Ga. at 283; quotation marks omitted)). Here, 11 the State demonstrated that Minor’s shackles were not visible to the jury at any time, including when Minor testified. Specifically, the record reflects that (1) curtains were positioned around all sides of the prosecution and defense tables, hiding Minor’s feet and legs; (2) each time the jury entered the courtroom, Minor was already seated at the defense table, and the jury exited the courtroom before Minor was removed from the courtroom; (3) when Minor testified, he walked to the witness box and testified without any restraints or shackles; and (4) the jury never learned that Minor was incarcerated or was wearing shackles during trial. Moreover, nothing in the record indicated that the shackles prevented Minor “from participating in his own defense by, for example, communicating with trial counsel.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 US 622, 634 (2005) (considering the factors influencing a finding of harm or prejudice from unconstitutional shackling). See Wallace, 320 Ga. at 283 (concluding shackles were not harmful where they were not visible to the jury). Additionally, in denying Minor’s motion for new trial, the trial court explicitly found that Minor’s shackles were never visible to the jury during jury selection or at trial. Further, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Minor’s guilt in this case, including (1) testimony from eyewitnesses who saw the shooting and saw the shooter flee behind an adjacent drugstore; (2) surveillance video recordings capturing the shooting and the aftermath; (3) Smallidge’s testimony identifying Minor as the shooter in still photographs from the restaurant’s surveillance video recording; (4) evidence showing that a person driving a vehicle matching Minor’s—a black Dodge Charger—arrived at the crime scene shortly before the shooting occurred and fled in that vehicle moments after the shooting; (5) bullets matching the shell casings found at the scene and glasses matching those worn by the shooter were located 12 inside Minor’s vehicle; (6) the shooter said, “This is for my nephew,” before shooting Davis, and evidence showed that Minor’s nephew had recently been murdered and that Davis was a suspect in that murder; and (7) cell phone evidence showing that Minor searched the internet for information about his nephew’s shooting and Davis before the shooting occurred, as well as information about Davis’s shooting after it occurred. The trial court also instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof, and a jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions when rendering a verdict in this case. See Kam, S26A0215, slip op. at 11 (in assessing any harm from the shackling of the defendant, noting the “strong” evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the trial court’s proper instructions to the jury on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof). Thus, given that Minor’s shackles were not visible to the jury at any point during trial; the evidence presented against Minor was extremely strong; and the trial court properly charged the jury in this case, the “State has carried its burden to show that any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wallace, 320 Ga. at 284. See also Kam, S26A0215, slip op. at 11–12 (concluding that, based on similar facts, the arguably “unconstitutional shackling” of the defendant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, this enumeration of error fails. 3. Minor contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several respects, which we will address collectively in this division. Each of these ineffectiveness claims fails under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984). For Minor to prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of- counsel claims, he “must show both that his counsel’s 13 performance was constitutionally deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance.” Tabb v. State, S26A0953, slip op. at 7 (Ga. June 2, 2026) (2026 WL 1541297) (citing Strickland, 466 US at 687). To establish deficient performance, Minor “must show that his counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Saunders v. State, 323 Ga. 136, 139 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). We have said that “[e]stablishing deficient performance is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably,” and the defendant “bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Sims v. State, S26A0143, slip op. at 22 (Ga. June 2, 2026) (2026 WL 1541050). To carry this burden, Minor “must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not.” Id., slip op. at 22–23. And “decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Id., slip op. at 23. To demonstrate prejudice, Minor “must establish a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different.” Saunders, 323 Ga. at 140 (quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Tabb, S26A0953, slip op. at 7 (quotation marks omitted). “If this Court concludes that the appellant has failed to meet his burden to prove either deficiency or prejudice, we do not have to examine the other prong.” Sneed v. State, 324 Ga. 175, 179 (2026). And, “[i]n reviewing either component of the inquiry, all factual findings by the trial court will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 14  (a) Minor first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to improper testimony elicited from Davis’s sister regarding “the impact of the crime” on Davis’s two- year-old daughter. In support of this claim, Minor argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to this “victim impact” testimony was “objectively unreasonable” because the testimony was irrelevant, inadmissible in the guilt/innocent phase of trial, and served to improperly “engender the jury’s sympathies” for Davis and Davis’s family. Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349, 363 (2020). See Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 643 (2001). Minor has failed to carry his burden of showing that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in this respect. The record reflects that, at trial, the State called Davis’s sister, Ritketta Davis, to testify, and during direct examination, the following exchange occurred: PROSECUTOR: Now, in 2017, did your brother, Dedrick Davis, have any children? RITKETTA: Yes, a daughter. PROSECUTOR: How old was she in 2017? RITKETTA: One. PROSECUTOR: And in 2017, prior to the incident in this case, are you aware of where Mr. Davis was living? RITKETTA: Yes. PROSECUTOR: And where was he living? RITKETTA: With my mother. 15  The prosecutor then asked Ritketta a few more questions about how frequently Davis went to the area where the shooting occurred and when Ritketta learned of his death. The prosecutor’s final exchange with Ritketta was as follows: PROSECUTOR: And Mr. Davis’s child, who does she live with now? RITKETTA: My mom. Minor’s trial counsel did not object to this line of questioning at trial. In Minor’s motion for new trial, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Ritketta’s “victim impact testimony.” At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Minor’s appellate counsel presented excerpts of Ritketta’s trial testimony to Minor’s trial counsel to review and then asked trial counsel whether the statements about Davis’s “parental status and him taking care of the children prior to his death, and then the children being left to be cared for by the grandmother” were considered to be “victim impact testimony.” Minor’s trial counsel responded that he did “not necessarily” agree that Ritketta’s testimony was “victim impact testimony,” but merely “a factual circumstance.” When asked why he did not object to the testimony as irrelevant, trial counsel testified that they had “bigger fish to fry,” including “a very clear video,” and he did not think Ritketta’s testimony “would move the needle one way or another in terms of a jury’s decision.” On cross examination, trial counsel reiterated that he did not view Ritketta’s testimony as “victim impact,” “overly emotional,” or “anything that would sway a jury,” and if he had thought the State was “veering off into the world of overly emotional testimony by a family member,” he “would have objected.” In denying Minor’s motion for new trial, the trial court 16 concluded that Minor’s trial counsel was not deficient in determining that there was no reason to object to Ritketta’s testimony, and even if there was any deficiency, there was no prejudice. We agree that Minor’s trial counsel was not deficient in this respect. As an initial matter, Ritketta’s responses to the State’s questioning at trial did not constitute improper “victim impact” evidence because Ritketta’s testimony about Davis’s family was limited to a brief reference to his young daughter and where she was living before and after his death. “Under Georgia law, evidence about a crime victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, and the victim’s community generally is not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial.” Lofton, 309 Ga. at 363. Compare Sermons v. State, 262 Ga. 286, 286-87 (1992) (“Victim impact evidence has been defined as ‘simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm cause by the crime in question.’” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 US 808 (1991) (emphasis added)). At Minor’s motion-for-new-trial-hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not object to Ritketta’s limited testimony concerning Davis’s child because he did not view the testimony as “victim impact testimony,” but as a description of “a factual circumstance.” The record supports trial counsel’s view. There is no indication in the record that Ritketta was emotional in giving her testimony nor did she describe any emotional impact of Davis’s death on his daughter or his family. Compare Lofton, 309 Ga. at 362–64 (concluding that the prosecutor’s explicit appeals to the jury’s sympathy by referencing the victim’s family circumstances for which no evidence had been presented was improper). And the State’s questioning of Ritketta was not such as would elicit a response that “inappropriately appealed to the jury’s 17 sympathies.” Id. at 365. Trial counsel also testified that he did not object to Ritketta’s testimony as irrelevant because, in light of the other, more problematic evidence the State had against Minor, he did not think this testimony would have any impact on the jury’s decision. Thus, Ritketta’s testimony did not constitute improper “victim impact” evidence forming the basis for a valid objection. See Lofton, 309 Ga. at 363. And trial counsel had an objectively reasonable basis for not objecting to this testimony on other grounds. Therefore, this ineffectiveness claim fails. See Tabb, S26A0953, slip op. at 8–9 (concluding that trial counsel’s decision not to object to “victim-impact testimony” was not deficient because the testimony at issue was “brief” and “trial counsel’s reasons for not objecting [we]re objectively reasonable”); Jackson v. State, 321 Ga. 659, 665 (2025) (concluding that “[t]he failure to make a meritless objection cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance”). (b) Minor argues that trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to object to Smallidge’s lay opinion testimony identifying Minor in still photographs from the restaurant’s surveillance video recording. In support of this argument, Minor asserts that, because Minor’s theory of defense was misidentification and because the facts did not show that Minor’s appearance had changed significantly by the time of trial or that he possessed some characteristic that would make Smallidge better able to identify Minor than the jury would have been, trial counsel’s failure to object to Smallidge’s testimony was patently unreasonable. Minor further argues that, by allowing Smallidge to identify Minor in the still photographs, trial counsel allowed this witness to invade the province of the jury, which prejudiced Minor’s right to a fair trial, particularly since no one else identified Minor as the shooter 18 in this case. For the same reasons the trial court did not plainly err in admitting this evidence as explained in Division 1, Minor has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s decision not to object to Smallidge’s identification of Minor in still photographs from the restaurant’s surveillance video was “patently unreasonable” or that “no competent attorney would have followed such a course.” Nesbit v. State, 321 Ga. 240, 247 (2025). As explained above, Smallridge’s testimony was admissible, and at Minor’s motion-for- new-trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not object to Smallidge’s lay opinion testimony because he “did not believe there was a basis for an objection at trial.” Minor has not carried his burden to demonstrate otherwise. Because this testimony was clearly admissible and any objection thereto would have been meritless, Minor has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to Smallidge’s testimony. See Jackson, 321 Ga. at 665. Thus, this ineffectiveness claim also fails. (c) In his last ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Minor argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the shackling of Minor at trial. Even assuming that Minor’s trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the shackling of Minor at trial, Minor has failed to demonstrate prejudice, so this claim fails. As discussed above in Division 2, the shackling under the unique circumstances of this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Minor has not shown a reasonable probability that his shackling or his trial counsel’s failure to object to the shackling likely affected the outcome of his trial. See Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 571–72 (2008) (concluding that, where “the issue is the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to … shackling, the [defendant] is entitled to relief 19 only if he or she can show there is a reasonable probability that the shackling affected the outcome of the trial”). Again, the shackles in this case were never visible to the jury; the defense table was covered by a full curtain; and Minor was not shackled when he testified at trial. Moreover, the evidence of Minor’s guilt in this case was overwhelming, and Minor has not explained how being shackled changed the outcome of his trial. Therefore, assuming without deciding that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the shackling here, Minor has failed to establish the requisite prejudice, and this final ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails, as well. See Wallace, 320 Ga. at 283–85; Whatley, 284 Ga. at 571–72. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P. J., not participating. 20