Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0994 Peggy Milton v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of Emanuel County No. 23CR39 Decided: August 18, 2026 LAND, Justice. Appellant Peggy Milton challenges her convictions for fel- ony murder and related charges stemming from the shooting death of her boyfriend, Nicholas Hall. On appeal, Milton’s sole ar- gument is that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support her convictions. 1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1 The crimes occurred on July 9, 2022. On January 30, 2023, an Eman- uel County grand jury indicted Milton for malice murder (Count 1), felony mur- der (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). At a trial held from April 8 to April 10, 2024, the jury found Milton not guilty of Count 1 and guilty of Counts 2 through 4. Milton was sentenced to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole for Count 2 and five years probation for Count 4 to be served consecutive to Count 2. Count 3 was merged with Count 2 for sentencing purposes. Milton filed a timely motion for new trial on April 15, 2024, and amended that motion through new counsel on April 2, 2025. «V1.165, 189-200» Milton waived a hearing on her motion for new trial, the trial court denied the amended motion for new trial in a written order on April 14, 2025, and Milton filed a timely notice of appeal. «V1.1-5» The case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the ev- idence presented at trial showed as follows. On July 9, 2022, Mil- ton and Hall were playing cards and drinking at the home of James and Lakendra Mincey. James testified that, at some point in the evening while the group was playing a card game, Milton “got up” and walked outside and Hall followed her. James testi- fied that Milton and Hall did not appear to be arguing or yelling before they left the house. Lakendra testified that she heard Mil- ton and Hall “saying something about a cigarette” before leaving the house. Lakendra testified that there was a “little bit” of bick- ering between Milton and Hall, but that “we always do that, like when we [are] playing cards and stuff like that.” Archie Mincey, who was sitting outside on the porch talk- ing to Keisha Hunter, testified that he saw Milton and Hall walk outside to the truck before “turn[ing] around and walk[ing] back … beside us and went back in the house.” Archie testified that he “heard gunshots” before Milton and Hall “got in the house.” Archie testified that he did not see any argument or yelling be- tween Milton and Hall prior to the shooting. Hunter testified that she heard Milton tell Hall to “go on” and “leave me alone” shortly before hearing “a shot.” Another witness who was sitting outside in his truck testified that he did not see or hear any argument before hearing a gunshot. Police received a call reporting the shooting at 9:13 p.m. and responded immediately, arriving at the scene less than two minutes after receiving the call. The responding officer testified that he saw Hall’s body “laying out just at the steps of the resi- dence.” The officer checked for a pulse, was “unable to find any- thing,” and observed that Hall had a gunshot wound to his face. Milton was arrested at the scene and did not appear to have any 2 visible injuries. The medical examiner who conducted Hall’s au- topsy determined that, due to stippling on the entry wound, Hall was shot at close range and that Hall’s cause of death was a gun- shot wound to the head. Milton testified in her own defense at trial. Milton testified that she previously worked as a correctional officer, that she re- ceived firearms training through her work, and that she owned a firearm because “they told [her] to get something for [her] protec- tion just in case … the inmates got out.” Milton testified that Hall was “abusive,” that she and her son were “scared … to be home,” and that Hall “put his hands on [her] plenty of times,” including choking her until she was unconscious on one occasion. Milton testified that due to her medical conditions, which included gout and rheumatoid arthritis, she sometimes was unable to get out of bed or dress herself, and that Hall would “do things that he [knew] … [she] couldn’t do anything about,” like “push [her] down” so that she could not get up. Several of Milton’s friends testified that they witnessed Hall’s physical abuse of Milton. Lakendra testified that Milton and Hall argued frequently and that she had seen “a lot of push- ing and pulling” between Hall and Milton, although she “didn’t see a lot of punches.” She testified that she had noticed “marks” on Milton “at least two or three times.” Another friend testified that she had seen Hall “slap,” “punch,” “choke,” and “verbally abuse” Milton “numerous times.” One of Hall’s coworkers testified that he once saw Hall slap Milton and that Milton “hit him back” during an argument about money. Milton testified that on the night of the shooting, Hall was 3 “mad because [she] wouldn’t give him [her] pack” of cigarettes.2 She then got into her car to leave, but Hall “took [her] keys.” Mil- ton testified that she then retrieved her gun from the center con- sole, which she testified Hall saw her do, exited the car, and “walk[ed] back to the steps.” Milton testified that when they reached the steps to the house, Hall “tried to reach out or hit me or whatever” and she pulled the gun on him because she “was just scared … that he was going to do something to [her].” Milton tes- tified that she told police that she lifted her arms up to try “to protect her face” and that the gun fired accidentally. A firearms expert testified, however, that Milton’s gun was “functioning properly” and agreed that the gun did not appear to have any issues that would cause it to discharge without some- body intentionally pulling the trigger. The expert testified that he performed a trigger pull pressure test, the results of which indi- cate that the gun’s “trigger has to be pulled in order for it to initi- ate a firing sequence.” 2. Milton’s sole argument on appeal is that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support her convictions for fel- ony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm dur- ing the commission of a felony.3 We disagree. When considering whether the evidence was constitution- ally sufficient to support a defendant’s convictions, we ask 2 In a custodial interview shortly after the shooting, which was played for the jury, Milton told officers that she went outside because Hall was “jerk[ing]” at her because she caught him cheating at cards. She told officers that Hall was “walking up on her” and that she “didn’t know the safety was off” on her firearm. 3 Because the aggravated assault count merged with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes, Milton’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evi- dence on the aggravated assault count is moot. See Eggleston v. State, 309 Ga. 888, 891 (2020). 4 “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jack- son v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). It is up to the jury to resolve “conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Whisnant v. State, 322 Ga. 253, 257 (2025) (cleaned up). See Jackson, 443 US at 319 (“[T]he factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”). “When a defendant presents evidence that [s]he was justified in using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Willerson v. State, 312 Ga. 369, 372 (2021) (citation omit- ted). “Questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve, and the jury may reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not done in self-defense.” Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (2020) (cleaned up). See Maynor v. State, 317 Ga. 492, 497 (2023) (same). Milton argues that she pulled the gun’s trigger by accident and did not intend to shoot Hall. Milton also argues that, even if she did intentionally pull the trigger, she acted in self-defense to prevent Hall from committing a forcible felony and because she was at risk of great bodily harm due to her underlying medical conditions. 4 4 Pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-21(a): A person is justified in threatening or using force against an- other when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or her- 5 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver- dict, however, the jury was authorized to reject Milton’s self-de- fense claim and find her guilty of the crimes of which she was convicted. 5 Milton received firearms training, and the State’s fire- arms expert testified that Milton’s gun was “functioning properly” and that the trigger would have to be pulled for the gun to go off. Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that Milton pulled the trigger to shoot Hall and that her gun did not fire accidentally. See Hopwood v. State, 307 Ga. 305, 305–06 (2019) (holding that jury was free to disregard defendant’s argument that the murder weapon was fired accidentally when a firearms expert testified that “there was no chance that the weapon had been fired acci- dentally”); Smith v. State, 292 Ga. 620, 621 (2013) (holding that evidence was sufficient to uphold conviction for malice murder where the jury heard evidence that the firearm used to kill the victim “was in good operating condition and required several pounds of applied force to be fired”). Additionally, based on the evidence presented at trial, the self or a third person against such other’s imminent use of un- lawful force; however, except as provided in Code Section 16-3- 23, a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he or she rea- sonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 5 A person commits aggravated assault, a felony, when she “[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another” “[w]ith a deadly weapon.” OCGA §§ 16-5-20(a)(1) & 16-5-21(a)(2). And a person commits felony murder when she “causes the death of” another person, “irrespective of malice,” while “in the commission of a felony.” OCGA § 16-5-1(c). Finally, a person is guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony when she has “on or within arm’s reach of … her person a firearm” during “the commission of … [a]ny crime against or involving the person of another” when the crime is a felony. OCGA § 16-11-106. 6 jury could reasonably conclude that Milton and Hall were not in an argument at the time of the shooting. None of the other wit- nesses saw Milton and Hall arguing prior to leaving the house. At most, the other witnesses saw Milton and Hall engaging in banter that was typical in the group’s card games. Moreover, Archie, who was sitting on the porch outside when the shooting happened, did not hear any arguing between Milton and Hall. And although Hunter did hear an argument, the jury could have chosen to dis- believe that testimony. See Mickens v. State, 277 Ga. 627, 629 (2004) (noting that, when presented with witnesses who have con- flicting testimony, “it is the province of the jury to decide which testimony is most believable”). The jury also could have rejected Milton’s claim of self-de- fense based on its assessment of her credibility and the fact that, even if there was an argument, the argument itself or Hall’s “reaching for” Milton did not justify the shooting. See Gibbs, 309 Ga. at 564 (observing that the jury may reject evidence offered in support of a justification defense). Although Milton presented ev- idence at trial suggesting that Hall had been physically abusive towards her in the past, the jury could have disbelieved these wit- nesses or concluded that, even despite this abuse, Milton could not have reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to protect herself in this particular encounter with Hall. See Willer- son, 312 Ga. at 372 (“Deadly force is not justified if the degree of force used by the defendant exceeds that which a reasonable per- son would believe necessary to defend against the victim’s unlaw- ful actions.” (cleaned up)). In short, the question of whether Mil- ton acted in self-defense was for the jury, and the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. See Whisnant, 322 Ga. at 258 (jury was free to reject defendant’s “self-serving” testimony that victim was attacking her when she shot him); Maynor, 317 Ga. at 497 (“Moreover, the only evidence supporting [a]ppellant’s 7 affirmative defense was his own self-serving testimony. … The jury was free to disbelieve [a]ppellant’s testimony.”). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support Milton’s convictions. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Warren, P.J., not participating. 8