Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A1628 Blackwell v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of Fulton County No. 23SC188905-01 Decided: November 3, 2026 MCMILLIAN, Justice. Alice Blackwell appeals from her convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Carl Phillips. 1 Blackwell asserts that (1) the trial court violated OCGA 1 The crimes were committed on April 12, 2022. In January 2024, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Blackwell for malice murder (Count 1), fel- ony murder (Counts 2, 4, and 6), arson in the first degree (Counts 3 and 5), and criminal damage to property in the first degree (Count 7). At a jury trial held in April 2024, Blackwell was found guilty of all counts except Count 1, on which she was found not guilty. On April 26, 2024, the trial court sentenced Blackwell as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(a) and (c) to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder and a concurrent ten-year term for criminal damage to property in the first degree; the remaining counts either merged for sentencing purposes or were vacated by operation of law. Blackwell timely filed a motion for new trial, which was amended through new counsel in January 2026. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as amended, on January 27, 2026. Blackwell timely filed a notice of appeal, and her case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in August 2026 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. § 17-8-57 by commenting “we’re trying to get the story straight” and “I’m going to let him try to get to the bottom of this” when defense counsel objected to the State’s cross-examination of Blackwell; and (2) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s comments under OCGA § 17-8-57. For the following reasons, we affirm. The evidence introduced at trial showed that James Love- lace owned a house located on Chappell Road Northwest in At- lanta. Lovelace allowed Phillips to stay at the house. Lovelace also allowed David Hunter to stay at the house overnight some- times. Lovelace had known Blackwell for a couple of years and saw her “on and off.” On or around April 11, 2022, Lovelace messaged Blackwell on Facebook offering to take her shopping for her birthday that day. They agreed to meet up in Jonesboro at his cousin’s home where Lovelace was staying at the time. Blackwell drove to the Jonesboro house in her white Volkswagen van to meet up with Lovelace. Lovelace and Blackwell then went shopping, and he bought her clothes, paid to get her nails and hair done, and gave her money. After they went shopping, they went to the Chappell Road house in Atlanta because Blackwell wanted to shower and change clothes. At some point, Blackwell and Lovelace got into an argu- ment, and Lovelace demanded that Blackwell take him back to the Jonesboro house, which she did. At the Jonesboro house, Blackwell and Lovelace got into a physical altercation about whether Lovelace took Blackwell’s birthday money, which re- sulted in Blackwell attempting to run over Lovelace with her van several times. Lovelace testified that he then heard Blackwell tell someone on the phone, “Come and shoot his house up.” Shortly after the physical altercation, both separately drove away from 2 the Jonesboro house. Later that evening, Blackwell went to the Chappell Road house; her ankle monitor showed that she arrived at the Chappell Road house at 1:01 a.m. and left at 1:06 a.m. 2 A license plate read- ing camera also captured Blackwell’s vehicle traveling towards the Chappell Road house around this time. Cell phone records show that at 1:09 a.m., Lovelace’s phone, which was still in Jones- boro, attempted to call Blackwell’s phone, which was near an In- terstate 20 interchange in Atlanta. Lovelace’s “vehicle was not captured on any license plate reading cameras in the City of At- lanta around the time this incident occurred.” On the early morning of April 12, Hunter and Phillips were inside the Chappell Road house. Hunter was covering his head with a blanket to stay warm, obscuring his vision, when he heard “a van pull up” and heard doors open and close, including another door “slide[] and slam.” He then heard “somebody walk down the side of the house” and a “boom, sizzling,” and after he heard the “boom,” he took the blanket off, saw black smoke from a fire, and left the house through the back door. At the time, Hunter did not see anyone or any vehicles outside the house. Phillips, who was partially blind, was still in the house when the fire started. Two 911 calls were placed at approximately 1:08 a.m. about a fire at the Chappell Road house, and the fire department arrived shortly after. Hunter told the firefighters Phillips was still in the house. One firefighter pulled some boards off the house and saw an indi- vidual, later identified as Phillips, inside on the floor, not moving. The firefighter removed Phillips from the house, and CPR was 2 The record does not indicate why Blackwell was wearing an ankle monitor. 3 performed until an ambulance arrived and took him to the hospi- tal. Phillips arrived at the hospital with no heartbeat and soot in his nostrils and throat. Phillips was pronounced dead at the hos- pital, and his cause of death was attributed to smoke inhalation and carbon monoxide toxicity from a fire. The manner of death was classified as a homicide. Later that morning, Hunter went to the vacant lot beside the Chappell Road house and saw two bottles with gasoline- doused rags inside, referred to as Molotov cocktails; one showed signs of burning, and the other did not. Hunter noted the odor of gasoline. Hunter gave the two bottles 3 to the investigators, who then found an additional bottle with a substance that tested pos- itive for an ignitable liquid. The fire investigator noted that the front porch was heavily charred and that most of the house had smoke staining. The fire investigation determined that the source of the fire came from outside the wall on the front porch area. The investigation concluded that the fire was not started from weather or natural causes, an electrical or gas fire, a cigarette, a water heater, the fireplace, the microwave, or the stove. Ulti- mately, the investigation determined that the “fire was incendi- ary” and that the ignition source “was brought to the [Chappell Road house] by an individual.” The fire investigator spoke with Blackwell on the phone approximately a week after the fire, and she denied setting the fire. By the time of the trial, no one had “come forward saying they witnessed who started the fire.” 1. Blackwell contends that the trial court violated OCGA § 17-8-57 when defense counsel objected during Blackwell’s cross- examination on the grounds that the questions were asked and 3 Fingerprint analysis was requested for only these two bottles, and no “potentially suitable” fingerprints were found on them. «V4. 176, 224» 4 answered, and the trial court responded by stating, “I mean, we are trying to get the story straight” and “I’m going to let him try to get to the bottom of this.” On May 3, 2022, City of Atlanta Police Detective Scott Demeester interviewed Blackwell. At trial, Detective Demeester testified about his interview, during which Blackwell described the events of April 11 and 12, including that after the altercation with Lovelace about the birthday money at the Jonesboro house, she claimed that Lovelace followed her from the Jonesboro house to the Chappell Road house. Blackwell also alleged that Lovelace was at the Chappell Road house when she returned there and that she “tr[ied] to get her belongings” but “[Lovelace] was not allowing her to go inside the house.” She then claimed that Love- lace threw a gas can at her and that Lovelace was smoking a cig- arette. However, during her direct examination at trial, Blackwell testified that she initially thought somebody other than Lovelace, whom she did not know, was at the Chappell Road house “yelling, looking for [Lovelace]” and that person threw the gas can at her. Blackwell then admitted that she told Detective Demeester that Lovelace was at the Chappell Road house even though she knew it was not him. During the State’s cross-examination, Blackwell admitted that she lied when she told Detective Demeester that Lovelace had followed her from the Jonesboro house to the Chap- pell Road house. Blackwell also conceded that she said that Love- lace threw the gas can at her “[b]ecause, initially, I did think it was [Lovelace] at first. I thought he had something to do with it and so I said it was him,” but “when he started talking, I knew it wasn’t [Lovelace].” This exchange then occurred: STATE: All right. So when you left Chappell Road, you knew that … was not [Lovelace]; correct? 5 BLACKWELL: Yes, I did. STATE: Okay. And so when you met with Detective Demeester, you lied and said that [Lovelace] had fol- lowed you all the way from Clayton County to his home on Chappell Road. That was a lie that you told Detective Demeester; correct? BLACKWELL: I admitted that I lied because I was afraid for my safety. That’s why I lied. I admitted that I lied, and it was wrong for me to lie, but I was scared for my safety. I mean, what was I supposed to do. I didn’t know this man. … STATE: All right. Well, hold on. You didn’t just tell Detective Demeester that [Lovelace] was there. You told Detective Demeester that [Lovelace] threw gas at you; right? BLACKWELL: Yeah. I did. TRIAL COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor – BLACKWELL: I did. TRIAL COUNSEL: He’s asked her this three times. COURT: I mean, I think we’re trying to get the story straight, so. … BLACKWELL: I did. Yeah. We had already got it 6 straight– COURT: -- attitude. 4 (Emphasis supplied.) The State then questioned Blackwell about why she claimed Lovelace had a cigarette in his mouth at the time, suggesting that she was trying to implicate Lovelace in the fire. Blackwell denied that she was trying to suggest that Love- lace started the fire. This exchange followed: STATE: Why did you have to bring [Lovelace] into it at all? BLACKWELL: Why I had to bring him into it at all? STATE: Why did you have to? BLACKWELL: It’s his home. I didn’t know nobody else. I don’t know none of these people but him. STATE: But why did you have to say that you saw anybody there? BLACKWELL: Because the fact is he – I don’t know nobody else but him. STATE: But you knew it wasn’t him. You knew he wasn’t there; right? BLACKWELL: Yeah. But the same reason why – same reason why he knew I didn’t. 4 The transcript indicates that there were “simultaneous speakers” during this exchange, which may account for the trial court’s response. 7 TRIAL COUNSEL: Your Honor, objection. COURT: Hang on. There’s an objection. TRIAL COUNSEL: Your Honor, she has answered this several times. She’s explained – COURT: I’m going to let him try to get to the bottom of this. BLACKWELL: Just like he knew I didn’t call nobody to shoot him, either. COURT: Do not talk when I’m talking. TRIAL COUNSEL: Okay, Your Honor. She’s ex- plained it several times, the same scenario, maybe not the same words, but she’s explained it several times now. COURT: Okay. Go ahead, [counsel]. (Emphasis supplied). OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) provides that “[i]t is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or inti- mate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” A “party who alleges a violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall make a timely objection and inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection, outside of the jury’s hearing and presence.” OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(2). “[F]ailure to make a timely objection to an alleged violation … shall preclude appel- late review, unless such violation constitutes plain error which affects substantive rights of the parties.” OCGA § 17-8-57(b). 8 While Blackwell did object to the prosecutor’s questions, on appeal she argues that the trial court made improper comments in response to those objections, which Blackwell did not object to at trial. Therefore, we review for plain error only. See Washington v. State, 320 Ga. 839, 848 (2025) (“Because Appellant did not ob- ject at trial that the court’s statement violated OCGA § 17-8- 57(a)(1), we review this claim only for plain error.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Perryman-Henderson v. State, 316 Ga. 626, 631 (2023) (“Because trial counsel did not object to the trial court’s comment at trial, this claim is reviewed for plain er- ror only.”). “To show plain error, [Blackwell] must show that the al- leged error (1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was obvious be- yond reasonable dispute, and (3) affected [her] substantial rights, which ordinarily means showing that it affected the outcome of the trial.” Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 104 (2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the defendant makes this show- ing, then this Court may exercise its discretion to remedy the er- ror only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). Blackwell argues that the trial court violated OCGA § 17- 8-57 by stating, “I think we’re trying to get the story straight” and “I’m going to let him try to get to the bottom of this” because these comments intimated the trial court’s opinion on her credibility, unnecessarily highlighting Blackwell’s prior untruthfulness and casting doubt on her other testimony at trial. Blackwell also con- tends that by intimating that “we’re trying to get this story straight” in response to the defense’s objection, the trial court aligned itself with the State and appeared to take a prosecutorial role, undercutting Blackwell’s credibility. However, Blackwell has not shown error, let alone plain 9 error, because neither statement violates OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1). As a general matter, “[t]he remarks of a judge explaining a reason for his ruling are neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence.” Sessions v. State, 304 Ga. 343, 348 (2018) (cita- tion omitted). See also Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 747–48 (2016) (“Furthermore, we have previously determined that remarks of a judge assigning a reason for his rulings are neither an expression of opinion nor comment on the evidence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). “OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) does not generally ex- tend to colloquies between the judge and counsel regarding the admissibility of evidence.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 273 (2022). The trial court made the first statement that “I think we’re trying to get the story straight” following an objection to question- ing about whether Blackwell had lied to Detective Demeester about Lovelace throwing the gas can at her, after she had already admitted to lying about Lovelace following her to the Chappell Road house. And the trial court made the second statement that “I’m going to let him try to get to the bottom of this” following an objection to questioning about Blackwell’s motives as to her changing stories. 5 Both statements appear to be explanations for overruling defense counsel’s asked-and-answered objections to al- low the prosecutor to continue trying to clarify why Blackwell said Lovelace was at the Chappell Road house that night. Because the trial court’s statements pertained to why it overruled defense counsel’s objections and were not comments on whether a fact had been proved or disproved, Blackwell has failed to show error, 5 Blackwell also argues that by commenting on Blackwell’s “attitude,” the trial court cast Blackwell in an even more negative light. However, the trial transcript does not support that the trial court was commenting on Blackwell’s attitude by saying the word “attitude” or that the trial court’s utterance of the word “attitude” pertained to any issue of fact or credibility at trial. 10 much less, plain error. See Moore, 315 Ga. at 272–74 (trial court’s comment that “I think it is hearsay. Let’s see if we can figure a way around it” concerned the admissibility of evidence and was not a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57); Sessions, 304 Ga. at 348 (trial court “merely gave the reasons for [its] evidentiary ruling that the disputed testimony was hearsay,” which was not a comment on “either the veracity of the witness or the guilt of the [defendant]” and was not a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57); Pyatt, 298 Ga. at 747– 48 (trial court’s comment that a witness’s statement “that the jury already heard about” was “critical evidence” pertained to the ad- missibility of evidence and was not a violation of the former but materially similar OCGA § 17-8-57) (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Ridley v. State, 290 Ga. 798, 800 (2012) (allow- ing the trial court to stop testimony and state “I think he’s specu- lating. He doesn’t know … what he’s talking about now is not something he’s an expert in any more than any of us are” to ex- plain its basis for an evidentiary ruling was not a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57). 2. Blackwell also argues that trial counsel was constitu- tionally ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s improper comments. Because trial counsel did not perform deficiently, this claim fails. To prevail on a constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Blackwell must show both deficient performance and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Blackwell “must show that trial counsel performed [her] duties in an objectively unrea- sonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Jackson v. State, 324 Ga. 497, 505 (2026) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide 11 range of reasonable professional assistance.” Washington, 320 Ga. at 851 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Overcoming that presumption requires an appellant to show no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to make a meritless objection.” Jackson, 324 Ga. at 505 (cleaned up). “If the defendant fails to establish either deficient perfor- mance or prejudice, this Court need not examine the other re- quirement.” Washington, 320 Ga. at 851. As explained above, given that the trial court’s statements did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57, trial counsel did not perform de- ficiently by failing to make a meritless objection. See Reynolds v. State, S26A1003, slip op. at 18–19 (Sep. 22, 2026) (concluding that the trial court did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57 so trial counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection); DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga. 283, 290–91 (2020) (same); Hightower v. State, 304 Ga. 755, 759 (2018) (same). For this reason, Blackwell’s ineffec- tive assistance of counsel claim fails. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. 12