Full Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION BROWN, C. J., MERCIER, P. J., and EPPS, J. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules September 14, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1612. STATE v. EAGLE. BROWN, Chief Judge. Marques Khalil Eagle pled guilty to various sexual crimes against a minor victim. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it deviated from the mandatory sentencing requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2. As more fully set forth below, we vacate Eagle’s sentence and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. “Whether or not to downwardly deviate under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the requirements under the statute are met. However, if the sentencing issue turns on the proper interpretation of OCGA § 17-10-6.2, it is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Carter, 378 Ga. App. 378, 378 (926 SE2d 71) (2026) (punctuation omitted). In December 2022, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment against Eagle alleging various sexual crimes against a minor. Count One of the indictment charged Eagle with aggravated child molestation (OCGA § 16-6-4(c)), Count Two charged Eagle with enticing a child for indecent purposes (OCGA § 16-6-5), Counts Three and Four charged Eagle with statutory rape (OCGA § 16-6-3(a)), and Count Five charged Eagle with child molestation (OCGA § 16-6-4(a)). The indictment alleges that Eagle was older than the age of 21 and the victim was under the age of 16 at the time of the offenses. The State’s proffer at the plea hearing, which Eagle does not dispute, showed that between September 2021 and September 2022, Eagle “engaged in a sexual relationship of sort with the ... victim in this case ... when the child was under the age of 16[.]” These acts included messaging the minor child on social media and through text in order to discuss and plan sexual acts as well as engaging in sexual acts, including intercourse, with the minor child. 2 On July 1, 2025, Eagle entered a guilty plea subject to an agreed-upon maximum sentence or “cap.” At the plea hearing, the State agreed to reduce Count One from aggravated child molestation to child molestation in exchange for recommending a “capped” aggregate sentence of thirty years, with five years to be served in custody. Eagle’s defense counsel then agreed that he would be “entering a plea as well to be 30 do 5.” At the July 11, 2025 sentencing hearing, the trial court reflected that this was “not a negotiated plea,” but instead was a “plea with a cap.” The State again recommended that Eagle be sentenced to a total sentence of “30 serve 5.” Defense counsel then changed its initial recommendation and instead requested “a probated sentence given the mitigating factors” that were described during the sentencing hearing. The trial court sentenced Eagle to the following concurrent terms: twenty years on Count One (child molestation); thirty years on Count Two (enticing a child for indecent purposes); twenty years on Count Three (statutory rape), twenty years on Count Four (statutory rape); and twenty years on Count Five (child molestation) for a total sentence of thirty years. The trial court ordered that “170-180 days” of the 3 sentence would be served in a probation detention center, with the remainder to be served on probation. After the oral pronouncement of the sentence, a colloquy ensued wherein the State argued that the sentence imposed was void because it did not comply with the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by OCGA § 17-10-6.2. The trial court stated that it would allow the parties to “brief it out,” but that it would “leave this as the sentence” and allow the parties to appeal if necessary. On July 11, 2025, the trial court entered an “Order to Deviate from Sentence Requirements.” The order stated that under OCGA § 17-10-6.2, “the minimum portion of the sentence may not be probated, absent an agreement by the State and Defense or certain findings by the Court.” The order made no finding that the parties had come to an agreement regarding sentencing and instead, it acknowledged that the State requested “a total of thirty years with five to be served in confinement” and that Eagle requested a “probated sentence.” The order then stated that the trial court intended to downwardly deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence required by OCGA § 17-10-6.2, and found that Eagle had no prior convictions, did not use a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime, did not cause intentional physical harm to the victim, and there were no relevant similar transactions. However, the trial 4 court’s order does not address whether the victim was transported or physically restrained during the commission of the offense. The State appeals from that order. 1. The State argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is void as a matter of law because the trial court improperly deviated from the mandatory sentencing requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(a) without making all of the written findings required to support such a deviation under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F). Eagle argues that the trial court was not required to make these findings because the parties had agreed to the sentence. As this issue turns on the proper interpretation of OCGA § 17-10-6.2, “it is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal.” State v. McKnight, 367 Ga. App. 633, 634 (887 SE2d 68) (2023). It is undisputed that the sentence imposed by the trial court fell under the mandatory minimum sentences set for the offenses of child molestation, enticing a child for indecent purposes, and statutory rape.1 However, a trial court retains the 1 Under OCGA § 16-6-4(b)(1), any person convicted of a first offense of child molestation “shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than five nor more than 20 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10- 6.2. Under OCGA § 16-6-5(b), any person convicted of enticing a child for indecent purposes “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 30 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10- 6.2. Under OCGA § 16-6-3(b), any person over the age of 21 that is convicted of statutory rape “shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 5 discretion under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements set out in subsection (b) under two scenarios. See State v. McCauley, 353 Ga. App. 94, 96 (834 SE2d 567) (2019) (“whether or not to downwardly deviate under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the requirements are met”). Specifically, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) provides: “[i]n the court’s discretion, the court may deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence as set forth in subsection (b) of this Code section, or any portion thereof, [1] when the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory minimum or [2] provided that” certain conditions set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) are met. (Emphasis added.) These conditions include that: (A) the defendant not have a prior conviction for a sexual offense; (B) the defendant did not use a deadly weapon or object during the commission of the crime; (C) the trial court has not found evidence of a relevant similar transaction; (D) the 20 years” and is also subject to the sentencing conditions contained in OCGA § 17-10- 6.2. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b), in turn, mandates a person convicted of a sexual offense be sentenced to a split sentence that includes the minimum term of imprisonment as specified for the offense and an additional probated sentence of at least a year. However, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) clarifies that “when a court imposes consecutive sentences for sexual offenses, the requirement that the court impose a probated sentence of at least one year shall only apply to the final consecutive sentence imposed.” 6 victim did not suffer intentional physical harm during the commission of the crime; (E) the offense did not involve transportation of the victim; and (F) the victim was not physically restrained during the commission of the offense. OCGA § 17-10- 6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F). If the trial court exercises sentencing discretion, it must make written findings supporting the deviation. OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(2); Hedden v. State, 288 Ga. 871, 874 (708 SE2d 287) (2011). (a) The parties’ agreement. Eagle argues that the trial court did not need to make the written findings set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) in order to exercise its discretion to downwardly deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence because the parties had agreed to a sentence below the mandatory minimum. Under the facts of this case, we disagree. In construing a set of statutory provisions, this Court looks at the “terms, giving words their plain and ordinary meaning, and where the plain language of the statute is clear and susceptible of only one reasonable construction, we must construe the statute according to its terms.” Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 382(2) (punctuation omitted). Further, when “construing language in any one part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent 7 from the statute as a whole.” Tew v. State, 320 Ga. App. 127, 129 (739 SE2d 423) (2013) (punctuation omitted). As noted above, OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c) does not require a trial court to make the findings of fact set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) if “the prosecuting attorney and the defendant have agreed to a sentence that is below such mandatory minimum[.]” OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1).2 The use of the indefinite article “a” before the word “sentence” means that the phrase refers to a single, particular sentence and not a range of sentence possibilities. See Pavlov v. State, 362 Ga. App. 831, 836(1)(b) (870 SE2d 449) (2022) (finding that each distinct act of sodomy constitutes a unit of prosecution for the crime of aggravated child molestation when the relevant statute stated that “an offense of child molestation which act ... involves an act of sodomy” and the phrase “an act” referred “unambiguously to a single act”) (citation modified). See also McFadden v. United States, 576 US 186, 191(11)(A) (135 SCt 2298, 192 LE2d 260) (2015) (“When used as an indefinite article, ‘a’ means ‘some 2 See Roberts v. State, 376 Ga. App. 816, 826(3) (921 SE2d 71) (2025) (“[T]he plain language of [OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)] provides that a trial court may deviate from the mandatory minimum period of incarceration either upon the consent of both parties or upon the trial court’s own motion, provided that the requisite findings set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (F) are made by the trial court.”) (emphasis in original). 8 undetermined or unspecified particular[.]’”); Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC, 997 F.3d 1356, 1362 (III) (11th Cir.) (2021) (concluding that the “use of the indefinite article ‘a’ before the word ‘farm’” means that the phrase “work performed ... on a farm” refers to a single farm). Thus, the plain language of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(a)(1) refers to an agreement to a particular sentence and not to a possible range of sentences to be imposed by the trial court. Here, the record in this case shows that Eagle and the prosecuting attorney agreed to reduce the aggravated child molestation count to child molestation as part of a plea deal where they agreed to a “capped” aggregate sentence as to all five counts. However, the parties did not come to an agreement on the specific sentence to be rendered on each count. Indeed, although Eagle initially agreed at the plea hearing to a plea “capped” at thirty years with five to serve, it is clear that he had changed his request by the date of the sentencing hearing. At sentencing, Eagle sought a sentence with no time spent in custody. The fact that the parties initially agreed that the trial court should impose a “capped” sentence of a certain range does not show that they have agreed to a specific “sentence that is below such mandatory minimum” as contemplated by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1). 9 Furthermore, this Court has held that an agreement as to an aggregate sentence for a multi-count indictment does not constitute such an agreement “to a sentence that is below ... mandatory minimum” as contemplated by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1). Mejia v. State, 366 Ga. App. 837, 838–39(b) (884 SE2d 423) (2023) (remanding for resentencing on an incest charge because although OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) “authorized the trial court, with the agreement of [the defendant] and the prosecuting attorney, to deviate from the split-sentencing requirement [of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b)], the record contains no evidence that the parties negotiated anything beyond the aggregate sentence to be served”). Here, to the extent that it can be said that the parties reached any agreement about the sentence to be imposed, such agreement was only to a “capped” aggregate total sentence as to all five counts of the indictment and did not constitute an agreement as to the specific sentences to be imposed for each count. As noted above, the trial court in this case did not follow either party’s recommendation when sentencing Eagle. Instead, it sentenced Eagle to a much shorter period of incarceration than recommended by the State.3 3 As a result of this holding, we conclude that Eagle’s argument that the State lacked jurisdiction to bring this appeal is without merit. See OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(2) (authorizing the State to file an appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 from the trial court’s order deviating from the mandatory minimum sentence “unless the sentence 10 (b) The sufficiency of the trial court’s order. Based upon the above, we conclude that the trial court was required to make the written specific findings required by OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F) in order to issue a downward deviation from the minimum mandatory periods of confinement established for sexual offenses. However, as noted by the State, although the trial court made some of these written findings in its “Order to Deviate from Sentence Requirements,” it failed to make specific findings regarding subsections (E) and (F). See Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 382(1) (“Under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1), all of the conditions must be met in order for the trial court to deviate from the mandatory sentencing requirements absent an agreement between the State and the defendant.”) (emphasis supplied). These subsections required the trial court to make findings that “the offense did not involve the transportation of the victim” and that the “victim was not physically restrained during the commission of the offense.” OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(E)-(F). Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court to make these determinations in the first instance and to enter a new sentence that complies with the imposed was pursuant to an agreement by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant”). See also OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(10) (State may appeal “[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment issued pursuant to subsection (c) of Code Section 17-10-6.2”); Carter, 378 Ga. App. at 380–81(1). 11 requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2. See Mejia, 366 Ga. App. at 839(b) (vacating trial court’s sentence that deviated from mandatory minimums for failure to comply with requirements of OCGA § 17-10-6.2 and remanding for imposition of a compliant sentence). 2. The State next argues that, based upon the facts presented during the plea hearing and sentencing hearing, the trial court’s downward deviation cannot be sustained. However, the question of whether the State met its burden of showing that there was an absence of facts from which the trial court could grant a downward deviation is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court. See, e. g., Maddox v. State, 374 Ga. App. 736, 739 (913 SE2d 856) (2025) (State bears the burden to present evidence of the absence of any statutory factor that would prohibit a downward deviation under OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)). Judgment vacated and case remanded. Mercier, P.J. and Epps, J. concur. 12