Full Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules September 17, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0944. SCOTT v. THE STATE. DILLARD, Presiding Judge. Christopher Scott appeals his convictions for trafficking cocaine, sale of cocaine (two counts), and possessing illegal substances within 1,000 feet of a housing project. More precisely, Scott argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and that there was insufficient corroboration to support the admission of his accomplice’s pre-trial statements. For the following reasons, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict,1 the record shows that in 2021, the Winder Police Department (“WPD”) and Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) conducted a joint undercover operation targeting an open-air 1 See, e.g., Roundtree v. State, 358 Ga. App. 140, 141 (854 SE2d 340) (2021). drug market2 in Barrow County. During the operation, Rhett Moore—an undercover GBI special agent—became familiar with Robert Harvey—who was one of the first individuals Moore purchased drugs from. According to Moore, Harvey became “probably the most regular subject [he] would purchase drugs from, mostly powder cocaine.” Harvey was a “street level dealer” who engaged in smaller drug transactions, and law enforcement developed a relationship with him in an attempt to identify his supplier. On October 27, 2021, Agent Moore negotiated a deal with Harvey to purchase two ounces of cocaine for $3,000. The transaction occurred on October 29 between Harvey, Moore, and Robert Cunningham—another undercover GBI special agent. During the controlled buy, other law-enforcement officers provided “cover and surveillance” in the area, and their vehicles were equipped with audio and video recorders. And because of the amount of money involved, Harvey instructed the GBI agents to wait in an Aldi’s parking lot near his supplier’s neighborhood so they “could watch him walk to wherever it was he was going to get the drugs ... .” 2 At trial, a GBI agent explained that an open air drug market is “basically ... a part of town or a city where drugs are sold kind of freely on the street, like street corner deals, deals out of parking lots, or gas stations, convenience stores, things like that.” 2 While speaking to Harvey at the Aldi, Agent Cunningham spied a burgundy Dodge Challenger with gold rims turn onto Marion Lay Street. The driver was later identified as Scott. In fact, another GBI agent (Cameron Corradi) testified that he had seen Scott driving the car “often.” Law enforcement eventually discovered that the Dodge Challenger was registered to Precious Fuller-Lewis at 48 Marion Street in Winder, Georgia, who was “romantically involved” with Scott. Back to the controlled buy. After giving Harvey money for the cocaine, GBI agents watched him walk down Marion Lay Street and into the neighborhood—but at some point, they lost sight of him. Later on, the Special Agent in Charge (Klay Kilcrease) watched the Dodge Challenger leave the area, drive onto Highway 316 and into Gwinnett County. But the agent lost track of the vehicle after it reached the Indian Trail exit—which Kilcrease testified was in the Lawrenceville area. Ultimately, the GBI agents waited over two hours for Harvey to return with the drugs. Even so, they stayed in contact with him via text and phone calls. And once Harvey finally arrived around 6:00 p.m, he referred to his supplier as “Chris” and told the agents that Chris had to go to Lawrenceville to get the cocaine. Harvey then gave the drugs to Agent Cunningham, and the transaction ended. 3 A few days later, on November 1, 2021, Agent Moore began “brokering another deal” with Harvey for November 4. Moore’s understanding was that Harvey was “running his negotiations by his supplier.” And ultimately, Harvey agreed to sell Agent Moore 34 grams of cocaine for $2,000. Then, on November 4, Agents Moore and Cunningham met with Harvey at the same Aldi where they made the October 29 drug buy. When Harvey arrived, he did not have the cocaine with him, but Agent Cunningham saw him make a phone call to a contact saved as “Chris” in his phone.3 A later extraction of Harvey’s phone confirmed that the contact saved as “Chris” in his phone was Scott, and Scott was the only contact in Harvey’s phone saved as Chris or anything similar. During the agents’ conversation with Harvey in the parking lot, they “discussed the Dodge Challenger” from the first drug deal, and Harvey “made a statement about that being the individual he was getting the cocaine from.” And as with the first controlled buy, Harvey left the agents waiting at the Aldi and walked down Marion Lay Street until he was out of sight. Once again, Harvey returned with the cocaine. 3 Although Agent Cunningham could not hear both sides of the conversation, he testified that he could see the phone’s screen. 4 At some point, GBI agents learned that Scott lived at 48 Marion Lay, Apartment 37B; and by the time of the November 4 buy, law enforcement was focused on Scott and trying to learn more about him. Indeed, as of November 4, Agent Corradi and another GBI agent (David Kissinger) placed Scott’s residence under surveillance. And at 6:03 p.m., the agents observed Scott arrive at his residence, briefly interact with a third party by the door, and then go inside. A few minutes later, Agent Kissinger saw Harvey enter Scott’s residence, remain inside for about five minutes, and then walk back in the direction of the Aldi. On November, 17, 2021, Scott was arrested. He was later charged, via indictment, with one count of trafficking in cocaine, two counts of selling cocaine, and two counts of having illegal substances within 1,000 feet of a housing project.4 After a jury trial, the State nolle prossed one of the counts of having illegal substances within 1,000 feet of a housing project; but Scott was convicted of all other charged offenses. Scott then moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal follows. 4 Harvey and Scott were charged with the same offenses in a joint indictment; but it appears that, before trial, Harvey pleaded guilty to one count of trafficking cocaine. 5 1. Scott first argues the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce “other-acts evidence” that purportedly showed he previously offered to sell drugs to “unrelated and unknown third parties.” We disagree. At trial, the court below allowed the State to present messages that Scott sent from his phone to others unrelated to this case through Facebook Messenger, Snapchat, and text message between February 16, 2021, and May 28, 2021. And agent Corradi testified that—based on his experience working as a GBI agent at the Appalachian Regional Drug Enforcement Office (“ARDEO”)5 and as an officer with the WPD—the “slang terms” Scott used in those messages related to the sale of cocaine. Indeed, Corradi stated that he was familiar with the meaning of those terms “[t]hrough training, ... experience in drug investigations, [including] interactions with confidential informants, other agents, other investigators involv[ed] [in] drug investigations, interviews with individuals who may be drug dealers, and/or drug users and drug customers.” Corradi also testified that drug dealers use these slang terms because “it is 5 The ARDEO primarily focuses on “drug investigations and attempting to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations within [its] area of operation,” which includes approximately 30 to 40 counties. Before joining the GBI, Agent Corradi worked as a law-enforcement officer for the WPD, and he focused on drug, gang, and fugitive investigations. And during that time, Corradi became familiar with the “drug trade” in Winder, and he interacted with the community in that area. 6 part of the drug culture,” and disguises conversations about drug transactions from law enforcement. More precisely, Agent Corradi testified that some slang terms for cocaine are “soft, powder, coke, [and] snow.” And as to some of the prior bad acts evidence admitted at trial,6 Corradi stated that Scott sent the following message to someone on April 13, 2021: “A1 soft on deck. Help me get off this soft next time. I reupholster on fuck with Jay so we both get money together.” Indeed, as to this message, Corradi noted that “on deck” typically refers to drugs being in stock. Another message Scott sent on March 11, 2021, stated “soft on deck, unk, and gas. Be in Winder in 30 minutes.” Then, on May 28, 2021, Scott sent a message advising “Powder on deck. Good shit.” Scott argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these messages and testimony under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (“Rule 404(b)”), which provides, among other things, that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not 6 Because it is unnecessary for the resolution of this appeal, we do not address every message admitted at trial. 7 limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.7 Even so, evidence offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) may still be excluded under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”8 To properly weigh the considerations of these two evidentiary rules and evaluate the admissibility of so-called “other acts” evidence,9 the Supreme 7 (Emphasis added). 8 OCGA § 24-4-403. Accord Staley v. State, 375 Ga. App. 339, 346(2) (916 SE2d 168) (2025). 9 See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69(2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (“Many provisions of the new Evidence Code were borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence, and when we consider the meaning of these provisions, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit. Rule 404(b) is one such provision, and so, when we have considered the meaning of Rule 404(b), we consistently have looked for guidance in the decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).” (citations omitted)); State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 158(1) (773 SE2d 170) (2015) (noting that Georgia courts have adopted the three-part test used by the Eleventh Circuit in evaluating other-acts evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, upon which Georgia’s new Evidence Code is modeled). See also Ronald L. Carlson and Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence, p. 137 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that “[t]he adoption of OCGA § 24-4-404(b) provides Georgia with a statutory framework for the admission of other acts evidence 8 Court of Georgia has adopted a three-part test: “(1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2) the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; [and] (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act.”10 Finally, we review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of other crimes for “a clear abuse of discretion.”11 Here, at the outset of trial, Scott objected to the admission of messages he sent to others not involved in this case, as well as Agent Corradi’s testimony about the slang terms used in those messages. The trial court did not initially rule on the objection, but when Scott renewed it during trial, the court found the messages were admissible under Rule 404(b). And after doing so, the court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury: [L]adies and gentlemen, it’s appropriate at this time for me to give you a special instruction. So if you will pay attention here. Sometimes evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. You are about to hear evidence that the Defendant allegedly committed other acts apart from the ones in the indictment for which he is standing trial before you. Before you can for non-character purposes”). 10 Staley, 375 Ga. App. at 346–47(2) (punctuation omitted). Accord Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656(3) (769 SE2d 892) (2015). 11 Staley, 375 Ga. App. at 347(2) (punctuation omitted). 9 consider using these other acts for any purpose whatsoever, you must first determine whether it is more likely than not that the Defendant committed these other acts. If you determine that the Defendant committed these other acts, those acts may be admitted for specific limited purposes. In this instance, those acts may be considered for the sole purpose of establishing the Defendant’s intent to commit the crimes charged as alleged in this indictment. Whether this evidence illustrates such matters is solely for you, the jury, to determine, but you are not to consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may not infer from such evidence that the Defendant is of a character that [he] would commit such crimes. The Defendant is on trial for the offenses charged in this bill of indictment only and not for any other acts, even though those acts may incidentally be criminal. By giving this instruction, the Court in no way suggests to you that the Defendant has or has not committed any other acts, nor whether such acts, if committed, prove anything. This is a matter solely for your determination. The court then confirmed that Scott had no objections to the limiting instruction. Scott concedes that the State satisfied the first element of the Rule 404(b) test—i.e., the extrinsic evidence must be relevant to an issue other than character—because the evidence was relevant to prove his intent to commit the instant crimes. Indeed, he acknowledges that the intent apparent in the messages at issue—i.e., 10 to “monetize the possession of cocaine through commercial sale and distribution”—is “similar [to] or the same [as] the intent the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial ... .” As to the second element of the Rule 404(b) (i.e., compliance with Rule 403), we reiterate that—under Rule 403—other-acts evidence may be excluded if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” This is because the primary function of Rule 403 is to “exclude matters of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”12 Significantly, a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is “an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.”13 Finally, the determination of whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 “lies soundly within the discretion of the trial court and calls for a common sense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, including 12 Staley, 375 Ga. App. at 348(2) (punctuation omitted). Accord McAllister v. State, 351 Ga. App. 76, 81(1) (830 SE2d 443) (2019). 13 Staley, 375 Ga. App. at 348(2) (punctuation omitted). Accord Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472, 480(4) (819 SE2d 468) (2018). 11 prosecutorial need, overall similarity between the extrinsic act and the charged offense, as well as temporal remoteness.”14 As to the prosecutorial need for the other-acts evidence, Scott agrees that the State’s case was “weak” because it relied on the testimony of an accomplice (Harvey), who “disavowed and recanted” the pre-trial statements he made to police incriminating Scott. But Harvey’s refusal to cooperate at trial and his inconsistent statements before and during trial significantly increased the State’s need for other-acts evidence to prove Scott’s intent to engage in trafficking cocaine.15 So, while Scott goes on to discuss other incriminating evidence presented at trial (albeit without providing citations to the record),16 the State’s evidence was entirely circumstantial—as none of the witnesses 14 Mulkey v. State, 366 Ga. App. 427, 431(1) (883 SE2d 173) (2023) (punctuation omitted). Accord Benning v. State, 344 Ga. App. 397, 402 (810 SE2d 310) (2018). 15 During his brief testimony at trial, Harvey was hostile to the State, refusing to be sworn in, repeatedly saying that he was not testifying against Scott, and telling the State he would not be answering any of its questions. He admitted pleading guilty to trafficking cocaine, but stated many times that he did not remember having any involvement with Scott or having spoken with law enforcement about Scott being his supplier. 16 As we have explained, “[i]t is not the function of this [C]ourt to cull the record on behalf of a party in search of instances of error.” Fleming v. Advanced Stores Co., 301 Ga. App. 734, 735 (688 SE2d 414) (2009) (punctuation omitted). 12 actually observed Scott supply drugs to Harvey.17 Given the foregoing, we are persuaded that the State’s need to present the other-acts evidence to establish Scott’s intent to commit his drug-related offenses was significant. As for the overall similarity of the prior acts and instant offenses, Scott admits they are “similar or the same.” Indeed, all of the other-acts evidence involved trafficking cocaine. And as to temporal remoteness, all of the relevant messages occurred between February 16, 2021 and May 28, 2021—with the charged offenses occurring only a few months later in October and November 2021. Significantly, we have held that prior acts occurring much more remote from a charged offense weighed in favor of admitting such evidence under Rule 403.18 As a result, we conclude the temporal proximity between the 17 See Moon v. State, 312 Ga. 31, 56(3)(d) (860 SE2d 519) (2021) (“[T]he prosecutorial need for the evidence [of prior crimes] was significant. Except for the statement of the jailhouse informant, ... the evidence against [the defendant] was entirely circumstantial); McMillan v. State, 357 Ga. App. 344, 350(1)(b) (850 SE2d 779) (2020) (“The prosecutorial need for the other acts evidence was strong because much of the evidence against [the defendant] was circumstantial in nature.”). 18 See Harris v. State, 358 Ga. App. 204, 208(4) (854 SE2d 374) (2021) (“The fact that the prior incident took place more than twenty years earlier does not render the evidence inadmissible [under Rule 403].”); Sturgis v. State, 356 Ga. App. 219, 220–22 (842 SE2d 82) (2020) (holding that, although the prior child-molestation offenses at issue occurred between 22 and 10 years before trial, the offenses were similar enough to the instant offense such that they could aid the jury in determining whether the defendant committed); Boyd v. State, 351 Ga. App. 469, 473(3) (829 SE2d 13 prior bad acts and the instant crimes—as well as overall similarity between them—also weigh in favor of admitting the evidence under Rule 403. As to the third requirement of the Rule 403 analysis (i.e., that there is sufficient evidence the defendant committed the prior bad acts), the messages were extracted from Scott’s phone, and he does not dispute that the State presented sufficient evidence he sent them. So, Scott has abandoned any argument in this regard.19 Finally, the trial court mitigated any undue prejudice from the challenged evidence by giving a detailed jury instruction, which emphasized the limited purpose for which the messages were to be considered.20 Under these circumstances, the probative value of the prior-acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and so the evidence did not 163) (2019) (“The fact that the other acts were remote in time—between 16 and 22 years before—did not demand a different ruling by the trial court. There is no bright-line rule as to how old is too old ... .”). 19 See Seals v. State, 350 Ga. App. 787, 789(1) (830 SE2d 315) (2019) (holding that a claim of error was abandoned when the only legal authority cited by the appellant was the standard for considering the issue). 20 See Jernigan v. State, 357 Ga. App. 415, 426(2)(a)(ii) (848 SE2d 707) (2020); (“[T]he trial court mitigated any risk of unfair prejudice by giving a limiting instruction ... .”); Lofland v. State, 357 Ga. App. 92, 97(1)(a) (850 SE2d 175) (2020) (finding that the prejudicial impact of the admission of evidence was mitigated by a limiting instruction); Moton v. State, 351 Ga. App. 789, 793–94 (833 SE2d 171) (2019) (noting that the risk of unfair prejudice was reduced by the trial court’s limiting instruction). 14 violate Rule 403. In sum, because all three factors in the 404(b) analysis favor admission, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence. 2. Scott also contends that “apart from the improperly admitted other-acts evidence, insufficient evidence corroborated ... Harvey’s prior statement inculpating [him].”21 Again, we disagree. OCGA § 24-14-8 provides as follows: The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact. However, in certain cases, including prosecutions for treason, prosecutions for perjury, and felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness, except in prosecutions for treason.22 So, in felony cases (such as this one) an accomplice’s testimony “must be corroborated by other evidence.”23 And importantly, the necessary corroboration may consist 21 As mentioned above, Harvey was uncooperative at trial, stating several times that Scott had nothing to do with his drug transactions. But the jury viewed a video of Harvey’s interview with law enforcement in which he conceded that Scott supplied him with the drugs. 22 (Emphasis added). 23 MacMillan v. State, 372 Ga. App. 796, 803(2) (906 SE2d 876) (2024). See Montanez v. State, 311 Ga. 843, 848(1)(b) (860 SE2d 551) (2021) (“[I]n felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice to the crimes, that witness’s testimony alone 15 “entirely of circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant’s conduct before and after the crime was committed may give rise to an inference that he participated in the crime.”24 In fact, sufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony “requires only slight evidence.”25 The corroborating evidence, then, “need not be sufficient in and of itself to warrant a conviction, so long as it is independent of the accomplice’s testimony and directly connects the defendant to the crime or leads to the inference of guilt.”26 Lastly, and significantly, the sufficiency of the corroboration is “a matter for the jury to decide.”27 Here, we have already determined that—contrary to Harvey’s contention—the other-acts evidence of the incriminating text messages found on his phone—along with is insufficient to support a defendant’s convictions.”). 24 MacMillan, 372 Ga. App. at 803(2) (punctuation omitted). Accord McCain v. State, 300 Ga. 400, 401 (794 SE2d 58) (2016). 25 MacMillan, 372 Ga. App. at 803(2) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis added). See McCain, 300 Ga. at 401 (explaining as to the accomplice-corroboration requirement, “it is well established that slight evidence of corroboration is all that is needed”). 26 MacMillan, 372 Ga. App. at 803–04(2) (punctuation omitted). Accord Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582, 588(2)(a) (820 SE2d 679) (2018). 27 MacMillan, 372 Ga. App. at 804(2) (punctuation omitted). 16 Officer Corradi’s testimony about their content—were admissible at trial. Additionally, testimony by several law-enforcement officers involved in the drug transactions with Harvey provided extensive circumstantial evidence that Scott was Harvey’s supplier. Indeed, both times GBI agents purchased drugs from Harvey, he instructed them to wait near his supplier’s residence because of the amount of money involved. And each time, Harvey walked into Scott’s neighborhood toward his home. Harvey also repeatedly referred to his supplier as “Chris,” he called a contact saved in his phone as Chris (when agents believed he was speaking with his supplier), and there were no other contacts in Scott’s phone saved as Chris or any variation of that name. And a later extraction of Harvey’s phone confirmed that the number associated with the contact saved as Chris belonged to Scott. Moreover, the first time Harvey sold drugs to the agents, Scott’s vehicle was seen leaving his neighborhood and heading in the direction of Lawrenceville; and Harvey later told agents that his supplier had to go to Lawrenceville to pick up the drugs. Harvey also informed officers that the person driving the burgundy Dodge Challenger—who law enforcement determined to be Scott—was the person selling him the cocaine. Also, around the time of the November 4 transaction, two GBI agents saw Harvey enter Scott’s residence, remain inside for about five minutes, and then walk back in the 17 direction of the Aldi where he provided the cocaine to the agents. Put simply, there was overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented at trial to corroborate Harvey’s pre-trial statement to law enforcement that Scott supplied him with cocaine. And because only slight evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony is required, there was more than sufficient evidence to corroborate Harvey’s statement.28 For these reasons, we affirm Harvey’s convictions. Judgment affirmed. Gobeil and Pipkin, JJ., concur. 28 See Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 21(1) (679 SE2d 348) (2009) (“[A]ccomplice’s statements were sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of the case agent that a loaded pistol was found at [the defendant’s] feet and that the black bag containing the currency used in the drug transaction was found within arms’ reach of [defendant].”); Reeves v. State, 244 Ga. App. 15, 18(1)(c) (534 SE2d 179) (2000) (holding that sufficient evidence corroborated accomplice’s testimony when accomplice was not the only witness placing the defendant at the scene where he had a box of methamphetamine, the accomplice brought an investigating officer to the defendant’s home and claimed he was the supplier, there was a brief interval of time between the accomplice receiving the methamphetamine from the defendant and when he delivered it to the investigator); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 421, 421(1) (265 SE2d 341) (1980) (“There was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony in the testimony of a police officer who saw defendant throw a white cloth on the ground from which the controlled substance was later taken by a police undercover agent when the cloth was pointed out by the accomplice.”). 18