Full Opinion

SECOND DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules September 17, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1492. LEAMON v. THE STATE. DAVIS, Judge. A Catoosa County jury found Samantha Leamon guilty of possession of fentanyl and possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute. Leamon appeals from the trial court’s order denying her motion for new trial, arguing that (1) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by presenting bad character evidence and by failing to file a general demurrer; and (2) the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Leamon’s motion for new trial. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts,1 the evidence presented at trial shows the following. On March 25, 2024, Leamon was sentenced and placed on probation for offenses unrelated to this case. According to Officer Alex Barbee of the Georgia Department of Community Supervision, when Leamon appeared in court on March 25, 2024 to be sentenced for the unrelated offenses, an unknown individual approached another officer at the courthouse and told them that Leamon appeared to be “high.” Law enforcement screened Leamon for drugs, she tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl, and she tested positive again for the same substances on April 2, 2024. On April 11, 2024, Officer Barbee, Agent Stephen Pendergrass of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”), and other officers went to Leamon’s home in Rossville, Georgia, to conduct a compliance check. Leamon and two men were inside the home when the officers arrived. One of the males had methamphetamine and fentanyl in his possession, and the other male, who was staying at Leamon’s home, had methamphetamine inside his bedroom. Agent Pendergrass searched the master bedroom and master bathroom and found a zippered “change purse” that contained 1 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 a white powder, a purple “rock type” substance, which he believed to be fentanyl, and an identification card bearing Leamon’s name.2 Agent Pendergrass also found a digital scale next to the purse which had white residue. He testified that scales are typically used by dealers to weigh drugs to make sure they are receiving or selling the correct amount of drugs. He further testified that the items weighed more than four grams, which was more than what individuals normally use for personal use, which is .1 grams. The State also presented other acts evidence that on May 6, 2021, a search warrant was executed on Leamon’s home, and an officer found a purse inside the master bedroom that contained fentanyl and a large amount of currency.3 Leamon was indicted on one count each of possession with fentanyl (OCGA § 16-13-30(a)) and possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13- 30(b)). The jury found Leamon guilty of both offenses, and the trial court imposed a 30-year sentence, with the first 10 years to be served in confinement and the 2 Photographs of the items were entered into evidence, and a forensic chemist from the GBI confirmed that the items were fentanyl. 3 The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction before the presentation of the other acts evidence. 3 remainder to be served on probation.4 Leamon filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal followed. 1. First, Leamon argues that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by presenting bad character evidence at trial and by failing to file a general demurrer. We conclude that Leamon has failed to show that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. “A claim for ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact, and we accept the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous but independently apply the law to those facts.” Slaughter v. State, 366 Ga. App. 803, 805 (884 SE2d 407) (2023) (quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, [Leamon] must prove both that [her] lawyer’s performance was deficient and that [s]he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. To prove that [her] lawyer’s performance was deficient, [Leamon] must show that the lawyer performed his duties at trial in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms. 4 The trial court merged the possession of fentanyl conviction into the possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute offense for sentencing purposes. 4 Id. (quotation marks omitted). Critically, our Supreme Court has been clear that [p]roving deficient performance is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [Leamon] bears the burden of overcoming this presumption. To carry this burden, [s]he must show that no reasonable lawyer would have done what [her] lawyer did, or would have failed to do what [her] lawyer did not. In particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have followed such a course. State v. Riley, 321 Ga. 323, 327–28 (913 SE2d 553) (2025). And to prove that [s]he was prejudiced by [her] lawyer’s deficient performance, [Leamon] must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.... The defendant bears the burden of proof of both prongs of an ineffective assistance claim, and if [s]he fails to establish either prong, the reviewing court need not examine the other. Slaughter, 366 Ga. App. at 805. “In all, the burden of proving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a heavy one.” Fraser v. State, 322 Ga. 544, 547(2) (920 SE2d 5 644) (2025). With these guiding principles in mind, we turn to Leamon’s ineffectiveness claims. (a) Bad character evidence. Leamon first argues that her trial counsel was ineffective by presenting evidence of her bad character. Specifically, she argues that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to the State presenting evidence of her two prior positive drug screens and that an unknown individual told an officer that she appeared to be “high” when she attended court for sentencing for the unrelated offenses; and (2) portraying her to the jury as a drug user rather than a drug dealer. Leamon, however, cannot show that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this regard. At the outset, we note that “[d]eciding what evidence to present or forego in defending a client charged with a crime is a matter of strategy and tactics, and such decisions do not amount to deficient performance unless they are so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made them under similar circumstances.” Bozzie v. State, 302 Ga. 704, 712(4)(e) (808 SE2d 671) (2017). In this same vein, “[a]n attorney’s decision about which defense to present is [also] a question of trial strategy.” Adams v. State, 323 Ga. 279, 284(1)(b) (925 SE2d 144) (2026). 6 Here, at the hearing on Leamon’s motion for new trial, Leamon’s trial counsel testified that he did not believe Leamon would be acquitted of the possession of fentanyl charge, but he “thought the State overcharged [Leamon] by doing possession with intent.” He testified that his “strategy was to defeat the possession with intent [charge] by showing that there was not enough evidence to show intent to distribute[,]” and that his theory was to show that Leamon was a drug user rather than a drug dealer. He emphasized that “[t]he defense was Ms. Leamon has a drug problem. She’s a drug user. The drugs that they found that day were not for her to distribute. My focus was beating the charge of possession with intent to distribute, not the possession charge.” Regarding the two positive drug screens and the testimony about the unknown individual at the courthouse, he testified that he “wanted the fact that [Leamon] used drugs to come in[,]” and that he questioned Officer Barbee about that evidence to show bias and to preserve the record for appellate review regarding the admissibility of delinquency reports. He further explained that because the State was going to present the other acts evidence regarding the search of Leamon’s home in 2021, “[he] did not have a problem with saying that [Leamon] used a lot of drugs[.]” 7 We conclude that Leamon cannot show that her trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the evidence and by presenting evidence that she used drugs. Trial counsel’s strategy of allowing the evidence to be presented to portray her as a mere drug user to defeat the possession of fentanyl with the intent to distribute was not unreasonable, such that no competent attorney would have done the same. See Fraser, 322 Ga. at 552–53(2)(b) (trial counsel’s decision to present evidence of the defendant’s juvenile criminal history was “an objectively reasonable strategic decision”); McNair v. State, 296 Ga. 181, 183–84(2)(b) (766 SE2d 45) (2014) (trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to witness’ testimony because the testimony supported trial counsel’s theory for the case); State v. Reynolds, 332 Ga. App. 818, 823 (775 SE2d 187) (2015) (trial counsel’s strategy to elicit testimony about the defendant’s drug-related offenses to exculpate him from the more serious charges was not “so unreasonable that no competent attorney would have pursued it under similar circumstances”). But even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the evidence and by presenting evidence that she used drugs, Leamon cannot show that she suffered any prejudice. Officer Barbee testified that his department supervises felony offenders 8 and that Leamon was one of the individuals that was being supervised. Thus, through this testimony, the jury learned that Leamon was a felony offender and was on probation. Furthermore, the State presented other acts evidence that a search warrant was executed on Leamon’s home in 2021 and that fentanyl and a large amount of currency were found inside of a purse in her master bedroom. Because the challenged evidence above was cumulative of other evidence at trial that showed Leamon’s bad character, Leamon cannot show a reasonable probability that the outcome at trial would have been different, and thus her ineffectiveness claim fails. See Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772, 798(7)(c) (896 SE2d 549) (2023) (defendant could not show prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to object to bad character evidence based on witness’ testimony that the defendant was a bad influence where the evidence was cumulative of other bad character evidence that was presented at trial). (b) General Demurrer. Leamon further argues that her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to file a general demurrer because the indictment failed to state that the crimes were committed in Catoosa County. We again conclude that Leamon cannot show that her trial counsel was ineffective. 9 “A general demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the substance of an indictment.” Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 765(5)(c) (922 SE2d 56) (2025). And “[a] failure to allege venue goes to the merits and renders an indictment or accusation subject to a general demurrer.” Houston v. State, 267 Ga. App. 315, 315 (599 SE2d 278) (2004) (citation modified). The general demurrer must be granted if the indictment fails to either (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish a violation of a criminal statute. Put another way, a general demurrer will be granted if the defendant can admit each and every fact alleged in the indictment and still be innocent of any crime. Because granting a general demurrer results in dismissal of the charges, an attorney who fails to file a meritorious general demurrer may be held constitutionally ineffective. Moss, 322 Ga. at 765(5)(c) (citation modified). As to allegations of a defective indictment because of venue, it is well settled that “[v]enue is a jurisdictional fact that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in every criminal case[,]” and that “at the outset of a criminal case—well before a case may be tried—the State must allege venue in the indictment.” Lewis v. State, 322 Ga. 134, 137(3) (918 SE2d 44) (2025). “Indeed, it has long been the standard in Georgia that the State, in a criminal case, 10 must allege that the crime was committed in the county in which such indictment or accusation was proceeding—and that the failure to do so would make the indictment or accusation demurrable.” Id. (citation modified). Nevertheless, it is equally well settled that venue is properly alleged in an indictment where the county in which the crime was committed is stated at the top of the indictment, and the body of the indictment states that the offenses were committed “in the county aforesaid.” Yates v. State, 278 Ga. App. 422, 424 (629 SE2d 67) (2006).5 Here, the indictment states “Catoosa County” at the top of each page of the indictment. Count 1 of the indictment alleges that Leamon committed the offense of possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute “in the [s]tate and [c]ounty aforesaid.” Similarly, Count 2 of the indictment states that Leamon committed the offense of possession of fentanyl “in the [s]tate and [c]ounty aforesaid.” Thus, because Catoosa 5 Although we held in Yates that the accusation in that case is defective for failure to allege venue, we note that the Yates Court distinguished its holding in that case from other cases which challenged the sufficiency of an indictment based on the failure to state the venue where the crimes occurred. Yates, 278 Ga. App. at 424. Specifically, the Yates Court determined that the accusation in that case was insufficient because although the county was stated at the top of the page of the accusation, the body of the offense did not contain the phrase “in the county aforesaid” to incorporate the county that was listed at the top of the page. Id. Thus, to the extent that Leamon relies upon Yates to support her claim that the indictment in this case defective, her reliance is misplaced. 11 County is listed at the top of each page of the indictment, and the body of the indictment for each of the offenses alleges that Leamon committed the crimes “in the [s]tate and [c]ounty aforesaid,” the indictment in this case was not defective, and thus Leamon cannot show that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to file a general demurrer. See Leverette v. State, 291 Ga. 834, 836(3) (732 SE2d 255) (2012) (indictment which alleged that the defendant committed the crimes “in the [c]ounty and [s]tate aforesaid” was not defective); Dixon v. State, 252 Ga. App. 385, 388(4) (556 SE2d 480) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the indictment was defective for failure to allege the county in which the crime was committed because the indictment stated the county of the offense at the top of the document, and the body of the indictment stated that the crime was committed in “the county aforesaid.”). See also Mims v. State, 304 Ga. 851, 858(2)(c) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (“[T]rial counsel cannot be deficient for failing to file a meritless motion[.]”). Consequently, for the reasons stated above, Leamon has failed to carry her burden of showing that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and thus her ineffectiveness claims fail. 12 2. Second, Leamon argues that the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. This claim, however, also fails. It is well settled that “[u]nder State v. Lane,[6] we must consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 568, 583(5) (889 SE2d 824) (2023). “To establish cumulative error, a defendant must show that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and that the multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” Dickerson v. State, 323 Ga. 389, 401–02(5) (925 SE2d 507) (2026) (citation modified). Here, however, “[Leamon] has failed to identify any errors that were committed during the course of [her] trial, and thus [her] cumulative error claim fails.” Grier v. State, 377 Ga. App. 419, 443(9) (922 SE2d 643) (2025). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Leamon’s motion for new trial. Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Whitaker, J., concur. 6 State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). 13