Full Opinion

SECOND DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk's office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules October 27, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1598. LOVE-BULLOCK v. THE STATE. DAVIS, Judge. Christy Nicole Love-Bullock appeals the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea and motion to vacate her sentence imposed on May 24, 2024. Following a jury trial where Love-Bullock was acquitted of some charges and the jury deadlocked on others, she entered a guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, she argues the trial court erred in denying her motions because her prosecution for involuntary manslaughter was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Georgia Constitution. Love-Bullock argues (1) that her plea was not knowing and voluntary; (2) that the withdrawal of her plea is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice; (3) that she received ineffective assistance of plea counsel; and (4) that the trial court erred in failing to declare the plea a nullity, the sentence void, and vacate her sentence based on double jeopardy. Upon a close review of the record and the relevant law, we affirm the denial of Love-Bullock’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and motion to vacate her sentence. In November 2018, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Love-Bullock for (1) malice murder (OCGA § 16-5-1(a)); felony murder (OCGA § 16-5-1(c)); aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (OCGA § 16-11-106). The case proceeded to a jury trial, and following the presentation of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on malice murder and felony murder. Following those instructions, the trial court further instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as follows: Now if you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the offenses of Murder and/or Felony Murder as alleged in Counts 1 and 2, you may consider what we call a lesser included offense of Involuntary Manslaughter. A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter when they cause the death of another person without intending to by committing the offense of reckless conduct. A person commits the offense of reckless conduct when they cause bodily harm to another or endanger the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their act would cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. You may also consider the lesser included offense of Voluntary Manslaughter. The law provides a person commits voluntary 2 manslaughter when that person causes the death of another human being under circumstances that would otherwise be murder if that person acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. The verdict form provided to the jury listed Count 1, malice murder, followed by four options: guilty, not guilty, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Count 2, felony murder, was also followed by four options: guilty, not guilty, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The jury ultimately returned a verdict form where they checked not guilty under Count 1, malice murder, and left the other options under malice murder blank. After some discussion with the court and amongst themselves, in an attempt to accurately convey their verdict, under Count 2, felony murder, the jury checked not guilty; on the line next to “guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter,” they wrote “not guilty;” and on the line next to “guilty of the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter,” they wrote “deadlock.” Under Count 3, aggravated assault, the jury checked not guilty and, on the line beside “guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless conduct,” they wrote “deadlocked.” Finally, under Count 4, the jury checked not guilty. The trial court accepted the jury’s unanimous not guilty verdicts as to Count 1, malice murder; Count 2, felony murder; the lesser included offense of voluntary 3 manslaughter; Count 3, aggravated assault; and Count 4, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and declared a mistrial on the lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct. On March 22, 2023, the trial court appointed new counsel to represent Love- Bullock. And on May 23, 2024, that attorney assisted Love-Bullock with entering a non-negotiated guilty plea under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970), to the charge of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced her to seven years to serve in confinement. Shortly thereafter, Love- Bullock moved the trial court to withdraw her guilty plea. And, through new counsel, she filed an amended motion to withdraw her guilty plea and a motion to vacate her sentence, declare the guilty plea a nullity, the sentence void, and a plea in bar of former jeopardy, arguing that, by entering a verdict of not guilty to malice murder, the jury had also acquitted her of all the lesser included offenses, including involuntary manslaughter. The trial court denied both motions. This appeal followed. 1. Because Love-Bullock’s arguments hinge on whether double jeopardy barred the State from prosecuting her for involuntary manslaughter following her jury trial, we address this issue first. For the following reasons, we find that the State 4 was not barred from prosecuting Love-Bullock for involuntary manslaughter following the trial. On appeal from the grant or denial of a double jeopardy plea in bar, we review the trial court’s oral and written rulings as a whole to determine whether the trial court’s findings support its conclusion. When the facts are undisputed, our review of the trial court’s application of the law to those facts is de novo. The trial court’s factual findings are assessed under the standard of clear error. State v. Harris, 372 Ga. App. 742, 742 (905 SE2d 868) (2024). No person, the Double Jeopardy Clause states, shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. To determine what a jury has necessarily decided, courts should examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. Floyd v. State, __ Ga. __(2)(b) (931 SE2d 881) (2026) (quotation modified). After careful review of the entire record, specifically considering the jury instructions, the verdict form, and the transcribed discussion surrounding the return of jury’s verdict, the record does not support the contention that the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter listed under Count 1, malice murder. 5 In its order denying Love-Bullock’s plea in bar, the trial court found that the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault. The trial court declared a mistrial to the offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct. At trial, the jury was instructed on malice murder and felony murder. Following those instructions, the trial court further instructed the jury on the lesser included offenses as follows: “Now if you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the offenses of Murder and/or Felony Murder as alleged in Counts 1 and 2, you may consider what we call a lesser included offense of Involuntary Manslaughter.” The trial court instructed the jury on both involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter. The trial court instructed the jury on how to fill out the verdict form as follows: As to Counts 1 & 2 if you do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or felony murder, but do believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter, then you would be authorized to find her guilty of that offense and the form of your verdict would be, we the jury, find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter whichever your unanimous verdict may be. … If you do not believe that the defendant is guilty of any of these offenses, or if you have any reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, then it would be your duty to acquit the defendant, in which event the form of 6 your verdict would be we the jury find the defendant not guilty as to whichever count you are then considering. After deliberating, the jury sent a note to the trial court which stated: “We, as the jury, are deadlocked on the lesser charges by a vote of 11 to 1. We are unanimous on four main counts, but we cannot submit a verdict due to deadlock on the lesser charges.” The trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberating. The jury continued deliberating and sent a second note to the trial court which stated: “This is the verdict of the jury at this time. We are not unanimous on the lesser charges.” The trial court then questioned the foreperson as follows: [THE COURT]: Sir, was the verdict of the jury unanimous as to Count 2, malice murder? THE FOREPERSON: Yes, your honor. THE COURT: was the verdict of the jury unanimous on Count 2, felony murder? I can hand it back to you if you need it. THE FOREPERSON: That’s okay. Yes, it is, your Honor. THE COURT: It was unanimous THE FOREPERSON: Uh-huh. THE COURT: All right. Was the verdict of the jury unanimous on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter? THE FOREPERSON: Yes. THE COURT: That is the one that is blank, on your form. THE FOREPERSON: I apologize. There’s two lesser charges. THE COURT: Hand back the form, Pattie. It’s your verdict. It’s got to be clear. No gray areas. THE FOREPERSON: It is right. … THE COURT: Was the verdict of the jury unanimous on the lesser- included offense of involuntary manslaughter? THE FOREPERSON: No, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: The answer is no? … Then I don’t understand your form.… I’m going to send it back to yall because it’s got to be right. We’ve got to understand what the jury did. Court recessed, and some time later the jury sent a third note that said: “We are in deadlock on the lesser charges, and no productive conversation is being made. We are unanimous on Counts 1 and 4. We cannot come to a decision on Count 2 or 3.” The trial court published the verdict as follows: As to Count 1, malice murder, not guilty. Count 2, in accordance with what our foreperson has said to us, there is no decision as to Count 2. As to Count 3, there is no decision as to Count 3. As to Count 4, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, the verdict of the jury is not guilty. But, because the foreperson continuously stated the jury was “deadlocked on the lesser charges,” the trial court determined it had a duty to ask the jury for further clarification. The trial court further instructed the jury as follows: To make certain that you help us with the clarification as to your intent, I’m going to have you write the word “deadlock” on any counts – any version of any counts that you are deadlocked on. If you’ve made an “all 12 agree” on anything else, check that accordingly. Does that make sense? Following the jury’s clarification, the trial court published the additional verdicts: “Count 2, felony murder, not guilty. Lesser included offense, voluntary manslaughter, not guilty. Lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, deadlock. Count 3, greater offense, aggravated assault, not guilty. Lesser-included 8 offense, reckless conduct, deadlock.” The trial court declared a mistrial on involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct. Love-Bullock argues because the jury checked “not guilty” under Count 1, malice murder, and left the lines blank next to “guilty of voluntary manslaughter” and “guilty of involuntary manslaughter,” we should construe the jury’s verdict form to conclude that the jury also returned not guilty verdicts on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter.1 The record does not support this conclusion. Although the verdict form lists voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter under both Count 1, malice murder, and Count 2, felony murder, the trial court’s instructions on how to fill out the verdict form, and the instructions on the offenses themselves, show that the jury did not acquit Love-Bullock on involuntary manslaughter. See Whittaker v. State, 317 Ga. 127, 138 (891 SE2d 849) (2023) (“In deciding whether a verdict form accurately presented the law and properly guided the jury, this Court reviews the language of the form along with the trial court’s instructions to the jury.”). See also Drake v. State, 288 Ga. 131, 134 (702 1 The State concedes that the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on malice murder and all lesser included offenses under that count. But this Court is not bound by a party’s concession on appeal. Tiller v. State, 314 Ga. App. 472, 474(3) n.2 (724 SE2d 397) (2012). 9 SE2d 161) (2010) (“Qualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court.”). Love-Bullock asserts that the not guilty verdict on Count 1, malice murder, was legal because it was unanimous, in writing, signed by the foreperson, delivered in open court, and published. And we agree. But the record does not support Love- Bullock’s further contention that the not guilty verdict returned as to malice murder necessarily means the jury rendered not guilty verdicts on the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the verdict that was read in open court and accepted by the trial court accurately reflects the jury’s verdict. The cases Love-Bullock cites in support of her position are not controlling on this issue. These cases stand for the correct assertion that jury verdicts are final once returned and published in open court. See Medina v. State, 309 Ga. 432, 435-37(1) (844 SE2d 767) (2020) (Where the jury could not reach a verdict as to three counts of a four-count indictment, although the parties agreed the trial court would declare a mistrial as to all four counts, once the validly returned verdict was published in open court, it was final). See also McElrath v. Georgia, 601 US 87 (144 SCt 651, 217 LE2d 419) (2024) (A “not guilty but mentally ill” verdict constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes despite any inconsistency with other verdicts the jury may 10 have rendered, and defendant could not be retried once that verdict was returned). In fact, McElrath’s definition of an acquittal as “encompass[ing] any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense” supports our ruling today. 601 US at 94. Because here, given the context of the verdict form, the jury instructions, and the discussion surrounding the verdict, the blanks left on the lines next to the lesser included offenses listed under Count 1, malice murder did not constitute acquittals on those offenses and publishing the not guilty verdict on Count 1, malice murder, did not amount to publishing an acquittal on involuntary manslaughter. Because the jury did not return a verdict on involuntary manslaughter, the State was not barred from prosecuting Love-Bullock on involuntary manslaughter. OCGA § 16-1-8(a)(1) (“A prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal.”). See also State v. Archie, 230 Ga. App. 253, 254-55 (495 SE2d 581) (1998) (“[I]f a jury cannot agree upon a verdict in a criminal case, the trial judge may declare a mistrial, and the accused may then be tried a second time for the same offense. … [T]he acquittal on the indicted offense of murder would not bar retrial on the lesser included unindicted offense of [in]voluntary manslaughter[.]”); State v. LeMay, 186 Ga. App. 146, 147(3) 11 (“Appellee’s prior trial on the vehicular homicide charge did not end in conviction, acquittal, or improper termination. Therefore, retrial on that same charge is not barred by either the constitutional or statutory prohibitions against double jeopardy.”). Accordingly, there was no error in the trial court accepting Love- Bullock’s plea to involuntary manslaughter. 2. Because of our holding in Division 1, we need not reach Love-Bullock’s other arguments. Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J. and Whitaker, J. concur. 12