Full Opinion

FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MARKLE and HODGES, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules October 30, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1720. EDWARDS v. THE STATE. BARNES, Presiding Judge. Following a jury trial, Anna Nichole Edwards was convicted of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.1 On appeal from the denial of her amended motion for new trial, Edwards contends that the evidence was insufficient to support those convictions. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse Edwards’s conviction for armed robbery, affirm her firearm possession conviction, and remand for resentencing. 1 Edwards was also found guilty of aggravated assault and theft by taking, but the trial court merged those counts into the armed robbery conviction for purposes of sentencing. Construed in favor of the verdict,2 the evidence showed that in September 2022, the victim was searching online for a PlayStation and found an advertisement for a used console with a sale price of $250. The seller went by the name “Nicolle” and was later identified by the victim as Edwards. The victim texted Edwards and arranged to purchase the PlayStation. Edwards wanted cash for the purchase and asked the victim to meet her at a residential address in Henry County. On the afternoon of September 1, 2022, the victim traveled to the address provided by Edwards and texted her. A few minutes later, Edwards emerged from behind the house across the street and approached the victim. Edwards was carrying a black bag, and the victim asked to see the PlayStation inside of it. Edwards responded that everything was in the bag. The victim handed Edwards the cash as Edwards handed him the bag. However, after taking the bag, the victim realized that it was too light to contain the console, and he demanded his money back. The victim reached for Edwards, but she backed away, pulled out a handgun, and pointed it in his direction. Shaken and scared, the victim retreated to his vehicle and called 911, and 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319(III)(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2 Edwards ran back around the house. As he made the call, the victim heard a gunshot and drove from the scene. Edwards lived in the house across the street from where she agreed to meet the victim. Edwards initially told the police that the victim wanted to buy a console from her but later claimed that he wanted to purchase a phone. However, the phone Edwards showed to the police was broken. Edwards said that the victim had tried to grab her and that she had fired a shot into the ground. She showed the police the handgun. The police learned that Edwards’s house had a video surveillance system, but there was a gap in the recording during the time period when Edwards interacted with the victim. Edwards’s online account where she advertised the PlayStation had also been deactivated that afternoon. The money that the victim gave Edwards was never recovered. 1. Edwards contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for armed robbery because the uncontradicted evidence showed that the taking of the victim’s money was completed before the victim was threatened with the handgun. We agree. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his criminal convictions, we ask only whether, after viewing the 3 evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each element of the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld. Priddy v. State, 362 Ga. App. 434, 434–35(1) (868 SE2d 831) (2022). See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319(III)(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). “A person commits the offense of armed robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon[.]” OCGA § 16-8-41(a). To sustain a conviction for armed robbery, the defendant’s use of the offensive weapon must occur prior to or contemporaneous with, and not subsequent to, the taking of the victim’s property. See Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 36(1)(b) (709 SE2d 202) (2011); Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 403 (207 SE2d 30) (1974). “It follows that armed robbery does not occur unless the robber’s use of an offensive weapon directly or indirectly induces the possessor of property to relinquish possession to the perpetrator.” State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 177 (476 SE2d 579) (1996). Moreover, our Supreme Court has held “the ‘taking’ of property is not a continuing transaction which ends only when the 4 defendant leaves the presence of the victim. Instead, the taking is complete once control of the property is transferred involuntarily from the victim to the defendant, even if only briefly.” Fox, 289 Ga. at 36(1)(b) (citation modified). “[F]orce used in an attempt to escape with property taken by larceny does not transform the crime into robbery.” Hicks, 232 Ga. at 403. The indictment alleged that Edwards committed armed robbery by taking United States currency “from the person and immediate presence of [the victim], by use of a handgun.” The State therefore was required to prove that Edwards use of the handgun occurred prior to or contemporaneous with the taking of the victim’s currency such that it induced the victim to relinquish possession. See Fox, 289 Ga. at 36(1)(b); Epps, 267 Ga. at 177. See also Attaway v. State, 332 Ga. App. 375, 377(1)(a) (772 SE2d 821) (2015) (noting well-established rule that the defendant’s use of force against the victim “must either precede or be contemporaneous with, and not subsequent to, the taking”). The State failed to carry its burden. The evidence, even when construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Edwards had already handed the bag purportedly containing the console to the victim and had already taken possession of 5 the victim’s money when Edwards drew the handgun and threatened the victim with it. Although there was evidence that Edwards used the handgun to keep the victim from grabbing the currency back from her and to help effectuate her escape, there was no evidence that she used it to induce the victim to hand over the currency in the first place. “Rather, [Edwards’s] use or threats to use the [handgun] occurred after the theft [by means of deception] was completed.” Attaway, 332 Ga. App. at 378(1)(a). Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support Edwards’s conviction for armed robbery. See Fox, 289 Ga. at 36-37(1)(b) (explaining that holding a victim at gunpoint after taking possession of the victim’s money would not support an armed robbery conviction because in that scenario, the defendant’s use of the handgun would not have occurred “prior to or contemporaneously with the taking” of the money) (quotation marks omitted); Page v. State, 334 Ga. App. 657, 658 (780 SE2d 77) (2015) (reversing armed robbery conviction where defendant pointed a gun at the victim only after exercising control over the stolen property); Attaway, 332 Ga. App. at 377–78(1)(a) (reversing armed robbery conviction where evidence showed that defendant brandished a knife only after he was in possession of stolen merchandise and was attempting to escape from the store); Gatlin v. State, 199 Ga. App. 500, 501(1) 6 (405 SE2d 118) (1991) (reversing armed robbery conviction where defendant pulled out a gun only after snatching money from the victim, such that “the weapon was not an ingredient” in the taking and “did not figure until after the taking occurred”). In ruling otherwise, the trial court relied on Woods v. State, 269 Ga. 60 (495 SE2d 282) (1998). In that case, the victim gave a co-defendant cocaine and expected payment later that night, but the defendant shot and killed the victim prior to payment. Id. at 60-61(1). The defendant challenged his conviction for armed robbery, contending that the evidence was insufficient because the transfer of the cocaine occurred before his use of the handgun. Id. at 61(2). Our Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the co-defendant’s “custody of the [cocaine] did not ripen into legal possession until the condition of payment was fulfilled, and [the victim] retained constructive possession and title to the property until payment was received.” Id. at 62(2). Because the defendant shot and killed the victim before payment was made and thus prior to when the sales transaction was completed, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s use of the handgun “was the force that caused [the victim] to part with possession of his property” and affirmed his armed robbery conviction. Id. 7 Woods is distinguishable from the present case. In Woods, the sales transaction was still in progress when the handgun was used by the defendant. Here, in contrast, the uncontradicted evidence showed that the victim exchanged money for the bag purportedly containing the video game console before Edwards pulled out the handgun and threatened the victim with it. By the time that Edwards brandished the handgun, the (fraudulent) sales transaction had already been completed and the victim had already been induced to hand over his cash through deception. Thus, unlike in Woods, Edwards’s use of the handgun occurred subsequent to the taking of the victim’s property and was insufficient to establish armed robbery. See Fox, 289 Ga. at 36(1)(b); Hicks, 232 Ga. at 403. Accordingly, Edwards’s armed robbery conviction must be reversed. 2. Edwards contends that if her armed robbery conviction is reversed, her conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony must also be reversed. But the indictment alleged that Edwards possessed a firearm “during the commission of at least one of the following felonies, to wit: Armed Robbery and Aggravated Assault.” “As we have previously explained, if a crime may be committed in more than one way, it is sufficient for the State to show that it was committed in any 8 one of the separate ways listed in the indictment.” West v. State, 378 Ga. App. 121, 129(1)(a) n.7 (924 SE2d 458) (2025) (citation modified). And the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find that Edwards committed aggravated assault by pointing the handgun towards the victim. See OCGA §§ 16-5-20 (a), 16-5- 21(a)(2);3 Diaz v. State, 255 Ga. App. 288, 289(1) (564 SE2d 872) (2002) (affirming aggravated assault conviction where the defendant pointed a handgun at the victim). Consequently, Edwards has shown no basis for reversal of her firearm possession conviction. In sum, we reverse Edwards’s conviction for armed robbery but affirm her conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Because we are reversing the armed robbery conviction, the counts for aggravated assault and theft 3 A simple assault occurs when a person either “[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another” or “[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” OCGA § 16-5-20(a). A simple assault is elevated to aggravated assault when the assault is committed with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). 9 by taking no longer merge into that conviction. See Chambers v. State, 320 Ga. 770, 780(2) (911 SE2d 616) (2025). We therefore remand for resentencing.4 Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and case remanded for resentencing. Markle and Hodges, JJ., concur. 4 On remand, the trial court will need to address whether the aggravated assault and theft by taking counts should merge together. 10