William Daniel Dubee, Jr v. State
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
Date FiledOctober 8, 2026
DocketA27I0059
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA,____________________
October 08, 2026
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
A27I0059. WILLIAM DANIEL DUBEE, JR. v. THE STATE.
On August 4, 2026, the trial court issued orders denying William Daniel Dubee,
Jr.’s motion to dismiss the indictment, motion to suppress evidence, and motion to
return seized firearm. On September 15, 2026, the court certified its orders for
immediate review. Dubee then filed this application for interlocutory review. We lack
jurisdiction.
A party may seek interlocutory review only if the trial court “certifies within ten
days of entry thereof that the order, decision, or judgment is of such importance to the
case that immediate review should be had.” OCGA § 5-6-34(b). A timely certificate
of immediate review is a jurisdictional requirement. See Von Waldner v.
Baldwin/Cheshire, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 23, 24(2) (209 SE2d 715) (1974). If the certificate
is not entered within the ten-day period, it is untimely, and the party seeking review
generally must wait until final judgment to appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-34(b); Duke v.
State, 306 Ga. 171, 178(3)(a) (829 SE2d 348) (2019); Turner v. Harper, 231 Ga. 175,
176 (200 SE2d 748) (1973).
Here, because the certificate of immediate review was entered 42 days after
entry of the underlying orders, we are constrained to conclude that we lack
jurisdiction, and Dubee’s interlocutory application is hereby DISMISSED.1
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________
10/08/2026
I certify that the above is a true extract from
the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Witness my signature and the seal of said court
hereto affixed the day and year last above written.
, Clerk.
1
We note that in order to give Dubee a second opportunity to pursue an
interlocutory appeal, the trial court may vacate and reinstate both the underlying order
and the certificate. See Canoeside Properties v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425, 426–27(1) (589
SE2d 116) (2003); Piedmont Hosp. v. D. M., 335 Ga. App. 442, 444(1) (779 SE2d 36)
(2015).