Full Opinion

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia ATLANTA,____________________ October 28, 2026 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order: A27O0023. BOBBY L. CHAVIS JR. v. BARRY A. FLEMINGS, et al. Bobby L. Chavis Jr. filed a pro se petition in this Court, arguing that his probation was improperly revoked and seeking reinstatement of and termination of four to six years of his probation. For reasons that follow, the petition is subject to dismissal on at least two grounds. First, to the extent that Chavis is attempting to invoke this Court’s original mandamus jurisdiction, he has not followed the proper procedure. Generally, the superior courts of this state have the power, in proper cases, to issue process in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, specific performance, quo warranto, and injunction, and hence the need to resort to the appellate courts for such relief by petition filed in the appellate courts will be extremely rare. Brown v. Johnson, 251 Ga. 436, 436 (306 SE2d 655) (1983), disapproved in part on other grounds, Arnold v. Alexander, 321 Ga. 330, 336(1) (914 SE2d 311) (2025). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV. An appellate court’s authority to issue such writs “is connected only to such powers as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments. It does not grant jurisdiction to [the appellate court] to issue process as an original matter wholly unconnected to its appellate jurisdiction.” Arnold, 321 Ga. at 334(1) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, except in the rarest of cases, the procedure to be followed before seeking to invoke this Court’s original mandamus jurisdiction is to file the petition in the appropriate lower court first. See Graham v. Cavender, 252 Ga. 123, 123 (311 SE2d 832) (1984), disapproved in part on other grounds, Arnold, 321 Ga. at 336(1) & n.7; Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga. App. 450, 455(2)(b) (699 SE2d 600) (2010), disapproved in part on other grounds, Arnold, 321 Ga. at 336(1) & n.7. Here, the record contains no indication that Chavis obtained a ruling in the superior court on the claims in his mandamus petition. Moreover, this is not one of the extremely rare instances in which this Court will exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. See generally Humphrey v. Owens, 289 Ga. 721, 722 (715 SE2d 119) (2011) (explaining that a mandamus petition is not the proper vehicle for seeking post-appeal relief in a criminal matter); Ford Motor Co. v. Lawrence, 279 Ga. 284, 285 (612 SE2d 301) (2005) (“Extraordinary writs are not the proper remedy to seek review of a ruling made by a trial court where there is a right of judicial review of the judge’s ruling, because the availability of judicial review is an adequate legal remedy that eliminates the availability of mandamus relief.”). Second, to the extent Chavis’s petition can be construed as a discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5) — which is required to appeal an order revoking probation — it is untimely. An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5- 6-35(d). This deadline is jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance with the statute. See Boyle v. State, 190 Ga. App. 734, 734 (380 SE2d 57) (1989). Because Chavis filed this petition on October 14, 2026, 135 days after entry of the June 1, 2026 order revoking his probation, we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, Chavis’s petition is hereby DISMISSED. Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 10/28/2026 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk.