Full Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION BARNES, P. J., MERCIER P. J., and PADGETT, J. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules September 18, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1568. HUNTER v. THE STATE. PADGETT, Judge. Jordan Hunter was indicted, along with other co-defendants, and charged with the offenses of kidnapping, theft by taking (felony grade), sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, conspiracy to commit rape, rape, false imprisonment and financial transaction card fraud.1 Following a jury trial in which Hunter was tried separately from the other co-defendants, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on two counts but found him guilty of theft by taking, sexual battery, a second count of sexual battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, conspiracy to commit rape and false imprisonment. On a later date, Hunter entered a guilty plea to 1 OCGA §§ 16-5-40; 16-8-2; 16-6-22.1; 16-6-22.2; 16-4-8 and 16-6-1; 16-6-1; 16- 5-41 and 16-9-33, respectively. the offense of kidnapping and the remaining charge of rape was dismissed. Hunter filed a timely motion for new trial which was denied and he appeals from that ruling, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants a new trial. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Hunter has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, we review only that evidence which is relevant to his enumerations of error and which provide context and factual background to address the enumerations raised on appeal. Eaker v. State, 315 Ga. 202, 203(1) (881 SE2d 673) (2022). On the date in question, the victim, her husband and other friends visited an establishment that had three different bars in the same vicinity. During the night, the victim consumed several different drinks and became inexplicably incoherent.2 Without anyone in her party noticing, she took her purse, left the bar and walked outside. 2 There was testimony about the effects of drugs such as GHB, Ketamine and Rophypnol which can be used to adulterate beverages but because these drugs are quickly metabolized by the body, there was no evidence of those drugs being in the victim’s system. However, experts testified that the victim’s reported symptoms were “classic GHB symptoms.” 2 Hunter and three other individuals occupied a car and were parked near the bars. They observed the victim on the sidewalk and noticed that she was stumbling and struggling to keep her balance. Hunter called over to her and she entered their car. The car left the area and Hunter began making plans with his uncle via telephone calls to identify a place where they could take the victim to have sexual relations with her. As they traveled, Hunter began molesting the victim who, by this point, was completely incoherent and unresponsive. Hunter also removed the victim’s underwear and tossed them out the rear window of the moving vehicle. Hunter and the three other individuals in the car with the victim met up with his uncle in another part of town. They followed Hunter’s uncle to an apartment complex and the victim was taken into an apartment, leaving two of the co-defendants in the vehicle. Hunter and two co-defendants removed the victim from the car by grabbing her feet and legs and carrying her into the apartment. The two co-defendants remaining in the car took that opportunity to look through the victim’s purse, taking things of value. At some point during the night, the victim’s wedding ring was stolen.3 3 There were inconsistencies in the evidence relative to the stolen ring. However, on appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and leave issues such as conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence for the jury to resolve. Beckett v. State, 372 Ga. App. 139, 140(1) (903 SE2d 3 After a period of time, those in the apartment called or texted the co-defendants in the car and advised that they needed additional condoms. The co-defendants in the car purchased condoms with the victim’s credit card and provided them to the co- defendants in the apartment. Those in the car later used the victim’s credit cards that morning to purchase fast food and additional condoms. The victim came to her senses and testified that when she became coherent, Hunter was on top of her and was vaginally penetrating her. The victim panicked, pushed Hunter off of her and walked into the living room of the apartment. There she noticed a number of other men, including one who was standing between her and the door. She realized that she had no underwear, shoes, wedding ring, purse or phone. She asked for her phone, which the men refused to give her. She had no idea where she was or how she had gotten there. At trial, the victim identified Hunter as the man who was on top of her when she came to her senses at the apartment. She also identified the other co-defendants and explained the role each man played in the incident. 824) (2024). 4 A brief negotiation ensued where the men demanded money from the victim. After noting that she did not have her purse or wallet, she offered to pay the men cash that she had stored in her home if they would take her home unharmed. They eventually settled on the price of $5,000 for her safe return home. During the ride to her home, Hunter again sexually molested the victim and demanded that she provide oral sex to all of the individuals in the car. When the victim refused, the price that had been negotiated for her safe return home was increased to $10,000. Once they arrived at the victim’s home, the victim entered her house and used her nanny’s cell phone to contact her husband and law enforcement. When the victim did not return with cash, the defendants began beating on the door but eventually gave up and all got back into the car to flee the scene. Law enforcement officers arrived as they were trying to leave. The officers were able to locate the victim’s purse, phone, and a box of condoms in the car occupied by Hunter and the co-defendants. Hunter and all co-defendants who occupied the car were taken into custody at the scene. Officers located her wedding ring at the entrance to the jail in the path taken by one co-defendant and they located her wallet in the possession of another co-defendant. After investigation, officers were able to corroborate the location of the defendants’ 5 cell phones on the night in question with the testimony given at trial. Officers were also able to identify the transactions made with the victim’s credit cards at locations near the apartment complex and confirmed that at least one transaction involved the purchase of condoms. The evidence showed that the victim was last seen by her friends and family at the bar at 1:36 a.m., that she arrived at the apartment complex at approximately 2:30 a.m. and that the call to police was made at 6:24 a.m. At trial, Hunter noted in his opening statement, during cross examination of several witnesses, and in his closing argument that the victim and her family had filed a civil lawsuit against the bars involved and the apartment complex where the victim was taken by the defendants, suggesting that her motivation in seeking a conviction was based upon her desire to enhance her civil lawsuit. Two of the co-defendants testified at trial, largely corroborated each other’s testimony and both implicated Hunter. 1. Hunter argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to certain testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argument relating to the impact these crimes had on the victim and her family. We conclude that while some of the examples cited by Hunter could be properly characterized as victim impact 6 evidence, other testimony cited by Hunter was either admissible or merely irrelevant and did not implicate the prohibition against the admission of victim impact evidence. We further find that the prosecutor’s argument was not improper. “Under Georgia law, evidence about a crime victim’s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on the victim, the victim’s family, and the victim’s community generally is not admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial.” Walker v. State, 360 Ga. App. 211, 217(4) (860 SE2d 868) (2021) (punctuation omitted). To prevail in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hunter “must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced him that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Cross v. State, 377 Ga. App. 764, 776(4) (922 SE2d 447) (2025) (punctuation omitted). When assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was impacted by the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, we must evaluate whether there was a substantial, not merely conceivable, likelihood of a different result. Id. at 776–77(4). If Hunter is unable to satisfy both prongs of this test, his claim of 7 ineffective assistance fails. Jackson v. State, 317 Ga. 139, 145(2) (891 SE2d 878) (2023). “The burden of showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance, though not impossible to carry, is a heavy one.” Revere v. State, 302 Ga. 44, 49(2)(a) (805 SE2d 69) (2017) (punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we give deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we review a trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130(5) (757 SE2d 831) (2014). The portion of the State’s closing argument cited by Hunter is not clearly an improper comment on how the crime has impacted the victim. The prosecutor argued that the victim was a happily married woman, a successful real estate agent and struggled to admit that she had been the victim of these crimes — to include her initial failure to report that she had been vaginally penetrated by Hunter. The argument was based upon the facts elicited during trial, was an attempt by the prosecutor to address the credibility of the victim and to explain both inconsistencies and similarities in the victim’s testimony. We conclude that the prosecutor’s argument was not 8 objectionable and, therefore, Hunter’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to raise a timely objection to the argument. Hawkins v. State, 376 Ga. App. 520, 527(2)(a) (920 SE2d 439) (2025). “We have previously recognized that evidence of a purported rape victim’s state of mind following the attack may corroborate her claim that she was raped.” Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 633(3) (805 SE2d 103) (2017) (punctuation omitted). While victim impact evidence is not generally admissible, such evidence is admissible if it is “clearly probative of issues at trial.” Huff v. State, 367 Ga. App. 774, 778(3) (888 SE2d 575) (2023) (punctuation omitted). The prosecutor in this case elicited testimony which established that the victim and her immediate family were in therapy due to the sexual assault alleged in this case. Another witness testified that the victim was not the same after the incident and was more emotionally closed off than she had been before the incident. This evidence was admissible because there was testimony from co-defendants suggesting that the victim entered the vehicle with the defendants voluntarily at the beginning of her ordeal and that, during interviews with officers, she failed to tell officers that she had experienced vaginal penetration. See 9 Smith v. State, 244 Ga. App. 165, 167(2) (534 SE2d 903) (2000) (testimony that the victim “had been a ‘basket case’ since the attack” was properly admitted to corroborate the victim’s rape allegation).Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this testimony. As we have repeatedly held, trial counsel does not perform deficiently by failing to make a meritless objection. Hawkins v. State, 376 Ga. App. at 527(2)(a). However, other testimony was elicited by the prosecutor which could be characterized as victim impact testimony. The victim’s husband testified that the crime damaged his entire family and that those impacts have become more “crazy” as time passed. An employee of the victim’s husband testified that the victim’s husband had become less involved with his business following the incident. During the hearing on Hunter’s motion for new trial, trial counsel was asked why no objection was raised when the witnesses were asked questions that invited victim impact evidence. Counsel testified that he was unaware that the admission of such evidence was improper. Pretermitting whether the cited testimony constituted improper victim impact evidence and was not merely irrelevant, we conclude that Hunter has not carried his 10 burden of establishing that there was both error and a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was impacted by the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Page v. State, 372 Ga. App. 128, 137(4)(c)(i) (903 SE2d 815) (2024). The jury failed to reach a verdict on the charges of rape and kidnapping with bodily injury, suggesting that the jurors were not unduly prejudiced by the evidence presented. When performing a prejudice determination in connection with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider the totality of the evidence. Revere, 302 Ga. 49(2)(a). Given the overwhelming evidence of Hunter’s guilt on the charges of which he was convicted, the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel does not support a finding that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different in the absence of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Owens v. State, 374 Ga. App. 56, 68(2)(b)(ii) (911 SE2d 330) (2025); Bunn v. State, 379 Ga. App. 15, 20(4)(a) (929 SE2d 23) (2026). 2. Hunter also argues that his convictions should be reversed due to the collective prejudicial effect of counsel’s ineffective representation. State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). We find that the cumulative prejudice from any assumed deficiencies in trial counsel’s performance in failing to object to the two 11 instances of alleged victim impact testimony is insufficient to show a reasonable probability that the results of Hunter’s trial would have been different in the absence of the alleged deficiencies. Bunn, 379 Ga. App. at 25(4)(i). In light of the strong evidence of Hunter’s guilt for the offenses of which he was convicted, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors made by trial counsel does not warrant a new trial under the cumulative error test. Walker, 360 Ga. App. at 218(5). Judgment affirmed. Barnes, P. J., and Mercier, P.J., concur. 12