Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 1 of 30 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-4037 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ZERION MARCOS FRANKLIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:24-cr-00105-D-KS-1) Argued: January 30, 2026 Decided: August 14, 2026 Before AGEE, BENJAMIN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Berner joined. Judge Agee wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Sandra Payne Hagood, LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA PAYNE HAGOOD, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Katherine Simpson Englander, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: W. Ellis Boyle, United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 2 of 30 DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge: Zerion Marcos Franklin was employed by the United States Postal Service in Fayetteville, North Carolina. After stolen checks were discovered during a traffic stop, Franklin was charged with one count of theft of mail matter by a postal service employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1709 and one count of possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. He pled guilty to both counts. The district court calculated Franklin’s Sentencing Guidelines range, imposing, among other things, a two-level firearm enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B). That section increases a defendant’s total offense level “[i]f the offense involved . . . [the] possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the offense.” Based on its Guidelines calculation, the district court sentenced Franklin to 48 months’ imprisonment. Franklin now appeals his sentence, arguing the district court erred in imposing the firearm enhancement. Franklin specifically argues that the Government did not meet its burden in showing that the firearm was possessed “in connection with” either of his offenses. Because the district court failed to make factual findings linking Franklin’s possession of a firearm with either of his offenses, we vacate Franklin’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 3 of 30 I. A. Franklin worked for the United States Postal Service at its Fayetteville mail processing annex. On June 6, 2023, Franklin was driving with Delana Bolding, a passenger in his vehicle, when police officers stopped him for a window tint violation. While conducting the stop, the officers observed drug paraphernalia in the vehicle and proceeded to search Franklin’s vehicle. That search produced 48 United States Treasury checks. The checks were not made payable to Franklin, but to individuals receiving federal tax refunds, social security benefits, and veteran benefits. Of the checks found in Franklin’s vehicle, 47 of 48 checks were found in the trunk while one of the checks was found in Franklin’s backpack, which was in the back seat of the car. Each of these checks had been processed through the Fayetteville mail processing annex. The check found in Franklin’s backpack had been altered to reflect “Delana Leigh Bolding” as the payee. Along with the altered check, the backpack contained marijuana, a bag with marijuana residue, a syrup medicine bottle, $22,538 in United States currency, and a loaded firearm. A week later, a police report was filed by a victim for a stolen federal tax refund check for $3,947 that had been cashed in Franklin’s name at Walmart. Franklin was stopped again by police officers for a traffic violation. After a positive alert from a police canine unit, officers searched Franklin’s vehicle and recovered a magnifying glass and razor blades—oft used to forge documents—as well as another United States Treasury check. Soon after the second traffic stop, the police department 3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 4 of 30 obtained and executed a search warrant at Franklin’s home. At Franklin’s home, officers discovered two additional United States Treasury checks that had been altered to reflect a new payee. All in all, Franklin was responsible for 51 stolen checks for an actual loss of $3,947, and an intended loss of $767,485.39. B. Franklin was indicted on two counts: one count of theft of mail matter by postal service employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1709 and one count of possession of stolen mail in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. He pled guilty to both counts. The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) to assist the district court at Franklin’s sentencing. In calculating Franklin’s offense level, the PSR applied, among other things, a firearm enhancement pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) (the “firearm enhancement”). That subsection provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved . . . [the] possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the offense.” And according to the PSR, Franklin’s offense involved the possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with the offense. In total, Franklin’s offense level was 23. Combined with a criminal history category of I, Franklin’s Guidelines range was 46 to 57 months of imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR without objections. Franklin argued for a below-Guidelines sentence, citing his military service and his family’s circumstances. The Government requested a within-Guidelines sentence, emphasizing the 4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 5 of 30 need for general deterrence for this type of conduct, especially for those employed by the United States Postal Service. The district court found a downward variance would not be appropriate because of the seriousness of Franklin’s conduct, even though it found no motive apparent other than greed. It considered the mitigating factors raised by Franklin and sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment for each count, to run concurrently, which was two months above the lowest end of Franklin’s advisory Guidelines range. Franklin now appeals, arguing that his sentence was unreasonable. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). II. We review sentencing decisions for reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). “Reasonableness review has procedural and substantive components.” United States v. Elboghdady, 117 F.4th 224, 233 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 2012)). Here, Franklin only challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. “A district court commits procedural error by failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range.” Elboghdady, 117 F.4th at 235 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 459, 464 (4th Cir. 2023)). District courts have an independent obligation to correctly calculate a defendant’s Guidelines range. United States v. Henderson, 159 F.4th 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). When reviewing the district court’s calculation of a 5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 6 of 30 defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Mitchell, 78 F.4th 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 659 (4th Cir. 2010)). Franklin failed to raise any objection to the firearm enhancement at sentencing and thus any error by the district court is confined by our plain error analysis.1 Thus, Franklin must show three things to prevail: “(1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Franklin has the burden to show that the error impacted his substantial rights—that it was not harmless. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. A procedural error in sentencing does not impact a defendant’s substantial rights if “ ‘the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way []’ and . . . ‘the sentence would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.’ ” United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006)). And even if Franklin can show the error impacted his substantial rights, we will not correct such an error unless it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)). 1 Franklin does not dispute that plain error review applies. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 7 of 30 III. Franklin raises a single argument challenging his eligibility for the firearm enhancement. He asserts that the Government did not offer sufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm in connection with either his theft or possession offense. Therefore, the district court should not have applied the firearm enhancement, and it committed procedural error by miscalculating his Guidelines range. A. USSG § 2B1.1 applies when a defendant is convicted of theft, embezzlement, receipt of stolen property, property destruction, and offenses involving fraud or deceit. It increases a defendant’s total offense level by two “if the offense involved. . . possession of a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) in connection with the offense.”2 § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) (emphasis added). Crucial to Franklin’s argument’s is the definition of “in connection with.” However, the Guidelines text and its commentary do not define “in connection with” and we have yet to interpret that language in the context of this Guideline provision. But we have defined “in connection with” in a similar enhancement, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). i. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies if a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used The applicable Guidelines here is the version effective from November 1, 2023, to 2 October 31, 2024. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 8 of 30 or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” Id. Although this enhancement applies to defendants when a firearm is used in connection with another felony offense, compared to § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B)’s application when a firearm is used in connection with the offense, it is still instructive. In the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) context, we have determined that “in connection with” is synonymous with “in relation to,” such that “a weapon is used or possessed ‘in connection with’ another offense if the weapon ‘facilitates or has a tendency to facilitate the other offense.’ ” United States v. Blount, 337 F.3d 404, 411 (4th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Garnett, 243 F.3d 824, 828 (4th Cir. 2001)). This standard is not “especially burdensome.” United States v. Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020). A weapon is used in connection with another offense if the weapon “ ‘ha[d] some purpose or effect with respect to the’ ” crime, Blount, 337 F.3d at 411 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)), including “if the firearm was present for protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 654 (4th Cir. 1997)). The “presence or involvement [of the weapon] cannot be result of accident or coincidence.” Blount, 337 F.3d at 411 (cleaned up). ii. The court has further interpreted the meaning of “in connection with” in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in both the drug possession and drug trafficking context. As explained below, these cases provide a helpful analogy. Importantly, the commentary to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) directs that proximity of a firearm to drugs in connection with a drug 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 9 of 30 trafficking offense creates a presumption that the firearm facilitated the offense. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(B). But for drug possession crimes, district courts “must evaluate whether the firearm ‘facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating’ ” the drug possession. United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 2009). In United States v. Jenkins, the court held that the district court’s factual findings supported its determination that a firearm facilitated the defendant’s drug possession offense. 566 F.3d at 164. There, the court relied on the presentence report’s description of the defendant’s environment—a public street late at night where a firearm was recently shot—as support for the district court’s conclusion that “there was a heightened need for protection and that the firearm emboldened [the defendant].” Id. In United States v. Bolden, the court vacated and remanded the sentence of a defendant who was charged with being a felon in possession based on two firearms recovered from his home after his arrest. 964 F.3d at 284. The defendant was deemed eligible for a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) firearm enhancement because the firearms recovered were found in the same bedroom as cocaine. Id. But the court found the district court’s factual findings insufficient in “linking the firearms to [the defendant’s] cocaine possession” because “physical proximity is not by itself enough to establish the necessary connection between guns and a drug possession offense.” Id. at 287–88. In United States v. Mitchell, the court again took issue with a district court’s reliance on weak facts when applying a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. 78 F.4th at 665. The court held that a defendant who was found in his car late at night on a rural road, slumped over and unconscious with cocaine in his pocket and a loaded firearm in his hand, was not 9 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 10 of 30 eligible for a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement because the district court failed to make “express” findings that the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the defendant’s possession of the cocaine. Id. at 671–73. Contemporaneous possession of the firearm and cocaine on his person was insufficient, because “proximity alone fail[ed] to establish that [the defendant’s] possession of the gun was connected to his possession of cocaine.” Id. at 672. What’s more, the court noted that there were multiple, plausible reasons offered by both parties as to why the defendant might have carried a firearm on a rural road at night, whether it was to embolden his possession or because he drove a truck in a secluded and rural area of North Carolina. But because appellate courts may not presume a sentencing court has “silently adopted arguments presented by a party[,]” the court determined it was precluded from review. Id. at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2009)). B. Relying on our precedent interpreting § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), we conclude that the firearm enhancement’s use of ‘in connection with’ similarly means ‘in relation to.’ Accordingly, the firearm enhancement only applies if Franklin’s weapon facilitated or had the potential to facilitate either of his offenses. See Blount, 337 F.3d at 411 (cleaned up). After reviewing the record, we cannot properly address Franklin’s challenge because the district court failed to make “express findings[s]” linking Franklin’s possession of a firearm 10 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 11 of 30 with either his theft or possession of stolen checks.3 Mitchell, 78 F.4th at 673 (quoting Bolden, 964 F.3d at 288). Regarding Franklin’s theft offense, there is nothing in the record that supports the conclusion that the firearm recovered from Franklin’s vehicle facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the offense. The more likely assumption is that Franklin’s role as a postal service employee afforded him the opportunity to access and steal the checks—not the use or presence of any firearm. But regardless, we are constrained to vacate because the district court made no factual findings on this point. For Franklin’s possession offense, the Government insists that the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate possession of the stolen checks because the firearm was kept in his backpack along with one of the checks, a stolen document with “intrinsic value.” 3 Our colleague in dissent concludes the firearm facilitated Franklin’s offenses because it was found along with a stolen check in Franklin’s backpack in the backseat of his vehicle, making the firearm both “accessible and ready for use.” Diss. Op. at 29–30. But “physical proximity is not by itself enough to establish the necessary connection” here. Bolden, 964 F.3d at 287–88. And there are several plausible reasons why Franklin might have carried one in his vehicle. The dissent cites United States v. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d 609, 614 (4th Cir. 2010), as instructive because the court affirmed a district court’s finding that “carrying a loaded firearm in a backpack . . . facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” another offense. Diss. Op. at 30. But that case concerned a defendant who entered a probation office with a loaded firearm in his backpack with no safety mechanism. Alvarado Perez, 609 F.3d at 614. Importantly, the offense in Alvarado Perez that the court concluded the firearm “facilitated” was a reckless endangerment conviction under Maryland law. Id. It makes sense that a loaded firearm with a disengaged safety would facilitate one’s reckless endangerment of others. Such a logical conclusion is not apparent in Franklin’s case—another reason why further factual findings are needed from the district court. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 12 of 30 Appellee’s Br. (ECF No. 53) at 16.4 But proximity alone cannot support the conclusion that a firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate an offense. See Bolden, 964 F.3d at 288. What’s more, the record indicates that Franklin’s environment was vastly different from that of the defendant in Jenkins, where the district court made factual findings leading this court to affirm application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. 566 F.3d at 164. Here, there is no evidence that Franklin was stopped late at night, that the checks were being guarded by a firearm, or that any danger had arisen such that Franklin needed protection in possessing or stealing the checks. See Jenkins, 566 F.3d at 164. It “is not ‘so obvious’ from the record” that Franklin’s firearm facilitated or had the potential of facilitating his offense and the district court failed to make factual findings on this issue. Mitchell, 78 F.4th at 673 (quoting Bolden, 964 F.3d at 288). We cannot affirm the application of the enhancement because we cannot “[confidently] assume the district court’s fact-finding role.” Id. at 671. Importantly, we make no determination as to whether the enhancement is inapplicable as a matter of law. We acknowledge that this case is before us after Franklin failed to raise at sentencing the arguments he raises now. But regardless of whether a defendant raises an objection at sentencing, the obligation rests with the district court to independently and correctly calculate a defendant’s Guidelines range. Henderson, 159 F.4th at 219 (holding that failure to object to a presentence report “didn’t relieve the district Page numbers for citations to ECF documents utilize the page numbers in the 4 header on each document. 12 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 13 of 30 court of its independent duty to calculate [the defendant’s] proper [G]uideline range, which includes consideration of applicable enhancements.”). That means district courts have an obligation to make independent evaluations of any recommended enhancements to determine whether the record supports such application. In the case of the § 2B1.1(b)(16)(B) enhancement, district courts must make the necessary factual findings to determine whether a defendant’s possession of a firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate another felony offense. Failure to do so constitutes procedural error. Accordingly, we hold that the district court’s imposition of the firearm enhancement without making the necessary factual findings was error. IV. Now that we have determined the district court erred, we must determine whether that error was plain. That is, the district court’s error must have been “clear or obvious.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010). An error is clear and obvious “if the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 285 F.3d 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2002)). We hold that the district court’s error was plain. “[A]ll sentencing proceedings” must begin “by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. As stated above, “district courts have an independent obligation to properly calculate” a defendant’s Guidelines range regardless of the “parties’ arguments or the recommendations in the presentence report.” Henderson, 159 F.4th at 219. And part of 13 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 14 of 30 that obligation is to make the necessary factual findings to determine whether an enhancement applies. The court has instructed district courts that they “must first evaluate whether evidence exists to support a finding that that [a defendant’s] possession of a gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate” their offense. Mitchell, 78 F.4th at 673. Thus, “an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular facts of the case before it” is required. Id. Here, the record is devoid of any factual findings by the district court as to whether Franklin’s possession of a gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate his possession of stolen checks. And without that factual finding, the district court could not perform its independent obligation to correctly calculate the applicable Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. We hold that such failure constitutes a clear and obvious procedural error. V. Last, we must consider whether the district court’s error impacted Franklin’s substantial rights. An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is “ ‘ “a reasonable probability that, but for the error,” the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2018) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016)). In the case of plain error, that outcome must be that “a different sentence might have been imposed.” Henderson, 159 F.4th at 221 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2010)). By determining (1) whether “ ‘the district court would have reached the same result even 14 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 15 of 30 if it had decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way,’ and (2) if “ ‘the sentence would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in [Franklin’s] favor,’ ” we can ascertain whether Franklin’s substantial rights have been impacted. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d at 123 (quoting Keene, 470 F.3d 1349). And even then, we will not correct such an error unless it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15)). Because we cannot determine from the record whether the district court would have reached the same result and because the district court’s error affects the fairness of judicial proceedings, we hold Franklin’s substantial rights were impacted. A. When a district court commits a procedural error in sentencing, we employ the harmlessness inquiry “to avoid the empty formality of an unnecessary remand where it is clear that an asserted [G]uideline[s] miscalculation did not affect the ultimate sentence.” Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 163 (cleaned up). The substantial rights analysis is akin to the harmlessness inquiry with one key difference: on review for plain error, the defendant, not the government, bears the burden of showing their substantial rights have been affected. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (explaining that the substantial rights element of the plain error inquiry is one in the same as the harmlessness inquiry other than the burden shifting to the defendant). Thus, we apply the harmlessness inquiry to whether Franklin’s substantial rights were affected but require Franklin to show that his sentence would have been different but for the district court’s error. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 16 of 30 From what we can glean from the record, we cannot tell whether the district court would have reached the same result even if it had not erred. We acknowledge that, without any objections, the district court had no reason to assume it may have erred in calculating the Guidelines range. But that reality carries little weight in determining if the district court would have reached the same outcome even under the correct Guidelines range. Rather, we are compelled to find that the district court would not have reached the same result because there was no independent explanation of why 48 months was sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing, let alone why 48 months would be sufficient as an alternate variant sentence. That is, the district court did not tell us why 48 months was an appropriate sentence, even if Franklin’s Guidelines range was 30–37 months.5 When imposing Franklin’s sentence, the district court stated that it believed it calculated the Guidelines range correctly but even if it did not, it would “impose the same sentence as an alternative variant sentence” pursuant to United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 5 Franklin asserts that the correct Guidelines range is 30–37 months because without the enhancement, he would receive a zero-point offender reduction pursuant to USSG § 4C1.1(a)(7) that would decrease his total offense level by four. Although the record does not definitively indicate whether this reduction would apply if Franklin was sentenced without the firearm enhancement, it does not matter whether Franklin’s Guidelines range is 30–37 months compared to 37–46 months. What matters is the district court’s failure to explain why any upward variance was appropriate. And under either Guidelines range, Franklin’s sentence of 48 months would constitute an upward variance. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 17 of 30 2014)—landmark cases in our harmlessness jurisprudence. J.A. 58.6 But each of those cases is markedly different and inapplicable to the facts here. In both Hargrove and Gomez-Jimenez, the district courts engaged in a thorough analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors after the defendant objected to their calculated Guidelines range. Only then did they declare they would impose the same sentence as an alternate variant sentence if they were wrong on the Guidelines issue. Importantly, the district courts in those cases contemplated (in response to an objection by the defendant) whether they might have calculated each defendant’s Guidelines range incorrectly and ultimately concluded they would have reached the same result even if they were mistaken. In Hargrove, the probation officer recommended the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range was 10–16 months of imprisonment, but the defendant objected, arguing the correct range was 0–6 months. 701 F.3d at 159. The district court, after entertaining all the parties’ arguments, calculated a range of 41–51 months as appropriate and noted “it would sentence Hargrove to 51 months if imposing [a] sentence under that range.” Id. at 160. But in determining an upward variance of 60 months was justified, it stated: “If I had sustained the [d]efendant’s objections and come up with a Guideline[s] range that the [d]efendant did not object to, I would still have imposed both the upward departure to 60 months and an upward variance to 60 months.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the lower court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “J.A.” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document. 17 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 18 of 30 In Gomez-Jimenez, there were two defendants. For the first defendant, the advisory Guidelines range was 168–210 months of imprisonment, the defendant objected, and the district court overruled his objection. 750 F.3d at 375–76. It sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment after considering the § 3553(a) factors and indicated it would impose an alternate variant sentence with a statement similar to the statement of the district court in Franklin’s case. Id. at 376 (“The district court stated: I do believe that I have calculated the advisory [G]uideline[s] range properly. If, however, it’s determined that I have not, I announce pursuant to United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2011), that I would have imposed this same sentence as an alternative variant sentence in light of all the 3553 factors.” (second alteration in original)). For the second defendant, the advisory Guidelines range was 360 months to life for two of the counts and 240 months for the last four counts. Id. Again, the second defendant raised objections, the district court overruled them and indicated it would impose an alternate variant sentence with a statement like that made to the first defendant. Id. at 376–77 (“The district court stated that, although it believed it had properly calculated the Guidelines range, it would have imposed the same sentence as a variant sentence pursuant to Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, and United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 2012).”) Unlike the defendants in Hargrove and Gomez-Jimenez, Franklin did not raise any objections to his Guidelines range at sentencing. In imposing Franklin’s sentence, the district court certainly engaged the § 3553(a) factors in considering the nature and circumstances of the offenses, Franklin’s history, needs for deterrence, and the seriousness 18 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 19 of 30 of his offenses, among other factors. It ultimately sentenced him to 48 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of Franklin’s Guidelines range, without any indication it may have miscalculated that range. J.A. 52–59. This is different from Hargrove and Gomez- Jimenez, where in response to an objection to each defendant’s Guidelines range, the district court determined that it would impose the same sentence regardless of the accuracy of its calculation. The Sentencing Guidelines serve as a tool for district courts to determine proportionate sentences. But the discretion afforded to district courts is not without limits. District courts are required to explain their conclusions when they impose an above- Guidelines sentence or an otherwise “unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence . . . to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair justice.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 50. If the harmlessness inquiry is one of our court’s tools for appellate review, “[n]othing could be less meaningful than labeling an error harmless so long as a district court states it would impose the same sentence in the event it erred, without also thoroughly explaining why it would do so.” Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 390 (4th Cir. 2014) (Gregory, J., concurring) (cleaned up) (citing United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 389 (3d Cir. 2013)). “The absence of such justification for the alternative sentence cannot be more at odds with the perception of fair justice.” Id.; see also United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding it hard “to imagine a case where it would be procedurally reasonable for a district court to announce that the same sentence would apply even if correct guidelines calculations are so substantially different, without cogent explanation” because the reviewing court “might be inclined to suspect that 19 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4037 Doc: 62 Filed: 08/14/2026 Pg: 20 of 30 the district court did not genuinely ‘consider’ the correct guidelines calculation in reaching the alternative rationale”). Here, the district court only rejected a downward variance and granted the Government’s request for a within-Guidelines sentence. While the district court stated that it would impose the same alternate variant sentence if it made an incorrect calculation, it did not provid