United States v. Marvin Gutierrez

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 1 of 52 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24-4308 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CRISTIAN ARIEL AREVALO ARIAS, a/k/a Serio, Defendant – Appellant. No. 24-4325 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MARVIN MENJIVAR GUTIERREZ, a/k/a Astuto, Defendant – Appellant. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 2 of 52 No. 24-4358 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CARLOS JOSE TURCIOS VILLATORO, a/k/a Carlos Jose Turicios Villatoro, a/k/a Oculto, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:21-cr-000260-LMB-5; 1:21-cr- 000260-LMB-2; 1:21-cr-000260-LMB-6) Argued: March 20, 2026 Decided: September 3, 2026 Before RICHARDSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Nos. 24-4308 and 24-4325 affirmed and No. 24-4358 vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson and Judge Berner joined. Nos. 24-4308/4325. ARGUED: Bernadette Mary Donovan, DONOVAN & ENGLE, PLLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lawrence Hunter Woodward, Jr., RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD, MORECOCK, TALBERT & WOODWARD, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant Marvin Menjivar Gutierrez. Matthew K. Hoff, Violent Crime & Racketeering Section, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Erik S. Siebert, United States 2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 3 of 52 Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, John C. Blanchard, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. No. 24-4358. ARGUED: Gregory M. Lipper, LIPPER LAW PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jacqueline Romy Bechara, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth L. Van Pelt, LIBBEY VAN PELT LAW, PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Matthew K. Hoff, Violent Crime & Racketeering Section, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Vetan Kapoor, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, John C. Blanchard, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 4 of 52 QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge: These appeals arise from a joint trial of three MS-13 members charged with racketeering, murder, witness tampering and drug offenses. After counsels’ closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury to completely disregard one defendant’s entire closing after finding portions of it improper. That instruction cured any prejudice the two codefendants may have experienced if the argument was indeed improper because it expressly removed the challenged argument from their cases. But the same instruction was a prejudicial abuse of discretion for the defendant whose entire summation was stricken. So, we vacate the convictions of that defendant. But, because we find no reversible error on the issues the other defendants raise, we affirm their convictions. I. BACKGROUND To set up the issues on appeal, we start with an overview of the events giving rise to this case and its procedural history, focusing on the trial testimony of a key government witness. As we move into our discussion of the parties’ arguments, we will include additional factual information specific to those issues. Woodbridge, Virginia experienced a spree of violent crime in the summer of 2019. Milton Beltran Lopez and Jairo Geremeas Mayorga were murdered in June, Eric Tate was murdered in August and Antonio Smith was murdered in September. Following extensive investigations into these murders and other criminal activities, state and federal authorities zeroed in on several individuals who were either members of or had close ties to the Sitios Locos Salvatrucha (STLS) clique of MS-13. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 5 of 52 In January 2022, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned a superseding indictment against 12 defendants: Marvin Menjivar Gutiérrez, Melvin Canales Saldana, Mario Antonio Guevara Rivera, Cristian Ariel Arevalo Arias, Carlos Jose Turcios Villatoro, Abner Jose Molina Rodriguez, Manilester Andrade Rivas, Jairo Gustavo Aguilera Sagastizado, Walter Jeovanny Rubio Lemus, Juan Carlos Hernández Landaverde, Karen Estefany Figueroa Alfaro and Juan Manuel Vasquez Reyes. 1 As the government’s investigation continued, several of these defendants—including Guevara, Molina and Vasquez—pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. On June 15, 2023, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment against eight defendants. The second superseding indictment charged Menjivar, Arevalo and Turcios in two overarching conspiracies: racketeering (Count One)—which the indictment charged under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962—and cocaine distribution (Count Two). It also charged all three of these defendants with various charges related to the murders. The indictment charged most of these offenses as violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR). See 18 U.S.C. § 1959. It charged the three defendants with three counts related to the murder of Beltran: VICAR conspiracy- murder (Count Three), VICAR murder (Count Four) and use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death (Count Five). It charged Arevalo and Turcios with three counts 1 In a previous indictment, the grand jury had charged Aguilera alone with various crimes related to murdering Smith. And a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation had previously filed a criminal complaint, accusing Rubio of conspiring to distribute cocaine. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 6 of 52 related to the murder of Geremeas: VICAR murder (Count Six), use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death (Count Seven) and witness tampering by killing (Count Eight). And in connection with Tate’s murder, it charged Arevalo with three counts: VICAR conspiracy-murder (Count Nine), VICAR murder (Count Ten) and use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death (Count Eleven). And, finally, the grand jury also charged Arevalo with one count of distributing cocaine (Count Seventeen). 2 Six of the eight individuals went to trial. 3 However, during a pre-trial conference on December 20, 2023, the district court determined that trying all six defendants at the same time would be difficult due to the complexity of the case. As a result, the district court severed the cases for trial, electing to hold two trials with three defendants at a time. The first trial began on January 8, 2024, and concerned the charges against Canales, Andrade and Aguilera. 4 The second trial began on January 22, 2024, and concerned the charges against Menjivar, Arevalo and Turcios—the three defendants at issue in this appeal. 2 Though the second superseding indictment charged other defendants, as mentioned above, we only describe the charges as to Menjivar, Arevalo and Turcios, since they are the three defendants in this appeal. 3 It is not obvious from the record what happened to the other two defendants, but the disposition of the cases against them is not relevant to our opinion. 4 The appeals stemming from the first trial have been consolidated under the lead case of United States v. Aguilera Sagastizado, No. 24-4251 (4th Cir. argued Mar. 20, 2026). 6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 7 of 52 A. Guevara’s Trial Testimony The second trial lasted two full weeks. The government called over a dozen witnesses. And Menjivar, Arevalo and Turcios called six witnesses. Among the government’s witnesses was Guevara, who pled guilty and agreed to cooperate. The government relied heavily on his recitation of the four murders. Because this testimony provides the factual context for all the issues presented by this appeal, we describe it at the outset. 1. STLS Background Guevara testified on the structure and membership of STLS. At the time of the events in this case, Menjivar was the First Word of STLS and Canales was the Second Word. The First Word and the Second Word are positions for first and second in command. 5 Guevara also stated that he, Molina, Turcios, Arevalo and Andrade were all Observacións. An Observación is a junior member of MS-13 who is usually overseen by more experienced gang members. MS-13 members are typically required to perform acts of violence to be promoted within the gang. Lower ranked members aspire to become Homeboys—meaning full-fledged members—which almost always requires committing one or more homicides. The information about the MS-13 ranks comes from an expert witness the 5 government called at trial. Guevara testified about who occupied those ranks at the time of the events giving rise to this case. 7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 8 of 52 2. The Double Murder Guevara explained that at some point during an STLS meeting, Menjivar and Canales admonished the other STLS members to start killing rival gang members to move up the ranks. The two leaders gave the others three months to find someone to kill. After that, Arevalo was drinking at a hotel when he heard Beltran claiming to be a Sureño, a member of a rival gang. So, Guevara, Arevalo and Turcios got permission from Menjivar to kill Beltran and began searching for Beltran in places where they knew he hung out, such as a grocery store called La Americana and a wooded area close to his house. On the evening of June 21, 2019, Guevara, Arevalo and Turcios stopped for gas at a station across the street from La Americana. As Arevalo walked into the station to buy cigarettes and other items, he heard a voice coming from behind one of the gas station’s trash cans that sounded like Beltran’s. But there were too many people around for them to kill Beltran there. So, they decided to lure Beltran into the woods behind the market by telling Beltran that they would give him drugs. Arevalo dropped off Guevara and Turcios, who were armed with a 9mm Glock and blades, in the wooded area and then returned to pick up Beltran. While Guevara and Turcios were waiting in the woods, Arevalo texted them to say he had picked up Beltran but that someone—who we now know was Geremeas—was with him. They decided to kill Geremeas too because “if that person was hanging out with a rival, he probably was a rival” 8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 9 of 52 and because “if [they] were going to kill [Beltran], [they] could not leave the other person alive because he would have already seen [them].” J.A. 958–59. 6 When Arevalo returned with Beltran and Geremeas, Turcios shot Beltran multiple times. Geremeas tried to run away, but Turcios shot him too. Guevara then shot Beltran several times. As he did so, Geremeas started to run away again, so Guevara shot Geremeas as well. Arevalo then stabbed and shot Beltran. Guevara, Arevalo and Turcios all received credit for two murders for purposes of advancing their rank in STLS. 3. Tate’s Murder In August 2019, Canales instructed Guevara to give Arevalo or Andrede a gun for them to use in a murder they were planning. Guevara did as he was told. Later, Arevalo told Guevara that he, Andrade, Molina and Wilmer Candelario Cabrera Rivera—one of the other defendants who was charged in the second superseding indictment—had been to some apartments behind the La Americana to look for a rival to kill. While they were there, they saw “a dark-skinned person” who “looked suspicious.” J.A. 1014. We now know that this person was Tate. Tate stopped at the entrance of La Americana and then turned around. Arevalo and Andrade followed him, walking around some cars so that Tate would not see them. Arevalo shot Tate in the back and handed the gun to Andrade. When Andrade froze, Arevalo instructed him, “dog, shoot.” J.A. 1015. So, Andrade started shooting Tate. 6 Unless otherwise noted, citations to the record are to the docket in United States v. Arevalo Arias, No. 24-4308. 9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 10 of 52 Andrade then tried to run away, but Tate, still alive, took out his own gun and fired. Andrade shot Tate again. By this point, Molina returned and also shot Tate. While it is unclear whether Arevalo received any credit, Andrade, Cabrera and Molina were all promoted after Tate’s murder. 4. Smith’s Murder In September 2019, Guevara testified that he, Aguilera and Molina were driving around looking for someone to kill. They found several potential victims but did not kill them because they were worried they would be seen. Eventually, they parked their car and found Smith walking toward them. Guevara then turned to Aguilera and stated, “we’re going to kill this one.” J.A. 1025. Aguilera agreed. Guevara started shooting Smith in the back. Smith fell and turned over, so Guevara shot him in the chest. Smith cried out, “oh my God, no, amigo, stop.” J.A. 1025. But Guevara continued shooting. Aguilera then asked for the gun, Guevara handed it to him and Aguilera began shooting. Guevara, Aguilera and Molina were eligible for promotions for murdering Smith. 7 B. The Verdict and this Appeal Following the presentation of all the evidence, the jury found both Turcios and Menjivar guilty on each count with which they were changed. And it found Arevalo guilty 7 It is not entirely clear from Guevara’s testimony what Molina’s involvement was in this homicide. But we know from his testimony that Molina was present because Guevara testified that after he and Aguilera returned to the car, Molina was holding a weapon. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 11 of 52 on his counts except VICAR conspiracy-murder of Tate, VICAR murder of Tate and using a firearm during the VICAR murder of Tate. 8 Menjivar, Arevalo and Turcios now appeal their convictions, asserting a host of challenges to various rulings the district court made throughout the proceedings. 9 II. DISCUSSION All three defendants challenge the district court’s decisions about Turcios’ closing argument, so we begin by considering the district court’s handling of that issue and will proceed to the other issues raised by defendants after that. For each issue, we start by providing some additional background on the district court’s challenged rulings. A. Turcios’ Closing Argument 1. Background Turcios’ convictions turned substantially on his involvement in the double murder of Beltran and Geremeas on June 21, 2019. And his defense primarily revolved around an alibi and an alternative theory of the double murder. His first witness was Monse Ambriz. Ambriz testified that she knew Turcios through Turcios’ cousin. According to Ambriz, Turcios had been living with his aunt, but after she kicked him out he started living in a 8 The district court sentenced Menjivar to life in prison on Counts One and Four and to 10 years on Counts Two and Three, to run concurrently. It sentenced Arevalo to life on Counts One, Four, Six and Eight and to 10 years on Counts Two, Three and Seventeen, to run concurrently. And it sentenced Turcios to life on Counts One, Four, Six and Eight, five years in prison on Count Two and 10 years in prison on Count Three, to run concurrently. 9 We have jurisdiction over these appeals from the district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 11 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 12 of 52 tent behind a trailer park. Ambriz testified that, on the evening of June 21, 2019, Turcios texted her to ask for some food. So, she waited until her parents went to sleep, made Turcios some eggs and met him at his tent at around 11 p.m. She stayed with Turcios in his tent for approximately one hour. After Ambriz, Turcios called Thomas Buckley and Philip Becnel, two private investigators. Buckley testified that he and Becnel went to both the gas station and the La Americana grocery store, where Arevalo had said he heard Beltran. Buckley went inside the gas station while Becnel spoke in a normal voice standing next to the dumpsters. Buckley stated that he could not hear Becnel at all. After all parties rested, Turcios was the final defendant to give a closing argument. His counsel began by honoring the victims and then explained why Turcios did not take the stand. She said Turcios had a grade-school education in El Salvador and did not speak English. She asked, “How can he ever compete with these prosecutors who are skilled in cross-examination and highly educated?” J.A. 2063. So, she explained that Turcios had decided “that it’s best to let [counsel] speak for [Turcios] as best as [she] can to tell his story.” J.A. 2064. Counsel then suggested that two of the government’s cooperating witnesses were telling the truth when they testified about the other defendants’ involvement in STLS’ crimes. As for one of these witnesses, counsel stated, “[h]er tears on cross examination, that was real pain to me. . . . I suggest to you that she probably was telling the truth, and she probably got it right.” J.A. 2064–65. As for the other cooperating witness, counsel said, 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 13 of 52 “[h]e had real regret to me.” J.A. 2065. But counsel contrasted those witnesses with Guevara: [Guevara] is a different story. The shifty eyes. The no emotion. That’s what a sociopath looks like. I hope you never meet someone like him again in your life. All of the guns, all of the lying, the brutality . . . . I told you in opening statement that if you ran into [Guevara] on the street, you wouldn’t trust him what it is time -- to tell you what time it is. I stand by that. And you might run into him in the street, because if the government files their motion and Judge Brinkema grants it, he may get out of jail and stay in this country. J.A. 2065–66. Counsel then offered the following theory of how the murders took place: Here’s what I suggest happened. [Guevara] was driving around that night with someone else, maybe [Molina]. There’s a lot of evidence of that. It’s a Friday night, they’re out at the clubs, they’re selling cocaine, they’re doing cocaine, something [Turcios] wasn’t involved with; right? They stop at the Seven Mart, not at the Exxon, at the Seven Mart. My printer is dying, so this is a horrible photo. This is not the one in evidence, you can look at the one in evidence. And I can’t talk while I’m back there, but I’m going to go back there, and I’m going to point out the dumpster. I suggest to you that they’re driving around out randomly. If they really wanted to get [Beltran] this night, [Guevara] said he knew where his house was, he would have been waiting outside his house. No. They went there, they heard [Beltran’s] voice, they saw [Beltran’s] voice -- or they saw [Beltran], and [Guevara] and whoever was with him lured him with drugs into the woods, shot and killed him and stabbed [Geremeas]. You heard from Monse Ambriz, someone who, out of the goodness of her heart, came here to testify. [Turcios] can’t do anything for her. He’s been in jail. He’ll get deport- -- he can't do anything for her. She came in, and she told you that she hiked up the hill behind the trailer park, and she was with him from 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. that night. I suggest to you that perhaps [Turcios] then walked to the Exxon -- that’s why the Exxon is in the story -- and they picked him up after. J.A. 2068–69. At one point, the government rose to object. But the district court instructed, “Don’t object.” J.A. 2074. Eventually, Turcios’ counsel concluded—“I’m so worried I 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 14 of 52 forgot something. [Turcios] has been in my mind for two and a half years, and this is the hardest part of the case, because this is when I hand him over to you. . . . [P]lease take care of him.” J.A. 2077. After the closing arguments, Arevalo’s counsel complained to the court that Turcios’ counsel’s comments about why Turcios did not testify indirectly and inappropriately suggested Arevalo had no reason not to testify. Arevalo’s counsel then argued for a severance because Turcios’ counsel had improperly argued, for the first time, that the other defendants committed the murders without Turcios when, up until that point, they had jointly defended the case. Ultimately, Arevalo moved for a mistrial and to have his case severed from Turcios. And Menjivar’s counsel reiterated that it may have been improper for Turcios’ counsel to comment on the credibility of the government’s cooperating witnesses. The district court seemingly had similar concerns. It noted “counsel are not supposed to vouch for witnesses” and agreed Turcios’ “closing argument went way beyond the bounds of appropriate conduct.” J.A. 2095. But the district court denied the motion to sever and motion for a mistrial and proposed a jury instruction: During the closing argument for [Turcios], [his counsel] made improper and inappropriate statements regarding the credibility of the witness in this case. Her closing argument improperly relied on her personal perception of the witnesses’ credibility -- which is called vouching, and is not permitted -- and her argument did not focus solely on the evidence presented during the trial. I am, therefore, instructing you to completely disregard the entire closing argument offered by [Turcios’ counsel] on behalf of [Turcios]. You may not use any of the information or arguments she offered as you deliberate in this case; however, nothing in this instruction 14 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 15 of 52 changes the requirement that you cannot find [Turcios] guilty of any offense unless the government has proven his guilt for that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. J.A. 2100. Turcios objected to the proposed instruction and asked whether the district court could instruct the jury to disregard only the offending remarks rather than the entire closing argument. The district court declined this request: Quite frankly, I thought it was way too emotional for federal court as well. It was an inappropriate closing argument almost from the beginning. But, nevertheless, once or twice, poor [government’s counsel] stood up to object, and I gave him the hand signal to sit down. But you were talking about things that were simply not in the record, your description about how the indictment came forward, you were sort of saying it was all because of [Guevara], and the government did properly address that in the rebuttal argument, but that was not a proper closing argument. So I’m not changing my approach to the instruction. J.A. 2102. The district court later gave the proposed jury instruction. After all three defendants were convicted, Arevalo and Menjivar moved for a new trial based on Turcios’ improper closing argument and the prejudicial effects they alleged stemmed from that argument. The district court reiterated its finding that Turcios’ closing argument “was improper, for among other things, improperly vouching for a witness and alluding to facts not in evidence.” J.A. 2503. However, the district court denied Arevalo and Menjivar’s motion for a new trial. The court explained that its jury instruction was sufficient to cure any prejudicial effect Menjivar or Arevalo may have faced, and the court added that “[t]he overwhelming evidence introduced at trial—coupled with the 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 16 of 52 comprehensiveness of the Court’s instructions to the jury—support the verdicts returned by the jury and the interests of justice do not require a new trial.” J.A. 2504. 2. Discussion Arevalo and Menjivar agree with the district court’s assessment that Turcios’ closing argument was improper. But they contend that the district court’s curative instruction was insufficient to remedy their prejudice, so the district court should have granted a mistrial. In contrast, Turcios contends his closing argument was proper. But he argues that even if parts were improper, the district court erred by instructing the jury to completely disregard his argument because that instruction effectively denied him the opportunity to make a closing argument at all—which he contends violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. a. Standard of Review We begin with our standard of review. District courts enjoy broad discretion in limiting or controlling closing arguments to ensure those arguments do not “stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). And for this reason, we normally review a district court’s limitations on closing arguments for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 93 F.4th 619, 631 (4th Cir. 2024). But the right of a criminal defendant to make a closing argument is protected by the Sixth Amendment. See Herring, 422 U.S. at 856–63. Thus, a district court may abuse its discretion when it effectively denies a criminal defendant the opportunity to make a closing argument. See id.; see also United States v. 16 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 17 of 52 King, 650 F.2d 534, 537 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Of course, the trial court retains the broad discretion to limit the scope and duration of all phases of a trial, including closing argument; however, this discretion must be exercised with proper regard for the defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 10 Similarly, we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial, its denial of a motion for severance and its decision regarding curative instructions. See Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 731 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 348 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Wallace, 515 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 2008). b. Menjivar and Arevalo With our standard of review in mind, we first turn to Menjivar and Arevalo’s contention that several aspects of Turcios’ closing argument were improper. They claim Turcios’ counsel improperly (1) waited until closing to introduce a mutually antagonistic defense, (2) vouched for two of the government’s witnesses, (3) argued facts not in evidence and (4) engaged in discussion of Turcios’ decision to not testify. Menjivar and 10 Because Turcios characterizes the district court’s actions in this case as effectively denying him his right to make a closing argument, he suggests that this is both a constitutional error and a pure legal question that we should review de novo. Perhaps there is tension between abuse of discretion review and the protection of constitutional rights. But if there is, we read both the Supreme Court’s decision in Herring, 422 U.S. at 856–63, and our decision in King, 650 F.2d at 537, as resolving that tension by recognizing that a district court retains discretion in controlling closing arguments but may abuse that discretion if it crosses the line into denying a defendant the ability to make such an argument. Moreover, even when we review for abuse of discretion, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, so a district court abuses its discretion if it makes an error of law. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996); United States v. Nixon, 130 F.4th 420, 428 (4th Cir. 2025). 17 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 18 of 52 Arevalo argue that these various improprieties should have resulted in a mistrial because, despite the curative instruction, the risk that the jury would be influenced by Turcios’ improper arguments was too great. They also argue that the district court’s curative instruction may have created an additional problem—that the jury might disregard parts of all three defendants’ closing arguments. We do not need to decide if Turcios’ closing argument was improper to resolve whether the district court erred in denying Menjivar and Arevalo’s request for a mistrial. Even if it was, any prejudice to Menjivar or Arevalo that may have resulted from Turcios’ closing argument was rectified by the district court’s curative instruction. We presume that jurors follow such a curative instruction. Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 646–47 (2023). True, that presumption is not absolute. Menjivar and Arevalo contend that there are some instances when the risk of prejudice to a defendant is so great that courts cannot rely on this presumption. But the presumption “yields only in the ‘exceptional’ case where inadmissible evidence makes so strong an impression that its prejudicial effect cannot realistically be erased by an instruction to disregard.” United States v. Ritter, 167 F.4th 677, 683 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 438 (1887)). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)—a case Menjivar and Arevalo analogize to—the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction could not cure the prejudice faced by one defendant when he was implicated in a confession introduced into evidence against his co-defendant. Id. at 136–37. The Court explained that “there are some contexts 18 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 19 of 52 in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135. Since then, however, the Court has resisted extending the Bruton rule. For example, in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 202 (1987), the Court examined “whether Bruton requires the same result when the codefendant’s confession is redacted to omit any reference to the defendant, but the defendant is nonetheless linked to the confession by evidence properly admitted against him at trial.” Id. at 202. The Court held that it did not, reiterating the importance of the general presumption that juries follow instructions. Id. at 211. And in Samia, the Court declined to extend Bruton to a situation when an officer testified about one defendant’s confession without mentioning the non-confessing defendant. Samia, 599 U.S. at 653–54. The Court explained that “to disregard or to make unnecessary exceptions to [the general presumption] ‘would make inroads into th[e] entire complex code of . . . criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.’” Id. at 647 (alterations in original) (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967)). For two reasons, we likewise decline to extend Bruton and, instead, presume that the jury followed the district court’s instructions. First, as just described, the Supreme Court has declined to extend Bruton beyond its facts, and applying Bruton here would do just that. 11 Second, Turcios’ closing did not implicate the same concerns underlying 11 There may still be instances outside of the facts of this case when a curative instruction is insufficient to ameliorate the effects of the introduction of inadmissible 19 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4325 Doc: 124 Filed: 09/03/2026 Pg: 20 of 52 Bruton. That’s because Bruton was animated by the fact that the confession was in evidence. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 127 (“Here Evans’ oral confessions were in fact testified to, and were therefore actually in evidence.”). But, in contrast, Turcios’ counsel’s statements during closing were arguments, not evidence. See Long v. Hooks, 972 F.3d 442, 463 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“[I]t is elemental that counsel’s arguments are not evidence in a case. It is literally black letter law.”). We also find that, contrary to Menjivar and Arevalo’s suggestion, the text of the district court’s curative instruction did not “create[] a risk that the jury would discount all defense closing arguments, especially given the jury’s knowledge of defense coordination.” Op. Br. at 69. Rather, the instruction identified Turcios’ closing argument alone, directed the jury to disregard it and reiterated that the government bore the burden of proving each defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither Menjivar nor Arevalo identifies a record-specific reason to conclude that the jury could not follow that targeted evidence. But, in those instances, the defendant must demonstrate “there is an ‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions . . . and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be ‘devastating’ to the defendant.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (first quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208; and then quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136); accord United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e can only reverse if there is some specific reason to doubt that the jury adhered to the district court’s limiting instruction.”). The only fact Menjivar and Arev