Full Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2025-2061 ____________ GARY LAWRENCE, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. November 19, 2026 FRANCIS, J. Gary Lawrence, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the dismissal of his third successive motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the dismissal of his claims.1 I. Lawrence was convicted of and sentenced to death for the “extraordinarily brutal” 1994 first-degree murder of Michael Finken. Lawrence v. State (Lawrence I), 698 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 1997). 2 1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 2. Lawrence was also convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, auto theft, and petit theft. We affirmed his convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal in Lawrence I, where we recounted that Lawrence conspired with his wife, Brenda, to kill Michael after learning that Michael slept with Brenda during the couple’s prior separation. Id. at 1220, 1222. Lawrence beat Michael with a pipe until it bent, then beat him with a baseball bat to the point Michael’s face and head were disfigured and his eyeball was protruding. Id. at 1220. Michael begged him to stop. Id. Lawence also shoved a mop handle down Michael’s throat, and, after removing it, Michael gave three to four final ragged breaths. Id. 3 Several years after Lawrence I, Lawrence filed his initial postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 raising multiple claims, the denial of which we affirmed in 3. The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three, and the sentencing court imposed the death penalty based on three aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while Lawrence was under sentence of imprisonment, (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. Id. at 1221 & n.1. The sentencing court also found five nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, that Lawrence: (1) cooperated with police; (2) had a learning disability and low IQ; (3) had a deprived childhood; (4) was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crimes; and (5) does not have a violent history. Id. at 1221 & n.2. -2- Lawrence v. State (Lawrence II), 831 So. 2d 121, 126 nn.1-2 (Fla. 2002) (listing claims). We also denied his habeas petition raising multiple claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in Lawrence II. Id. at 126 n.4, 134-37. Lawrence also filed a first and second successive motion for postconviction relief, both of which were denied and affirmed on appeal. Lawrence v. State (Lawrence III), 236 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 2018) (denying relief under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)); Lawrence v. State (Lawrence IV), 296 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 2020) (denying relief under Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014)). In his third successive postconviction motion, Lawrence raised two interrelated claims of newly discovered evidence related to the passage of the Dozier School for Boys and Okeechobee School Victim Compensation Program (“Dozier Act”). See ch. 2024-254, Laws of Fla. (creating § 16.63, Fla. Stat. (2024) (effective July 1, 2024)). First, he argued that because the same entity that sentenced him to death—the State of Florida—acknowledged (by offering him reparations) that he suffered abuse at another of its entities, Dozier, -3- his death sentence is “disproportionate” under the Eighth Amendment. Second, he argued that he is entitled to a new penalty phase based on the newly discovered mitigating evidence brought to light by the Dozier Act. The postconviction court treated both arguments as newly discovered evidence claims and summarily dismissed both as untimely and procedurally barred. With respect to the first claim, the postconviction court noted that this Court had already rejected similar arguments that the 2024 Dozier Act constitutes newly discovered evidence. See Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1061-62 (Fla. 2024) (explaining that the Dozier Act did not revive Cole’s previously denied postconviction claim and overcome the procedural bar because the conditions at the Dozier school had been exposed long ago); Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 628 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). The postconviction court found Lawrence failed to distinguish Cole from his own case because, while he pointed out that Cole was not at the school during the time period covered by the Dozier Act, this fact was irrelevant to this Court’s analysis in Cole. -4- With respect to Lawrence’s second claim, the postconviction court concluded that the record refuted Lawrence’s claim of newly discovered evidence. As evidence, the court attached portions of the record showing that Lawrence’s time at the Dozier school was mentioned in Lawrence’s original Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI) and in his second successive rule 3.851 motion (the denial of which was affirmed in Lawrence IV). Thus, the court concluded that Lawrence’s claim did not constitute newly discovered evidence. II. Our review of an order summarily denying a successive rule 3.851 motion is de novo. See Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1262 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025). Summary denial is appropriate if “the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Id. (quoting Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335, 344 (Fla. 2023)). A postconviction court may also appropriately summarily dismiss untimely or procedurally barred claims under the rule. Id.; see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2). With limited exceptions, rule 3.851(d)(1) imposes a one-year time limitation on any motion to vacate a final judgment and -5- sentence of death. Lawrence attempts to avail himself of the newly discovered evidence exception—when “the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A). We affirm the postconviction court’s conclusion that Lawrence’s attempt to raise newly discovered evidence claims based on the 2024 Dozier Act is untimely and procedurally barred. As an initial matter, this Court has already announced that the Dozier Act (or CS/HB 21) “does not constitute newly discovered evidence.” Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1062. In Cole, we explained that “[a]lthough CS/HB 21 was recently enacted, it does not amount to newly discovered evidence. Indeed, we have routinely held that resolutions, consensus opinions, articles, research, and the like do not satisfy the standard.” Id. at 1061-62 (citing Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (other citations omitted)). “Like the APA resolution in Barwick, CS/HB 21 expresses a public stance predicated on reports, data, and research that have been publicly available for years” and “[t]he harsh conditions at the Dozier School were exposed long ago.” Id. at 1062 (alteration in original). -6- We further agree with the postconviction court that the record attachments conclusively refute Lawrence’s newly discovered evidence claim because his PSI and second successive rule 3.851 motion show that the facts on which his current claims are predicated were either known or could have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Thus, Lawrence’s claims do not meet the newly discovered evidence exception to the one-year time limit under rule 3.851(d)(1) and are untimely. We also agree that Lawrence’s claims, which are very similar to what we considered in Jones, 419 So. 3d at 623-24, are procedurally barred. In Jones, we held in part that because Jones’s claim was predicated on abuse that occurred nearly fifty years ago and around fifteen years before Jones’s trial, it was procedurally barred because it “could have and should have been raised earlier.” Id. at 624. Likewise, any claim about any abuse Lawrence suffered at the Dozier school in the 1970s—well before his trial in the 1990s—could have and should have been raised earlier. Thus, we also affirm the postconviction court’s conclusion that Lawrence’s claims are procedurally barred. -7- We find the procedural bars dispositive and need not address the merits of either claim. III. We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s dismissal of Lawrence’s third successive postconviction motion. It is so ordered. COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County, Clifton Alan Drake, Judge Case No. 571994CF000397XXAXMX Dawn Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M. Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nida Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North Region, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee -8-