Gary Lawrence v. State of Florida
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketSC2025-2061
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC2025-2061
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GARY LAWRENCE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
November 19, 2026
FRANCIS, J.
Gary Lawrence, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals
the dismissal of his third successive motion for postconviction
relief. We affirm the dismissal of his claims.1
I.
Lawrence was convicted of and sentenced to death for the
“extraordinarily brutal” 1994 first-degree murder of Michael Finken.
Lawrence v. State (Lawrence I), 698 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 1997). 2
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
2. Lawrence was also convicted of conspiracy to commit
murder, auto theft, and petit theft.
We affirmed his convictions and sentence of death on direct
appeal in Lawrence I, where we recounted that Lawrence conspired
with his wife, Brenda, to kill Michael after learning that Michael
slept with Brenda during the couple’s prior separation. Id. at 1220,
1222. Lawrence beat Michael with a pipe until it bent, then beat
him with a baseball bat to the point Michael’s face and head were
disfigured and his eyeball was protruding. Id. at 1220. Michael
begged him to stop. Id. Lawence also shoved a mop handle down
Michael’s throat, and, after removing it, Michael gave three to four
final ragged breaths. Id. 3
Several years after Lawrence I, Lawrence filed his initial
postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.851 raising multiple claims, the denial of which we affirmed in
3. The jury recommended death by a vote of nine to three,
and the sentencing court imposed the death penalty based on three
aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed while
Lawrence was under sentence of imprisonment, (2) the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and (3) the murder was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. Id. at
1221 & n.1. The sentencing court also found five nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances, that Lawrence: (1) cooperated with police;
(2) had a learning disability and low IQ; (3) had a deprived
childhood; (4) was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
crimes; and (5) does not have a violent history. Id. at 1221 & n.2.
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Lawrence v. State (Lawrence II), 831 So. 2d 121, 126 nn.1-2 (Fla.
2002) (listing claims). We also denied his habeas petition raising
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in
Lawrence II. Id. at 126 n.4, 134-37. Lawrence also filed a first and
second successive motion for postconviction relief, both of which
were denied and affirmed on appeal. Lawrence v. State (Lawrence
III), 236 So. 3d 240 (Fla. 2018) (denying relief under Hurst v. State,
202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)); Lawrence v. State (Lawrence IV), 296 So.
3d 892 (Fla. 2020) (denying relief under Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701 (2014)).
In his third successive postconviction motion, Lawrence raised
two interrelated claims of newly discovered evidence related to the
passage of the Dozier School for Boys and Okeechobee School
Victim Compensation Program (“Dozier Act”). See ch. 2024-254,
Laws of Fla. (creating § 16.63, Fla. Stat. (2024) (effective July 1,
2024)).
First, he argued that because the same entity that sentenced
him to death—the State of Florida—acknowledged (by offering him
reparations) that he suffered abuse at another of its entities, Dozier,
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his death sentence is “disproportionate” under the Eighth
Amendment.
Second, he argued that he is entitled to a new penalty phase
based on the newly discovered mitigating evidence brought to light
by the Dozier Act.
The postconviction court treated both arguments as newly
discovered evidence claims and summarily dismissed both as
untimely and procedurally barred.
With respect to the first claim, the postconviction court noted
that this Court had already rejected similar arguments that the
2024 Dozier Act constitutes newly discovered evidence. See Cole v.
State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1061-62 (Fla. 2024) (explaining that the
Dozier Act did not revive Cole’s previously denied postconviction
claim and overcome the procedural bar because the conditions at
the Dozier school had been exposed long ago); Jones v. State, 419
So. 3d 619, 628 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). The
postconviction court found Lawrence failed to distinguish Cole from
his own case because, while he pointed out that Cole was not at the
school during the time period covered by the Dozier Act, this fact
was irrelevant to this Court’s analysis in Cole.
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With respect to Lawrence’s second claim, the postconviction
court concluded that the record refuted Lawrence’s claim of newly
discovered evidence. As evidence, the court attached portions of the
record showing that Lawrence’s time at the Dozier school was
mentioned in Lawrence’s original Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
(PSI) and in his second successive rule 3.851 motion (the denial of
which was affirmed in Lawrence IV). Thus, the court concluded
that Lawrence’s claim did not constitute newly discovered evidence.
II.
Our review of an order summarily denying a successive rule
3.851 motion is de novo. See Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257,
1262 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025). Summary denial
is appropriate if “the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Id.
(quoting Zack v. State, 371 So. 3d 335, 344 (Fla. 2023)). A
postconviction court may also appropriately summarily dismiss
untimely or procedurally barred claims under the rule. Id.; see Fla.
R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2).
With limited exceptions, rule 3.851(d)(1) imposes a one-year
time limitation on any motion to vacate a final judgment and
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sentence of death. Lawrence attempts to avail himself of the newly
discovered evidence exception—when “the facts on which the claim
is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney
and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(2)(A).
We affirm the postconviction court’s conclusion that
Lawrence’s attempt to raise newly discovered evidence claims based
on the 2024 Dozier Act is untimely and procedurally barred. As an
initial matter, this Court has already announced that the Dozier Act
(or CS/HB 21) “does not constitute newly discovered evidence.”
Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1062. In Cole, we explained that “[a]lthough
CS/HB 21 was recently enacted, it does not amount to newly
discovered evidence. Indeed, we have routinely held that
resolutions, consensus opinions, articles, research, and the like do
not satisfy the standard.” Id. at 1061-62 (citing Barwick v. State,
361 So. 3d 785, 793 (Fla. 2023) (other citations omitted)). “Like the
APA resolution in Barwick, CS/HB 21 expresses a public stance
predicated on reports, data, and research that have been publicly
available for years” and “[t]he harsh conditions at the Dozier School
were exposed long ago.” Id. at 1062 (alteration in original).
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We further agree with the postconviction court that the record
attachments conclusively refute Lawrence’s newly discovered
evidence claim because his PSI and second successive rule 3.851
motion show that the facts on which his current claims are
predicated were either known or could have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence. Thus, Lawrence’s claims do not meet the
newly discovered evidence exception to the one-year time limit
under rule 3.851(d)(1) and are untimely.
We also agree that Lawrence’s claims, which are very similar
to what we considered in Jones, 419 So. 3d at 623-24, are
procedurally barred. In Jones, we held in part that because Jones’s
claim was predicated on abuse that occurred nearly fifty years ago
and around fifteen years before Jones’s trial, it was procedurally
barred because it “could have and should have been raised earlier.”
Id. at 624. Likewise, any claim about any abuse Lawrence suffered
at the Dozier school in the 1970s—well before his trial in the
1990s—could have and should have been raised earlier. Thus, we
also affirm the postconviction court’s conclusion that Lawrence’s
claims are procedurally barred.
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We find the procedural bars dispositive and need not address
the merits of either claim.
III.
We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s dismissal of
Lawrence’s third successive postconviction motion.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, BARRIOS,
and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Santa Rosa County,
Clifton Alan Drake, Judge
Case No. 571994CF000397XXAXMX
Dawn Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M.
Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nida
Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, North Region,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee
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