Full Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2026-1605 ____________ JESSE GUARDADO, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. October 29, 2026 PER CURIAM. Jesse Guardado was sentenced to death twenty years ago for brutally murdering seventy-five-year-old Jackie Malone. The Governor has signed a warrant for Guardado’s execution, currently set for November 5, 2026. Guardado appeals the denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief. He also seeks a stay of his execution. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.; see also State v. Fourth Dist. Ct. of Appeal, 697 So. 2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1997) (holding “that in addition to our appellate jurisdiction over sentences of death, we have exclusive jurisdiction to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of postconviction relief. We also deny his request for a stay of execution. I In 2004, Guardado wanted to rob a local grocery store to pay for his crack cocaine habit and for repairs to his truck. 1 Guardado v. State (Guardado I), 965 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2007). His attempt failed after an employee intervened. Still desperate for money, Guardado decided to rob Malone because she lived in a secluded area and he shared a close relationship with her. Guardado had rented from Malone, stayed as a guest in her home, and received her assistance on multiple occasions. Guardado armed himself with a metal “breaker bar” and a kitchen knife before driving to Malone’s residence. After arriving, he 1. At the time of these crimes, Guardado had served concurrent prison sentences—twenty years out of Orange County for robbery with a deadly weapon and fifteen to twenty years out of Seminole County for robbery and robbery with a weapon. Guardado v. State (Guardado I), 965 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. 2007). Guardado was conditionally released on January 1, 2003, with supervision set to expire on February 6, 2014. Malone was murdered on September 13, 2004. -2- knocked repeatedly on the front door until Malone awoke. When she came to the door, Guardado identified himself. Malone greeted him, and he told her he needed to use the telephone. Malone let him inside. When she turned her back, Guardado pulled out the breaker bar he had concealed in his pants and repeatedly struck her in the head. Malone raised her hands to defend herself before falling to the living room floor. Believing she was still alive, Guardado then stabbed her several times—including in the heart— and slashed her throat. After the brutal attack, Guardado went to Malone’s bedroom and stole her jewelry box, briefcase, purse, and cell phone. Guardado waived counsel and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. 2 Id. at 113. Court-appointed counsel represented Guardado for the penalty phase, and a jury unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to death for Malone’s murder. Id. at 111. At sentencing, the trial court found five aggravating 2. Guardado also pleaded guilty to robbery with a weapon. Guardado I, 965 So. 2d at 112. For this count, the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in prison, set to run consecutively to the murder count. Id. -3- factors: (1) the capital felony having been committed by a person on conditional release supervision; (2) the defendant having been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person; (3) the capital felony having been committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery with a weapon; (4) the capital felony being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (5) the crime having been committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner (CCP). Id. at 112. Guardado asked the trial court not to consider any statutory mitigating factors, but the court still found nineteen nonstatutory mitigating factors. Id. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Guardado to death. Id. at 111-13. In 2005, Guardado directly appealed, raising four issues.3 Id. at 113-18. This Court affirmed Guardado’s judgment and sentence 3. Guardado raised the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry under Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), after Guardado expressly asked the court to remove his court-appointed counsel; (2) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could consider the HAC aggravator; (3) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could consider the CCP aggravator; and (4) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on the ground that Florida’s death penalty was unconstitutional -4- of death. Id. at 120. The United States Supreme Court denied Guardado’s petition for certiorari. Guardado v. Florida, 552 U.S. 1197 (2008). Guardado next sought postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Guardado v. State (Guardado II), 176 So. 3d 886, 889 (Fla. 2015). He filed his initial postconviction motion in October 2008 and an amended motion in June 2010. Id. at 892. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied relief, and we affirmed. 4 Id. at 899. In 2017, Guardado filed a successive postconviction motion arguing that he was entitled to relief under Hurst v. Florida, 577 under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Guardado I, 965 So. 2d at 113-18. 4. Guardado raised the following ineffective assistance of counsel claims on appeal: (1) counsel failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation by not contacting ten potentially mitigating witnesses; (2) counsel failed to expand the mitigation investigation when it became apparent that further investigation was necessary; (3) counsel failed to object when two prospective jurors were struck for cause; and (4) counsel failed to strike three allegedly biased jurors who ultimately served on the jury. Guardado II, 176 So. 3d at 893-99. -5- U.S. 92 (2016). 5 Guardado v. State (Guardado V), 238 So. 3d 162, 162-63 (Fla. 2018). The circuit court continued the postconviction proceedings to allow Guardado’s filing a habeas petition with this Court. Id.; Guardado v. Jones (Guardado III), 226 So. 3d 213, 214 (Fla. 2017). This Court denied that petition. Guardado III, 226 So. 3d at 215. Guardado then filed a motion for rehearing, which this Court also denied. Guardado v. Jones (Guardado IV), No. SC17- 389, 2017 WL 4150352 (Fla. Sep. 19, 2017). The United States Supreme Court denied Guardado’s certiorari petition that followed. Guardado v. Jones, 584 U.S. 922 (2018). After this Court denied habeas relief, the circuit court summarily denied Guardado’s successive rule 3.851 motion. Guardado V, 238 So. 3d at 163. This Court affirmed, holding that Guardado’s claims had already been rejected in the habeas 5. A few years prior to the filing of Guardado’s successive motion for postconviction relief, he joined as a party to a petition seeking to invoke this Court’s all writs jurisdiction. This Court transferred the petition to the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, where it was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Bondi, No. SC15-1481 (Fla. Oct. 8, 2015); Morrison v. Bondi, No. 63- 2015-CA-00099 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 2016). -6- proceeding. Id. at 164. The United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari relief. Guardado v. Florida, 586 U.S. 1004 (2018). Guardado then sought federal habeas relief, asserting five claims. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:15cv256-RH, 2022 WL 22863709, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2022). The district court denied the petition and denied a certificate of appealability. Id. at *21. Guardado moved to amend or alter the judgment or to reconsider the denial of the certificate of appealability, but the district court denied the motion. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 4:15cv256-RH, 2022 WL 22863708, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2022). The denial of Guardado’s petition was affirmed on appeal. Guardado v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 112 F.4th 958, 995 (11th Cir. 2024). The United States Supreme Court once again denied Guardado’s petition for certiorari relief. Guardado v. Dixon, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). On October 5, 2026, Governor DeSantis signed a death warrant for Guardado’s execution. Guardado timely filed the successive motion for postconviction relief at issue here, raising three claims: (1) that Florida’s clemency process is unconstitutional because it denies death-sentenced -7- individuals the minimal due process required; (2) that Guardado’s death sentence is unreliable under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments due to counsel’s representation at trial and in initial postconviction proceedings; and (3) that Florida’s warrant process is unconstitutional because that process deprives Guardado of a full and fair postconviction proceeding, in violation of his due process rights, and fails to satisfy the heightened reliability required in capital cases. On October 14, 2026, the circuit court held a Huff6 hearing and found that Guardado was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. On October 19, 2026, the circuit court entered its order summarily denying Guardado’s successive motion for postconviction relief. Guardado now timely appeals that order and asks that we stay his execution. II Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is appropriate “[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Fla. R. 6. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). -8- Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). In reviewing a circuit court’s summary denial, we accept as true the defendant’s allegations to the extent that they are not conclusively refuted by the record. Cole v. State, 392 So. 3d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2024). A circuit court’s decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion “is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 1000 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003)). A In his first argument on appeal, Guardado challenges the circuit court’s denial of his clemency process claim, arguing Florida’s clemency process violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Guardado argues that clemency in Florida is a nullity because it has not been granted to a death-sentenced defendant since 1983 and because the current Governor has expressly stated that he will not grant clemency to murderers or felony sex offenders. In support, Guardado relies on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard for the proposition that clemency proceedings require “some minimal procedural safeguards.” 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) -9- (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis omitted). Although we have acknowledged Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, we have never adopted a requirement of specific procedural safeguards applicable to the clemency process. See Marek, 14 So. 3d at 998 (noting that “none of the opinions in [Woodard] required any specific procedures or criteria to guide the executive’s signing of warrants for death-sentenced inmates”). Instead, we have repeatedly emphasized that Florida’s clemency process rests in the unfettered discretion of the Governor. Art. IV, § 8(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 4 (“The Governor has the unfettered discretion to deny clemency at any time, for any reason.”); see Johnston v. State, 27 So. 3d 11, 25 (Fla. 2010) (“no specific procedures are mandated”); Zakrzewski v. State, 415 So. 3d 203, 211 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 57 (2025); Chavez v. State, 132 So. 3d 826, 831-32 (Fla. 2014); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 887-89 (Fla. 2013). - 10 - Here, Guardado received clemency review. 7 Indeed, Guardado’s death warrant states that clemency “was considered pursuant to the Rules of Executive Clemency, and it has been determined that executive clemency is not appropriate.” So even taking as true his allegations about the Governor’s blanket policy, Guardado points to no authority prohibiting the executive branch from considering the offense of the conviction when “determining whether to exercise the ‘grace’ of clemency.” See Bryan v. DeSantis, 343 So. 3d 127, 129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (holding Governor’s denial of inmate’s clemency application for commutation of sentence for sexual battery by adult on victim less than twelve years of age did not violate inmate’s right to due process, even though Governor denied clemency applications of all individuals convicted of murder or felony sex offenses). As in Bryan, Guardado has not been denied all access to the statutorily established clemency process, identified any procedures the Governor violated, or demonstrated that the Governor failed to consider any required criteria. “[I]t is not our 7. In March 2026, Guardado received notice that his clemency interview was scheduled for July 2026. He alleges he only learned that the clemency process had concluded when his death warrant was signed on October 5, 2026. - 11 - prerogative to second-guess the application” of this exclusively executive function. See Bundy v. State, 497 So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1986). So Guardado cannot establish a due process violation. Because Guardado received a clemency proceeding, and he challenges only its sufficiency, his claim was properly denied by the circuit court. We affirm. B Next, Guardado argues that the circuit court erred in denying his second claim, in which he contends that counsel’s performance at trial and in the initial postconviction proceedings makes his death sentence unreliable under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Guardado’s argument amounts to multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As to trial counsel, Guardado asserts that counsel inadequately prepared for the penalty phase by failing to both investigate mitigation leads and present additional mitigating evidence, these failures allegedly preventing the jury from hearing Guardado’s full background. 8 Guardado argues that, had 8. Guardado identifies several categories of mitigation that he contends could have been presented at trial, including his remorse; - 12 - the jury heard the additional mitigation evidence, it would not have returned a unanimous recommendation of death. He also contends that initial postconviction counsel likewise failed to discover or develop this mitigation evidence. Guardado also alleges deficiencies in his initial postconviction representation more broadly. He asserts that his first appointed counsel had been barred from capital cases; that replacement counsel did not investigate mitigation evidence and did not pursue several claims; and that he went several years without representation in state court. Guardado alleges that these failures prevented the presentation of evidence that would have lessened his culpability and that, as a result, his death sentence is disproportionate and inconsistent with the individualized sentencing required by the Eighth Amendment. Guardado’s claims are untimely. A defendant must file a postconviction motion within one year after the judgment and leads referenced in Dr. James Larson’s report (including childhood sexual abuse and drug and alcohol abuse); his stay at the Dozier School for Boys; additional sexual abuse and substance abuse as an adult; and his lack of tools to succeed upon release from prison and supervision. - 13 - sentence become final, absent certain exceptions. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1)-(2); Ferguson v. State, 101 So. 3d 362, 366 (Fla. 2012) (“Claims raised pursuant to rule 3.851 must meet either the timeliness requirements provided in section (d)(1) or the exceptions provided in section (d)(2).”). The factual basis for these arguments was available long before the death warrant was signed, and Guardado does not allege or show that any exception under rule 3.851(d)(2) applies. See Cole, 392 So. 3d at 1061-62 (finding the “harsh conditions at the Dozier School were exposed long ago” and rejecting a claim based on that evidence as untimely); Bates v. State, 416 So. 3d 312, 320 (Fla.) (holding as untimely claims about mitigation omitted from a penalty phase that occurred decades ago), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 66 (2025). The claims likewise could have been raised in prior proceedings and are therefore procedurally barred. See Jennings v. State, 422 So. 3d 107, 114 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 402 (2025); Rogers v. State, 409 So. 3d 1257, 1263 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025). Guardado’s allegations are not new, and even if they were, they could have been raised in earlier postconviction proceedings. Nearly two decades have passed since - 14 - Guardado’s penalty phase and initial postconviction proceedings; accordingly, the claims are barred. See Atkins v. State, 663 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1995) (holding that a procedural bar applies to issues which should have been raised in prior collateral proceedings); Jones v. State, 419 So. 3d 619, 624 (Fla.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025); Bates, 416 So. 3d at 320; Gudinas v. State, 412 So. 3d 701, 712 (Fla.) (holding that a defendant’s claim is procedurally barred because it could have been previously raised), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2833 (2025). Guardado’s invocation of the concept of manifest injustice does not dissuade us from this conclusion. See Reaves v. State, No. SC2026-1512, 2026 WL 3071534, at *4 (Fla. Oct. 14), cert. denied, 2026 WL 3132759 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2026). The circuit court therefore correctly denied this claim. C Finally, Guardado argues that the expedited warrant process deprives him of due process, fundamental fairness, the right to effective counsel, and access to counsel. The circuit court correctly denied this claim because our precedent has repeatedly rejected similar challenges. - 15 - Guardado contends that he did not receive the same fair notice as the attorney general, citing comments made by an assistant attorney general at the scheduling hearing. The assistant attorney general had remarked that a warrant could be issued at any time during the past year given the pace at which the Governor has been signing warrants. Guardado also asserts that, under section 922.052, Florida Statutes, he was not eligible for a warrant until the clemency process was concluded, and that he did not learn that clemency had been denied until the warrant was signed. But Guardado has long been on notice that a warrant could be issued: his death sentence was imposed in 2005, and his sentence became final in 2008. We have repeatedly held that expedited warrant proceedings do not violate due process. See, e.g., Jennings, 422 So. 3d at 118-19; Jones, 419 So. 3d at 625. Due process in post-warrant litigation requires only notice and an opportunity to be heard. Bates, 416 So. 3d at 321; Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 390 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025). So we have rejected similar challenges to the length of the warrant period. See Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 789-90 (Fla. 2023); Hutchinson v. State, 416 - 16 - So. 3d 273, 279-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1914 (2025); Zakrzewski, 415 So. 3d at 210-11; Bell v. State, 415 So. 3d 85, 106- 07 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2872 (2025). Guardado cannot establish that the thirty-one-day warrant period deprives him due process because he “has not identified any matter on which he was denied notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Jones, 419 So. 3d at 625. Guardado’s allegations of gamesmanship and an unlevel playing field do not undermine the application of our existing precedent here. The circuit court properly denied relief. III We affirm the summary denial of Guardado’s successive motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his request for a stay of execution and request for oral argument. No motion for rehearing will be considered by this Court. The mandate shall issue immediately. It is so ordered. COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and BARRIOS, JJ., concur. TANENBAUM, J., concurs with an opinion. LABARGA, J., concurs in result. - 17 - TANENBAUM, J., concurring. Capital collateral counsel should keep in mind that part IV of chapter 27, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(h) do not give license to submit frivolous claims in the post-conviction court or here, even if there is an active death warrant. Rule 3.851(h), in particular, simply establishes a post- warrant expedited process for the rare, last-minute, meritorious claim for post-conviction relief. It should not be mistaken for an invitation to submit just one more successive post-conviction motion—any motion—for the mere sake of filing one, regardless of whether it wholly lacks merit. More to the point, an active death warrant does not exempt counsel from complying with Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-3.1, which precludes a lawyer from asserting an issue in a proceeding “unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Walton County, J. Ryan Love, Judge Case No. 662004CF000903CFAXMX - 18 - Dawn Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Karin Moore, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Lisa M. Fusaro, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Merribeth Bohanan, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Jason W. Rodriguez, Special Counsel and Assistant Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Special Counsel and Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee - 19 -