Full Opinion

Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC2024-0768 ____________ REYNALDO FIGUEROA-SANABRIA, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. November 19, 2026 FRANCIS, J. Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria appeals his sentences of death imposed following resentencing. We have jurisdiction, art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and affirm. I A jury convicted Figueroa-Sanabria of murdering John Travlos and Germana Morin on their houseboat in St. Petersburg, Florida, on the morning of April 12, 2013. During the initial penalty phase, Figueroa-Sanabria waived mitigation. Figueroa-Sanabria v. State, 366 So. 3d 1035, 1046 (Fla. 2023). But rather than accepting that waiver, the circuit court erroneously gave Figueroa-Sanabria the choice of either proceeding with counsel and presenting mitigation evidence, or forgoing counsel and proceeding pro se. Figueroa- Sanabria chose the latter. Ultimately, the jury unanimously found five aggravating factors and unanimously recommended death sentences for both murders, which the circuit court accepted and imposed. We affirmed the convictions on appeal but remanded for resentencing because the circuit court fundamentally erred by depriving Figueroa-Sanabria of his constitutional right to penalty phase counsel. Id. at 1057. During the preliminary hearings leading up to the new penalty phase, and just before the new penalty phase was to begin, Figueroa-Sanabria insisted upon waiving his right to present mitigation evidence and a penalty phase jury, declaring that he did not want his family brought from Puerto Rico to testify on his behalf. Relatedly, about a month before his new penalty phase, Figueroa-Sanabria asked for a continuance because he wanted to return to state prison rather than wait in the county jail. He told -2- the circuit court that it could sentence him that day and that he did not want a jury. The court replied that it could not “take a plea because [Figueroa-Sanabria] fe[lt] like [he was] under duress over at the jail” and that the court would let him speak with his counsel. Figueroa-Sanabria stated that he did not “want to talk with nobody,” and once again, that the court “could sentence [him],” and that he did not “want no jury, no doctor, no family, no nothing.” The court responded that it would have his counsel, Mr. Daniel Hernandez, speak with him. At a status check hearing the following week, the circuit court revisited the issue of Figueroa-Sanabria’s request to waive a penalty phase jury. Mr. Hernandez informed the court that he disagreed with Figueroa-Sanabria’s decision because Figueroa-Sanabria’s “only shot for a life sentence is to get a life recommendation” from a jury. Despite his attorney’s admonition, when asked whether he understood why counsel disagreed with him, Figueroa-Sanabria responded, “Yeah, I understand. Let’s do the bench trial.” Later in the hearing, the circuit court stated that it did not mind doing a bench trial, but that Figueroa-Sanabria would “be disregarding the advice of [his] attorney.” Asked if he understood -3- that, Figueroa-Sanabria replied, “Yeah, yeah, yeah. Let’s do this.” The circuit court then asked Figueroa-Sanabria whether he was “on any medication over at the jail right now other than for physical health” and Figueroa-Sanabria responded, “No.” Asked again whether he was “on any psychological medication or anything like that,” Figueroa-Sanabria also replied, “No.” On April 15, 2024, the new penalty phase began. To verify Figueroa-Sanabria understood his decision to waive the penalty phase jury, the circuit court explained that in 2019 it had accepted the jury’s recommendation of death, even though it could have rejected it. The court informed Figueroa-Sanabria that if he still wanted to waive a penalty phase jury, he could, but he could also still change his mind, and if he did, the court would bring in a jury “tomorrow.” Figueroa-Sanabria rejected the offer, stated that he did not want to talk to his counsel about the decision, and that he still wanted a bench trial. This colloquy then followed: THE COURT: Okay. I don’t see any blink in your eyes. You seem very decisive about this. You understand that the same evidence that was presented the last time is kind of expected to be presented again. . . . But what you are going to hear over the next couple of days is probably going to be very similar to -4- what was presented back in October of 2019. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I understand everything that you’ve said, your Honor. . . . I told Mr. Hernandez: Don’t present any mitigation. I’m good with that. And actually this trial just happened two and a half years ago. I could tell you word by word what happened. I remember everything. So I don’t know why we have to go through all this just for you to sentence me. You could sentence me, like I told you two and a half weeks ago, right now. .... THE COURT: [Y]ou’re going to be here with us either way. So if you want a jury, you still have to be here with us. If you want me to do it, you still have to be here with us for the trial. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I understand. THE COURT: With that in mind, do you still wish to have me as your judge deciding whether or not the death penalty should be imposed? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you are still freely and voluntarily waiving the jury that I am prepared to pick for you tomorrow? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Mr. Hernandez then informed the court that he had met with Figueroa-Sanabria the week prior, during which Mr. Hernandez expressed his objection to a bench trial, but Figueroa-Sanabria clearly wanted it. Thereafter, the circuit court accepted Figueroa- -5- Sanabria’s waiver of his right to a penalty phase jury, concluding that it was freely and voluntarily made.1 The State then presented much of the same evidence presented during Figueroa-Sanabria’s guilt phase. See Figueroa- Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1044-46. As to Figueroa-Sanabria’s behavior and understanding of the proceedings, the circuit court positively remarked on Figueroa- Sanabria’s engagement with his counsel, including that Figueroa- Sanabria “was engaged,” “providing information to his attorney,” “[n]ot in any disruptive type of way,” and that “[h]e was being a gentleman,” which the court appreciated. Figueroa-Sanabria agreed he was involved, stating, “I’m involved because it doesn’t matter what happens here. Whatever is the decision your Honor takes and whatever the sentence is, I’m going to appeal.” Once the State rested, the circuit court instructed Figueroa- Sanabria to privately meet with Mr. Hernandez and co-counsel, Mr. Keith Hammond, to reconsider whether to present any mitigation 1. Just before officially beginning the penalty phase, the court gave Figueroa-Sanabria one last chance to request a jury, but he confirmed that he still wanted a bench trial. -6- evidence. Following that meeting, Figueroa-Sanabria informed the court that he still did not want to present any mitigation. He agreed, however, to allow evidence from the prior Spencer2 hearings to be admitted so that the evidence could be argued by Mr. Hernandez during closing and considered by the court. Mr. Hernandez then informed the court, “I can tell the [c]ourt that despite the fact that we have mental mitigators, I never have questioned the competency of my client to be able to comprehend my arguments and why I disagreed with him in waiving mitigation.” Mr. Hernandez concluded that he had “no argument to make that [Figueroa-Sanabria was] not mentally capable of waiving [his] rights.” On May 13, 2024, as it had done the first time, the circuit court once again sentenced Figueroa-Sanabria to death for the murders. The court found that the State had proven the following five aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt as to both murders: (1) the capital felonies were committed to avoid or prevent lawful arrest (moderate weight); (2) the capital felonies were 2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). -7- committed for financial or pecuniary gain (great weight); (3) the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great weight); (4) the capital felonies were committed in a cold, calculated, premeditated manner without any pretense of moral justification (great weight); and (5) the victims were vulnerable due to their advanced age and disabilities (some weight). II Figueroa-Sanabria’s first two claims arise out of his decision to waive the penalty phase jury. He first argues that his due process rights were violated because the circuit court accepted his waiver while he was incompetent. He then asserts that the waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary because the circuit court failed to make a proper assessment. We reject both claims. First, competence is presumed unless there is some basis to call it into question, particularly where, as here, there was a prior judicial determination that Figueroa-Sanabria was competent to proceed. See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 482-83 (Fla. 2010). Only in the event that “bona fide doubt is raised as to a defendant’s mental capacity is the court required to conduct another competency proceeding.” Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d -8- 157, 175 (Fla. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1995)). Here, Figueroa-Sanabria was previously found competent at a hearing on October 28, 2019, where “a court-appointed expert witness testified that Figueroa-Sanabria was competent to make the decision to waive mitigation and represent himself.” Figueroa- Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1046. And there is no record evidence that has since called that competency finding into question. To the contrary, the record is replete with instances of Figueroa-Sanabria consulting with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and displaying a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Time and again, he told the circuit court he understood his right to mitigation and to a penalty phase jury but wished to waive them both. Mr. Hernandez, Figueroa-Sanabria’s own attorney, stated on the record that he had no reason to question “the competency of [his] client to be able to comprehend [his] arguments and why [he] disagreed with him in waiving mitigation,” or whether his client “is not mentally capable of waiving [his] rights.” Figueroa-Sanabria himself told the circuit court, in response to questioning about -9- waiving his rights, that he understood everything and could tell the court “word by word what happened” in the prior sentencing, that he informed his attorney not to present any mitigation, and perhaps, rationally, that he wanted to waive his right to commence his appeal. And during the new penalty phase proceedings, the court specifically observed and remarked upon Figueroa-Sanabria’s positive engagement with his other attorney, Mr. Hammond, on his case, including “providing information to his attorney” and being engaged. In fact, by the time of the new proceedings, the court had observed Figueroa-Sanabria’s behavior for around seven years and had not once questioned his competence. 3 Thus, the record affirmatively disproves Figueroa-Sanabria’s claim that the circuit court allowed him to proceed while incompetent. Instead, based on the prior determination of competency, and the record evidence of continued competency, there was no bona fide doubt raised in the proceedings such that the circuit court was required to reassess 3. Judge Pat Siracusa took over in early 2017 and eventually presided over the trial. Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1043 n.6. - 10 - Figueroa-Sanabria’s competency.4 See Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d 933, 947 (Fla. 2021) (“[A] competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.”); Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 175. Figueroa-Sanabria’s second claim is that the circuit court failed to properly inquire into his waiver to ensure it was knowing and voluntary. Specifically, he contends that his waiver of a penalty phase jury could not have been knowing and intelligent because a sizeable part of what might be raised on appeal was excluded, leaving him little of substance to argue. But Figueroa-Sanabria needed only to understand what he was waiving—which the record shows he did—not to possess the legal knowledge of an appellate attorney. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in 4. Figueroa-Sanabria also points to allegedly “nonsensical” comments he made, medication he was on for physical ailments, and his history of anxiety and depression. However, our analysis remains unchanged, as the record overwhelmingly shows that Figueroa-Sanabria was able to consult with his attorneys and understand the proceedings against him. - 11 - general in the circumstances.” Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1054 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)). “The knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a waiver of a penalty-phase jury is something ‘the record must affirmatively show.’ ” Boatman v. State, 402 So. 3d 900, 922 (Fla. 2024) (quoting Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974)). Figueroa-Sanabria’s attorney explained on the record that he had discussed with him why he disagreed with his decision to waive a penalty phase jury and reiterated those concerns in open court, including the strategic disadvantages the waiver would pose. One of those disadvantages was that the judge presiding over the new penalty phase had already imposed sentences of death based on the same evidence that would be presented again. In light of that concern, Figueroa-Sanabria’s attorney explained that Figueroa- Sanabria’s “only shot” for life sentences was to get life recommendations from the jury. But Figueroa-Sanabria, while indicating that he understood this, continued to insist upon a bench trial, and did so consistently throughout the proceedings. Because the record shows that Figueroa-Sanabria understood the right he was waiving and the strategic disadvantages of a bench - 12 - trial, any subsequent regret regarding his waiver of a penalty phase jury is immaterial. The fact that his waiver may have left him with little of substance to argue on appeal has no bearing on whether his waiver was knowing and intelligent. The record therefore affirmatively refutes his claim, and so we reject it. Figueroa-Sanabria’s third and final claim is that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Florida’s Constitution because it abandoned proportionality review and fails to limit the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. We have repeatedly rejected similar challenges and continue to do so here without further elaboration. See Wilson v. State, 410 So. 3d 548, 567-68 (Fla.) (“We have repeatedly declined invitations to reconsider our decision in Lawrence [v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020] and have reaffirmed that comparative proportionality review is not mandated by the Eighth Amendment.”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 830 (2025); Fletcher v. State, 415 So. 3d 147, 157 n.12 (Fla. 2025) (“We have repeatedly declined the invitation to recede from Lawrence and reinstate automatic appellate proportionality review.”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1467 (2026); Herard v. State, 390 - 13 - So. 3d 610, 623 (Fla. 2024) (declining to recede from State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), and rejecting argument that the “death penalty scheme . . . did not meaningfully narrow the class of defendants eligible for a death sentence”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1315 (2025); Fletcher, 415 So. 3d at 164 (“we have consistently rejected Fletcher’s challenge to the death penalty statute’s so-called ‘overprovision’ of aggravators (which Fletcher labels ‘aggravator drift’)”). We also reject Figueroa-Sanabria’s request that we reconsider Poole in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020), for reasons expressed most recently in Hunt v. State, 428 So. 3d 43 (Fla. 2025), petition for cert. filed, No. 26-78 (U.S. July 14, 2026). See Hunt, 428 So. 3d at 54 (“The holding in Ramos does not apply to a jury’s recommendation of death in a capital case because a jury’s recommendation is not equivalent to a verdict. Instead, it is a capital jury’s finding of an aggravating factor that is equivalent to a verdict.” (citing Poole, 297 So. 3d at 503-04)). - 14 - III Because none of Figueroa-Sanabria’s claims warrant relief, we affirm his death sentences. It is so ordered. COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. LABARGA, J., concurring in result. I recognize that in this case the trial court found five aggravating factors, including that the capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and they were committed in a cold, calculated, premeditated manner without any pretense of moral justification. However, even in this highly aggravated case, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020). When this Court receded from comparative proportionality review in Lawrence, it departed from a decades-old reasonable safeguard intended to help ensure that Florida’s death penalty - 15 - remains a punishment for only the most aggravated and least mitigated of first-degree murder cases. I acknowledge the majority’s rationale in Lawrence that it is bound by the conformity clause and thereby precluded from conducting proportionality review. However, this is where I fundamentally disagree with the majority and continue to believe that the United States Constitution provides the floor, not the ceiling, for constitutional protections to which our fellow citizens are entitled. [S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). For this reason, I concur in the result. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County, Pat Edward Siracusa, Jr., Judge Case No. 522013CF006490AXXXNO - 16 - Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, for Appellant James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Timothy A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee - 17 -