Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria v. State of Florida
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketSC2024-0768
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC2024-0768
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REYNALDO FIGUEROA-SANABRIA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
November 19, 2026
FRANCIS, J.
Reynaldo Figueroa-Sanabria appeals his sentences of death
imposed following resentencing. We have jurisdiction, art. V,
§ 3(b)(1), Fla. Const., and affirm.
I
A jury convicted Figueroa-Sanabria of murdering John Travlos
and Germana Morin on their houseboat in St. Petersburg, Florida,
on the morning of April 12, 2013. During the initial penalty phase,
Figueroa-Sanabria waived mitigation. Figueroa-Sanabria v. State,
366 So. 3d 1035, 1046 (Fla. 2023). But rather than accepting that
waiver, the circuit court erroneously gave Figueroa-Sanabria the
choice of either proceeding with counsel and presenting mitigation
evidence, or forgoing counsel and proceeding pro se. Figueroa-
Sanabria chose the latter.
Ultimately, the jury unanimously found five aggravating
factors and unanimously recommended death sentences for both
murders, which the circuit court accepted and imposed. We
affirmed the convictions on appeal but remanded for resentencing
because the circuit court fundamentally erred by depriving
Figueroa-Sanabria of his constitutional right to penalty phase
counsel. Id. at 1057.
During the preliminary hearings leading up to the new penalty
phase, and just before the new penalty phase was to begin,
Figueroa-Sanabria insisted upon waiving his right to present
mitigation evidence and a penalty phase jury, declaring that he did
not want his family brought from Puerto Rico to testify on his
behalf.
Relatedly, about a month before his new penalty phase,
Figueroa-Sanabria asked for a continuance because he wanted to
return to state prison rather than wait in the county jail. He told
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the circuit court that it could sentence him that day and that he did
not want a jury. The court replied that it could not “take a plea
because [Figueroa-Sanabria] fe[lt] like [he was] under duress over at
the jail” and that the court would let him speak with his counsel.
Figueroa-Sanabria stated that he did not “want to talk with
nobody,” and once again, that the court “could sentence [him],” and
that he did not “want no jury, no doctor, no family, no nothing.”
The court responded that it would have his counsel, Mr. Daniel
Hernandez, speak with him.
At a status check hearing the following week, the circuit court
revisited the issue of Figueroa-Sanabria’s request to waive a penalty
phase jury. Mr. Hernandez informed the court that he disagreed
with Figueroa-Sanabria’s decision because Figueroa-Sanabria’s
“only shot for a life sentence is to get a life recommendation” from a
jury. Despite his attorney’s admonition, when asked whether he
understood why counsel disagreed with him, Figueroa-Sanabria
responded, “Yeah, I understand. Let’s do the bench trial.”
Later in the hearing, the circuit court stated that it did not
mind doing a bench trial, but that Figueroa-Sanabria would “be
disregarding the advice of [his] attorney.” Asked if he understood
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that, Figueroa-Sanabria replied, “Yeah, yeah, yeah. Let’s do this.”
The circuit court then asked Figueroa-Sanabria whether he was “on
any medication over at the jail right now other than for physical
health” and Figueroa-Sanabria responded, “No.” Asked again
whether he was “on any psychological medication or anything like
that,” Figueroa-Sanabria also replied, “No.”
On April 15, 2024, the new penalty phase began. To verify
Figueroa-Sanabria understood his decision to waive the penalty
phase jury, the circuit court explained that in 2019 it had accepted
the jury’s recommendation of death, even though it could have
rejected it. The court informed Figueroa-Sanabria that if he still
wanted to waive a penalty phase jury, he could, but he could also
still change his mind, and if he did, the court would bring in a jury
“tomorrow.” Figueroa-Sanabria rejected the offer, stated that he did
not want to talk to his counsel about the decision, and that he still
wanted a bench trial. This colloquy then followed:
THE COURT: Okay. I don’t see any blink in your eyes.
You seem very decisive about this. You understand that
the same evidence that was presented the last time is
kind of expected to be presented again.
. . . But what you are going to hear over the next
couple of days is probably going to be very similar to
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what was presented back in October of 2019. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand everything that you’ve
said, your Honor. . . . I told Mr. Hernandez: Don’t
present any mitigation. I’m good with that. And actually
this trial just happened two and a half years ago. I could
tell you word by word what happened. I remember
everything. So I don’t know why we have to go through
all this just for you to sentence me. You could sentence
me, like I told you two and a half weeks ago, right now.
....
THE COURT: [Y]ou’re going to be here with us either way.
So if you want a jury, you still have to be here with us. If
you want me to do it, you still have to be here with us for
the trial. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: With that in mind, do you still wish to have
me as your judge deciding whether or not the death
penalty should be imposed?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are still freely and voluntarily
waiving the jury that I am prepared to pick for you
tomorrow?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Mr. Hernandez then informed the court that he had met with
Figueroa-Sanabria the week prior, during which Mr. Hernandez
expressed his objection to a bench trial, but Figueroa-Sanabria
clearly wanted it. Thereafter, the circuit court accepted Figueroa-
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Sanabria’s waiver of his right to a penalty phase jury, concluding
that it was freely and voluntarily made.1
The State then presented much of the same evidence
presented during Figueroa-Sanabria’s guilt phase. See Figueroa-
Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1044-46.
As to Figueroa-Sanabria’s behavior and understanding of the
proceedings, the circuit court positively remarked on Figueroa-
Sanabria’s engagement with his counsel, including that Figueroa-
Sanabria “was engaged,” “providing information to his attorney,”
“[n]ot in any disruptive type of way,” and that “[h]e was being a
gentleman,” which the court appreciated. Figueroa-Sanabria
agreed he was involved, stating, “I’m involved because it doesn’t
matter what happens here. Whatever is the decision your Honor
takes and whatever the sentence is, I’m going to appeal.”
Once the State rested, the circuit court instructed Figueroa-
Sanabria to privately meet with Mr. Hernandez and co-counsel, Mr.
Keith Hammond, to reconsider whether to present any mitigation
1. Just before officially beginning the penalty phase, the court
gave Figueroa-Sanabria one last chance to request a jury, but he
confirmed that he still wanted a bench trial.
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evidence. Following that meeting, Figueroa-Sanabria informed the
court that he still did not want to present any mitigation. He
agreed, however, to allow evidence from the prior Spencer2 hearings
to be admitted so that the evidence could be argued by Mr.
Hernandez during closing and considered by the court. Mr.
Hernandez then informed the court, “I can tell the [c]ourt that
despite the fact that we have mental mitigators, I never have
questioned the competency of my client to be able to comprehend
my arguments and why I disagreed with him in waiving mitigation.”
Mr. Hernandez concluded that he had “no argument to make that
[Figueroa-Sanabria was] not mentally capable of waiving [his]
rights.”
On May 13, 2024, as it had done the first time, the circuit
court once again sentenced Figueroa-Sanabria to death for the
murders. The court found that the State had proven the following
five aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt as to both
murders: (1) the capital felonies were committed to avoid or prevent
lawful arrest (moderate weight); (2) the capital felonies were
2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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committed for financial or pecuniary gain (great weight); (3) the
capital felonies were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (great
weight); (4) the capital felonies were committed in a cold, calculated,
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral justification
(great weight); and (5) the victims were vulnerable due to their
advanced age and disabilities (some weight).
II
Figueroa-Sanabria’s first two claims arise out of his decision to
waive the penalty phase jury. He first argues that his due process
rights were violated because the circuit court accepted his waiver
while he was incompetent. He then asserts that the waiver was
neither knowing nor voluntary because the circuit court failed to
make a proper assessment. We reject both claims.
First, competence is presumed unless there is some basis to
call it into question, particularly where, as here, there was a prior
judicial determination that Figueroa-Sanabria was competent to
proceed. See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 482-83 (Fla. 2010).
Only in the event that “bona fide doubt is raised as to a defendant’s
mental capacity is the court required to conduct another
competency proceeding.” Santiago-Gonzalez v. State, 301 So. 3d
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157, 175 (Fla. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Hunter v. State, 660
So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1995)).
Here, Figueroa-Sanabria was previously found competent at a
hearing on October 28, 2019, where “a court-appointed expert
witness testified that Figueroa-Sanabria was competent to make the
decision to waive mitigation and represent himself.” Figueroa-
Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1046. And there is no record evidence that
has since called that competency finding into question.
To the contrary, the record is replete with instances of
Figueroa-Sanabria consulting with his attorneys with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and displaying a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Time and
again, he told the circuit court he understood his right to mitigation
and to a penalty phase jury but wished to waive them both.
Mr. Hernandez, Figueroa-Sanabria’s own attorney, stated on
the record that he had no reason to question “the competency of
[his] client to be able to comprehend [his] arguments and why [he]
disagreed with him in waiving mitigation,” or whether his client “is
not mentally capable of waiving [his] rights.” Figueroa-Sanabria
himself told the circuit court, in response to questioning about
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waiving his rights, that he understood everything and could tell the
court “word by word what happened” in the prior sentencing, that
he informed his attorney not to present any mitigation, and
perhaps, rationally, that he wanted to waive his right to commence
his appeal. And during the new penalty phase proceedings, the
court specifically observed and remarked upon Figueroa-Sanabria’s
positive engagement with his other attorney, Mr. Hammond, on his
case, including “providing information to his attorney” and being
engaged. In fact, by the time of the new proceedings, the court had
observed Figueroa-Sanabria’s behavior for around seven years and
had not once questioned his competence. 3 Thus, the record
affirmatively disproves Figueroa-Sanabria’s claim that the circuit
court allowed him to proceed while incompetent. Instead, based on
the prior determination of competency, and the record evidence of
continued competency, there was no bona fide doubt raised in the
proceedings such that the circuit court was required to reassess
3. Judge Pat Siracusa took over in early 2017 and eventually
presided over the trial. Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at 1043 n.6.
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Figueroa-Sanabria’s competency.4 See Noetzel v. State, 328 So. 3d
933, 947 (Fla. 2021) (“[A] competency determination is necessary
only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s
competence.”); Santiago-Gonzalez, 301 So. 3d at 175.
Figueroa-Sanabria’s second claim is that the circuit court
failed to properly inquire into his waiver to ensure it was knowing
and voluntary. Specifically, he contends that his waiver of a
penalty phase jury could not have been knowing and intelligent
because a sizeable part of what might be raised on appeal was
excluded, leaving him little of substance to argue.
But Figueroa-Sanabria needed only to understand what he
was waiving—which the record shows he did—not to possess the
legal knowledge of an appellate attorney. See Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389, 400 (1993). “[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver
knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in
4. Figueroa-Sanabria also points to allegedly “nonsensical”
comments he made, medication he was on for physical ailments,
and his history of anxiety and depression. However, our analysis
remains unchanged, as the record overwhelmingly shows that
Figueroa-Sanabria was able to consult with his attorneys and
understand the proceedings against him.
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general in the circumstances.” Figueroa-Sanabria, 366 So. 3d at
1054 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 629 (2002)). “The knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of
a waiver of a penalty-phase jury is something ‘the record must
affirmatively show.’ ” Boatman v. State, 402 So. 3d 900, 922 (Fla.
2024) (quoting Lamadline v. State, 303 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1974)).
Figueroa-Sanabria’s attorney explained on the record that he
had discussed with him why he disagreed with his decision to waive
a penalty phase jury and reiterated those concerns in open court,
including the strategic disadvantages the waiver would pose. One
of those disadvantages was that the judge presiding over the new
penalty phase had already imposed sentences of death based on the
same evidence that would be presented again. In light of that
concern, Figueroa-Sanabria’s attorney explained that Figueroa-
Sanabria’s “only shot” for life sentences was to get life
recommendations from the jury. But Figueroa-Sanabria, while
indicating that he understood this, continued to insist upon a
bench trial, and did so consistently throughout the proceedings.
Because the record shows that Figueroa-Sanabria understood
the right he was waiving and the strategic disadvantages of a bench
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trial, any subsequent regret regarding his waiver of a penalty phase
jury is immaterial. The fact that his waiver may have left him with
little of substance to argue on appeal has no bearing on whether his
waiver was knowing and intelligent. The record therefore
affirmatively refutes his claim, and so we reject it.
Figueroa-Sanabria’s third and final claim is that Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme violates the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Florida’s Constitution because it
abandoned proportionality review and fails to limit the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty.
We have repeatedly rejected similar challenges and continue to
do so here without further elaboration. See Wilson v. State, 410 So.
3d 548, 567-68 (Fla.) (“We have repeatedly declined invitations to
reconsider our decision in Lawrence [v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla.
2020] and have reaffirmed that comparative proportionality review
is not mandated by the Eighth Amendment.”), cert. denied, 146 S.
Ct. 830 (2025); Fletcher v. State, 415 So. 3d 147, 157 n.12 (Fla.
2025) (“We have repeatedly declined the invitation to recede from
Lawrence and reinstate automatic appellate proportionality
review.”), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1467 (2026); Herard v. State, 390
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So. 3d 610, 623 (Fla. 2024) (declining to recede from State v. Poole,
297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), and rejecting argument that the “death
penalty scheme . . . did not meaningfully narrow the class of
defendants eligible for a death sentence”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct.
1315 (2025); Fletcher, 415 So. 3d at 164 (“we have consistently
rejected Fletcher’s challenge to the death penalty statute’s so-called
‘overprovision’ of aggravators (which Fletcher labels ‘aggravator
drift’)”).
We also reject Figueroa-Sanabria’s request that we reconsider
Poole in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos v.
Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020), for reasons expressed most recently
in Hunt v. State, 428 So. 3d 43 (Fla. 2025), petition for cert. filed, No.
26-78 (U.S. July 14, 2026). See Hunt, 428 So. 3d at 54 (“The
holding in Ramos does not apply to a jury’s recommendation of
death in a capital case because a jury’s recommendation is not
equivalent to a verdict. Instead, it is a capital jury’s finding of an
aggravating factor that is equivalent to a verdict.” (citing Poole, 297
So. 3d at 503-04)).
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III
Because none of Figueroa-Sanabria’s claims warrant relief, we
affirm his death sentences.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, BARRIOS, and
TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
I recognize that in this case the trial court found five
aggravating factors, including that the capital felonies were
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and they were committed in
a cold, calculated, premeditated manner without any pretense of
moral justification. However, even in this highly aggravated case, I
continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissent in
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020).
When this Court receded from comparative proportionality
review in Lawrence, it departed from a decades-old reasonable
safeguard intended to help ensure that Florida’s death penalty
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remains a punishment for only the most aggravated and least
mitigated of first-degree murder cases.
I acknowledge the majority’s rationale in Lawrence that it is
bound by the conformity clause and thereby precluded from
conducting proportionality review. However, this is where I
fundamentally disagree with the majority and continue to believe
that the United States Constitution provides the floor, not the
ceiling, for constitutional protections to which our fellow citizens
are entitled.
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their
citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution.
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law. The
legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective
force of state law—for without it, the full realization of
our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).
For this reason, I concur in the result.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,
Pat Edward Siracusa, Jr., Judge
Case No. 522013CF006490AXXXNO
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Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and
Timothy A. Freeland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida,
for Appellee
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