Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-2464 _____________________________ KIMO BRACHT, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Linda F. McCallum, Judge. February 12, 2020 PER CURIAM. Kimo Bracht appeals an order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the claim raised in Bracht’s motion was not cognizable under rule 3.800(a) and did not meet the requirements for the postconviction court to consider the motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, Bracht’s motion was properly denied. Bracht pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of more than twenty grams of cannabis. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, with a three-year mandatory-minimum term. Following his conviction, Bracht moved for postconviction relief under rule 3.800(a), arguing that his three-year mandatory-minimum term was illegal because he constructively, rather than actually, possessed the firearm. The postconviction court denied the motion, finding that Bracht’s claim was not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). Bracht argues that the court reversibly erred because (1) Bracht was entitled to relief under rule 3.800(a); and (2) if not cognizable under rule 3.800(a), the postconviction court should have treated his motion as one filed under rule 3.850. We disagree. First, the postconviction court properly denied Bracht’s motion because he sought to challenge the factual basis (possession of the firearm) of his mandatory-minimum sentence under rule 3.800(a). That type of challenge is not permitted under rule 3.800(a). See State v. Mancino, 705 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. 1998) (holding that a challenge to the factual basis of a firearm enhancement is not cognizable under rule 3.800(a)); cf. Haynes v. State, 106 So. 3d 481, 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that challenges to mandatory-minimum terms imposed under a plea agreement are improper under rule 3.800(a)). Second, the postconviction court properly declined to treat Bracht’s motion as one filed under rule 3.850. The general rule is that “a motion filed under rule 3.800(a) may be treated as a motion filed under rule 3.850 where it is in the ‘interest of justice to do so’ and the motion would be timely under rule 3.850.” Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 2011) (citations omitted). Still, the motion must state a prima facie claim under rule 3.850 to be considered under that rule. Id. Bracht’s motion was timely filed, but did not satisfy the requirements of rule 3.850. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c), (n)(2). For this reason, the court did not err when it declined to consider Bracht’s motion under rule 3.850. * AFFIRMED. RAY, C.J., and ROWE and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur. * Because two years have not passed since Bracht’s conviction became final, the time has not expired for Bracht to file a rule 3.850 motion. 2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Kimo Bracht, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 3