Full Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed November 4, 2026. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D24-0830 Lower Tribunal No. F14-23368 ________________ Robert Holton, Appellant, vs. State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marisa Tinkler-Mendez, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Kayla H. McNab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ. LINDSEY, J. Robert Holton appeals his final judgment of conviction and sentence for first-degree murder and first-degree arson. 1 Holton contends the State made improper closing argument comments that told the jurors Holton was no longer presumed innocent; were highly and unnecessarily inflammatory; and denigrated him and his theory of defense. Because Holton concedes he did not object to such comments, he argues that the cumulative effect of the comments rise to the level of fundamental error. Read, not in a vacuum, but in context, as we must, the comments were not improper. There being no cumulative fundamental error, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND Holton was indicted with the first-degree murder of Kayla Gloster and first-degree arson. The State claimed Holton murdered Gloster because he was jealous that Gloster was dating another man. The State presented evidence that Holton’s DNA was found in several places in Gloster’s apartment, including on the lid of a bottle of motor oil the State claimed Holton attempted to use as an accelerant or igniting fluid. The State presented evidence that Holton’s cell phone was pinging off a cell tower in the vicinity of Gloster’s apartment. Though no eyewitnesses placed Holton 1 We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(A). 2 on the scene, the State introduced the testimony of Gloster’s neighbor who claimed she heard commotion coming from Gloster’s apartment and heard Gloster murmur “please stop” on the afternoon of her murder. The State presented the testimony of Gloster’s parents who testified that Gloster and Holton had a tumultuous relationship, as well as Holton’s statements to police admitting the relationship was rocky at times. In his statements to the police, Holton admitted to getting into physical fights with Gloster and breaking her car windows. He also stated he knew that Gloster was dating another man named Deon McKnight. In defense, Holton argued another person committed the crimes, possibly McKnight. Holton used his statements introduced by the State to explain that his blood DNA was found in Gloster’s apartment because he had cut himself at work before going to her house and having sex with her. He presented his own DNA expert who admitted that his DNA was found in Gloster’s apartment but explained that there was no way of knowing when his DNA was left there. Holton’s expert also testified that the State’s DNA expert overstated the significance of his DNA on the lid of the motor oil bottle. Holton argued that the State’s timeline did not make sense when considered with the phone record evidence and that the police conducted a shoddy investigation by failing to explore the possibility of other suspects. He also 3 argued that the officers who processed the crime scene should have been more thorough in collecting evidence, by checking fingerprints or DNA on the balcony and surrounding areas, as it was possible the assailant fled the scene that way. The jury returned a guilty verdict. After a penalty phase, Holton was sentenced to life in prison for murder and thirty years state prison for arson. He timely appealed. II. ANALYSIS Holton argues the State made improper comments during closing arguments that improperly told the jurors Holton was not presumed innocent, that were highly and unnecessarily inflammatory, and that denigrated Holton and his theory of defense. Holton concedes there was no objection to these comments at trial, arguing instead, the cumulative effect of these improper comments constitutes fundamental error. “We conduct a two-part inquiry to determine if closing comments comprise fundamental error. First, we determine whether the comments were impermissible.” Talley v. State, 260 So. 3d 562, 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (citation omitted). Next, we resolve whether the improper comment constitutes fundamental error by determining if it affected the validity of the trial such that, “but for the comment, the jury could not have reached the 4 verdict it did.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. State, 238 So. 3d 726, 740 (Fla. 2018) (explaining fundamental error is reserved for cases where the cumulative effect of the improper comments “reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the alleged error.”) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895, 898 (Fla. 1996)). The first unobjected-to comment is as follows: No one, other than the defendant, had a turbulent relationship with Kayla Gloster. No one else. Remember, Judge Tinkler Mendez said we have to prove that a crime was committed and who did it. You sat through this trial, and there should be no doubt in your mind that a crime occurred, the savage and brutal murder of Kayla Gloster. We are halfway there. The defendant is no longer presumed innocent. You’ve heard the testimonial, physical, and circumstantial evidence, and it tells you that he is the killer. (emphasis added). Next, Holton contends several alleged improper comments occurred when the State was describing the nature of the crimes, Holton’s alleged actions, and his character: He turned off his phone, and he turned off his phone because something very terrible had just happened, and he’s in panic mode. And he turns that phone off until 8:38. So, from 6:30 until 8:38 his phone is off. Why is that important? It’s important because he’s done something unimaginable and he, during that time frame, is figuring out the clean up. ... 5 What does that tell you? That tells you he’s jealous, he’s controlling, and he is doing behavior that is not indicative of a normal healthy relationship. ... This relationship is not good. It’s a powder [keg] and it’s on a very dangerous route. It went from busting out windows of car that Deon got her to this horrific homicide on November the 15th. ... His hands are the hands of a killer, and it’s consistent with him being the person who stabbed her those five times on her neck and her chest. ... And I submit to you that there was extreme violence in this bathroom, and you can see it. ... This was an unhealthy and dangerous relationship that reached a dangerous, dangerous conclusion on November the 15th. (emphasis added). Holton also contends the State’s comments about the implausibility of defense theory were improper: Every piece of evidence in this case points to him as the killer. Kayla had no enemies. He’s the only person who has a history of violence with her. There is no evidence that Deon McKnight had a problem with Kayla. Zero. Nothing from this witness stand that Deon McKnight and Kayla had any issue. You can’t consider it. It would be speculation. Your verdict must not be based on speculation. (emphasis added). Finally, Holton contends the following comments in the State’s rebuttal about the nature of the crimes and theory of defense were improper: 6 Defense counsel made reference that we inundated you with photos that we didn’t need to show you. I submit to you we did need to show all of those photos to you . . . They all show something different, and more importantly, I don’t know if repulsive is the right word that defense counsel used. They are difficult to view, but this is what happened to Kayla, you’re entitled to know what happened to Kayla. It’s ugly. It’s heinous, atrocious, and cruel. ... And when we come to the end of this case, you will judge this case by using reasonable doubt standards. Reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary, or forced doubt. This idea that it can easily go from the third floor to the second floor balcony, climb to the second floor or jump down or whatever it is, that is the defendant of a possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary, or forced doubt. Then you have to consider, well, yeah, I mean Tyreek Hill could easily made that from the third floor to the second floor, but not for someone who is 5’9” 250. Who knows? He couldn’t do it at 5’9” 250. It’s not so easy. So, defense counsel says anyone can easily do it. There is no evidence of that. It’s a possible, imaginary, speculative, and forced doubt. ... The unused condom wrappers? They are not even apparently touched. They’re just sitting on the TV stand. Defense counsel’s argument that it would have assisted in this case, make or break the case. Water test that. What evidentiary value is it that someone else’s prints or DNA would have been on these unused condom wrappers? ... This love triangle thing? First of all, there was no love triangle. My interpreting, the evidence doesn’t [show] there was a love triangle. But if there was a love triangle, who was out? It wasn’t Deon McKnight who’s standing there getting his picture taken. His picture is on the counter. Mr. Holton is the odd man out. (emphasis added). 7 a. No Longer Presumed Innocent Comments Holton argues the State’s comments concerning his presumption of innocence were improper because the State did not link them to any specific evidence, but rather, just told the jurors not to afford him the presumption given it had presented evidence establishing he was the killer. Not so. Read in context, the surrounding comments link the remark to “testimonial, physical, and circumstantial evidence” the jury had heard. Accordingly, the State’s comments do not constitute error because the comments were directly tied to the State’s perspective on the strength of the evidence. See Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 487 (Fla. 2010) (finding no error where State commented it “chipped and chipped away at that cloak [and] [defendant] no longer enjoys that presumption” because comments were tied to the State’s perspective on the strength of the evidence); see also Dailey v. State, 965 So. 2d 38, 44 (Fla. 2007) (“Regarding the prosecutor’s statements concerning [defendant’s] presumption of innocence, . . . when read in context, the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of her belief that the State satisfied its burden of proof.”). b. Inflammatory Comments Holton argues comments describing the nature of the crimes, his alleged actions, and his character were unnecessarily and highly 8 inflammatory, including comments referring to the murder as “savage and brutal,” “unimaginable,” and “heinous, atrocious, and cruel,” and referring to him as having “hands of a killer”. We do not think so. The medical examiner established that Gloster was beaten, strangled, stabbed five times in her neck and chest, drowned, and burned, with defensive wounds showing signs of struggle. So, the State’s descriptions are not impermissible in view of all the evidence in this case. See Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1190–91 (Fla. 1997) (finding characterization of murder of 11-year-old, handicapped child and its perpetrator as “vicious” and “brutal” did not constitute improper comment in view of the evidence); see also Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 719–20 (Fla. 2021) (finding no fundamental error where characterization of co-defendants’ actions as “unspeakable acts,” and “violent and senseless,” and referring to them as “unbelievably brutal strangers” tracked evidence showing they broke into the victim’s apartment, beat, bound, and gagged him, shot him, and used his bank card to withdraw cash). Further, the “hands of a killer” comments do not amount to fundamental error here. The State did not merely brand Holton a killer in the abstract. Shortly preceding the challenged comments, the State recounted the evidence adduced at trial, including Holton’s DNA found in the apartment, 9 Gloster’s multiple stab wounds, and a cut on his hand consistent with holding a knife. The State immediately linked the “hands of a killer” characterization to the evidence: “it’s consistent with him being the person who stabbed her those five times on her neck and her chest.” Thus, read, not in a vacuum but in context, this comment argues a conclusion from the forensic evidence introduced including placing Holton in the apartment, the stab wounds, and the photographs of cuts on his hands. See Davis, 698 So. 2d at 1190 (“When it is understood from the context of the argument that the charge is made with reference to the evidence, the prosecutor is merely submitting to the jury a conclusion that he or she is arguing can be drawn from the evidence.”); Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1157 (Fla. 2014) (explaining comment allegedly dehumanizing a capital defendant was not improper where it was also “confined to inferences drawn from the evidence[.]”); see also Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 956–57 (Fla. 2003) (finding unobjected-to “hands- on killer” comments not fundamental error because, “along with the magnitude of physical and testimonial evidence,” they “did not affect the jury’s verdict.”). Thus, we find no fundamental error. c. Denigration of Defense Theory Holton argues the State denigrated his theory of defense by suggesting that the defense was implausible and telling the jurors not to consider that 10 another person might have been responsible for the crimes. Not so. Because Holton argued the alternative killer theory, the State was entitled to respond arguing the theory lacked evidentiary support and question its plausibility. See Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1203 (Fla. 2014) (citation modified) (“Prosecutor is permitted to suggest to the jury that based on the evidence of the case, they should question the plausibility of the defense’s theory.”); Andres v. State, 254 So. 3d 283, 300 (Fla. 2018) (finding prosecutor did not denigrate the defense by referring to defense’s case as “speculation,” “guessing,” and “coincidences”); Noriega v. State, 228 So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“Where the defendant presents and argues for its theory of the case, the state is permitted to respond (if true) that the defendant’s theory is not supported by the evidence at trial.”). d. Cumulative Error Lastly, because none of the comments individually are improper, there is no cumulative error, and as such, no fundamental error. See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]here individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error must fail.”); Johnson v. State, 293 So. 3d 46, 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“[W]here all individual claims of prosecutorial misconduct are meritless, a cumulative error claim also fails.”). And the jury was presented 11 with forensic evidence of Holton’s blood throughout the apartment; photographs of his arms and hands showing cuts on his fingers; his phone records indicating his phone was in the vicinity of the apartment for hours at the same time he claimed he was home; and him stating to the police that Gloster was strangled despite the interviewing detective not suspecting she was strangled at the time of the interview. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 209 So. 3d 543, 563 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]here was a substantial amount of evidence to convict [defendant] on all three of the charges . . . such that the cumulative effect of these improper comments was not so prejudicial that it vitiated the entire trial.”); Robards v. State, 112 So. 3d 1256, 1271 (Fla. 2013) (holding cumulative effect of prosecutor’s improper comments during closing argument did not constitute fundamental error where evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming). Accordingly, we do not find fundamental error here. 2 III. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the State’s comments are proper when read in context thereby precluding any cumulative effect amounting to fundamental error. 2 We note that the jury was instructed that Holton was presumed innocent and that the State had the burden of proving that he was guilty of committing the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was also instructed that what the lawyers say is not evidence, including right before closing arguments. 12 Affirmed. 13