Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D18-4885 _____________________________ ANTHONY JONES, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. Steven B. Whittington, Judge. June 8, 2020 ROWE, J. Anthony Jones appeals his conviction for DUI manslaughter, raising three issues: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) fundamental error occurred when a witness testified about his personal opinion; and (3) fundamental error occurred during closing arguments. We affirm all issues on the merits and write only to address Jones’ argument on the motion for judgment of acquittal. Facts Jones was involved in a single-car accident that caused the death of his best friend. On the night of the accident, Jones and the victim went to a nightclub and consumed alcoholic beverages. On their way home, Jones lost control of the car. The car’s data recorder showed that five seconds before the accident, the car was traveling at a speed of 100 miles per hour in a zone with a posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour. The car was traveling at a speed of 85 miles per hour when it struck a curb and went airborne. The car landed in a grassy area, but the right side of the car collided with several small trees and then struck a pole. After the car struck the pole, it started coming apart and caught fire. The victim was not wearing a seatbelt and was ejected from the car. The engine block landed on the victim’s legs. He was barely breathing when paramedics arrived on the scene and never regained consciousness. Jones, who was wearing his seatbelt, was trapped inside the car until firefighters could extract him. Testing after the accident revealed that Jones’ blood alcohol level was three times the legal limit. At trial, Jones argued that the victim caused the accident. He claimed that just before the accident, the victim grabbed the steering wheel because he wanted to go to another night club. And the car hit the curb as Jones and the victim fought over the steering wheel. Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal arguing that the State failed to prove that the victim’s actions did not cause his own death. The trial court denied the motion. The jury found Jones guilty of DUI manslaughter. This timely appeal follows. Analysis We review an order denying a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. Dunn v. State, 206 So. 3d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). A defendant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal, when after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Deloach v. State, 270 So. 3d 457, 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). Jones argues that the general standard of review does not apply. He asserts that because the proof of his guilt was wholly circumstantial, the reasonable-hypothesis-of-evidence special 2 standard of review applies instead. See Knight v. State, 186 So. 3d 1005, 1010—11 (Fla. 2016) (upholding the special standard of review where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial and affirming that a conviction may be upheld only if the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence). We disagree for two reasons. First, the supreme court recently abandoned the special appellate standard of review for cases in which the only proof of guilt is circumstantial. Bush v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S145 (Fla. May 14, 2020). Thus, all claims of legal sufficiency must be reviewed to determine “whether the State presented competent, substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Id. When applying this standard, a reviewing court must “view[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the State” and consider whether “a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019)). Second, even if the supreme court had not abandoned the special appellate standard, it would not apply here because the proof of Jones’ guilt was not wholly circumstantial. And so, for both reasons, the general standard applies to our review. * The statutory offense of DUI manslaughter requires proof that the defendant was operating a vehicle while legally impaired and that the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused or contributed to the death of the victim. Koroly v. State, 257 So. 3d 1096, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Pryear v. State, 243 So. 3d 479, 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)). The State presented direct evidence of Jones’ legal impairment and his operation of the car at the time of the accident. Even so, Jones asserts that he was still entitled to a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the victim caused the accident by grabbing the steering wheel while Jones was driving. But this * The supreme court instructed that this standard “should now be used in all cases where the sufficiency of the evidence is analyzed.” Bush, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S145. 3 argument ignores that the driver’s conduct need not be the sole cause of the victim’s death to support a conviction for DUI manslaughter. Id. Rather, the State need only present evidence to show that the driver was legally impaired, the driver was operating the vehicle, and that the conduct of the driver contributed to the victim’s death. Id. Even accepting as true Jones’ claim that the victim’s action in grabbing the steering wheel may have contributed to the accident, the State presented evidence to show that Jones’ conduct contributed to the victim’s death. At the time of the accident, the road was free of obstructions, and the weather was clear and dry. Jones was driving the car, and his blood alcohol level was at least three times greater than the legal limit. The car’s data recorder showed that moments before the accident, the car was traveling at a speed of 100 miles per hour. And the recorder showed no signs that Jones braked to slow the car as it veered off the road. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was operating the car while legally impaired and that his operation of the car caused or contributed to the victim’s death. And so, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. Jones’ conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. WINOKUR and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Danielle Jorden, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4