Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-1048 _____________________________ DEVIN DAENARD GARMON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. J. Lee Marsh, Judge. March 31, 2021 PER CURIAM. In this appeal from Appellant’s convictions and sentences for armed burglary of a dwelling with assault, aggravated assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, attempted armed burglary of a dwelling with assault, and shooting into or within a building, we affirm in all respects and write only to address Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing his mother from testifying that the victim made a prior statement that was inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony. “[I]ntroduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness’s present testimony is also one of the main ways to attack the credibility of a witness.” Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 569 (Fla. 2004) (citing § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001)). “The theory of admissibility is not that the prior statement is true and the in- court testimony is false, but that because the witness has not told the truth in one of the statements, the jury should disbelieve both statements.” Id. To be inconsistent, a prior statement must either directly contradict or be materially different from the expected testimony at trial. The inconsistency must involve a material, significant fact rather than mere details. Id. “Even if there is some relevancy, the evidence is subject to exclusion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues, unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389, 394–95 (Fla. 1994). The trial court’s decision whether to allow impeachment of a witness’s trial testimony by way of prior inconsistent statements is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mordica v. State, 305 So. 3d 745, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020); Ocasio v. State, 994 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Any error in excluding such evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis. Pearce, 880 So. 2d at 570. In this case, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by preventing his mother from testifying that the victim made a prior statement that was inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony. Specifically, he asserts that he should have been permitted to impeach the victim by eliciting testimony that the victim told his mother that the state attorney’s office threatened to have the victim’s children taken away if the victim did not testify against Appellant, which was inconsistent with the victim’s cross-examination testimony that she had not been threatened and never had any conversation with Appellant’s mother. Even if the evidence had some relevancy, the trial court properly excluded the evidence insofar as its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues, unfair prejudice, or misleading the jury. Moreover, even if the evidence should not have been excluded, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) the evidence was admissible only for purposes of impeaching the victim’s credibility, not as 2 substantive evidence that the victim had been threatened into testifying against Appellant; and (2) the victim’s account of the incident was corroborated by her next-door neighbors, recorded 911 calls, and the physical evidence. See Pearce, 880 So. 2d at 570– 71 (holding that the trial court’s error in excluding evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement was harmless where the evidence was only admissible for purposes of impeaching the witness’s credibility, not as substantive evidence of defendant’s level of involvement in the killings or his prior knowledge of the shooter’s intentions, and even if the witness’s credibility had been called into question by admission of his prior inconsistent statements, the witness’s account of the evening was corroborated by the testimony of others); Thorne v. State, 271 So. 3d 177, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (holding that the error in preventing the defense from challenging the victim’s credibility by introducing her prior statements during a November 2013 interview “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the extensive inculpatory evidence and the entire context of the November 2013 interview”) (emphasis added). AFFIRMED. B.L. THOMAS, WINOKUR, and JAY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Welch, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 3