Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT SCOTT JOSEPH TRADER, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. No. 4D2025-1213 [November 18, 2026] Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Lawrence Mirman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562016CF003220AXXXXX. Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pablo Tapia, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. MAY, J. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery on a child under twelve. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motions to disqualify, for a statement of particulars, and to suppress evidence. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to receive medroxyprogesterone acetate (“MPA”) treatment, pursuant to section 794.0235(1), Florida Statutes (2016). The defendant lastly argues he was entitled to a twelve-person jury. We affirm on all issues except the sentencing error, which we reverse. In 2016, the State charged the defendant with molestation and sexual battery. In the same information, the State charged the defendant with sexually-based offenses against another victim, R.V. In 2023, the defendant was tried and convicted of the charges involving both victims. The defendant appealed those convictions. We reversed and remanded the convictions due to misjoinder. See Trader v. State, 386 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). On remand, the defendant chose to represent himself. The jury once again convicted the defendant. The trial court imposed two life sentences and ordered the defendant be treated with MPA, pursuant to section 794.0235(1), Florida Statutes (2016). 1 The defendant objected to the State’s request for MPA treatment. After the defendant filed his notice of appeal, the trial court entered an order striking the MPA treatment. The order indicated that it was issued “on the State’s Motion.” The defendant filed a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentence months later, arguing that section 794.0235(1) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The record does not reflect a ruling on the motion. The defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence. • The Analysis The defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motions to disqualify, for a statement of particulars, and to suppress evidence. We affirm those issues without further discussion. 1 Section 794.0235, Florida Statutes (2016) provides: (1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court: (a) May sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s. 794.011. (b) Shall sentence a defendant to be treated with medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA), according to a schedule of administration monitored by the Department of Corrections, if the defendant is convicted of sexual battery as described in s. 794.011 and the defendant has a prior conviction of sexual battery under s. 794.011. .... (2)(a) An order of the court sentencing a defendant to medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment under subsection (1), shall be contingent upon a determination by a court appointed medical expert, that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatment. Such determination is to be made not later than 60 days from the imposition of sentence. .... 2 Next, the defendant argues the trial court erred in ordering MPA treatment. First, the defendant suggests section 794.0235(1) requires the order for treatment be “‘contingent upon a determination by a court appointed medical expert, [and] that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatment.’” This determination must be made within sixty days of sentencing. Here, no evaluation occurred. Second, the defendant makes a facial equal protection argument against section 794.0235(1). Third, the defendant argues section 794.0235(1) impermissibly “assigns the crucial factual determination” that a defendant is an appropriate candidate for MPA treatment to an expert, not a jury or court. Fourth, the defendant also claims section 794.0235(1)’s procedure violates due process because it lacks “any mechanism for judicial fact- finding . . . .” Fifth, the defendant argues the MPA treatment requirement lacks a rational relationship to the legislative objective. The State responds the trial court properly struck the order requiring the defendant’s MPA treatment. Thus, the State submits the issue is moot. See Jeda v. Gerasci, 330 So. 3d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect.”). On reply, the defendant suggests the trial court lacked jurisdiction to strike the MPA treatment and requests a reversal on this issue. “Because a sentencing error involves a pure issue of law,” we have de novo review. A.T.M.C. v. State, 413 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025) (citation modified). Before we can reach the defendant’s constitutional challenges, we must address the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter the order striking the MPA treatment. The defendant argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order, arguing “this Court may determine that the trial court” “did not have jurisdiction,” which by implication is because it was after the notice of appeal. In its brief, the State does not respond to the defendant’s 3 jurisdiction argument but does not oppose the trial court’s striking of the MPA treatment. The defendant filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 2025. The trial court’s order striking the MPA treatment was entered on May 22, 2025. Generally, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to enter orders after a notice of appeal is filed. See Alvarez v. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc., 93 So. 3d 415, 415 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation modified). Here, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to strike the MPA treatment because the defendant had already filed his notice of appeal. The State argues the MPA treatment issue is moot. “An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect.” Jeda v. Gerasci, 330 So. 3d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citation modified). Here, however, the trial court struck the MPA treatment after the notice of appeal had been filed. At that time, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Thus, the issue is not moot. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order requiring the defendant to receive MPA treatment and remand the case to the trial court to reenter the order striking the MPA treatment. We affirm the trial court’s decision to impanel a six-person jury for the trial. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. denied, No. SC22-1597, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023); Cunningham v. Florida, 144 S. Ct. 1287 (2024) (denying petition for writ of certiorari challenging Florida’s use of six-member juries). But see Kian v. State, 421 So. 3d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 2025), cert. granted, No. SC25-6623, 2026 WL 1718018 (June 15, 2026). Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. SHEPHERD and SHAW, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing. 4