Eric Pierce v. State of Florida
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledJuly 20, 2021
Docket1D19-2829
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D19-2829
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ERIC PIERCE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County.
Don H. Lester, Judge.
July 20, 2021
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND/OR CLARIFICATION
PER CURIAM.
We deny Appellee’s motion for rehearing and/or clarification,
but withdraw our prior opinion dated March 24, 2021, and
substitute the following opinion in its place.
In this appeal from his convictions and sentences for two
counts of vehicular homicide, Appellant claims that the trial court
erred in imposing consecutive sentences of ten and eleven years in
prison where the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet provided
for a lowest permissible sentence of 19.8 years. We agree and
reverse and remand for resentencing.
I.
After Appellant entered an open guilty plea to two counts of
vehicular homicide, the trial court rejected Appellant’s request for
a downward departure and sentenced Appellant to concurrent
terms of twenty-one years in prison as to each count. After filing a
timely notice of appeal, Appellant filed a motion to correct
sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)(2). The motion claimed that the trial court was required
to impose sentences of 19.706 years on each count because this was
the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment
Code scoresheet and exceeded the fifteen-year statutory maximum
for a second-degree felony.
The trial court entered an order granting Appellant’s motion
insofar as Appellant’s individual sentences exceeded the statutory
maximum of fifteen years for a second-degree felony. However, it
rejected Appellant’s argument that the lowest permissible
sentence must be imposed when it exceeded the statutory
maximum for each individual count. Citing Gabriel v. State, 44 Fla.
L. Weekly D2913 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6, 2019), the court found that
the lowest permissible sentence must be imposed only when it
exceeded the collective statutory maximum for all counts, which in
Appellant’s case was thirty years if the court imposed consecutive
sentences of fifteen years in prison. Based on a corrected
scoresheet, the court found that the lowest permissible sentence
was 19.8 years, which did not exceed the collective statutory
maximum of thirty years. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that
Appellant be resentenced using a corrected scoresheet.
At Appellant’s resentencing hearing, the State argued that “a
21-year sentence can still be fashioned here, based on just a
consecutive sentence between the counts.” Defense counsel
acknowledged that the court could impose consecutive sentences
as long as Appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated and
requested that the court “consider giving him the guidelines which
is maybe about a little—little more than a year under 21 years.”
The court agreed that it could not exceed the twenty-one-year
sentence originally imposed. The court then resentenced Appellant
to consecutive terms of ten and eleven years in prison for a total
sentence of twenty-one years.
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II.
Under the Criminal Punishment Code, sentence points are
scored for the primary offense, “the offense at conviction pending
before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points
recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than,
the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the
offender and pending before the court at sentencing”; additional
offenses, those “for which an offender is convicted and which [are]
pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary
offense”; and the prior record, “a conviction for a crime committed
. . . prior to the time of the primary offense.” § 921.0021(1), (4) &
(5), Fla. Stat. (2019). A scoresheet is used to calculate total
sentence points that determine the lowest permissible sentence,
i.e., the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court
absent a valid reason for departure. § 921.0024(1)(a) & (2), Fla.
Stat. (2019). “The permissible range for sentencing shall be the
lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory
maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and
any additional offenses before the court for sentencing.” §
921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). The Criminal Punishment Code also
provides that the trial court “may impose a sentence up to and
including the statutory maximum for any offense” and expressly
allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing. §§ 921.002(1)(g) &
921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2019). However, “[i]f the lowest permissible
sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence
as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must
be imposed.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2019).
In this case, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences of ten and eleven years in prison
where the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet provided for a
lowest permissible sentence of 19.8 years in prison, asserting that
the trial court should have imposed concurrent sentences of 19.8
years for both counts. The issue here is whether the lowest
permissible sentence applies under section 921.0024(2) when the
lowest permissible sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for
each individual count or when it exceeds the collective statutory
maximum for all counts.
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In Champagne v. State, 269 So. 3d 629 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019),
the Second District concluded that the lowest permissible sentence
“is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony
at sentencing for which the [lowest permissible sentence] exceeds
that felony’s statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether
the felony is the primary or an additional offense.” Id. at 636. The
court expressly rejected the alternative interpretation that the
lowest permissible sentence “is a collective minimum sentence.” Id.
Subsequently, in Gabriel v. State, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2913
(Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 6, 2019), review granted, No. SC19-2155, 2020
WL 1888656 (Fla. Apr. 16, 2020), the Fifth District disagreed with
Champagne and held that the lowest permissible sentence must be
applied under section 921.0024(2) only when it exceeds the
collective statutory maximum—not each individual statutory
maximum. The court certified conflict with Champagne as well as
the following question of great public importance:
IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY
AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES,
AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A
COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE
MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A
SINGLE SCORESHEET?
Id. at D2913.
Recently, the Florida Supreme Court answered the above
question in the affirmative, disapproved the Fifth District’s
decision in Gabriel, and approved the Second District’s decision in
Champagne. State v. Gabriel, 46 Fla. L. Weekly S62 (Fla. Apr. 8,
2021). In light of the supreme court’s pronouncement on this issue,
the trial court was required to impose sentences of 19.8 years for
each count of vehicular homicide where the Criminal Punishment
Code scoresheet provided for a lowest permissible sentence of 19.8
years.
III.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the lowest
permissible sentence is an individual minimum sentence where
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there are multiple convictions subject to sentencing on a single
scoresheet. As a result, the trial court should have imposed 19.8
years for both counts of vehicular homicide where the scoresheet
prescribed a lowest permissible sentence of 19.8 years.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing.
M.K. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur; JAY, J., specially concurs
with opinion.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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JAY, J., specially concurring.
The Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gabriel has
effectively limited the trial court’s sentencing discretion in this
case to the imposition of either concurrent or consecutive
sentences. However, if consecutive sentences were to be imposed
on remand, this would almost double the trial court’s original
sentence of twenty-one years, giving rise to a presumption of
vindictiveness in violation of due process. See Trotter v. State, 825
So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that following the reversal
of a sentence on appeal, the presumption of vindictiveness arises
when the trial judge imposes a more severe sentence upon
resentencing). Because the trial court acknowledged that it could
not exceed its original sentence of twenty-one years, I believe that
the trial court should impose concurrent sentences of 19.8 years.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
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Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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