Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-1622 _____________________________ CARL HARRISON SEALE JR., Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County. Christopher N. Patterson, Judge. February 18, 2021 PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his amended post-conviction motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. He alleges his sentence of 60 months of drug offender probation is illegal because his offense of aggravated stalking is a disqualifying crime for drug offender probation. Finding Appellant’s claim is barred by the law of the case and collateral estoppel, we affirm. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 289–91 (Fla. 2003). Appellant has raised this claim before. He preserved this claim in a rule 3.800(b) motion and, upon denial, raised the claim in his direct appeal, which this Court affirmed. Seale v. State, 276 So. 3d 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). A defendant is barred by collateral estoppel from raising a claim in a subsequent 3.800 motion that has already been raised and decided on the merits. McBride, 848 So. 2d at 289-91. Further, upon affirmance of Appellant’s judgment and sentence, the legality of the drug offender probation and special conditions, which were imposed in the original sentence and challenged on appeal, became law of the case. Id. Concerning the legality of Appellant’s sentence, Appellant agreed to the sentence and felony drug offender probation as part of his request for downward departure sentencing consideration. Specifically, Appellant agreed to drug offender community control as part of his November 14, 2018, plea and again as part of his April 11, 2019, plea on a violation of probation offense. Because Appellant agreed to the sentence he received, the sentence is not illegal. See Carson v. State, 37 So. 3d 884, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“In our view, it is not ‘illegal’ to allow a defendant to agree to serve a special type of probation, e.g., because of a substance abuse problem, even though the trial court could not impose such a condition on an unwilling defendant convicted at trial.” (emphasis in original)). AFFIRMED. ROWE, M.K. THOMAS, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Carl Harrison Seale Jr., pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 2