Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-645 _____________________________ JOHNNY COPELAND, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla County. Ronald W. Flury, Judge. March 20, 2020 PER CURIAM. We affirm the denial of Appellant’s motion to correct illegal sentence. In 2015, Appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence where he argued that the lower court had previously resentenced him on a kidnapping conviction that was stricken and reversed on appeal. The postconviction court granted relief on this claim and entered an amended judgment striking that sentence on April 13, 2016, outside of Appellant’s presence. Appellant now argues that his sentence is illegal because he was not present when the amended judgment was entered and that the trial court improperly struck out a portion of the amended judgment on a first-degree murder charge that would have made him eligible for parole after 25 years. He contends that he is entitled to resentencing or a new trial. Appellant’s claims are without merit. The amended judgment entered by the postconviction court only struck the kidnapping sentence that had previously been vacated. The trial court had no discretion to alter the Appellant’s sentence in any other way. Additionally, the transcript and sentencing agreement from the 1992 sentencing hearing clearly show Appellant was never meant to be eligible for parole. Thus, the amended judgment could not have removed such eligibility. We find the trial court’s handwritten correction was a purely ministerial act done to correct a scrivener’s error in the amended judgment. See Daniels v. State, 31 So. 3d 190, 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that the defendant’s presence is not necessary when a court is merely engaged in a purely ministerial act where it has no discretion). Appellant’s second claim is likewise without merit. He attempts to argue that his own violation of the sentencing agreement by seeking postconviction relief entitles him to resentencing or a new trial. However, the plea agreement only gives the State the option to declare the agreement null and void. It has no obligation to do so, and as it has not sought to enforce that element, this argument must fail. In view of the above, we affirm the trial court’s ruling as to all of the Appellant’s claims. Appellant is warned that any future filings that this Court determines to be frivolous may result in the imposition of sanctions, including a prohibition against any further pro se filings in this Court and a referral to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures as provided in section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2019) (providing that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous or malicious suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal is subject to disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections). AFFIRMED. ROWE, WINOKUR, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. 2 _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Johnny Copeland, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 3