United States v. Cooper

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 24-1769 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. SHERRIFF COOPER, Defendant, Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] Before Gelpí, Rikelman, and Aframe, Circuit Judges. Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of Massachusetts, for appellant. Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. August 6, 2026  RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. A jury found Sherriff Cooper guilty of multiple crimes connected to sex trafficking of a minor, including forced labor. Cooper now lodges several challenges to his convictions; he claims that one count of the indictment charged more than one crime and that the government failed to produce enough evidence against him at trial. He also contends that he should have been tried on the forced labor charge in New York, not Massachusetts, or, at a minimum, that the issue of venue should have been put to the jury. Although we are unpersuaded by Cooper's other arguments, we agree that the jury should have decided if Massachusetts was the proper venue for the forced labor charge. Thus, we vacate only Cooper's forced labor conviction and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. Relevant Facts In early 2017, Cooper worked as a security guard at St. Mary's Center for Women and Children, a Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF) program for young mothers.1 At St. Mary's, Cooper -- who was then 30 years 1 Cooper's multiple claims require us to evaluate the record from various perspectives. For Cooper's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence against him, "we recount the relevant facts as presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, consistent with record support." United States v. Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). In analyzing his other claims, "we offer a balanced treatment, in - 2 - old -- met J.C., a pregnant 15-year-old girl. The two began communicating, both in person and via text message, and eventually started a sexual relationship several months later, once J.C. turned 16 in April. J.C. gave birth in July 2017 at a local Boston hospital, accompanied by a St. Mary's staff member. During her hospital stay, J.C. asked the St. Mary's staff member to meet "her boo" downstairs to retrieve the food he had brought for her. The staff member recognized J.C.'s "boo" as Cooper and became concerned about the relationship. She reported the incident to St. Mary's, which subsequently filed a "51A" report with DCF -- a report alleging abuse or neglect of a minor -- against Cooper. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 51A. DCF conducted an investigation and determined that the allegation that Cooper sexually exploited J.C. was "supported." After giving birth, J.C. briefly returned to St. Mary's with her child but soon left to live with her mother. Cooper moved in with her, as they were in a "relationship" by then. While living together, Cooper became violent with J.C., including "chok[ing]" her, "chasing [her] in the street with his car," and "slapp[ing] [her] in [the] face" when he believed that she was cheating on him. which we objectively view the evidence of record." Id. (citation modified). - 3 -  In October 2017, DCF took custody of J.C.'s child, and J.C. subsequently spent several weeks in a mental-health facility. During those weeks, Cooper sent her letters and bought her a ring. By December 2017, J.C. had moved to a DCF program for young mothers in Newburyport, Massachusetts. While J.C. was in Newburyport, she and Cooper spoke daily and met in person every week. To prove that she was "loyal" to Cooper, J.C. had sex with him in his car. J.C. ran away from the Newburyport program in early 2018 to meet Cooper at a local train station. When J.C. arrived, Cooper checked her for wires and broke her cell phone. The two then began living together again, initially with Cooper's aunt in Boston, and eventually in various other places, including Cooper's car. After Cooper lost his job driving for Uber in the spring of 2018, he told J.C. that she could either "go back to DCF" or "stay with him" and "help him make money" through prostitution. Cooper brought J.C. to a client and taught her "what to do" and "what to say" during the sexual encounter. J.C. had sex with the client, collected $100, and handed the money to Cooper. Cooper told J.C. that she had "done a good job" and "that it wasn't that hard." J.C. was barely 17 at the time. Cooper eventually bought J.C. a disposable cell phone and taught her how to answer the phone to set up "dates" (a term for prostitution arrangements), including by describing payments - 4 - as "donations" or "roses" to avoid detection. He also posted an advertisement on Backpage -- a website that listed escort and prostitution services -- using fake pictures and names and listing the number to the disposable cell phone. After the government shut down Backpage, J.C. continued to schedule dates with previous clients who called or texted her on the disposable phone using the TextNow application. J.C. testified that, for a period in the spring of 2018, she went on nearly 10 dates per night and worked almost every night of the week. Cooper drove J.C. to these dates, waited for her in his car, and then collected the cash payments from her. If she did not want to work, Cooper would "hit" her and call her "lazy." The "dates" continued through May 2018, shortly after J.C. turned 17.2 When J.C. asked Cooper if she could stop engaging in prostitution, he responded "no[t] until [she] [could] go to the strip club." According to J.C., Cooper was referring to a strip club in New York, Junior's Cabaret, which required its performers to be 18. Cooper and J.C. traveled to New York on April 30, 2018, during the time that J.C. was going on "dates" in Massachusetts, Although J.C. was uncertain of when exactly the "dates" 2 stopped, she testified that she did not engage in prostitution after moving to New York in June 2018. - 5 - but they presented different accounts of the impetus for this trip. According to J.C., because she was 17 at the time, Cooper brought her to New York to obtain a fake ID so that she could work at the strip club. But the ID they procured in New York did not fool the security guard at Junior's Cabaret, and he turned J.C. away. Cooper testified, however, that they traveled to New York to visit his mother and his two children, not to obtain an ID for J.C.3 For her part, J.C. acknowledged she and Cooper "hung out with [Cooper's] kids" and "met his mom" during the trip but maintained that the purpose of the trip was always to obtain a fake ID. While Cooper and J.C. were in New York, Cooper posted a prostitution advertisement on another website, Plenty of Fish. Cooper brought J.C. on a "date" he arranged through the website, but J.C. left out of fear of being raped when she encountered multiple men at the meet-up location. Cooper and J.C. then returned to Massachusetts temporarily. During this interim period, Cooper coerced J.C. to resume "dates" and hit her if she refused to answer the phone, go on a date, or give him the money. 3We describe Cooper's trial testimony because it is relevant to his venue challenges to Count Three, the forced labor charge. See infra section II.C. But we do not consider this testimony in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence against Cooper for Counts One and Two, because it was the jury's prerogative not to credit his testimony in reaching its verdict. See infra section II.B. - 6 -  On June 1, 2018, Cooper and J.C. tried to move to New York. A police officer stopped them en route because of the window tint of Cooper's car. After initially providing the police with a fake name, J.C. eventually divulged her real identity. Because J.C. was an underage "runaway," the officer returned her to DCF custody but allowed Cooper to leave. Soon after, J.C. escaped from DCF custody again, and Cooper picked her up and drove them to New York that same day. While they were driving, Cooper destroyed J.C.'s prepaid phone so they could not "be caught with it." In New York, Cooper and J.C. lived in various places throughout the summer and fall of 2018, including with Cooper's mother in the Bronx. During this time, Cooper occasionally worked as a janitor at a high school and later as a security guard. By August, Cooper had obtained another ID for J.C., which was a legitimate ID that belonged to a neighbor's daughter. J.C. applied to work at Junior's Cabaret with this ID, and she became a regular performer by mid-September, when she was still 17. J.C. testified that she gave her earnings -- between $600 to $1,000 per shift -- to Cooper. J.C. described Cooper as "extremely violent" during their time in New York. According to J.C., Cooper hit her and sent her profanity-filled and violent text messages. One August text read: "Bitch I'll fuckin cut ya throat" and "when I see you tonight, I'm gonna fuck you up." In the fall of 2018, J.C. told - 7 - Cooper she was pregnant, but Cooper said she could still work because she was not "showing yet" and was just "being lazy." He allowed her "a couple days off" after she had an abortion. And in December, an upset Cooper came to Junior's Cabaret when J.C. did not answer her phone and tried to follow her into the dancers' dressing room, causing a scene. Finally, in late March or early April 2019, J.C. told Cooper she was pregnant again and could not work because it hurt her. After an argument, Cooper choked J.C. over the bathtub, making her fear for her pregnancy. On the heels of this abuse, and soon after she turned 18, J.C. returned to Boston using a bus ticket that Cooper's mother had bought for her. J.C. gave birth to their child in October 2019, and she and Cooper continued to communicate via phone and text during this time. One October text from Cooper read: "I'm so sorry for putting you in that game," which J.C. testified was a term for prostitution (and Cooper maintained was about stripping). In a separate text, Cooper again apologized for having her "in that life." In a series of text exchanges during this time, J.C. wrote: "All you want to do is be a drug dealing, rapper, pimp" and implored Cooper to "go get someone else pregnant and beat them up." A few messages later, Cooper admitted: "I get emotional [when] I'm hurt and lonely like [I] said I'm sorry. Everything you said about me is true." In November, J.C. and Cooper moved to New Jersey to attempt to live together again, this time with their baby. But, after four or - 8 - five months, in the spring of 2020, J.C. moved out and called the police after an argument when Cooper spit in her face. After J.C. left Cooper, he sought visitation time with their son. J.C. filed for a restraining order against Cooper in June 2020 and requested an extension of the restraining order in October 2020. She also spoke with law enforcement, leading to Cooper's ultimate arrest on the charges at issue in this case. B. Procedural History In June 2021, a grand jury charged Cooper with three crimes: sex trafficking of a minor and by force, fraud, and coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1), and (b)(2) ("Count One"); transportation of a minor with intent that the minor engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) ("Count Two"); and forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) ("Count Three"). Before trial, Cooper filed multiple pro se motions to dismiss and quash the indictment. He contended that Count One was duplicitous and failed to provide fair notice of the charges against him. And he challenged the venue for both Counts One and Three. The district court denied each of Cooper's motions to dismiss, and Cooper proceeded to trial. Both J.C. and Cooper testified, along with a number of other witnesses. After the government rested its case, Cooper moved for an acquittal arguing - 9 - that the government had introduced insufficient evidence to convict him, but the district court denied his motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Cooper later asserted objections to the jury instructions, including the absence of a venue instruction. The jury ultimately convicted Cooper on all three counts. As to Count One -- sex trafficking -- the jury indicated on the verdict form that Cooper "knew, or recklessly disregarded" both "that Ms. J.C. had not attained the age of 18 years" and that "means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, or any combination of such means, would be used to cause Ms. J.C. to engage in a commercial sex act." After the verdict, Cooper filed additional motions, including for acquittal and for a new trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), 33. The district court denied those motions as well. See United States v. Cooper, 744 F. Supp. 3d 107 (D. Mass. 2024). It then sentenced Cooper to 216 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The court also ordered Cooper to pay $97,200 in restitution to J.C. Cooper timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION Cooper argues that we should reverse each of his convictions. First, he brings various duplicity-related challenges to Count One -- the sex trafficking charge. Second, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him on Counts - 10 - One and Two. And finally, he lodges a multi-faceted attack on the venue for Count Three -- the forced labor charge. He contends that venue was not proper in Massachusetts or, at the very least, that there was a genuine factual dispute about venue that should have been decided by the jury. As we will explain, we conclude that only one of his challenges has merit. A. Duplicity (Count One) Cooper maintains that Count One -- the sex trafficking charge under § 1591(a)(1) -- was duplicitous on its face, failed to provide him with adequate notice of the charges against him, and raised the risk of a non-unanimous verdict. At bottom, each of his duplicity-related arguments stems from his claim that § 1591(a)(1) sets out ten separate offenses instead of alternative means of committing the single offense of sex trafficking. Whether § 1591(a)(1) prohibits more than one offense is a question of first impression for our court.4 Because we agree with the district 4 In a recent decision, we stated that a violation of § 1591(a)(1) "requires proof in relevant part that someone: (1) knowingly (2) by means of interstate or foreign commerce, (3) recruited, enticed, [etc.] by any means a person, (4) knowing that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act." United States v. Pires, 138 F.4th 649, 658 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). Although our description in Pires of what the government must prove to secure a conviction under § 1591(a)(1) suggests that the ten acts listed in the provision are means, not elements, that case did not grapple with the duplicity question we decide today. - 11 - court that the critical text in § 1591(a)(1) does not describe ten separate crimes, we reject Cooper's duplicity-related arguments. We review the district court's denial of Cooper's motion to dismiss Count One on duplicity and lack of proper notice grounds de novo. See United States v. Prieto, 812 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2025) (reviewing sufficiency of indictment). And we also review de novo the district court's decision to deny Cooper's request for a unanimity instruction for Count One. See United States v. Rodriguez, 115 F.4th 24, 46 (1st Cir. 2024); United States v. Orlandella, 96 F.4th 71, 90 (1st Cir. 2024) ("[W]e review de novo a party's right to a jury instruction on unanimity because their right to such an instruction is a question of law."). 1. Means or Elements? Cooper contends that Count One, which tracks the language of § 1591(a)(1), was duplicitous, because it "join[ed] in a single count two or more distinct offenses." United States v. Pontz, 132 F.4th 10, 27 (1st Cir. 2025) (citation modified). The chief evil of a duplicitous indictment is that "the jury may find a defendant guilty on a count without having reached a unanimous verdict on the commission of any particular offense." United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 1995). A duplicitous indictment also "may (1) fail to give the defendant adequate notice of the nature of the charges [against them], - 12 - (2) threaten to subject the defendant to prejudicial evidentiary rulings at trial, and (3) produce trial records inadequate to allow a defendant" to raise an objection to a "subsequent prosecution for the same offense." United States v. D'Amico, 496 F.3d 95, 99 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007), judgment vacated on other grounds, 552 U.S. 1173 (2008). Thus, the prohibition on duplicity seeks to safeguard a defendant's right not to be tried twice for the same crime, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, and to a verdict by a unanimous jury, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Trainor, 477 F.3d 24, 32 n.16 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that "a jury may find a defendant guilty on [a duplicitous] count without having reached a unanimous verdict on the commission of any particular offense, which in turn may prejudice a later double jeopardy defense" (citation modified)); U.S. Const. amend. V, § 2 (protecting the right not to be tried twice "for the same offense"); U.S. Const. amend. VI, § 1 (preserving the right to trial "by an impartial jury"). Count One charged Cooper with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which is titled "Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion." Section 1591(a) states: (a) Whoever knowingly -- (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, - 13 -  maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Count One tracked the language of § 1591(a)(1). It alleged that Cooper: [D]id knowingly, in and affecting interstate commerce, recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain, advertise, maintain, patronize and solicit by any means [J.C.], knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, and any combination of such means, would be used to cause [J.C.] to engage in a commercial sex act, and knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that [J.C.] had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. According to Cooper, the ten acts listed in § 1591(a)(1) -- "recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits" -- represent distinct elements of ten separate offenses. - 14 - See United States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476, 492 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Some statutes are divisible, meaning they list elements in the alternative."). The government contends, however, that the provision lists ten alternative means of committing just one offense: sex trafficking. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (explaining that statutes "frequently enumerate alternative means of committing a crime without intending to define separate elements or separate crimes"), abrogated on other grounds by Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021). Ultimately, to resolve this means-versus-elements dispute, we must determine Congress's intent in enacting § 1591(a)(1). As we have held, "[w]hether a particular fact is a means or an element is a 'value choice more appropriately made in the first instance by a legislature than by a court.'" United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 299 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation modified) (quoting Schad, 501 U.S. at 637). In conducting our analysis of what Congress intended, we "begin[] -- and sometimes end[] -- with the text of the statute of conviction." United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining how to determine "the extent to which jury unanimity is required"). If the statute's text "does not furnish decisive guidance," we expand our analysis to the "overall structure of the law," the "statute's legislative history," "relevant legal traditions," and any - 15 - "implications for unfairness." Id. (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 819-20 (1999); Schad, 501 U.S. at 637-38). We start with the text of § 1591. Four aspects of the text, when viewed together, indicate that Congress intended the ten acts in § 1591(a)(1) to describe different means of committing a single crime rather than elements of ten separate crimes. First, "the proscribed conduct is listed in a single sentence" within § 1591(a)(1). United States v. Bradford, 148 F.4th 699, 707 (9th Cir. 2025) (discussing § 1591(a)). By contrast, Congress has used separate subsections in other statutes to "set out [separate crimes] in the alternative." Taylor, 848 F.3d at 492 (concluding the assault statute at issue "is plainly divisible" as "the subsections [(a) and (b)] are set out in the alternative"). Consistent with this principle, at least one court has concluded that subsections (1) and (2) in § 1591(a) represent different crimes.5 See United States v. Lewis, No. 19-cr-307, 2021 WL 2809819, at *6-7 (D.D.C. July 6, 2021). Second, the "nature of the behavior" that underlies most of the ten acts does not "differ[] so significantly" so as to warrant treating them as different crimes. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); see id. at 127 5 Count One did not charge Cooper under § 1591(a)(2), so this provision of the statute is not at issue. - 16 - (determining that the relevant phrases in the statute at issue did not define separate crimes because the phrases "describe[d] roughly similar forms of behavior"). Instead, many of the ten acts, such as enticing and recruiting, cover overlapping conduct and "amount to variations on a single theme." Id. at 127. No doubt, Cooper makes a valid point that there is less overlap between some of the ten acts than others. For example, he contends that "providing" covers conduct that is arguably inconsistent with "patronizing." And he emphasizes that advertising is qualitatively different from all the other acts listed in § 1591(a)(1). But Cooper's argument throughout this case has been that Congress intended that each of the ten acts listed in § 1591(a)(1), no matter how similar, be treated as an element of a separate crime. And, as we explained, accepting his argument would require us to ignore the overlapping nature of many of the listed acts, such as recruiting and enticing. Cf. United States v. Burwell, 122 F.4th 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ("The fact that [the two statutory words] 'intimidation' and 'extortion' are synonyms is strong evidence that Congress viewed extortion and intimidation as alternative means to commit bank robbery."). Yet, Cooper provides no principled or practical reason why we should ignore that aspect of § 1591(a)(1)'s text. Cf. Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 506 (2016) (explaining that the inclusion of - 17 - "diverse means" in a statute "merely . . . spells out various factual ways of committing . . . the offense"). Third, we do not read the inclusion of the phrase "by any means" at the end of the list of acts in § 1591(a)(1) to signal Congress's intent to create ten separate crimes. In Cooper's view, comparing Congress's use of "by any means" in this portion of the provision to its use of the word "means" at the end of § 1591(a) indicates that Congress intended the acts listed to represent elements of ten separate crimes and specified that those elements could be committed "by any means." Indeed, he argues that any other reading of § 1591(a)(1) would make the provision redundant. But we see no redundancy in § 1591(a)(1). Each of the ten acts listed -- such as "recruit[ing]" or "entic[ing]" -- can be accomplished in a multitude of ways. As Cooper admits, one can "entice" a person with money, candy, or promises of stability. Thus, the phrase "by any means" at the end of § 1591(a)(1) can be read just as easily to confirm Congress's view that any form of enticement or recruitment, for example, that caused a person to engage in a commercial sex act amounts to a violation of the statute. Fourth, the penalty for violating § 1591(a)(1) does not depend on which of the ten acts a defendant committed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b). Instead, it depends on two other aspects of the offense: (1) the age of the minor, and (2) whether "the offense - 18 - was effected by means of force" or "not so effected." Id. § 1591(b)(1), (b)(2). Thus, whether the defendant engaged in advertising or enticement, for example, makes no difference. That Congress calibrated the penalty for sex trafficking to other aspects of a defendant's conduct indicates that Congress did not have "an intent . . . to link culpability" to a particular act listed in § 1591(a)(1), undermining the conclusion that each act is a separate element. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d at 299-300 (concluding that the punishment provisions in the felon-in-possession statute did not support a claim that the nature or number of firearms possessed was an element of the crime). To be sure, Cooper highlights features of the text that arguably skew in his favor. He points out that § 1591(a) uses the term "violation" and contends that the Supreme Court held in Richardson that Congress's use of that term in the continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, "support[ed] the conclusion" that the text at issue described separate elements. See 526 U.S. at 818-19 (reasoning that the "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that 'violates' the law" supports the conclusion that "each 'violation'" in the phrase "continuing series of violations" of the federal drug laws "amounts to a separate element"). But Cooper ignores that the term "violation" in the CCE statute appears in the critical text describing the crime - 19 - itself -- "a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if . . . such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of [the relevant provisions in the criminal code] . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). Whereas, in § 1591(a), "violation" is part of a textual sentence making clear that the mens rea for advertising is different than that for the other acts listed in § 1591(a)(1). Cooper also claims that the "extremely broad" scope of the acts in § 1591(a)(1) is akin to the broad sweep of the CCE statute. But this comparison does not hold up. The word "violation" in the CCE statute "covers many different kinds of behavior of varying degrees of seriousness," from removing drug labels to distributing large quantities of drugs, prohibited by the 90 sections of the federal criminal code that set out drug crimes. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 819. By contrast, § 1591(a)(1) is a single subsection that describes ten largely overlapping acts. Cooper's final textual argument highlights the different mens rea for "advertising." See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (". . . knowing, or, except where the act . . . is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force" will cause a commercial sex act (emphasis added)). And he is correct that a different mens rea is one indication that statutory text corresponds to an element not just a means. See, e.g., United States v. Tavares, 843 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2016) (concluding an - 20 - offense "reads as a divisible statute" given one section "requires a heightened mens rea"). Cooper then contends that, at a minimum, we should hold that "advertising" is a separate offense under § 1591(a)(1) and dismiss Count One on the ground that it is duplicitous "in part." But Cooper did not make this argument to the district court or in his opening brief on appeal. Thus, he has both forfeited and waived this argument, and we leave for another day whether the provision's text supports treating "advertising" as a separate offense. See United States v. Shafa, 175 F.4th 1, 29 n.9 (1st Cir. 2026) (explaining that "[w]e have consistently held that . . . arguments not raised in a party's initial brief and instead raised for the first time at oral argument are considered waived" (quoting parenthetically United States v. Pizarro-Berrios, 448 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2006))); United States v. Walker, 538 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining that forfeiture occurs when "a party fails to make a timely assertion of a right" at the district court (citation modified)). All told, we conclude that § 1591(a)(1)'s text does not support treating all of the listed acts as elements instead of means. But even if the text were inconclusive, the legislative and statutory history of § 1591 convinces us that the government has the better argument about its meaning. See Verrecchia, 196 F.3d at 300 (considering legislative history as "further evidence - 21 - of Congressional intent"). Congress enacted Section 1591 as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("the Act"). See Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). In findings accompanying the Act, Congress explained that "[e]xisting legislation" in the United States prohibiting sex trafficking was "inadequate," a "comprehensive law" was needed to "bring traffickers to justice," and the Act's purpose was to ensure "effective punishment of traffickers." Id. Div. A., § 102(a), (b)(14). Division A of the Act is titled the "Trafficking Victims Protection Act" (TVPA). Section 1591 is part of the TVPA and falls under the subsection "Strengthening Prosecution and Punishment of Traffickers." Id. Div. A., § 112. Importantly, the Act contains a definitions section, including for the term "Sex Trafficking." In 2000, Congress defined sex trafficking as "the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act." Id. Div. A, § 103(9). This definition of the crime of "sex trafficking" mirrored the list of acts in the original version of § 1591(a)(1), except that the verb "entice[]" also appeared in the original version. See id. Div. A., § 112. Over time, Congress amended § 1591(a)(1) to add to the list of prohibited acts. A 2008 amendment added "maintains." See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 222, 122 Stat. 5044, 5069. - 22 - And a later amendment via the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 added "patronizes" and "solicits" with the purpose of "clarify[ing] the range of conduct punished as sex trafficking." Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108, 129 Stat. 227, 238-39. Finally, Congress added "advertises" to expand § 1591(a)(1) to its current form. See id. § 118. Both the original definition of the term "sex trafficking" in the Act, which mirrored the original version of § 1591(a)(1), and Congress's amendments to § 1591(a)(1), indicate that it considered this provision to prohibit one crime of sex trafficking, which could be accomplished through multiple means. Cooper has not pointed to any legislative or statutory history to the contrary. Thus, the best evidence indicates that Congress's focus in enacting § 1591(a)(1) was "the scope of the crime of [trafficking] as a whole, [not] each act . . . comprised within that whole." Lee, 317 F.3d at 39. Finally, the other factors -- such as "[c]onsiderations of tradition and potential unfairness" -- do not obviously weigh in Cooper's favor. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d at 300-01. Cooper contends that our interpretation of the acts as means would "undermine[] the constitutional requirement of juror unanimity," because it risks "covering up disagreements about what the defendant did." But, as the government points out, treating the ten acts listed in § 1591(a)(1) as elements of ten different - 23 - offenses would permit the government to charge an individual with multiple crimes for conduct such as enticing a sex trafficking victim and recruiting that same victim. Cooper does not explain how that outcome would be more consistent with tradition or more likely to ensure fairness for defendants. Thus, we reject Cooper's argument that Count One was duplicitous because § 1591(a)(1) sets out ten separate offenses. See United States v. Garcia-Torres, 341 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Barbato, 471 F.2d 918, 922 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973) (explaining "it is permissible for a count in an indictment to allege all or several" of the "different means" listed in a statute)). Our holding is consistent with the decisions of two of our sister circuits, which have considered similar issues. See United States v. Paul, 885 F.3d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 2018) (suggesting that § 1591(a)'s statutory language of "recruits, entices [etc.]" indicates "alternative ways of committing a single offense" in holding that the district court did not plainly err in failing to address issue of duplicity sua sponte); Bradford, 148 F.4th at 705-06 (rejecting argument that "advertising" was an element of a "separate and distinct crime" prohibited by § 1591(a)(1)). To date, no circuit has concluded otherwise. 2. Remaining Duplicity Arguments Because we reject Cooper's duplicity challenge to Count One, his related arguments about lack of notice, the government's - 24 - failure to elect a theory of prosecution, and his request for a jury unanimity instruction also fail. First, we have repeatedly held that an indictment that tracks the language of the criminal statute at issue provides sufficient notice to a defendant of the crime charged. See Coleman, 149 F.4th at 18 (determining that "it was permissible to list each statutorily available method of kidnapping in the alternative in the indictment"). And when a statute lists multiple means of committing that crime, the indictment is not defective because it lists all those means in the alternative. See id.; see also Schad, 501 U.S. at 631 ("[A]n indictment need not specify which overt act, among several named, was the means by which a crime was committed."). Second, because we disagree with Cooper's duplicity arguments, the government did not need