Full Opinion

Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 25-30111 FILED November 17, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III United States of America, Clerk Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Miguel Keelen, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:24-CR-38-1 ______________________________ Before Jones, Clement, and Richman, Circuit Judges. Priscilla Richman, Circuit Judge: Miguel Keelen appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as unconstitutional. He additionally appeals the district court’s imposition of fourteen conditions of supervised release imposed in the written judgment, arguing that they were either not orally pronounced at sentencing or that they conflict with conditions orally pronounced at sentencing. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 I Keelen was previously convicted of several felony offenses, including drug possession, drug trafficking, and firearm offenses, with one offense involving his shooting into an occupied vehicle. While serving a term of parole supervision, he was charged with the offense that is the subject of this appeal. Keelen pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The presentence report (PSR) proposed thirteen conditions of supervised release it labeled as “standard” and two conditions it labeled as “special.” Keelen did not file any objections to these conditions. At the sentencing hearing, the district court confirmed Keelen “received a copy of the” PSR, “read it,” and “underst[ood] it.” The court discussed Keelen’s criminal history, and then turned back to the PSR, stating that it sustained Keelen’s objection to the calculation of the guidelines sentencing range and noting that the probation division had provided a supplemental addendum to the PSR reflecting a new guidelines range. The court stated that it granted Keelen’s motion for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and that the “reduction is already reflected in the [PSR].” The next sentence from the district court was, “Overall, I agree with the conclusions of the [PSR] as modified by the Court’s written opinion [which dealt with hemp and the court’s decision not to count a 2013 conviction as a predicate offense] and second addendum to the [PSR].” In the following sentence, the court summarized the PSR’s recommendations regarding offense level, criminal history, guidelines imprisonment range, a one- to three-year term of supervised release, a fine, special assessment, and no restitution. After hearing from the defendant and a family member, the court discussed Keelen’s criminal record and pronounced a sentence of 75 months 2 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and no fine due to inability to pay. The court orally pronounced five supervised release conditions. The court then stated that the defendant “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release including the following special conditions,” and the court orally pronounced three special conditions. Keelen did not object to, or seek clarification of, any of the orally recited conditions. The district court subsequently issued its written judgment, listing thirteen “standard” and three “special” conditions of supervised release. Keelen appeals his conviction and the conditions of his supervised release.1 II Keelen contends the Second Amendment renders his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him. He also argues § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and therefore is unconstitutional. He recognizes that these issues are foreclosed by circuit precedent2 and raises them only to preserve them for further review. We therefore do not address those issues. _____________________ 1 The government also filed an appeal in this case, but then filed a motion to dismiss, which this court granted. 2 See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024) (concluding § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025); United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 318 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment “because Congress can categorically disarm individuals convicted of violent felonies”), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135675 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (No. 25-5747); United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to those with convictions for committing violent acts with a firearm), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1781 (2026); United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating § 922(g)(1) does not exceed Congress’s commerce clause power). But see United States v. Squire, 177 F.4th 614, 626 (5th Cir. 2026) (concluding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment 3 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 III Keelen contends the district court did not satisfy its oral pronouncement requirement as to the thirteen “standard” conditions of supervised release set forth in the written judgment. He argues that all thirteen “standard” conditions must be stricken from the judgment. Alternatively, he contends that, to the extent that some of the “standard” conditions were pronounced at his sentencing hearing, the written judgment conflicts with those pronouncements, and the written judgment should be modified. He further requests that one of the “special” conditions of supervised release, regarding searches, be modified. “District courts are . . . required to pronounce orally any condition of supervised release that is not required to be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).”3 None of the “standard” conditions in the written judgment are required by § 3583(d). They are discretionary,4 so the district court was required to pronounce them at the sentencing hearing. “The pronouncement requirement . . . is part of the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing,” and that requirement is satisfied when a district judge gives “the defendant notice of the sentence and an opportunity to object.”5 “A court may do so by orally stating the condition[s] or by reference to a list of recommended supervised release conditions from a _____________________ “as applied to a convicted drug trafficker possessing a firearm inside his home”), vacated, reh’g en banc granted, 182 F.4th 481 (5th Cir. 2026) (en banc)). 3 United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Diggles, 957 F.3d at 558-59. 5 Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560. 4 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 court-wide or judge-specific standing order, or some other document.”6 Accordingly, “[w]hen the defendant confirms review of the PSR and sentencing goes forward, a court’s oral adoption of PSR-recommended conditions gives the defendant an opportunity to object.”7 We review for plain error when the defendant has an opportunity to object but fails to do so.8 However, “the mere existence of such a document [setting forth conditions of supervised release] is not enough for pronouncement.”9 Our en banc court in Diggles “expressly disapproved of a procedure ‘in which the court admitted a list of proposed conditions but never said that it was adopting those recommendations.’”10 As discussed above, at the sentencing hearing, the district court orally pronounced five conditions of supervised release and then stated that Keelen “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release including the following special conditions.” To what did “the standard conditions of supervised release” refer? The government maintains this was a “shorthand reference” to the PSR. In light of the record, we agree. The district court referred to and discussed the PSR during the sentencing hearing, and in the context of what transpired prior to and at the sentencing hearing, “the standard conditions of supervised release” could only have meant those set forth in the PSR.11 The district court, therefore, satisfied the _____________________ 6 Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367 (citing Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-62). 7 Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560. 8 Id. at 563. 9 Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367 (quoting Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5). 10 Id. (quoting Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5). 11 See United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that the PSR “set out the three conditions” challenged on appeal “exactly as they appear 5 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 pronouncement requirement, even though it did so imperfectly.12 The district court did not reference a standing order, nor any other document. The parties do not cite, and research does not reveal, a standing order that the Eastern District of Louisiana or the sentencing court has formally adopted as standard conditions of supervision.13 The district court could have been, and should have been, much clearer. We again admonish district courts to refer expressly to the source of “standard” conditions of supervised release when adopting them at _____________________ in the [written] judgment,” and concluding that there was no conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment, because, “although the court did not recite the conditions in full,” the oral pronouncement as a “shorthand reference” to the standard conditions in the PSR or its standing order “was adoption all the same”); see also Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367. 12 Cf. United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that the district court satisfied its pronouncement requirement because even though it did not explicitly adopt the PSR, the court had confirmed with the defendant “that he and his counsel had reviewed” the PSR, which recommended mandatory and standard conditions, the court had stated during sentencing that the defendant’s supervised release would be “under the Court’s . . . conditions,” and the court had a “longstanding” standing order that “defense counsel certainly knew” the court was referring to (emphasis added)); United States v. Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding the defendant had sufficient notice and the court committed no error when it adopted the PSR and stated it was imposing standard conditions without “citi[ing] the district’s standing order,” explaining that the PSR recommended standard conditions and the written judgment included standard conditions from the district’s standing order, which “defense counsel certainly knew” were the ones “being imposed”); United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e derived the rule in Vargas: that oral reference to ‘standard conditions’ where there exists a standing order imposing said conditions is sufficient.”). But see Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367-68 (concluding the district court erred when it did not “locate, identify, and adopt by reference a specific written list of conditions” when it stated that it was requiring the defendant to “comply with the standard conditions that will be set forth in the judgment of conviction and sentence,” despite the district having a standing order that listed nine standard conditions that “substantial[ly] overlap[ped]” with the fifteen conditions at issue). 13 Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text. 6 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 sentencing by reference, whether that source is a PSR, a standing order, or some other document.14 Failure to identify with clarity the document in which the “standard conditions” are set forth leads to costly and time- consuming appeals. Equally important, if not more important, when a district court fails to reference sufficiently the document in which conditions are set forth, and an appeal is successful, that results in the removal of conditions of supervised release that were intended to be of benefit to the defendant or to protect the public. But we would be remiss if we also failed to observe that it blinks reality for a defendant and their counsel to say they did not understand, in a case like the present one, what the district court meant when it said the defendant “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release.”15 The PSR, with detailed “standard” conditions of supervised release, had been provided to Keelen and his counsel well in advance of the sentencing hearing.16 There was no other source of “standard conditions” that might reasonably have been referenced. Moreover, there was a good reason why there were no objections in the district court to either the lack of clarity as to what “standard conditions” meant or to the substance of the “standard conditions” set forth in the PSR. It was obvious that the district court was referring to the PSR, and more importantly, substantively, there were no reasonable objections that could have been made to the “standard” conditions of supervised release set forth in the PSR. Even in this appeal, the complaints are not that the “standard” conditions in the written _____________________ 14 See Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367. 15 See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352-53. 16 Cf. id. at 352 (recognizing that the defendant “had the PSR six weeks before sentencing”). 7 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 judgment are, in and of themselves, objectionable. The complaints are that they “conflict” to some extent with those in the PSR. IV The appeal in the present case is not frivolous and has succeeded in some respects. However, had more attention and care been given in preparing the judgment, this appeal would not have been necessary. The “standard” conditions contained in the written judgment indeed do not track those in the PSR. We can discern what happened in the present case. The “standard conditions” in the PSR are virtually identical to those set forth in a form promulgated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. That form is “AO 245B (Rev. 11/25) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3A— Supervised Release.”17 But the written judgment was prepared from a much older Administrative Office form. The written judgment reflects on its face that it used “AO 245B (Rev. 02/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3— Supervised Release.” The “standard conditions” are similar, but distinctly not identical, to the AO form revised as of “11/25.” Most of the differences between the language used in the PSR and that used in the written judgment are immaterial. But not all of them. “If a term or condition of a sentence in the court’s written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence, the oral sentence controls.”18 _____________________ 17 The PSR in the present case was prepared before November of 2025, so the “standard conditions” may have come from a predecessor form that may have had slightly different language. 18 United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292, 302 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020)). 8 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 Here again, we admonish district courts and court staff and employees to pay much more attention to conforming written judgments to what transpired at the sentencing hearing. Appeals raising “Diggles” issues are costly, time-consuming, and in the main entirely avoidable. In most Diggles appeals, the parties are battling over conflicts between oral pronouncements and the written judgment, even though no legitimate objection could have been made to any of the “standard” conditions had they been orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing. A Keelen correctly points out that paragraphs 4 and 8 in the written judgment’s list of “standard” conditions have no counterparts in the PSR, the document we concluded the district court was referring to when it stated Keelen “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release including the following special conditions.”19 The government agrees that these paragraphs should be removed from the written judgment. Paragraph 4 provides “the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities.” Paragraph 8 provides “the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered.” Because there is a conflict between the PSR _____________________ 19 See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 353; Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367. 9 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 and the written judgment regarding these conditions,20 on remand, these conditions should be excised from the judgment.21 B Keelen asserts, and we agree, that paragraph 6 in the list of “standard” conditions in the written judgment imposes more onerous requirements if Keelen changes his residence or employment than the standard conditions in paragraphs 110 and 112 of the PSR. Paragraph 6 in the written judgment says, “the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment.” By contrast, paragraphs 110 and 112 of the PSR provide that notice within 72 hours will suffice in certain circumstances: 110. . . . . If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change. *** 112. . . . . If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least _____________________ 20 See United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he written judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement by imposing a more burdensome requirement . . . .”); Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303 (“A conflict exists when the written judgment ‘broadens the restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement.’” (quoting United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006))). 21 United States v. Currier, 160 F.4th 656, 658 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Any discretionary condition in a written judgment that conflicts with the sentence as orally pronounced must be excised on remand.” (emphasis in original)). 10 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change. On remand, the written judgment should be modified to conform to the PSR in this regard.22 C Keelen and the government agree that paragraph 7 in the written judgment is broader than the district court’s oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing that “[t]he defendant shall not possess a controlled substance.” Paragraph 7 provides “the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician.” On remand, this condition should be revised to conform to the oral pronouncement because it conflicts to the extent it references alcohol.23 D Keelen contends the district court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing of a special condition regarding searches conflicts with the written judgment. At sentencing, the district court orally imposed the following condition: “Due to the nature of the offense, the defendant shall submit his person, residence, office and vehicle to a search conducted by the United States Probation Officer at a reasonable time in a reasonable matter and on reasonable suspicion.” The written judgment added: “The defendant shall warn any other residents or occupants that the premises may be subject to _____________________ 22 See Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 383; Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303. 23 See Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303. 11 Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/17/2026 No. 25-30111 searches pursuant to this condition.” The government contends this does not conflict with the oral pronouncement but instead clarifies an ambiguity in the condition. We perceive no conflict. Warning others of the possibility of a search is consistent with the condition that his premises be subject to searches.24 The district court did not abuse its discretion regarding this condition. * * * For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Keelen’s conviction. The district court’s sentence is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED so the district court may conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncements consistent with this opinion. The stay previously granted is LIFTED. _____________________ 24 See United States v. Raymer, 148 F. App’x 555, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding there was no conflict when the court’s written judgment added a warning requirement because “warning others is a consistent way to implement the search condition”). 12