United States v. Keelen
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-30111
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-30111 Document: 89-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 25-30111
FILED
November 17, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
United States of America, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Miguel Keelen,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:24-CR-38-1
______________________________
Before Jones, Clement, and Richman, Circuit Judges.
Priscilla Richman, Circuit Judge:
Miguel Keelen appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as
unconstitutional. He additionally appeals the district court’s imposition of
fourteen conditions of supervised release imposed in the written judgment,
arguing that they were either not orally pronounced at sentencing or that they
conflict with conditions orally pronounced at sentencing. We affirm in part
and vacate and remand in part.
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No. 25-30111
I
Keelen was previously convicted of several felony offenses, including
drug possession, drug trafficking, and firearm offenses, with one offense
involving his shooting into an occupied vehicle. While serving a term of
parole supervision, he was charged with the offense that is the subject of this
appeal. Keelen pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The presentence report (PSR) proposed thirteen conditions of
supervised release it labeled as “standard” and two conditions it labeled as
“special.” Keelen did not file any objections to these conditions.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court confirmed Keelen
“received a copy of the” PSR, “read it,” and “underst[ood] it.” The court
discussed Keelen’s criminal history, and then turned back to the PSR,
stating that it sustained Keelen’s objection to the calculation of the guidelines
sentencing range and noting that the probation division had provided a
supplemental addendum to the PSR reflecting a new guidelines range. The
court stated that it granted Keelen’s motion for a three-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility and that the “reduction is already reflected in
the [PSR].” The next sentence from the district court was, “Overall, I agree
with the conclusions of the [PSR] as modified by the Court’s written opinion
[which dealt with hemp and the court’s decision not to count a 2013
conviction as a predicate offense] and second addendum to the [PSR].” In
the following sentence, the court summarized the PSR’s recommendations
regarding offense level, criminal history, guidelines imprisonment range, a
one- to three-year term of supervised release, a fine, special assessment, and
no restitution.
After hearing from the defendant and a family member, the court
discussed Keelen’s criminal record and pronounced a sentence of 75 months
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No. 25-30111
of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and no fine due to
inability to pay. The court orally pronounced five supervised release
conditions. The court then stated that the defendant “[s]hall comply with
the standard conditions of supervised release including the following special
conditions,” and the court orally pronounced three special conditions.
Keelen did not object to, or seek clarification of, any of the orally
recited conditions. The district court subsequently issued its written
judgment, listing thirteen “standard” and three “special” conditions of
supervised release. Keelen appeals his conviction and the conditions of his
supervised release.1
II
Keelen contends the Second Amendment renders his conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional both facially and as applied to
him. He also argues § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority and therefore is unconstitutional. He recognizes that these issues
are foreclosed by circuit precedent2 and raises them only to preserve them
for further review. We therefore do not address those issues.
_____________________
1
The government also filed an appeal in this case, but then filed a motion to
dismiss, which this court granted.
2
See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2024) (concluding
§ 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025); United States v.
Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 318 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding § 922(g)(1) does not violate the
Second Amendment “because Congress can categorically disarm individuals convicted of
violent felonies”), cert. denied, 2026 WL 135675 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026) (No. 25-5747); United
States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 529-30 (5th Cir. 2025) (concluding § 922(g)(1) is
constitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to those with convictions for
committing violent acts with a firearm), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1781 (2026); United States
v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating § 922(g)(1) does not exceed
Congress’s commerce clause power). But see United States v. Squire, 177 F.4th 614, 626
(5th Cir. 2026) (concluding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment
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III
Keelen contends the district court did not satisfy its oral
pronouncement requirement as to the thirteen “standard” conditions of
supervised release set forth in the written judgment. He argues that all
thirteen “standard” conditions must be stricken from the judgment.
Alternatively, he contends that, to the extent that some of the “standard”
conditions were pronounced at his sentencing hearing, the written judgment
conflicts with those pronouncements, and the written judgment should be
modified. He further requests that one of the “special” conditions of
supervised release, regarding searches, be modified.
“District courts are . . . required to pronounce orally any condition of
supervised release that is not required to be imposed under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d).”3 None of the “standard” conditions in the written
judgment are required by § 3583(d). They are discretionary,4 so the district
court was required to pronounce them at the sentencing hearing.
“The pronouncement requirement . . . is part of the defendant’s right
to be present at sentencing,” and that requirement is satisfied when a district
judge gives “the defendant notice of the sentence and an opportunity to
object.”5 “A court may do so by orally stating the condition[s] or by
reference to a list of recommended supervised release conditions from a
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“as applied to a convicted drug trafficker possessing a firearm inside his home”), vacated,
reh’g en banc granted, 182 F.4th 481 (5th Cir. 2026) (en banc)).
3
United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United
States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)).
4
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); Diggles, 957 F.3d at 558-59.
5
Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560.
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court-wide or judge-specific standing order, or some other document.”6
Accordingly, “[w]hen the defendant confirms review of the PSR and
sentencing goes forward, a court’s oral adoption of PSR-recommended
conditions gives the defendant an opportunity to object.”7 We review for
plain error when the defendant has an opportunity to object but fails to do
so.8
However, “the mere existence of such a document [setting forth
conditions of supervised release] is not enough for pronouncement.”9 Our
en banc court in Diggles “expressly disapproved of a procedure ‘in which the
court admitted a list of proposed conditions but never said that it was
adopting those recommendations.’”10
As discussed above, at the sentencing hearing, the district court orally
pronounced five conditions of supervised release and then stated that Keelen
“[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release including
the following special conditions.” To what did “the standard conditions of
supervised release” refer? The government maintains this was a “shorthand
reference” to the PSR. In light of the record, we agree. The district court
referred to and discussed the PSR during the sentencing hearing, and in the
context of what transpired prior to and at the sentencing hearing, “the
standard conditions of supervised release” could only have meant those set
forth in the PSR.11 The district court, therefore, satisfied the
_____________________
6
Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367 (citing Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-62).
7
Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560.
8
Id. at 563.
9
Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367 (quoting Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5).
10
Id. (quoting Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5).
11
See United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2020) (recognizing
that the PSR “set out the three conditions” challenged on appeal “exactly as they appear
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pronouncement requirement, even though it did so imperfectly.12 The
district court did not reference a standing order, nor any other document.
The parties do not cite, and research does not reveal, a standing order that
the Eastern District of Louisiana or the sentencing court has formally
adopted as standard conditions of supervision.13
The district court could have been, and should have been, much
clearer. We again admonish district courts to refer expressly to the source of
“standard” conditions of supervised release when adopting them at
_____________________
in the [written] judgment,” and concluding that there was no conflict between the oral
pronouncement and the written judgment, because, “although the court did not recite the
conditions in full,” the oral pronouncement as a “shorthand reference” to the standard
conditions in the PSR or its standing order “was adoption all the same”); see also Martinez,
47 F.4th at 367.
12
Cf. United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2022) (concluding that
the district court satisfied its pronouncement requirement because even though it did not
explicitly adopt the PSR, the court had confirmed with the defendant “that he and his
counsel had reviewed” the PSR, which recommended mandatory and standard conditions,
the court had stated during sentencing that the defendant’s supervised release would be
“under the Court’s . . . conditions,” and the court had a “longstanding” standing order that
“defense counsel certainly knew” the court was referring to (emphasis added)); United
States v. Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1180-81 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding the defendant
had sufficient notice and the court committed no error when it adopted the PSR and stated
it was imposing standard conditions without “citi[ing] the district’s standing order,”
explaining that the PSR recommended standard conditions and the written judgment
included standard conditions from the district’s standing order, which “defense counsel
certainly knew” were the ones “being imposed”); United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th
292, 299 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e derived the rule in Vargas: that oral reference to ‘standard
conditions’ where there exists a standing order imposing said conditions is sufficient.”).
But see Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367-68 (concluding the district court erred when it did not
“locate, identify, and adopt by reference a specific written list of conditions” when it stated
that it was requiring the defendant to “comply with the standard conditions that will be set
forth in the judgment of conviction and sentence,” despite the district having a standing
order that listed nine standard conditions that “substantial[ly] overlap[ped]” with the
fifteen conditions at issue).
13
Cf. supra note 12 and accompanying text.
6
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sentencing by reference, whether that source is a PSR, a standing order, or
some other document.14 Failure to identify with clarity the document in
which the “standard conditions” are set forth leads to costly and time-
consuming appeals. Equally important, if not more important, when a
district court fails to reference sufficiently the document in which conditions
are set forth, and an appeal is successful, that results in the removal of
conditions of supervised release that were intended to be of benefit to the
defendant or to protect the public.
But we would be remiss if we also failed to observe that it blinks reality
for a defendant and their counsel to say they did not understand, in a case like
the present one, what the district court meant when it said the defendant
“[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release.”15 The
PSR, with detailed “standard” conditions of supervised release, had been
provided to Keelen and his counsel well in advance of the sentencing
hearing.16 There was no other source of “standard conditions” that might
reasonably have been referenced. Moreover, there was a good reason why
there were no objections in the district court to either the lack of clarity as to
what “standard conditions” meant or to the substance of the “standard
conditions” set forth in the PSR. It was obvious that the district court was
referring to the PSR, and more importantly, substantively, there were no
reasonable objections that could have been made to the “standard”
conditions of supervised release set forth in the PSR. Even in this appeal,
the complaints are not that the “standard” conditions in the written
_____________________
14
See Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367.
15
See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352-53.
16
Cf. id. at 352 (recognizing that the defendant “had the PSR six weeks before
sentencing”).
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judgment are, in and of themselves, objectionable. The complaints are that
they “conflict” to some extent with those in the PSR.
IV
The appeal in the present case is not frivolous and has succeeded in
some respects. However, had more attention and care been given in
preparing the judgment, this appeal would not have been necessary. The
“standard” conditions contained in the written judgment indeed do not track
those in the PSR.
We can discern what happened in the present case. The “standard
conditions” in the PSR are virtually identical to those set forth in a form
promulgated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. That
form is “AO 245B (Rev. 11/25) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3A—
Supervised Release.”17 But the written judgment was prepared from a much
older Administrative Office form. The written judgment reflects on its face
that it used “AO 245B (Rev. 02/16) Judgment in a Criminal Case Sheet 3—
Supervised Release.” The “standard conditions” are similar, but distinctly
not identical, to the AO form revised as of “11/25.” Most of the differences
between the language used in the PSR and that used in the written judgment
are immaterial. But not all of them. “If a term or condition of a sentence in
the court’s written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence, the oral
sentence controls.”18
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17
The PSR in the present case was prepared before November of 2025, so the
“standard conditions” may have come from a predecessor form that may have had slightly
different language.
18
United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292, 302 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United
States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020)).
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Here again, we admonish district courts and court staff and employees
to pay much more attention to conforming written judgments to what
transpired at the sentencing hearing. Appeals raising “Diggles” issues are
costly, time-consuming, and in the main entirely avoidable. In most Diggles
appeals, the parties are battling over conflicts between oral pronouncements
and the written judgment, even though no legitimate objection could have
been made to any of the “standard” conditions had they been orally
pronounced at the sentencing hearing.
A
Keelen correctly points out that paragraphs 4 and 8 in the written
judgment’s list of “standard” conditions have no counterparts in the PSR,
the document we concluded the district court was referring to when it stated
Keelen “[s]hall comply with the standard conditions of supervised release
including the following special conditions.”19 The government agrees that
these paragraphs should be removed from the written judgment. Paragraph
4 provides “the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other
family responsibilities.” Paragraph 8 provides “the defendant shall not
frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used,
distributed, or administered.” Because there is a conflict between the PSR
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19
See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 353; Martinez, 47 F.4th at 367.
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and the written judgment regarding these conditions,20 on remand, these
conditions should be excised from the judgment.21
B
Keelen asserts, and we agree, that paragraph 6 in the list of
“standard” conditions in the written judgment imposes more onerous
requirements if Keelen changes his residence or employment than the
standard conditions in paragraphs 110 and 112 of the PSR. Paragraph 6 in
the written judgment says, “the defendant shall notify the probation officer
at least ten days prior to any change in residence or employment.” By
contrast, paragraphs 110 and 112 of the PSR provide that notice within 72
hours will suffice in certain circumstances:
110. . . . . If you plan to change where you live or anything
about your living arrangements (such as the people you live
with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days
before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance
is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must
notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware
of a change or expected change.
***
112. . . . . If you plan to change where you work or anything
about your work (such as your position or your job
responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least
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20
See United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he written
judgment conflicts with the oral pronouncement by imposing a more burdensome
requirement . . . .”); Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303 (“A conflict exists when the written
judgment ‘broadens the restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral
pronouncement.’” (quoting United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006))).
21
United States v. Currier, 160 F.4th 656, 658 (5th Cir. 2025) (“Any discretionary
condition in a written judgment that conflicts with the sentence as orally pronounced must
be excised on remand.” (emphasis in original)).
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10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at
least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated
circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72
hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
On remand, the written judgment should be modified to conform to
the PSR in this regard.22
C
Keelen and the government agree that paragraph 7 in the written
judgment is broader than the district court’s oral pronouncement at the
sentencing hearing that “[t]he defendant shall not possess a controlled
substance.” Paragraph 7 provides “the defendant shall refrain from
excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or
administer any controlled substance or any paraphernalia related to any
controlled substances, except as prescribed by a physician.” On remand, this
condition should be revised to conform to the oral pronouncement because it
conflicts to the extent it references alcohol.23
D
Keelen contends the district court’s oral pronouncement at
sentencing of a special condition regarding searches conflicts with the written
judgment. At sentencing, the district court orally imposed the following
condition: “Due to the nature of the offense, the defendant shall submit his
person, residence, office and vehicle to a search conducted by the United
States Probation Officer at a reasonable time in a reasonable matter and on
reasonable suspicion.” The written judgment added: “The defendant shall
warn any other residents or occupants that the premises may be subject to
_____________________
22
See Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 383; Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303.
23
See Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 303.
11
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searches pursuant to this condition.” The government contends this does
not conflict with the oral pronouncement but instead clarifies an ambiguity
in the condition.
We perceive no conflict. Warning others of the possibility of a search
is consistent with the condition that his premises be subject to searches.24
The district court did not abuse its discretion regarding this condition.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Keelen’s conviction. The
district court’s sentence is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED so the district court may conform the written judgment to
the oral pronouncements consistent with this opinion. The stay previously
granted is LIFTED.
_____________________
24
See United States v. Raymer, 148 F. App’x 555, 557-58 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding
there was no conflict when the court’s written judgment added a warning requirement
because “warning others is a consistent way to implement the search condition”).
12