United States v. Carrillo
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket26-50289
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 26-50289 November 16, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Pablo Carrillo,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:24-CR-1312-1
______________________________
Before Graves, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Pablo Carrillo appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea
conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. For the
first time on appeal, he argues that the district court erred in determining that
he was a career offender. The Government moves to dismiss Carrillo’s
appeal based on the appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/16/2026
No. 26-50289
“A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal” as part of a
valid plea agreement as long as “(1) [the] waiver was knowing and voluntary,
and (2) the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain
language of the agreement.” United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 488 (5th
Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005)).
We generally review de novo whether an appeal is barred by a waiver
provision, United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2005), applying
“normal principles of contract interpretation,” Palmer, 456 F.3d at 488.
Here, the record shows that Carrillo freely and knowingly pleaded guilty and
waived his right to appeal his sentence. See United States v. Rodriguez-
Estrada, 741 F.3d 648, 650 (5th Cir. 2014).
Carrillo argues that his “plea agreement should be rescinded on the
contract doctrine of mutual mistake” because both he and the Government
mistakenly believed that he was a career offender. We rejected this specific
argument in United States v. Cobos, 255 F. App’x 835, 836–37 (5th Cir. 2007).
It held that because the defendant “understood at the time of his plea
agreement that the district court had sole discretion to determine his
sentence,” “[t]he sentence and the appropriate guideline range [] were not
essential terms of the plea agreement,” and “any misunderstanding about his
eligibility for the career offender enhancement was irrelevant.” Id. (citing
Horner v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1984).
The record in this case, including Carrillo’s non-binding plea
agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) and the Government’s
agreement “not to advocate for a sentence exceeding 120 months,” likewise
reflects his understanding at the time of his plea that the district court had
the sole discretion to determine his sentence. Carrillo has not shown that
whether he was a career offender went to the essential terms of the plea
agreement or affected the parties’ exchange of performances. See id.;
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 152(1) (1981) (explaining that a
2
Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/16/2026
No. 26-50289
contract may be voided for mutual mistake “[w]here a mistake of both parties
at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the
contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of
performances”).
The Government’s opposed motion to dismiss is GRANTED, its
alternative motion for extension of time to file its brief is DENIED as moot,
and the appeal is DISMISSED.
3