Full Opinion

Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 26-50289 November 16, 2026 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Pablo Carrillo, Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:24-CR-1312-1 ______________________________ Before Graves, Wilson, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Pablo Carrillo appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. For the first time on appeal, he argues that the district court erred in determining that he was a career offender. The Government moves to dismiss Carrillo’s appeal based on the appeal waiver provision in his plea agreement. _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 26-50289 “A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal” as part of a valid plea agreement as long as “(1) [the] waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (2) the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of the agreement.” United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005)). We generally review de novo whether an appeal is barred by a waiver provision, United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir. 2005), applying “normal principles of contract interpretation,” Palmer, 456 F.3d at 488. Here, the record shows that Carrillo freely and knowingly pleaded guilty and waived his right to appeal his sentence. See United States v. Rodriguez- Estrada, 741 F.3d 648, 650 (5th Cir. 2014). Carrillo argues that his “plea agreement should be rescinded on the contract doctrine of mutual mistake” because both he and the Government mistakenly believed that he was a career offender. We rejected this specific argument in United States v. Cobos, 255 F. App’x 835, 836–37 (5th Cir. 2007). It held that because the defendant “understood at the time of his plea agreement that the district court had sole discretion to determine his sentence,” “[t]he sentence and the appropriate guideline range [] were not essential terms of the plea agreement,” and “any misunderstanding about his eligibility for the career offender enhancement was irrelevant.” Id. (citing Horner v. Bourland, 724 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1984). The record in this case, including Carrillo’s non-binding plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) and the Government’s agreement “not to advocate for a sentence exceeding 120 months,” likewise reflects his understanding at the time of his plea that the district court had the sole discretion to determine his sentence. Carrillo has not shown that whether he was a career offender went to the essential terms of the plea agreement or affected the parties’ exchange of performances. See id.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 152(1) (1981) (explaining that a 2 Case: 26-50289 Document: 67-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/16/2026 No. 26-50289 contract may be voided for mutual mistake “[w]here a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances”). The Government’s opposed motion to dismiss is GRANTED, its alternative motion for extension of time to file its brief is DENIED as moot, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 3