Tuttle v. Gallegos
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket25-20132
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-20132 Document: 121-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/16/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
November 16, 2026
No. 25-20132
____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Clifford F. Tuttle, Jr., as Representative of the Estate of
Dennis W. Tuttle, Deceased; Robert Tuttle; Ryan Tuttle;
Jo Ann Nicholas; John Nicholas,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Felipe Gallegos,
Defendant—Appellant,
______________________________
Jo Ann Nicholas, individually and as an heir of the Estate of Rhogena
Nicholas; John Nicholas, as temporary administrator of the Estate
of Rhogena Nicholas,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Felipe Gallegos,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 4:21-CV-270, 4:21-CV-272
______________________________
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No. 25-20132
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before Jones, Clement, and Richman, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
The petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED because, at the
request of one of its members, the court was polled, and a majority did not
vote in favor of rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40 and 5th Cir. R. 40).
In the en banc poll, five judges voted in favor of rehearing, Chief
Judge Elrod and Judges Graves, Higginson, Willett, and
Douglas, and twelve voted against rehearing, Judges Jones, Smith,
Stewart, Richman, Southwick, Haynes, Ho, Duncan,
Engelhardt, Oldham, Wilson, and Ramirez.
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No. 25-20132
James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, joined by ELROD, Chief Circuit
Judge, and Higginson and Douglas Circuit Judges, dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc:
This is an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal arising from a
botched no-knock warrant execution, in which Officer Gallegos shot and
killed Dennis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas. To secure a warrant for the
house, a narcotics supervisor falsely claimed that a confidential informant
had bought heroin in the house. When officers—including Officers Frank
Medina and Cedell Lovings—breached the house, a gunfight followed. In the
ensuing chaos, both Tuttle and Nicholas were killed, and four officers were
shot as well, leaving one paralyzed. Many of the wounded officers were shot
by other officers. This appeal concerns one officer: Gallegos. The district
court denied Gallegos’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning he was not
entitled to qualified immunity. The panel reversed, concluding that, given
the context, deploying deadly force against one unarmed person and one
incapacitated person was objectively reasonable.
I respectfully dissent.
I. Nicholas
Plaintiffs allege that (1) Officer Medina was not present when
Rhogena Nicholas was shot and (2) Gallegos intentionally shot her. Thus,
under Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, Gallegos shot and killed Nicholas
without warning when she was unarmed and non-threatening.
Our jurisdiction is limited. At the summary judgment phase, the facts
and conflicting evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. The court only reviews “whether the factual disputes that
the district court identified are material to the application of qualified
immunity.” Samples v. Vadzemnieks, 900 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2018). “We
do not decide whether genuine fact disputes exist. . . . Instead, accepting the
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plaintiffs’ version of the facts, we consider only the legal question whether
the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law.” 1 Williams, 41 F.4th at 422.
Using this standard, the district court’s decision should be affirmed.
As Tennessee v. Garner established, the use of deadly force is permitted only
to protect the life of the shooting officer or others from serious physical harm.
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). “Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” Id. Additionally, Garner
requires a warning before deadly force is used “where feasible.” Id. at 11–12.
These principles have been repeatedly applied by this court. See Cole v.
Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019); Mason
v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268, 277 (5th Cir. 2015).
Here, Plaintiffs’ proffered version of the facts is as follows: Nicholas
was the subject of a fraudulent no-knock warrant and shocked by the entrance
of the officers. The first few officers to enter the home did not perceive her
as a threat warranting deadly force. 2 She was unarmed, seated on a couch,
and did not resist. She could not have been threatening Medina because
Medina had already exited the home. Gallegos intentionally aimed at
Nicholas and gave no warnings before he shot and killed her. Because
Nicholas was non-threatening, the panel should have concluded that
Gallegos was not entitled to qualified immunity.
_____________________
1
Of note, the panel considers at least three versions of the facts. However, as
stated, we do not have jurisdiction to decide between these proffered versions of events. At
this stage, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
2
For example, Medina “attest[ed] that [he] didn’t see the need for deadly force
from what [he] perceived of [Nicholas’] behavior [before he was removed from the house]
. . . that’s why [he] did not use deadly force.”
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No. 25-20132
However, the panel makes the opposite conclusion, pointing to
Nicholas’ “actions.” Specifically, the opinion focused on the dangerous
environment and the fact that Lovings was still in the home. The panel then
cites cases where deadly force was used on unarmed suspects who appeared
to reach for a weapon and no constitutional violation was found. Based on
these cases and the situation, the panel concludes Gallegos is entitled to
qualified immunity.
What this reasoning lacks, nonetheless, is any supposed action 3 made
by Nicholas that made her an immediate threat. Nicholas, again, was neither
armed nor hovering over Medina, and there is no evidence that she made any
movement towards Lovings. Instead, what the panel seems to perceive as a
threat is her proximity to Lovings. However, that overextends Garner.
Simply being near an officer does not justify the use of deadly force.
Because the law is clearly established that officers cannot use deadly
force on a non-threatening suspect, the district court was correct. Gallegos is
not entitled to qualified immunity as to this claim.
II. Tuttle
_____________________
3
The cases the panel cites specifically turn on an action, usually “reaching.” See
Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (officer entitled to qualified immunity
for shooting unarmed man who allegedly reached for something under front seat of his
vehicle); Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2009) (officer
entitled to qualified immunity for shooting an unarmed man who reached into a boot for
what the officers believed could be a weapon); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500–01 (5th
Cir. 1991) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting an unarmed man who reached
down twice in his car after officers told him to raise his hands); Young v. City of Killeen, 775
F.2d 1349, 1351–53 (5th Cir. 1985) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting an
unarmed man who allegedly reached toward car floorboard). In contrast, because the panel
must view the factual disputes in favor of Plaintiffs, the panel must assume that Medina
was no longer in the home when Nicholas was shot. Because of that, there is no comparable
alleged movement or action that Nicholas made at the time Gallegos shot her.
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As to Tuttle, while I respect the panel’s efforts to understand
Gallegos’ position at the time, I disagree with the panel’s conclusion that
there is no constitutional violation presented.
When considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the
following scene is before us: Tuttle sustained nine bullet wounds, and only
the last two fatal shots by Gallegos are contested. Before the last two shots,
Tuttle had sustained major injuries as reflected by the graphic photo
evidence: a shot to his shoulder, a grazing wound on his right arm, a hole
through his left arm, a hole through his left wrist, and the destruction of his
right hand. Because of his injuries, Tuttle was not capable of holding a
weapon in either hand. When Gallegos approached, Tuttle had his back to
the door and was dropping to the ground. Gallegos shot Tuttle in the
buttocks. Twenty seconds later, Tuttle raised his upper body by his elbows,
and Gallegos shot Tuttle in the back of his head or neck, killing him.
This court must make “allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989). However, we have simultaneously acknowledged that “an exercise of
force that is reasonable at one moment can become unreasonable in the next
if the justification for the use of force has ceased,” Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560
F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009), and deadly force is excessive and unreasonable
“unless ‘the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.’” Romero,
888 F.3d at 176 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11).
Though the panel dismisses it, Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol.
Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015) is instructive here. In Mason, an officer
unleashed a dog on a suspect after seeing a gun. 806 F.3d at 273. Once the
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dog attacked, the suspect’s hand came in contact with the gun. Id. The officer
then shot the suspect five times. Id. The suspect was incapacitated and face
down on the ground when the officer stopped firing. Id. The officer then
claimed the suspect moved his shoulder and elbow “as if he were about to
spin over, pull out the gun, and start shooting,” and the officer shot the
suspect two more times. Id. at 274. Based on the facts, the court reasoned
that “a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Mason lay incapacitated on
the ground and did not move in a threatening manner before Faul fired the
final two shots . . . [meaning] a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr.
Mason objectively posed no immediate threat.” Id. at 277.
The same result should obtain here. While the panel emphasizes the
dangerous context and Gallegos’ possible knowledge, that alone does not
grant Gallegos qualified immunity according to our precedent. Like in Mason,
with the evidence provided, “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that when
[Gallegos] fired the final two shots, [Tuttle] would have appeared
incapacitated to an objectively reasonable officer.” Id. at 278. “Shooting a
clearly incapacitated suspect is inconsistent with Garner’s command that
deadly force is unconstitutional when a ‘suspect poses no immediate threat
to the officer and no threat to others.’” Id. (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11).
Thus, the panel erred in reversing the district court as to this claim.
* * *
At its core, qualified immunity seeks to “balance two competing
societal interests: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” Joseph
v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). However, the panel’s opinion ignores that balance
in favor of an absolute shield for officials over accountability where it is due.
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This case involves disputed facts that are material, and a clearly
established constitutional right has been violated on the facts alleged. See
Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2010); Tucker v. City of Shreveport,
998 F.3d 165, 172 (5th Cir. 2021). Thus, this case should have proceeded to
trial, and Officer Gallegos’ actions should have been evaluated by a jury.
Respectfully, I dissent.
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