Mata v. Guerrero
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-10526
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-10526 Document: 65-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-10526 November 17, 2026
____________
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
Desirae Monique Mata,
Petitioner—Appellant,
versus
Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:20-CV-86
______________________________
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before Elrod, Chief Judge, and Willett and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED and the following is
substituted in place of the previous opinion.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 25-10526
Desirae Mata, a Texas state prisoner, was convicted of two counts of
capital murder, for which she received two life sentences without the
possibility of parole. Her trial featured the testimony of a jailhouse
informant, Angie Brown, regarding statements Mata made to Brown about
her involvement in the murders. Mata appeals the denial of federal habeas
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on claims arising under Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Her Napue
theory is that the state prosecutor unconstitutionally used Brown’s
testimony about a possible deal that he was aware was false. Her Brady theory
is that the same prosecutor failed to disclose impeachment evidence in the
form of letters between Brown, Brown’s attorney, a Texas Ranger, and the
federal prosecutor responsible for Brown’s federal case. Because the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals’ rejection of both claims was not contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, we AFFIRM.
I
The murders arose out of a dispute over three diamond rings. Roland
“Rollie” Cantu, the father of Mata’s child, had received the rings in
exchange for drugs and asked John Allen to fence them. After Allen did so,
Mata lived with him for a time before moving out. Sometime later, Mata and
three associates went to Allen’s home—to rob him or to kill him, depending
on the account—and Allen and a second man, Jay Doyal, were shot and
killed. Mata v. State, No. 11-15-00081-CR, 2017 WL 2986845, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Eastland July 13, 2017, pet. ref’d). One of Mata’s associates, Juan
“Smokey” Castillo, confessed and identified his companions as Nicodemes
“Dan Dan” Sosa, Bobby Ruiz, and a woman he called “Rollie’s Desirae.”
Shown a photo lineup, Castillo identified a different woman, Desirae Reyna,
who had an alibi—she was in custody at the time of the murders.
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Mata was arrested in Alabama after the murders and held in custody
with Angie Brown, a fellow inmate. Brown, with her attorney Rita Briles,
gave Texas Rangers a statement describing incriminating statements Mata
purportedly had made to her, and went on to testify to that effect at Mata’s
trial.
At trial, the prosecutor asked Brown directly whether “[his] office”
had promised her “any kind of favorable deal . . . or anything like that”;
Brown answered, “No.” On cross-examination, defense counsel introduced
a November 15, 2013, letter in which Brown had asked a Texas Ranger to
“keep his promise,” and Brown confirmed that her earlier denial referred
specifically to the prosecutor, not the Ranger. In closing argument, the
prosecutor told the jury that he had made Brown no deal and that, in any
event, whether the Rangers had suggested one made no difference to the case
against Mata.
The prosecutor separately asked Briles whether anyone had
communicated to Brown that she would gain an advantage or lose something
if she didn’t give her statement; Briles said no, and confirmed she was not
aware of any offer of leniency to Brown “to this date.” On cross-
examination, defense counsel pressed Briles about correspondence
suggesting Brown was working to reduce her own federal sentence, including
a letter Briles had sent the prosecutor and a letter Brown had sent
independently. Briles acknowledged that her representation of Brown had
ended around 2012, that inmates “do things independently,” and that she
could not speak to any contact between Brown and others after that point.
The jury convicted Mata.
In 2018, five letters were disclosed for the first time in the trial of
Mata’s codefendant, Bobby Ruiz, that had not been turned over to Mata’s
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own defense.1 An April 18, 2013, letter from Briles to Brown discussed
Briles’s plan to ask a Texas Ranger to prepare a statement summarizing
Brown’s assistance. A May 9, 2013, letter from Briles to Brown reported that
Briles had passed information from the Texas Ranger and about a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion to the federal prosecutor then
handling Brown’s case. An October 28, 2013, letter from Brown to that
prosecutor enclosed supporting letters from the Ranger and Briles in aid of a
Rule 35 motion, and a letter of the same date from Brown to the Ranger
references “the assistance [she] gave” and her pursuit of a Rule 35 reduction.
Finally, a November 12, 2013, letter from a federal prosecutor to Brown
informed her that she had not yet provided sufficient information to support
a Rule 35 reduction and that more detailed information from a reputable
source would be required.
After losing a direct appeal and undertaking unsuccessful state habeas
efforts, Mata turned to federal court. The district court denied the instant
28 U.S.C. § 2254 application but granted a certificate of appealability on
Mata’s Napue and Brady claims.
II
We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. Miller v. Thaler, 714 F.3d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 2013).
Because the state habeas court adjudicated both claims on the merits, we may
not grant relief unless that adjudication “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court has explained that, “in order to
_____________________
1
Like Mata, Ruiz was convicted of two counts of capital murder and sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole.
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obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must . . . establish that the state
court ‘blunder[ed] so badly that every fairminded jurist would disagree’ with
the decision.” Klein v. Martin, 607 U.S. 213, 220–21 (2026) (per curiam)
(quoting Mays v. Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 392 (2021) (per curiam)). A state
court’s unexplained denial of relief is entitled to the same deference as a
reasoned one. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
III
A
A Napue violation requires that a witness testified falsely, that the
government knew the testimony was false, and that the testimony was
material. United States v. Brumfield, 89 F.4th 506, 519 (5th Cir. 2023). We
affirm on falsity and materiality and do not reach knowledge.
Testimony is false for these purposes if, for example, it is “specific
misleading evidence important to the prosecution’s case in chief.” Nobles v.
Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)). Mata’s claim rests on the prosecutor’s question
to informant Angie Brown—whether “[his] office” had promised her “any
kind of favorable deal in Florida or anything like that.” Brown answered
truthfully to the question posed. She denied a deal with the prosecutor’s
office specifically, and on cross-examination confirmed that her denial
referred to the prosecutor, not to others: “Not him.” The prosecutor’s
closing argument likewise disclaimed only his own involvement in any deal.
A jury hearing this testimony, together with the defense’s cross-
examination eliciting Brown’s letter asking a Texas Ranger to “keep his
promise,” could reasonably have understood that no promise had come from
the prosecutor’s office specifically, even if Brown believed she had received
one from state investigators. On this record, a fairminded jurist could
conclude that the testimony was not false or misleading. That is enough.
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Because AEDPA2 requires only that some reasonable jurist could agree with
the state, Klein, 607 U.S. at 220–21 (quoting Mays, 592 U.S. at 392), we need
not decide how we would resolve falsity in the first instance. The state court
could have rejected the Napue claim on this ground without unreasonably
applying clearly established federal law.
Even assuming arguendo that the testimony was false or misleading,
the Napue claim would still fail on materiality because fairminded jurists
could disagree whether there was “any reasonable likelihood” that the
testimony affected the jury’s judgment, for the reasons explained below in
discussing the Brady claim. Ukukansi v. Guerrero, 126 F.4th 382, 390 (5th
Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
B
A Brady violation requires favorable evidence, suppression, and
materiality. Grace v. Hooper, 123 F.4th 800, 805 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting
United States v. Glenn, 935 F.3d 313, 319 (5th Cir. 2019)). We assume without
deciding that the letters Mata identifies were favorable and suppressed, and
we affirm on materiality alone.
Suppressed “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. That inquiry accounts for the
cumulative effect of the withheld evidence against everything the jury already
had. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434–37 (1995).
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2
AEDPA refers to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
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The jury that convicted Mata already had substantial reason to doubt
Brown’s credibility on the very point the undisclosed letters would have
reinforced: that she hoped, and was actively working, to translate her
cooperation into a reduced federal sentence. The defense discussed before
the jury a letter in which Brown asked a Texas Ranger to “keep his promise,”
and it cross-examined Briles at length about the timing of her representation
and about correspondence touching on a possible sentence reduction. The
five letters Mata identifies as suppressed largely document the mechanics of
that same effort. See Felder v. Johnson, 180 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1999)
(“Suppressed evidence is not material when it merely furnishes an additional
basis on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown
to be questionable.” (quoting United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir.
1996))). Notably, one of the letters cuts the other way: a November 12, 2013,
letter from the federal prosecutor informed Brown that she had not yet
provided sufficient information to support a Rule 35 reduction and that more
detailed information from a reputable source would be required. That letter
shows the arrangement Mata’s brief treats as an established inducement was,
shortly before trial, an unresolved and partially rebuffed request—not the
settled quid pro quo the jury might otherwise have imagined from the trial
testimony alone.
For these reasons, a fairminded jurist could conclude that the
additional letters did not create a reasonable probability of a different
outcome, even accounting for their cumulative effect alongside the
impeachment evidence the jury already had. We accordingly hold that the
state court’s rejection of the Brady claim on materiality was not an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
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IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of
Mata’s habeas petition.
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