United States v. Enclade

Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED August 18, 2026 No. 24-30684 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Travis Enclade; Terence Wilson, Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC Nos. 2:22-CR-238-1, 2:22-CR-238-2 ______________________________ Before Richman, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: This appeal follows a jury’s convictions of Terence Wilson and Travis Enclade for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin. Wilson was additionally convicted of possessing those drugs with intent to distribute and unlawfully possessing two firearms found at the stash house as a convicted felon; Enclade was additionally convicted of unlawfully possessing those firearms and a third firearm found at his residence. The convictions stem from a two-month surveillance operation in New Orleans that ended with the search of three residences and the recovery of substantial Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 quantities of narcotics, multiple firearms, and a jailhouse call where Wilson directed Enclade to the stash. On appeal, the defendants raise nine issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain evidence and testimony, the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, the district court’s response to a jury question and denial of a continuance, cumulative error, Enclade’s sentence, and the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM. I. In early 2022, a Drug Enforcement Administration task force led by Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office narcotics agent Steven Brens began investigating Travis Enclade and Terence Wilson, relatives who were suspected of narcotics trafficking in the New Orleans area. Beginning in August 2022, law enforcement installed pole cameras outside two residences associated with the defendants: 4558 Camelot Drive, where Enclade lived with his girlfriend, and 4235 Hollygrove Street, where Wilson’s father lived. The cameras recorded automatically upon detecting movement and allowed law enforcement to capture still photographs. Through this video surveillance, supplemented by physical surveillance, GPS tracking, and phone toll analysis, Agent Brens observed Wilson and Enclade at both residences, along with several vehicles the two men used interchangeably—a practice Brens testified is intended to frustrate law- enforcement surveillance. The pole cameras captured multiple brief visits to both residences that Brens testified were consistent with hand-to-hand narcotics transactions. On August 18, 2022, footage from Camelot Drive showed Enclade retrieving objects from Wilson’s parked car; Brens opined, based on the activity and the appearance of a clear plastic bag, that Enclade was handling narcotics. On August 25, 2022, footage from Hollygrove showed an unknown man arriving 2 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 by truck and briefly interacting with Wilson and Enclade at a vehicle in what Brens identified as a hand-to-hand transaction; a still photograph taken shortly afterward showed Wilson exiting the same vehicle and entering the Hollygrove residence carrying a handgun. On August 26, 2022, footage showed Wilson retrieving an item from a vehicle that Brens “believe[d]” to be narcotics or currency, after which Wilson was observed placing a handgun in his waistband. Agent Brens later testified that a Smith & Wesson 9mm semi-automatic handgun recovered from the Hollygrove residence during the eventual search appeared to be the same firearm depicted in the footage, though the Government acknowledged it could not confirm the identification with certainty. On September 22, 2022, law enforcement installed a third pole camera at 3511 Encampment Street. The residence had previously been rented by Stacia Caston, an acquaintance of Wilson’s, who testified that she vacated the property on September 1 because she could no longer afford the rent and that Wilson thereafter arranged with her to take over the lease so that he could move his ailing father into more comfortable housing. After Caston moved out, Wilson began bringing items into the home, including a mattress, a television, and a black suitcase. Brens testified that he observed Wilson and Enclade accessing the Encampment residence with individual keys on repeated occasions, entering and exiting for brief periods—a pattern he described as consistent with a stash house maintained at a location deliberately distanced from the defendants through a third party. He similarly testified to near-daily hand-to-hand drug activity at the Hollygrove residence and to identifying several visitors there as narcotics customers through registration checks and prior law-enforcement contacts. On September 28, 2022, Wilson contacted an individual later identified as an undercover officer working with the Plaquemines Parish major crimes task force, and the two arranged what the officer understood to 3 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 be a narcotics transaction; Wilson was arrested when he arrived at the agreed meeting location, a Home Depot, though no narcotics were found on his person. The following morning, while in custody, Wilson placed a recorded call to Enclade using another inmate’s phone access. During the call, Wilson said, “Look ray.” Enclade responded, “Yeah I already know where ray at.” Wilson then said, “It’s in the cabinet.” Agent Brens testified that, based on the narcotics later recovered from a kitchen cabinet and his training and experience, he understood “ray” to be a coded reference to narcotics rather than to a person, a conclusion he maintained on cross-examination notwithstanding his acknowledgment that the term is not one commonly used in the drug trade. Pole camera footage captured Enclade entering the Encampment residence several hours after the call. Wilson was held for about twenty-four hours and then released. On October 4, 2022, footage showed Enclade arriving at the Encampment residence carrying what Brens identified, based on the item’s appearance, as a backpack; Brens later testified that a backpack matching those characteristics was recovered from a kitchen cabinet during the subsequent search, an identification he maintained on cross-examination despite challenges to the footage’s clarity. On the evening of October 8, 2022, footage captured Wilson and Enclade moving Wilson’s elderly father into the Encampment residence. On October 12, 2022, law enforcement executed search warrants at all three residences. At Hollygrove, officers recovered marijuana, small quantities of cocaine and heroin, a handgun, and ammunition. At Encampment Street, officers recovered narcotics from several locations, including a black backpack in a kitchen cabinet consistent with Wilson’s reference during the jailhouse call; the search yielded, in total, over 300 grams of methamphetamine, over 100 grams of fentanyl, and over 500 grams of heroin, later confirmed through forensic testing, along with distribution 4 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 paraphernalia including a vacuum sealer, digital scales, a blender, and a kilo press. Officers also recovered two firearms from the residence: a pistol found inside an open suitcase in a bedroom that pole camera footage had earlier shown Wilson carrying into the house, and a second pistol found in a bathroom. Wilson’s bedridden father was found in the residence at the time of the search. At Camelot Drive, officers recovered synthetic marijuana and two firearms, including a pistol in the master bedroom closet whose location Enclade identified for officers. A federal grand jury indicted Wilson and Enclade, charging both defendants with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and heroin (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute the same substances (Count 2); being felons in possession of firearms, as to Wilson for the two firearms recovered at Encampment Street (Count 3) and as to Enclade for those same firearms and the pistol recovered at Camelot Drive (Count 4); and possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 5). Before trial, the district court denied Wilson’s motions in limine to exclude evidence of his firearm possession outside of the Hollygrove residence, and to dismiss his felon-in-possession count on Second Amendment grounds. On the morning trial was set to begin, the district court denied Enclade’s request for new counsel and a continuance following an extensive colloquy with Enclade and his attorney. At trial, the Government called nine witnesses, including Agent Brens, forensic chemists, the undercover officer involved in Wilson’s arrest, Stacia Caston, and a firearms expert. Neither defendant testified, and the defense presented no case. During closing argument, the defendants argued primarily that the Government’s evidence rested on inference and speculation rather than direct or forensic proof. During rebuttal, the prosecutor made remarks now challenged as improper, including a statement that “law enforcement knew who done it” when the warrants were executed. 5 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 The jury convicted both defendants on Count 1, acquitted both on Count 5, convicted Wilson alone on Count 2, and convicted Wilson and Enclade respectively on Counts 3 and 4. The district court sentenced Enclade to 288 months’ imprisonment and Wilson to 240 months, both below the applicable Guidelines ranges. II. This appeal asks whether (A) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (B) the district court committed plain error in admitting Agent Brens’s lay opinion testimony; (C) the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument constituted reversible misconduct; (D) the district court properly admitted other-acts evidence of Wilson possessing uncharged firearms; (E) the district court adequately responded to a jury question during deliberations; (F) the district court abused its discretion in denying a morning-of-trial continuance; (G) cumulative error warrants relief; (H) Enclade’s below-Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable; and (I) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and Commerce Clause. We address each issue in turn. A Enclade and Wilson moved for a judgment of acquittal following the close of the Government’s case, preserving their challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Such preserved challenges “get de novo review, with a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2022). “[W]e consider the evidence, all reasonable inferences drawn from it and all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the Government, and affirm if a reasonable jury could find the offense’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998). 6 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 We proceed to address: (1) Enclade and Wilson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Count 1; (2) Wilson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Count 2; and (3) Enclade and Wilson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 3 and 4. (1) The jury convicted Enclade and Wilson of Count 1, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 40 grams of fentanyl, and 100 grams of heroin. “The essential elements of a drug conspiracy are (1) an agreement by two or more persons to violate the narcotics laws; (2) a defendant’s knowledge of the agreement; and (3) his voluntary participation in the agreement.” United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. Enclade and Wilson challenge only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the first element—an agreement. “A conspiracy agreement may be tacit, and the trier of fact may infer agreement from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1356 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348 (5th Cir. 1988)). The evidence was sufficient to establish an agreement between Enclade and Wilson. The Government presented evidence that the two men shared access to the Encampment Street residence, which Agent Brens identified as a stash house. Surveillance footage showed Enclade and Wilson repeatedly traveling to and from the residence, and both men possessed keys to the home. A search of the residence recovered narcotics, scales, a kilo press, a blender, a vacuum sealer, and packaging materials consistent with drug distribution. The jury also saw surveillance footage of what Agent Brens identified as hand-to-hand narcotics transactions involving Wilson and Enclade, both with each other and with third parties. 7 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 The jailhouse call between Enclade and Wilson following Wilson’s arrest reinforces the jury’s finding of an agreement. During the call, Wilson told Enclade, “Look ray.” Enclade responded, “Yeah I already know where ray at.” Wilson then stated, “It’s in the cabinet.” When law enforcement searched the Encampment Street residence, they recovered a black backpack containing narcotics from a cabinet under the sink. Agent Brens testified that, based on his experience, he understood “ray” to refer to narcotics and interpreted Wilson’s statement as directing Enclade to the drugs in the cabinet. A rational jury could infer from the exchange that Enclade already knew the location of the narcotics and that Wilson expected him to understand the reference without further explanation. That evidence, combined with the surveillance footage and shared access to the stash house, was sufficient to establish a coordinated operation. United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 643 (5th Cir. 2012) (“An agreement may be inferred from concert of action . . . .” (quoting United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 2009))). To the extent Enclade and Wilson challenge Agent Brens’s testimony as inadmissible opinion testimony, those arguments do not affect the sufficiency analysis. When a defendant separately challenges the admissibility of evidence supporting his conviction, sufficiency is considered first for double-jeopardy purposes, and the court considers all evidence presented to the jury, including evidence challenged as inadmissible. United States v. Robinson, 87 F.4th 658, 667 n.1 (5th Cir. 2023). Nor may the defendants defeat sufficiency by attacking Brens’s credibility. This court does not reweigh witness credibility unless testimony is incredible as a matter of law—that is, unless the testimony “relates to facts that the witness could not possibly have observed or to events which could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v. Green, 180 F.3d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1999) (first quoting United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir. 8 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 1994); and then citing United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cir. 1992)). Brens’s testimony was not incredible as a matter of law, and it was for the jury to determine what weight, if any, to give that testimony. Wilson counters that, at most, the evidence showed “mere parallel drug dealing,” which is insufficient to establish a conspiracy absent evidence of a mutually dependent relationship, citing to United States v. Holloway, 377 F. App’x 383 (5th Cir. 2010). This case is unlike Holloway. There, the evidence showed only buyer-seller transactions and “conscious parallelism,” without shared infrastructure, coordinated activity, or evidence that the defendants worked together toward a common distribution objective. Id. at 387–88. Here, by contrast, the evidence showed that Enclade and Wilson shared access to a stash house, engaged in transactions together, used shared resources, and communicated about the location of narcotics. The record therefore supports a finding of more than parallel drug activity. Enclade’s arguments—that his familial relationship with Wilson and the absence of forensic evidence undermine the verdict—are likewise unavailing. The Government never relied on the defendants’ familial relationship, and the absence of fingerprints or DNA evidence does not preclude a finding of conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence, Thomas, 12 F.3d at 1356. Enclade’s argument that Wilson’s use of Enclade’s truck, without Enclade present, during the Home Depot undercover-agent buy negates Enclade’s participation in the conspiracy likewise depends on drawing an inference in his favor, contrary to the governing standard of review. Medina, 161 F.3d at 872. A rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Enclade and Wilson agreed “to violate the narcotics laws.” Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d at 303. We therefore affirm their Count 1 convictions. 9 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 (2) The jury also convicted Wilson of Count 2, possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 40 grams of fentanyl, and 100 grams of heroin. “The essential elements of possession with the intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are 1) knowledge, 2) possession, and 3) intent to distribute the controlled substances.” United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir. 2001). Wilson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence establishing possession. “Possession may be actual or constructive and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). The Government proceeded under a constructive-possession theory. Constructive possession exists where the defendant has dominion or control over the item itself or over the premises in which the item is found. Id. But where, as here, the premises are jointly occupied, the Government must present “‘some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to’ the illegal item.” United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993)). Whether constructive possession exists is a fact-specific inquiry guided by common sense. United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Mergerson, 4 F.3d at 349). Wilson does not dispute that he had access to the Encampment Street house and its contents. Instead, he argues that the Government proved only joint occupancy, not that he knew of or exercised control over the narcotics found there. This argument is undermined by the jailhouse call, where Wilson told Enclade, “Look ray . . . It’s in the cabinet.” Officers subsequently recovered heroin and methamphetamine from a black backpack located in a cabinet under the sink. From this evidence, a rational jury could 10 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 infer that Wilson knew of the heroin and methamphetamine stored at the residence. And while Wilson does not separately identify any evidence undermining the inference that he knew of the fentanyl recovered from the house, the fentanyl was found in plain view in a closet at the Encampment Street residence. So, a jury could reasonably infer knowledge from that fact. United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2012). The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Wilson’s Count 2 conviction. (3) The jury convicted Wilson of Count 3, which charged him with being a felon in possession of two firearms recovered from the Encampment Street house: a Palmetto pistol found in a black suitcase in a bedroom and a Diamondback pistol found behind the door of a spare bathroom. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove that Wilson previously had been convicted of a felony, knowingly possessed a firearm, and that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 885 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000). Wilson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence establishing possession. As with Count 2, the Government proceeded under a constructive- possession theory. The same principles apply: in a jointly occupied residence, the Government must present evidence supporting a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the firearm. De Leon, 170 F.3d at 496; Hinojosa, 349 F.3d at 204. The jury heard evidence supporting an inference that Wilson constructively possessed both firearms. As to the Diamondback pistol, the jury heard evidence that the firearm was found lying on the bathroom floor near the open door, unobstructed by any container, furniture, or personal effects. Nothing in the photograph or the surrounding testimony suggests the firearm was shielded from view; it rested in open floor space visible to anyone 11 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 standing in the room. A firearm resting openly, with no intervening object blocking it from view, is a paradigm case of exposure. This court has repeatedly recognized that a firearm found in plain view in a jointly occupied residence supports an inference of constructive possession. United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cir. 1996); Meza, 701 F.3d at 420–21. A rational jury therefore could find that Wilson constructively possessed the firearm. The evidence was also sufficient as to the Palmetto pistol. The jury heard evidence that Wilson carried a black suitcase into the Encampment Street residence and that the Palmetto pistol was later found in a black suitcase inside the house. From that evidence, a rational juror could infer that Wilson brought the suitcase containing the firearm into the residence, establishing knowledge and access to the weapon. What’s more, law enforcement found the Palmetto in plain view too. Though it was in a suitcase, that suitcase was found wide open on the floor in a bedroom, empty but for the pistol laid bare inside it, confirmed by Agent Brens’s testimony that the Palmetto “was in plain view.” Fields, 72 F.3d at 1212; Meza, 701 F.3d at 420–21. The evidence was sufficient to support Wilson’s Count 3 conviction. Next, the jury convicted Enclade of Count 4, which charged him with being a felon in possession of the same two firearms recovered from the Encampment Street house and a Ruger pistol recovered from his Camelot Drive residence. Enclade challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence establishing constructive possession. As to the Palmetto and Diamondback pistols, the evidence was sufficient for the same reasons discussed above. The jury heard that Enclade had access to the Encampment Street residence, possessed a key to the residence, and regularly entered and exited the house. Because both firearms were located in plain view, the jury could reasonably 12 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 infer that Enclade had knowledge of and access to them. Fields, 72 F.3d at 1212; Meza, 701 F.3d at 420–21. The Ruger pistol presents an easier case. Enclade does not dispute that he exercised control over the Camelot Drive residence. Although his girlfriend also lived there, the jury heard that Enclade told officers where the firearm was located: in the master bedroom closet. Officers subsequently recovered the Ruger from that closet among men’s clothing. This evidence provided more than a plausible inference that Enclade knew of and had access to the firearm. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d at 204. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Enclade’s Count 4 conviction. B Wilson and Enclade challenge the admission of Agent Brens’s testimony on numerous grounds. Significantly, none of the theories now advanced was raised in the district court.1 Review is therefore for plain error, under which a defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). We address each theory in turn. (1) Wilson and Enclade argue that Brens’s testimony interpreting the word “ray” on the recorded jailhouse call exceeded the bounds of permissible lay opinion under Rule 701. A lay witness may offer an opinion only if it is “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to _____________________ 1 Government lead-agent testimony, whether lay or expert, requires close evidentiary scrutiny because of its impact and because it can implicate Confrontation Clause concerns as well as multiple Federal Rules of Evidence constraints. E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 602, 611, 701–04. 13 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Our analysis is guided by United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015), which addressed the admissibility of a DEA agent’s testimony interpreting wiretapped calls in a heroin conspiracy. Haines organized such testimony into three categories. The first covers terms carrying a consistent, specialized meaning within the drug trade generally—testimony admissible as expert opinion under Rule 702. Id. at 728 (citing United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321–22 (5th Cir. 1997)). The second covers terms whose meaning derives not from general drug-trade expertise but from the agent’s first-hand knowledge of the specific investigation—testimony admissible as lay opinion under Rule 701. Id. at 729 (first citing United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2014); and then citing United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001)). The third category covers testimony interpreting language that the jury is equally capable of evaluating for itself, such as ordinary English words and pronouns. Id. at 733. Such testimony is inadmissible under either Rule 701 or Rule 702 because it does not assist the jury in understanding something beyond its own ability to evaluate; instead, it simply supplies the inference the jury must itself draw from the evidence. See id. at 734. In Haines, this category included the agent’s interpretations of words like “what,” “she,” “that,” and “stuff,” as well as his testimony that “as soon as I can” referred to heroin distribution. Relying on United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 2004), Haines explained that a case agent may not simply narrate the meaning of recorded conversations when the jury is equally capable of drawing the relevant inference from the evidence before it. Id. Testimony of this kind is inadmissible regardless of the agent’s experience because the issue is not the 14 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 witness’s qualifications, but whether the jury needs assistance in reaching the conclusion itself. See id. at 733. Brens’s testimony implicated the same Rule 701(b) helpfulness concern identified in Haines’s explication of Category 3.2 Brens did not explain “ray” based on a broader pattern of usage or some investigative fact unavailable to the jury. He simply connected the term to the narcotics recovered from the Encampment Street residence. The jury had all the evidence necessary to draw or reject that inference itself: it heard the recording in which Wilson told Enclade to “look ray” and that “it’s in the cabinet,” and it heard that officers later recovered narcotics from a cabinet under the sink at the residence. Because the jury was equally capable of drawing the same inference from the evidence presented at trial, Brens’s interpretation was not helpful under Rule 701(b). The Government’s principal authorities do not support a different conclusion. In United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 2015), this court rejected the argument that a witness’s opinion was unhelpful merely because the jury might reach the same conclusion. Id. at 119. But the witness there supplied something the jury did not otherwise have: his own prior, private interactions with the defendant, including the defendant’s shifting admissions. Id. Similarly, in United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), an FBI agent testified that a codefendant’s recorded reference to someone being “sick” referred to Hamas leader Khalid Mishal, based on the agent’s knowledge, drawn from the investigation, that Mishal had recently _____________________ 2 Because Brens’s “ray” testimony failed Rule 701(b), we do not reach the defendants’ arguments that the testimony also lacked the personal knowledge required by Rule 701(a). Moreover, the defendants do not mount a Rule 701(c) challenge, seemingly because “ray” is not a term with a consistent, specialized meaning in the drug trade that would require expert testimony. 15 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 survived an assassination attempt and that the codefendant had telephoned Mishal’s father shortly after the call. Id. at 514 & n.13. In both cases, the witness’s testimony was helpful under Rule 701(b) precisely because it gave the jury access to a fact—developed independently through the investigation—that the jury had no other way of obtaining. Testimony can also be helpful on a different footing; namely, sustained exposure to how a term was used across an investigation, rather than any single undisclosed fact, can give an agent’s synthesis genuine value to the jury even where the jury hears the same underlying recordings. See Akins, 746 F.3d at 599–600; Miranda, 248 F.3d at 441. There, the assistance the testimony provides is not a fact the jury lacks but a pattern the jury, reviewing the same calls cold and in isolation, is not well positioned to reconstruct on its own. Brens’s testimony offered neither form of assistance. He identified no discrete fact, of the kind in Churchwell and El-Mezain, that the jury lacked; nor did he testify to any consistent usage of “ray” across other calls he had personally observed, in the manner of Akins and Miranda. His understanding arose from a single call, interpreted after the fact by connecting it to a search result the jury had already heard about. His testimony was therefore unhelpful under Rule 701(b)—it simply narrated an inference the jury was equally positioned to draw for itself—and it is what Haines forbids, resulting in error. That conclusion does not end the inquiry, however, because Wilson and Enclade must also show that the error affected their substantial rights— that is, a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. They have not made that showing here. Brens’s interpretation was only one piece of a substantial body of evidence supporting the convictions, including surveillance footage of 16 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 repeated hand-to-hand transactions, the defendants’ shared access to and use of the stash house, and the distribution paraphernalia and narcotics recovered during the search itself. Additionally, in closing argument, and arguably consistent with the failure to object earlier, defense counsel powerfully urged the jury to acquit in large part by highlighting that Brens was not “super natural” in his observations and comparisons. Given the strength of the independent evidence and the obviousness of the “ray” inference apart from Brens’s gloss, Wilson and Enclade have not shown a reasonable probability that the erroneous admission of this testimony affected the outcome of trial. The error therefore does not warrant relief under plain-error review. (2) Wilson separately argues that various of Brens’s opinions were improperly based on “the investigation as a whole” rather than his own perceptions, in violation of Rule 701(a), and that this same defect raises a Confrontation Clause problem. Wilson relies on United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005), where the Second Circuit found Rule 701(a) error because the testifying agent’s opinions drew on “the total information developed by all the officials who participated in the investigation” rather than his own perceptions. The court emphasized the agent’s repeated references to “our investigation” and what “we” learned, distinguishing testimony from an agent who personally participated in the events described. Id. “Precisely because Rule 701 limits the admissibility of lay opinions at trial to those based only on personal perceptions, an opinion . . . which appears to have been based on the totality of information gathered by various persons in the course of an investigation[] [i]s not admissible before a jury.” Id. at 213. 17 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 Garcia does not resemble this case. Much of the testimony Wilson identifies was not opinion testimony at all. Brens’s description of the investigative methods employed—such as aerial surveillance, GPS tracking, toll records, traffic stops, and pole cameras—was simply a factual account of the investigation. The same is true of his testimony that the lease on the Encampment Street residence automatically renewed at the end of its twelve- month term. And Wilson’s reliance on statements made during the Government’s closing argument is misplaced because closing argument is not evidence, much less testimony from Brens. The remainder of the challenged testimony reflected Brens’s own observations and conclusions. He repeatedly explained that his opinions rested on “my observations,” “my investigation,” and “my experience,” while identifying the surveillance, investigative steps, and conduct that he personally observed. Although Brens’s testimony occasionally used “we” when describing this surveillance, his testimony throughout established that “physical surveillance” meant conduct he personally undertook or monitored—“being in my vehicle, on foot,” and pole-camera footage he personally watched and adjusted from the DEA office—not an opinion that, like the agent’s in Garcia, drew on the total information developed by the investigative team without any limitation to what Brens personally perceived. Likewise, his testimony identifying recurring vehicles and customers at the Hollygrove residence was based on registration checks, traffic stops, and other investigative steps that he personally conducted. Taken together, the challenged testimony reflects Brens’s own perceptions rather than the collective knowledge of the investigative team. Wilson therefore cannot show that this case resembles Garcia. For the same reason, his related Confrontation Clause argument fails. Because Brens did not convey out-of-court statements or conclusions reached by other officers under the guise of lay opinion, his testimony did not implicate the 18 Case: 24-30684 Document: 183-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 08/18/2026 No. 24-30684 Confrontation Clause. United States v. Hamann, 33 F.4th 759, 767 (5th Cir. 2022). (3) Wilson and Enclade next argue that portions of Brens’s testimony were expert testimony governed by Rule 702 masquerading as Rule 701 lay opinion. The challenged testimony shares a common structure: the Government asked Brens, “in your experience,” to explain the significance of items, conduct, or patterns encountered during the investigation, and Brens answered by drawing on his experience investigating drug trafficking generally. The instances include testimony that the defendants’ frequent switching of vehicles and phones was, in his experience, indicative of efforts to thwart law-enforcement surveillance; that it is common, in his experience, for drug dealers to carry firearms to protect their supply; that a vacuum sealer, sealed-bag remnants, and a blender found at the Encampment Street residence were, in his experience, indicative of drug packaging; that a razor blade is used, in his experience, to cut narcotics into distributable amounts and that brown sugar is used to sp