Full Opinion

Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 20, 2026 No. 25-40551 ____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III Clerk United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Olabode Thomas Ajibola, Defendant—Appellant, consolidated with _____________ No. 25-40661 _____________ United States of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, versus Dumbor Josephine Baribe, Defendant—Appellant. Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 ______________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC Nos. 4:23-CR-136-2, 4:23-CR-136-11 ______________________________ Before Smith, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges. Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:* Olabode Ajibola and Dumbor Baribe were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering in connec- tion with private loans granted under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). On appeal, they contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support these convictions. Essentially, defendants maintain that neither of them knew that Olamide Bello, who worked with them to acquire the loans, was committing fraud against the government. Evidence presented at trial showed that the loan applications submit- ted in Ajibola’s and Baribe’s names were rife with fraud; that the two received loans for amounts far exceeding their reasonably foreseeable busi- ness expenses; that the two coordinated with Bello in deceiving creditors and forging indicia of formal employment; and that the two paid Bello kickbacks for his work in obtaining the fraudulent loans. There was also evidence that Ajibola gave documents to investigators that he should have known were fraudulent and that Baribe communicated with Bello to avoid scrutiny from her lender. Because this evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to reach the same conclusions as did this jury, we affirm. _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 2 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 I. Procedural History In 2023, a grand jury indicted Ajibola and Baribe (along with nine other defendants, including Bello), charging them with one count of conspir- acy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. A 2024 grand jury returned a superseding indictment that added conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The jury found Ajibola and Baribe guilty of both counts.1 In a thorough memorandum opinion and order, the district court denied Ajibola’s and Baribe’s post-trial motions for acquit- tal, which also argued insufficiency of the evidence. The court correctly iden- tified this circuit’s standard of review and pointed out that, for good reason, the jury “rejected” the defendants’ claim of ignorance of the scheme. The verdict, in the eyes of the district court, was supported by evidence such as the amount of loan money received, the thirty percent paid to Bello, and the behavior simulating W-2 employee expenses. Defendants appeal. II. Legal Standard Appeals of Rule 29 insufficiency-of-evidence claims are reviewed de novo, but that review is “highly deferential to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Bourrage, 138 F.4th 327, 348 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Mesquias, 29 F.4th 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2022)). We ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found the defendants guilty of each element of the offense beyond a reasona- ble doubt. United States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2014). The con- verse of this is that we will reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evi- dence “only if no rational jury could have found defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mesquias, 29 F.4th at 279 (citing United States v. Bowen, _____________________ 1 Bello was found guilty of the same two crimes at the same trial. All other defen- dants pleaded guilty to the wire fraud conspiracy charge alone. 3 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2016)). Caselaw has fleshed out this inquiry. Circumstantial evidence, includ- ing a defendant’s “implausible explanations,” may be sufficient for a jury to convict. United States v. Aguilar-Alvarez, 212 F. App’x 340, 342 (5th Cir. 2007). Jury decisions based on common sense and plausible-but-debatable inferences will not be overturned. See United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 422–23 (5th Cir. 2012) (jury could reject argument that tin of defendant’s paystubs in closet was assembled and stored by another occupant). But “a verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, speculation, or conjecture, or on an overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.” United States v. Petti- grew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996) (creation of lien used in fraud without more insufficient to show intent to defraud). In sum, evidence “need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt” because the jury “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence” and evaluate witness veracity. United States v. Gibson, 875 F.3d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)). III. Discussion Ajibola and Baribe do not present sufficient issues of fact to show that no rational jury could find them guilty of the charges appealed. A. Ajibola claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he entered into an agreement with Bello to commit fraud. He asserts that testi- mony and trial evidence established that he “trusted Bello’s self-proclaimed expertise in business and tax preparation” to assist him in his “tax filings and finances here in the United States.” Ajibola claims that he was introduced to Bello “by a trusted friend as someone who could assist Ajibola with his taxes”; his trust in Bello was supported by his declaration that Bello was “a 4 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 fellow Nigerian” “from the same region” and “tribe” whom Ajibola called “brother.” Ajibola therefore argued in the district court that he “trusted that the things Bello was doing in [his] name were lawful.” The jury, in finding that Ajibola knowingly entered into the conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering, apparently disagreed. Of course, trust that a friend will act in one’s best interests is not necessarily the same thing as trusting that a friend will act lawfully. And while Ajibola notes that Bello was the one who submitted all of the loan applications, it would be strange to think that a conspirator could escape liability by having his fraud- ster friends keep him in the dark about scams’ being done in his name. Therefore, the jury’s conclusion could have been reached by a rational jury exercising common sense judgment about the evidence proffered. Even if one grants that trust in Bello and ignorance of his methods weigh in Ajibola’s favor, the jury did not convict based on a mere hunch. There is no dispute that the loan application and loan forgiveness application submitted in Ajibola’s name were rife with lies.2 Ajibola seemed to know that some of those lies were important to keep up; in response to a subpoena, he supplied a federal investigator with a fake list of employees, none of whom he “personally kn[e]w,” and he admitted to the same investigator that he knew that at least 60% of the loan was to be used to “keep workers” by fund- ing payroll. Moreover, Ajibola’s first loan was for $111,332, whereas his com- _____________________ 2 In particular, the initial application claimed that his business had seven W-2 em- ployees when it actually had none; reported his monthly payroll expenses as $44,533 as distinguished from the true figure of $0; and reported its gross receipts for 2019 and 2020 as $820,766 and $590,000 as distinguished from $1,100 and “[nothing] near that amount.” The forgiveness application, meanwhile, claimed that Ajibola spent 100% of the loan on payroll, when 30% was given to Bello and the rest went to personal expenses and bank accounts. Additionally, both Ajibola and Baribe began to write checks marked “payroll” after—and only after—they obtained their fraudulent loans. 5 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 pany’s average annual revenue and cash deposits were just over $87,000 in the relevant time period.3 Since PPP loans were intended to cover “around two and a half months of [a business’s] average payroll,” it was reasonable for a jury to think that Ajibola should have realized that his PPP loan was excessive. Additionally, Ajibola paid Bello 30% of the loan amount for his work, as instructed, and communicated with him before, during, and after the loan was obtained. Such behavior is not “[m]ere similarity of conduct” or a situation in which the defendant was induced only to aid a fraudster. See United States v. Ganji, 880 F.3d 760, 767, 770–72 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Ajibola directly benefited from the fraud, paid the fraudster using loan proceeds, should have known that the loan amount was disproportionate to his busi- ness’s apparent needs, and could have (as was his business duty) clarified at any time the nature of Bello’s misrepresentations. Viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have chosen to dis- believe Ajibola’s claim that he did not know that his agreement with Bello was for unsavory purposes. Ajibola exhibited behavior that suggests he plausibly knew that the loan was fraudulent and that he plausibly intended to obtain fraudulent money and pass it off as business expenses with Bello’s help. Therefore, a rational jury could have found that Ajibola agreed to commit wire fraud (by obtaining the loan) and money laundering (by engaging in transactions de- rived from that loan),4 to have known the unlawful purpose of the agreement, _____________________ 3 Ajibola’s company’s bank account posted revenue and cash deposits totaling $143,329.62 in the 601 days from July 26, 2019, to March 18, 2021; dividing by 601 and multiplying by 365 yields $87,046.73. 4 See, e.g., Ajibola’s opening brief at 35-36 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957). 6 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 and to have joined willingly with intent to further it. B. Baribe’s claims fail for many of the same reasons. Like Ajibola, she paid Bello 30% of the loan, a misuse of PPP funds and an indication that she knew the risk Bello was taking. Her loan (which, as with Ajibola’s, was osten- sibly calculated as 2½ months of payroll) paid $141,373: Even a “charitable” estimate of her homespun business’s finances, meanwhile, put its annual revenue—before payroll—around $66,574.94.5 That means that Baribe’s loan, which was supposed to service less than ¼ of payroll expenses, was greater than her entire revenue for more than two years. Even if her daughters were considered to be on her payroll, despite not being W-2 employees, their monthly average employment cost was $839, far from the $48,216 on her loan application. Those figures establish that Baribe should have known that Bello was engaging in fraudulent behavior on her behalf or that she knew about the PPP loan fraud. A jury could reasonably reach just that conclusion based in part on that evidence.6 Additionally, Baribe’s communications with Bello before, during, and after the loan suffice to show plausible understanding of the fraudulent activ- ities that Bello undertook in her name. Notably, Baribe heeded Bello’s in- structions not to pick up calls from the very lender that ended up giving her the PPP loan. A jury could plausibly conclude that, if the PPP loan was legit- imate, Baribe could have handled the matter herself, or at least figure out _____________________ 5 The business’s revenue in the two years and one month from May 2019 through June 2021 was $133,149.88. Half of that figure is $66,574.94, which would be a high esti- mate for annual revenue. 6 Indeed, some defendants admitted to suspecting Bello’s unlawful conduct be- cause of the lack of proportion between the loan amount and the business’s revenue. 7 Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 25-40551 c/w No. 25-40661 what information might be needed to answer the lender’s questions. Taken together, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to con- clude that Baribe understood that she was voluntarily entering into an agree- ment fraudulently to obtain an excessive PPP loan and fraudulently to use it for purposes other than payroll expenses. IV. Although Bello was the driving force behind the illegal activity, this court grants deference to the jury, which “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” Gibson, 875 F.3d at 185. The record, viewed as a whole, supports a conviction because the narrative that neither knew anything about Bello’s illegal activi- ties is thinned by the evidence that the loan applications, communications, amounts, use, and payback were full of weighty indicia of knowing fraud. A rational jury could easily have found the defendants guilty, beyond a rea- sonable doubt, of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering. The judgments of conviction are AFFIRMED. 8