United States v. Baribe
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-40661
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
November 20, 2026
No. 25-40551
____________ Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Olabode Thomas Ajibola,
Defendant—Appellant,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 25-40661
_____________
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Dumbor Josephine Baribe,
Defendant—Appellant.
Case: 25-40551 Document: 103-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
______________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC Nos. 4:23-CR-136-2,
4:23-CR-136-11
______________________________
Before Smith, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:*
Olabode Ajibola and Dumbor Baribe were convicted of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money laundering in connec-
tion with private loans granted under the Paycheck Protection Program
(“PPP”). On appeal, they contend that the evidence at trial was insufficient
to support these convictions. Essentially, defendants maintain that neither
of them knew that Olamide Bello, who worked with them to acquire the loans,
was committing fraud against the government.
Evidence presented at trial showed that the loan applications submit-
ted in Ajibola’s and Baribe’s names were rife with fraud; that the two
received loans for amounts far exceeding their reasonably foreseeable busi-
ness expenses; that the two coordinated with Bello in deceiving creditors and
forging indicia of formal employment; and that the two paid Bello kickbacks
for his work in obtaining the fraudulent loans. There was also evidence that
Ajibola gave documents to investigators that he should have known were
fraudulent and that Baribe communicated with Bello to avoid scrutiny from
her lender.
Because this evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to reach the same
conclusions as did this jury, we affirm.
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*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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I. Procedural History
In 2023, a grand jury indicted Ajibola and Baribe (along with nine
other defendants, including Bello), charging them with one count of conspir-
acy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. A 2024 grand jury
returned a superseding indictment that added conspiracy to commit money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The jury found Ajibola and
Baribe guilty of both counts.1 In a thorough memorandum opinion and order,
the district court denied Ajibola’s and Baribe’s post-trial motions for acquit-
tal, which also argued insufficiency of the evidence. The court correctly iden-
tified this circuit’s standard of review and pointed out that, for good reason,
the jury “rejected” the defendants’ claim of ignorance of the scheme. The
verdict, in the eyes of the district court, was supported by evidence such as
the amount of loan money received, the thirty percent paid to Bello, and the
behavior simulating W-2 employee expenses. Defendants appeal.
II. Legal Standard
Appeals of Rule 29 insufficiency-of-evidence claims are reviewed
de novo, but that review is “highly deferential to the jury’s verdict.” United
States v. Bourrage, 138 F.4th 327, 348 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States
v. Mesquias, 29 F.4th 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2022)). We ask whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have
found the defendants guilty of each element of the offense beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. United States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2014). The con-
verse of this is that we will reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evi-
dence “only if no rational jury could have found defendants guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Mesquias, 29 F.4th at 279 (citing United States v. Bowen,
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1
Bello was found guilty of the same two crimes at the same trial. All other defen-
dants pleaded guilty to the wire fraud conspiracy charge alone.
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818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Caselaw has fleshed out this inquiry. Circumstantial evidence, includ-
ing a defendant’s “implausible explanations,” may be sufficient for a jury to
convict. United States v. Aguilar-Alvarez, 212 F. App’x 340, 342 (5th Cir.
2007). Jury decisions based on common sense and plausible-but-debatable
inferences will not be overturned. See United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411,
422–23 (5th Cir. 2012) (jury could reject argument that tin of defendant’s
paystubs in closet was assembled and stored by another occupant). But “a
verdict may not rest on mere suspicion, speculation, or conjecture, or on an
overly attenuated piling of inference on inference.” United States v. Petti-
grew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1521 (5th Cir. 1996) (creation of lien used in fraud without
more insufficient to show intent to defraud). In sum, evidence “need not
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent
with every conclusion except that of guilt” because the jury “retains the sole
authority to weigh any conflicting evidence” and evaluate witness veracity.
United States v. Gibson, 875 F.3d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing United States
v. Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)).
III. Discussion
Ajibola and Baribe do not present sufficient issues of fact to show that
no rational jury could find them guilty of the charges appealed.
A.
Ajibola claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he
entered into an agreement with Bello to commit fraud. He asserts that testi-
mony and trial evidence established that he “trusted Bello’s self-proclaimed
expertise in business and tax preparation” to assist him in his “tax filings and
finances here in the United States.” Ajibola claims that he was introduced to
Bello “by a trusted friend as someone who could assist Ajibola with his
taxes”; his trust in Bello was supported by his declaration that Bello was “a
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fellow Nigerian” “from the same region” and “tribe” whom Ajibola called
“brother.” Ajibola therefore argued in the district court that he “trusted
that the things Bello was doing in [his] name were lawful.”
The jury, in finding that Ajibola knowingly entered into the conspiracy
to commit wire fraud and money laundering, apparently disagreed. Of
course, trust that a friend will act in one’s best interests is not necessarily the
same thing as trusting that a friend will act lawfully. And while Ajibola notes
that Bello was the one who submitted all of the loan applications, it would be
strange to think that a conspirator could escape liability by having his fraud-
ster friends keep him in the dark about scams’ being done in his name.
Therefore, the jury’s conclusion could have been reached by a rational jury
exercising common sense judgment about the evidence proffered.
Even if one grants that trust in Bello and ignorance of his methods
weigh in Ajibola’s favor, the jury did not convict based on a mere hunch.
There is no dispute that the loan application and loan forgiveness application
submitted in Ajibola’s name were rife with lies.2 Ajibola seemed to know
that some of those lies were important to keep up; in response to a subpoena,
he supplied a federal investigator with a fake list of employees, none of whom
he “personally kn[e]w,” and he admitted to the same investigator that he
knew that at least 60% of the loan was to be used to “keep workers” by fund-
ing payroll. Moreover, Ajibola’s first loan was for $111,332, whereas his com-
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2
In particular, the initial application claimed that his business had seven W-2 em-
ployees when it actually had none; reported his monthly payroll expenses as $44,533 as
distinguished from the true figure of $0; and reported its gross receipts for 2019 and 2020
as $820,766 and $590,000 as distinguished from $1,100 and “[nothing] near that amount.”
The forgiveness application, meanwhile, claimed that Ajibola spent 100% of the loan on
payroll, when 30% was given to Bello and the rest went to personal expenses and bank
accounts. Additionally, both Ajibola and Baribe began to write checks marked “payroll”
after—and only after—they obtained their fraudulent loans.
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pany’s average annual revenue and cash deposits were just over $87,000 in
the relevant time period.3 Since PPP loans were intended to cover “around
two and a half months of [a business’s] average payroll,” it was reasonable
for a jury to think that Ajibola should have realized that his PPP loan was
excessive. Additionally, Ajibola paid Bello 30% of the loan amount for his
work, as instructed, and communicated with him before, during, and after the
loan was obtained.
Such behavior is not “[m]ere similarity of conduct” or a situation in
which the defendant was induced only to aid a fraudster. See United States v.
Ganji, 880 F.3d 760, 767, 770–72 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Ajibola
directly benefited from the fraud, paid the fraudster using loan proceeds,
should have known that the loan amount was disproportionate to his busi-
ness’s apparent needs, and could have (as was his business duty) clarified at
any time the nature of Bello’s misrepresentations. Viewing all facts in the
light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have chosen to dis-
believe Ajibola’s claim that he did not know that his agreement with Bello
was for unsavory purposes.
Ajibola exhibited behavior that suggests he plausibly knew that the
loan was fraudulent and that he plausibly intended to obtain fraudulent
money and pass it off as business expenses with Bello’s help. Therefore, a
rational jury could have found that Ajibola agreed to commit wire fraud (by
obtaining the loan) and money laundering (by engaging in transactions de-
rived from that loan),4 to have known the unlawful purpose of the agreement,
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3
Ajibola’s company’s bank account posted revenue and cash deposits totaling
$143,329.62 in the 601 days from July 26, 2019, to March 18, 2021; dividing by 601 and
multiplying by 365 yields $87,046.73.
4
See, e.g., Ajibola’s opening brief at 35-36 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957).
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and to have joined willingly with intent to further it.
B.
Baribe’s claims fail for many of the same reasons. Like Ajibola, she
paid Bello 30% of the loan, a misuse of PPP funds and an indication that she
knew the risk Bello was taking. Her loan (which, as with Ajibola’s, was osten-
sibly calculated as 2½ months of payroll) paid $141,373: Even a “charitable”
estimate of her homespun business’s finances, meanwhile, put its annual
revenue—before payroll—around $66,574.94.5
That means that Baribe’s loan, which was supposed to service less
than ¼ of payroll expenses, was greater than her entire revenue for more than
two years. Even if her daughters were considered to be on her payroll, despite
not being W-2 employees, their monthly average employment cost was $839,
far from the $48,216 on her loan application. Those figures establish that
Baribe should have known that Bello was engaging in fraudulent behavior on
her behalf or that she knew about the PPP loan fraud. A jury could reasonably
reach just that conclusion based in part on that evidence.6
Additionally, Baribe’s communications with Bello before, during, and
after the loan suffice to show plausible understanding of the fraudulent activ-
ities that Bello undertook in her name. Notably, Baribe heeded Bello’s in-
structions not to pick up calls from the very lender that ended up giving her
the PPP loan. A jury could plausibly conclude that, if the PPP loan was legit-
imate, Baribe could have handled the matter herself, or at least figure out
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5
The business’s revenue in the two years and one month from May 2019 through
June 2021 was $133,149.88. Half of that figure is $66,574.94, which would be a high esti-
mate for annual revenue.
6
Indeed, some defendants admitted to suspecting Bello’s unlawful conduct be-
cause of the lack of proportion between the loan amount and the business’s revenue.
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what information might be needed to answer the lender’s questions.
Taken together, the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to con-
clude that Baribe understood that she was voluntarily entering into an agree-
ment fraudulently to obtain an excessive PPP loan and fraudulently to use it
for purposes other than payroll expenses.
IV.
Although Bello was the driving force behind the illegal activity, this
court grants deference to the jury, which “retains the sole authority to weigh
any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”
Gibson, 875 F.3d at 185. The record, viewed as a whole, supports a conviction
because the narrative that neither knew anything about Bello’s illegal activi-
ties is thinned by the evidence that the loan applications, communications,
amounts, use, and payback were full of weighty indicia of knowing fraud. A
rational jury could easily have found the defendants guilty, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering.
The judgments of conviction are AFFIRMED.
8