Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 26-1752 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Medard Lotahe Elonge lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern ____________ Submitted: November 3, 2026 Filed: November 13, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________ Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Medard Elonge, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, appeals the within-Guidelines-range sentence imposed by the district court1 after he pled guilty 1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa. to conspiring to defraud the United States. His counsel has moved to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Elonge has filed a pro se brief challenging the validity of his guilty plea and counsel’s effectiveness, and raising “newly discovered evidence.” We conclude that Elonge entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily, see United States v. Green, 521 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review); Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s statements during plea hearing carry strong presumption of verity); and that any challenge to the factual basis for his plea was contradicted by Elonge’s adoption of the factual basis at the plea hearing, see United States v. Watson, 883 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (8th Cir. 2018) (concluding self-serving assertion that defendant was confused as to factual basis was directly contradicted by admissions at plea hearing). Relatedly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly denying any motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Osei, 679 F.3d 742, 746-47 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review; affirming denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea where defendant testified clearly about the factual basis for his guilty plea, responded coherently when asked whether he had adequately conferred with counsel, and indicated he understood and accepted that his plea would be final). We also conclude that Elonge’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct lack support in the record, see United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 378 (8th Cir. 2007) (standard of review), and that any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriate for collateral review, see United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826-27 (8th Cir. 2006). Additionally, we conclude that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence, as there is no indication the court failed to consider a relevant factor, gave significant weight to an improper factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the proper factors. See United States v. Newell, 186 F.4th -2- 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2026) (reviewing sentence under deferential abuse-of-discretion standard; within-Guidelines-range sentence entitled to presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing substantive reasonableness); see also United States v. Anderson, 90 F.4th 1226, 1227 (8th Cir. 2024) (explaining district court has wide latitude in weighing relevant factors, including discretion to assign more weight to offense’s nature and characteristics than to defendant’s mitigating personal characteristics). Finally, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment. ______________________________ -3-