Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2745 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Patrick Earl Robinson Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central ____________ Submitted: October 19, 2026 Filed: November 5, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________ Before KELLY, BENTON, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Patrick Earl Robinson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The district court 1 varied upward, 1 The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. sentencing him to 276 months (guideline range was 180 to 210 months). He appeals. Having jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. Robinson believes his sentence was unreasonable because the district court (1) varied upward based on criminal history that the guidelines accounted for and (2) did not give proper weight to Robinson’s childhood as a mitigating factor. This court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). It “will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” Id. at 464. I. The district court properly applied the § 3553(a) factors, concluding that Robinson’s criminal history justified the variance: So I’m going to talk about your history and characteristics, but I want you to understand that what this plays into are three different factors. The first factor is deterrence; and, really, here, what we’re talking about is specific deterrence, which means deterrence from you committing another crime, so finding a punishment that is significant enough that it will stop you from committing crimes in the future because, honestly, anything I give here, I think will satisfy general deterrence. I’m not concerned about the general deterrence prong. No. 2, protection of the public. I have to tell you looking at your PSR, I am very concerned with a lot of these crimes, including, of course, the one that I found by a preponderance of the evidence in terms of -- in terms of the fleeing in the car and the attempted carjacking. But that’s not it, right? There’s stuff in your PSR earlier that also shows a significant amount of violence, and the problem is, when we have a -2- track record both in the convictions and in what I found of a significant -- a significant track record of violence, the problem is if I can’t deter you and I can’t be sure that the prison sentence I give you is going to stop you from committing crimes, then I really do have to be worried about protecting the public from the effect of those crimes. And that’s true whether it’s intentional on your part or not. You might get out and intend to hurt somebody, or honestly, you might not. But what I have to be worried about is, is someone going to get hurt after you get out. And looking at this track record and worrying that I’m not able to specifically deter you, protection of the public is something that is at the forefront of my mind. Additionally, promotion for the respect of the rule of law, and it all ties together, and I want to explain this to you. The crimes you’ve committed are bad enough, but there’s a track record, again, based on both what’s in here and what I found by a preponderance of the evidence of you fleeing, okay? Fleeing is incredibly dangerous. Not only does it show a lack of respect for the rule of law, but it also puts you in danger, the officers in danger, and other innocent people in danger, potentially up to losing all of your lives. And that is incredibly, incredibly concerning conduct to me. .... My point is, I do not think that the guidelines right now sufficiently account for the dangerousness or the need for specific deterrence. I honestly don’t think that if I were to give you the top end of the guidelines, you would end up being deterred at all, and that’s from the last couple of prison sentences you served. Contrary to Robinson’s argument: “It is well-settled that factors taken into account in calculating the advisory guidelines range can form the basis of an upward variance and that a sentencing court may vary upward based on criminal history already accounted for by the Guidelines.” United States v. Ivory, 146 F.4th 693, 698 (8th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). The district court did not abuse its discretion by doing so here. -3- II. Robinson argues that the district court did not give proper weight to his childhood as a mitigating factor. To the contrary, the district court considered Robinson’s childhood: I acknowledge that you had a terrible, terrible childhood. There is no -- there is no question from what I’ve read that that’s true. It is among the most awful of what I’ve seen in my time on the bench, and I’ve seen a bunch, so I acknowledge that. And you are going to get for that something of a discount from what I otherwise would have given you to reflect what I think is not no moral culpability, not a little moral culpability, but lessened moral culpability from the type of moral culpability you would have if you had lived a perfect life, and if you had never had any problems. Now, I want to be clear, that only goes so far, and you are only going to get a small discount off of what I would otherwise have given you because this is far from your first run-in with the justice system. “Mere disagreement with how the district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal.” United States v. Johnson, 151 F.4th 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). It was not a clear error of judgment for the district court to give Robinson’s childhood less weight than the other factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion in varying upward. ******* The judgment is affirmed. ______________________________ -4-