Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-1672 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Rico Cordell Dixon lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________ Submitted: January 16, 2026 Filed: November 4, 2026 ____________ Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. ____________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. After trial, a jury found Rico Cordell Dixon guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The jury also found him not guilty of a third count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. By special interrogatory, the jury established a drug quantity of at least 50 but less than 500 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. At sentencing, overruling Dixon’s objections, the district court1 attributed a total of 4,585.56 grams of methamphetamine to him, establishing a base offense level of 32 under USSG § 2D1.1(b). The court imposed a three-level manager enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(b) and applied the career offender enhancement, see USSG § 4B1.1, raising his offense level to 37 and criminal history category to VI. This resulted in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 360 months to life. Varying downward due to Dixon’s military service, traumatic childhood, military sexual trauma, mental health history, and good behavior in pretrial detention, the court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 240 months imprisonment on each count. Dixon appeals, challenging the admission of prior convictions at trial and raising procedural sentencing issues that, if sustained, would not affect his advisory guidelines range. We affirm the convictions and sentence. I. Background. The trial testimony and evidence established the following facts. Appearing for the government as a cooperating conspirator, C.S. testified that he began purchasing methamphetamine from Dixon’s girlfriend, Staci Lillard, at her residence. Dixon was occasionally present for the sales. C.S. sometimes bought directly from Dixon, including at a residence of Valicia Watkins, another of Dixon’s girlfriends. In 2023, police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle being driven by C.S and found 83.36 grams of methamphetamine that C.S. had bought from Lillard. C.S. agreed to cooperate and then performed two controlled buys from Lillard at her 1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. -2- residence. Dixon was present for one sale, and he encouraged C.S. to buy in greater quantities to get a better price. Warrant searches of Lillard’s residence yielded 68.41 grams of methamphetamine and other indicia of drug trafficking. Police seized Lillard’s cell phone, which contained coded text messages in which Dixon discussed drug trafficking. During a warrant search of Watkins’s residence, officers found a vehicle registered to that address in Dixon’s name that contained mail addressed to Dixon at Lillard’s address. In the bedroom, police found tablets containing methamphetamine in a dresser; Dixon’s clothing and mail addressed to him; 239.7 grams of cocaine, 39.94 grams of methamphetamine, and two baggies of marijuana in a bucket next to the bed; and a bag containing a loaded handgun, ammunition, fentanyl, and mail addressed to Dixon. Like Lillard’s phone, Watkins’s phone contained coded drug-related messages with Dixon. Valicia Watkins also agreed to testify for the government in exchange for leniency. She testified that she and Dixon shared the bedroom in which the drug evidence was found and that he lived there episodically. She claimed the firearm belonged to Dixon and he had previously shown it to her. She identified the illegal drugs in the home as belonging to Dixon and acknowledged she helped sell them. Another cooperator, B.D., testified that for several months she sold methamphetamine that she acquired from Dixon and Watkins. Prior to trial, the government provided notice of its intent to use Dixon’s prior convictions as evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The convictions are for (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine (2012), (2) possession with intent to deliver ecstasy (2014), and (3) a carrying weapons state charge (2014). Dixon moved to exclude the convictions, stating that he would stipulate to his felony status pursuant to Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). Therefore, he argued, other evidence of his prior convictions would be inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403. The district court denied Dixon’s motion, holding that the convictions are relevant to Dixon’s knowledge of the -3- contraband he was charged with possessing and distributing. At trial, the court twice provided a standard 404(b) limiting instruction, immediately after the prior conviction evidence was admitted and again in the final written jury instructions. The jury verdict convicted Dixon of the conspiracy and two possession with intent to distribute counts. At sentencing, the government offered into evidence the grand jury testimony of C.R., a cooperator who did not testify at trial, in which he claimed to have purchased methamphetamine directly from Dixon around a dozen times, with the purchase amounts varying between one half and three pounds. C.R.’s testimony contributed 3,855.6 grams to the overall drug quantity. On appeal, Dixon argues that the district court (1) abused its discretion in admitting the 404(b) evidence of his prior convictions, (2) clearly erred in finding the manager enhancement applicable, and (3) erred in its drug quantity finding, both by erroneously crediting C.R.’s grand jury testimony and by attributing a quantity above that found by the jury. II. Discussion. The 404(b) Issue. Dixon first argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting his prior convictions under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion that permits evidence of prior crimes to show a defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” United States v. Monds, 945 F.3d 1049, 1052 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 974 (2020). However, “propensity evidence is out of bounds: using another bad act to show that an individual is likely to do the same thing again in the future.” United States v. Vaca, 38 F.4th 718, 721 (8th Cir. 2022). Therefore, to be admissible under Rule 404(b), extrinsic evidence of other bad acts “must be (1) relevant to a material issue raised at trial, (2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged, (3) -4- supported by sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the other act, and (4) of probative value not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Monds, 945 F.3d at 1052. Here, Dixon argues evidence of his prior convictions should have been excluded because it was irrelevant to show a proper purpose “without propensity reasoning.” We review the admission of evidence of past crimes under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for abuse of discretion and “we will not reverse unless the evidence clearly had no bearing on the case and was introduced solely to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit criminal acts.” United States v. Smith, 978 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 396 (2021). Dixon argues on appeal his prior convictions are not relevant because they only show a propensity to commit crimes. Like the district court, we disagree. By pleading not guilty to possession of drugs and a firearm, Dixon made “past firearm convictions relevant to show the material issues of knowledge of the presence of the firearm and his intent to possess it. . . even if the government only pursues a constructive-possession theory.” United States v. Drew, 9 F.4th 718, 723 (8th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1159 (2022). Here, Dixon’s knowledge was a focal point of the trial, as his defense was to deny knowledge of the contraband by shifting blame to Watkins and Lillard. See United States v. Walker, 470 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 2006) (gun); United States v. Fang, 844 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2016) (drugs). Dixon’s stipulation conceding that he knew he was a felon who could not possess a gun did not take the knowledge issue out of the case. Dixon correctly notes that “Rule 404(b) evidence is subject to Rule 403, which provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded ‘if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.’” United States v. Atkins, 52 F.4th 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). He argues the prior conviction evidence in this case was unfairly prejudicial because it “inhibited Mr. Dixon’s defense, which focuses on the cooperating witnesses’ significant credibility -5- problems [and] invited the jury to ignore those glaring credibility issues in favor of concluding, as to Mr. Dixon, ‘[o]nce a criminal, always a criminal.’” In addition to concluding the prior convictions are relevant to knowledge and intent, the district court noted that his prior convictions are not the type to risk prejudice by inflaming the jury’s passions. It also provided a limiting instruction after the prior conviction evidence was admitted and again in the final written jury instructions. See Drew, 9 F.4th at 724 (limiting instruction reduces risk of unfair prejudice). Bearing in mind that Rule 404(b) “is a rule of inclusion,” we conclude that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in admitting Dixon’s prior convictions. The Manager Role-in-the-Offense Enhancement. Dixon argues the district court clearly erred in applying the manager role enhancement, which applies “[i]f the defendant was a manager or supervisor . . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” USSG § 3B1.1(b); See United States v. Heard, 91 F.4th 1275, 1279 (8th Cir. 2024) (standard of review). “We construe the terms ‘manager’ and ‘supervisor’ liberally, affirming the enhancement even when the defendant managed or supervised only one other participant during a single transaction.” Id. We consider “the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. The district court found, and Dixon does not dispute on appeal, that his criminal activity involved five or more participants. But he argues he did not manage them, as they controlled their own drug operations. The district court found that Watkins’s testimony undermined this claim, as she provided a share of her proceeds to Dixon, evidence of a claimed right to a greater share of the proceeds. The text messages between Dixon and his girlfriends also show Dixon telling them which -6- drugs to sell to which customers. The district court did not clearly err in finding Dixon supervised at least one person on at least one occasion. The Drug Quantity Procedural Sentencing Issue. Dixon argues the district court erred in attributing 4,585.56 grams of methamphetamine to him. First, he argues, the court clearly erred in crediting C.R.’s grand jury testimony because he did not testify at trial and had a prior felony conviction for a crime of dishonesty. Second, the jury’s finding that the methamphetamine quantity was under 500 grams acquitted him of a higher quantity at sentencing. Because the newly amended USSG § 1B1.3(c) prohibits considering acquitted conduct in calculating the advisory guidelines range “unless such conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction,” Dixon argues the district court erred in considering the acquitted quantity in calculating his guideline range. The district court ruled that the exception to § 1B1.3(c) applies because “the drugs themselves and the [trial] evidence about drugs that underline Count 1 is conduct that established, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.” “Procedural errors, like the miscalculation of a defendant’s offense level, are subject to harmless-error review.” United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 940 (8th Cir. 2014). “When a defendant brings a procedural error challenge, the government bears the burden of showing the error did not substantially influence the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.” United States v. Woods, 717 F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). The government argues that any alleged procedural error was harmless. We agree. The two alleged procedural errors do not affect Dixon’s guidelines range because he does not dispute the applicability of the career offender enhancement. See United States v. Wiggins, 747 F.3d 959, 963-64 (8th Cir. 2014) (assuming drug-quantity miscalculation, any error harmless because the career-offender guideline set the offense level regardless). Therefore, Dixon’s advisory guidelines -7- base offense level is 37 and his criminal history category is Category VI, resulting in a guidelines range of 360 months to life, regardless of the drug quantity attributed to him for sentencing. Even if the higher drug quantity the district court attributed to Dixon does constitute acquitted conduct within the purview of the new § 1B1.3(c), his adjusted base offense level would still be 37, his criminal history category would be Category VI, and the adjusted guidelines range would still be 360 months to life, well above the 240 month sentence the district court imposed with a substantial downward variance. See USSG § 4B1.1(b)(1). Section 1B1.3(c) only prohibits considering acquitted conduct in calculating Dixon’s guidelines range. Sigillito, 759 F.3d at 940. Because the alleged procedural errors “would not change [Dixon’s] Guidelines range, any alleged error here was harmless.” Id. at 941. The amended Guideline “does not prohibit a court from considering acquitted conduct when analyzing the factors from § 3553(a).” United States v. Ware, 141 F.4th 970, 974 n.2 (8th Cir. 2025); see United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 921 (6th Cir. 2024). Accordingly, we affirm Dixon’s convictions and sentence. ______________________________ -8-