Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2069 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. CJ Jessie James Carruthers lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of North Dakota - Eastern ____________ Submitted: June 8, 2026 Filed: November 5, 2026 ____________ Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. ____________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. In 2021, CJ Carruthers and an accomplice arranged to purchase marijuana in a residential area, entered the seller’s vehicle with a firearm and stole his marijuana, and exited the vehicle. Carruthers and the seller exchanged shots, and a bullet from the seller’s firearm entered a nearby home where a six-year-old boy was lying in bed. The bullet struck the boy in the head, causing a skull fracture and traumatic brain injury that left him permanently impaired. Carruthers pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act Robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1951(a). Carruthers committed these offenses while under a criminal justice sentence, which increased his criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines by two status points, resulting in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 97 to 121 months imprisonment. The district court1 imposed a 120-month sentence. After Carruthers was sentenced, Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines took effect, limiting the effect of committing a crime while under a criminal justice sentence. If sentenced after Amendment 821, Carruthers’ guidelines range would have been 87 to 108 months imprisonment, as opposed to the previous 97 to 121 months. Accordingly, in 2024, Carruthers moved to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Part A of Amendment 821.2 The district court, applying the two-step test from Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826-27 (2010), denied a sentence reduction. As we recently explained the test in United States v. Spotted Elk, “[f]irst, the court determined [Carruthers] was eligible for a sentence reduction because [Part A of Amendment 821] had the effect of lowering his guidelines range. . . . Second, applying the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 1 The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 2 Under the previous Guideline, a defendant received two additional criminal history points, “known as status points, if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence . . . . See USSG App. C Supp., Amend. 821 (Nov. 1, 2024). After Amendment 821, a defendant with six or fewer criminal history points [such as Carruthers] receives no status points, and a defendant who has seven or more criminal history points receives only one . . . . USSG 4A1.1(e).” United States v. Youngman, No. 24-1369, 2025 WL 1554929, at *1 n.2 (8th Cir. June 2, 2025) (Guidelines quotations omitted). -2- sentencing factors and the applicable Guidelines policy statement, USSG § 1B1.10, the court determined that a reduction ‘is not warranted.’” 182 F.4th 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 2026), citing Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827. Here, applying the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded that the nature and circumstances of Carruthers’s offense and the need to afford adequate deterrence for similar crimes weighed against a sentence reduction, specifically emphasizing the physical and psychological trauma suffered by the six-year-old victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B). Carruthers appeals. Reviewing the district court’s denial of a sentence reduction for abuse of discretion, we affirm. See Spotted Elk, 182 F.4th at 1066 (standard of review). In that recent decision, we affirmed the district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction to a defendant who, like Carruthers, was eligible, applying step two of the Dillon test. Spotted Elk argued, as Carruthers does, that the district court abused its discretion “(1) by placing undue weight on his underlying offense and criminal history . . . (2) by placing significant emphasis on his post-sentencing conduct . . . he has already been punished for; and (3) by ignoring Spotted Elk’s rehabilitative efforts.” Id. at 1067. After careful review of the sentencing record, we likewise conclude “[t]here was no abuse of the district court’s substantial sentencing discretion” in denying Carruthers a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction. Id. at 1068. Carruthers argues the district court abused its discretion by weighing certain § 3553(a) factors more heavily than others. He argues the court gave too much weight to the nature and circumstances of his offense, because the court accounted for this factor at his original sentencing. He asserts the court effectively imposed an upward variance in considering the offense’s nature, nullifying the lower guidelines range applicable after Amendment 821. Carruthers further contends that the court gave too little weight to his history, characteristics, and the effect of his post-offense rehabilitation on public safety, stressing that he has participated in programming and obtained his GED while incarcerated. -3- “The district court has substantial latitude to determine how much weight to give the various factors under § 3553(a).” United States v. Granados, 830 F.3d 84, 842 (8th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). “[T]he simple fact that a defendant disagrees with how the district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors is insufficient to establish that the district court abused its discretion.” United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 653 (8th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 413 (2022). Here, the district court determined that the nature and circumstances of the offense, coupled with the need to deter similar crimes, weighed against a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B). The court was free to give great weight to the offense’s nature and the trauma suffered by the six-year-old victim, even if it considered these factors at Carruthers’s original sentencing. See, e.g., Youngman, 2025 WL 1554929, at *2. Our precedents reject the contention that the denial of a discretionary sentence reduction amounts to an upward variance, even if the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction applying a lower guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 992 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2021). The court properly exercised its discretion to deny Carruthers’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion based on its weighing of the § 3553(a) factors. It imposed no upward variance by doing so. Finally, although the court did not address Carruthers’s post-sentencing rehabilitation in its Order Denying Motion To Reduce Sentence, we noted (again) in Spotted Elk “that the district court may consider post-sentencing rehabilitation as warranting a reduction, not that it must.” 182 F.4th at 1067 (emphasis in original; citation and quotation omitted). Here, the court’s Order stated that it gave “careful review [to] the § 3553(a) factors,” which include “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1). As the issue was thoroughly presented and argued by Carruthers at the sentencing hearing, there was no need to further “address” it in the Order, absent a subsequent request for further explanation. -4- The Order of the district court dated May 12, 2025, denying Carruthers’s Motion To Reduce Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is affirmed. ______________________________ -5-