State v. Williams
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket2506008056
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, )
)
) I.D. No. 2506008056
v. )
)
ERICA WILLIAMS, )
)
Defendant.
Submitted: November 6, 2026
Decided: November 10, 2026
On Defendant Erica Williams Motion to Suppress: Denied.
Erica Williams moves to suppress her extended detention during a traffic stop
as unsupported by reasonable suspicion and her on-scene arrest as unsupported by
probable cause. Williams seeks suppression of the results of her Intoxilizer test as a
remedy for these alleged Constitutional violations. Final case review is scheduled
for November 16, 2026.
Factual Background
Trooper Gallo of Delaware State Police testified on behalf of the State.
Trooper Gallo received training from the police academy on driving under the
influence (“DUI”) investigations and has worked with the Delaware State Police for
six years. The State submitted a Mobile Video Recording (“MVR”) and Body-Worn
Camera (“BWC”) related to this incident. Trooper Gallo testified he was stationary
on June 14, 2025 when he saw Williams’ vehicle approach, without its lights on,
from his rear or side view mirror. The MVR does not depict this observation because
it is attached to the front of his car.
For a stretch of time on the MVR, Ms. Williams’ vehicle is in the distance.
Trooper Gallo testified her vehicle crossed both the center line and into the shoulder.
The Court made its own observation from the video and also saw a drift toward the
lines. It was not clear if the vehicle passed over those lines or ran along them.
Eventually, Trooper Gallo caught up with the vehicle as it turned into a
neighborhood, without using a turn signal. It is undisputed that this final traffic
offense warranted Trooper Gallo’s initial stop of the vehicle.
After the car stopped, the BWC showed Trooper Gallo telling Ms. Williams
her lights were off, and she then turned them on. She was pleasant and polite. But
her demeanor suggested she was overwhelmed. For example, when Trooper Gallo
asked where she was coming from, she replied she was traveling from Dover to
Newark. That statement was inconsistent with her direction of travel. She advised
she was running out of gas. At one point, she stated she was looking for a gas station
but at another, she stated someone was bringing her gas. She appeared exasperated
by her passenger. She had multiple identifications but no driver’s license.
Trooper Gallo’s testified that he detected an odor of alcohol. The Court could
see her eyes were somewhat glassy on the BWC. When asked if she had been
drinking that day, Ms. Williams admitted drinking earlier.
To be clear, there is a challenge to the extension of her traffic stop, therefore
it is important for the Court to limit its initial analysis to her statement prior to being
asked to exit—which is an admission to drinking, but it is noted that she gave
different statements later. She completed the alphabet test successfully but went too
far while counting backwards. She proffered, “I’m not drunk. I know what you’re
trying to do.” Trooper Gallo asked her to step outside the vehicle.
What took place next is significant for assessment of the later-administered
PBT. Trooper Gallo asked Ms. Williams to stand at the back of her car. He then
entered his own car, which was directly behind and facing her. He left the door of
his car ajar. He backed up the patrol car. He appeared to run an inquiry on his
computer and turned off the overhead lights. Trooper Gallo testified he left the door
ajar intentionally, so that he could continue his observation of Ms. Williams. When
Trooper Gallo reapproached Ms. Williams, she was on the phone with a third party.
He asked her to end the call and began to administer standardized field sobriety tests.
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests
During the administration of the HGN, Ms. Williams had consistent difficulty
keeping her head straight, despite multiple corrections. During the first pass, she
turned her head entirely. Trooper Gallo reminded her to keep her head straight. She
again moved her head. He again reminded her, but she again moved her head and
asked if she could call her father, who lived nearby. She had to be reminded a few
more times but ultimately was able to sufficiently comply. Trooper Gallo testified
regarding his administration of the test and notation of six clues. He did not provide
testimony regarding any specific statistical correlation between his observation and
impairment. Instead, he described his observation as indicative of a level of
impairment. After the HGN test, Trooper Gallo asked when she had her last drink.
She responded she drank the day before, which was inconsistent with her prior
statement. She again asked to call her dad.
Trooper Gallo asked if she was fine with doing additional tests and she said
yes. But she immediately advised she was bow-legged. Trooper Gallo responded
he too was bow-legged. On the BWC, he did not initially inquire further as to its
cause or potential impact on her ability to do the walk and turn test, which requires
walking heel to toe, in a straight line. It is the State’s burden on a warrantless arrest,
and the record is silent as to what the term bow-legged meant to Trooper Gallo or
Ms. Williams. Therefore, the Court will not consider her physical performance on
the Walk and Turn test. While the Court disregards her physical performance,
cognitively, Ms. Williams had difficulty counting from one to nine.
Trooper Gallo did engage in clarification on her physical limitation as to the
One-Leg Stand test. He asked if, despite her issue, if she could lift one leg. He then
explained the test and demonstrated. Ms. Williams noted no concern and proceeded
to try. Therefore, the Court will consider this test. Ms. Williams did not raise her
leg and instead rested her heel on the pavement. After a few attempts, she made an
unprompted statement that she was “just failing.”
Shortly thereafter, Ms. Williams made another phone call, while in the middle
of the administration of the PBT test. Immediately after she provided a sample, she
told the person on the phone that she drank. The State produced evidence that the
PBT machine had been calibrated two weeks before and again, right after her arrest
that night. Trooper Gallo testified regarding how the PBT is calibrated.
As for the 15-minute observation period, Trooper Gallo was questioned on
cross examination about whether he was fully able to observe Ms. Williams once he
returned to his vehicle to ensure she did not drink, chew gum, spit, or belch. Trooper
Gallo testified he could hear Ms. Williams talking on the phone as part of his
continued observation.
Parties’ Contentions
Ms. Williams concedes she was initially stopped legally, though she disputes
two of the three alleged traffic offenses cited by the officer and asks this Court to
give them minimal weight as to reasonable suspicion or probable cause for impaired
driving. Next, Ms. Williams challenges the extension of her traffic stop as being
unsupported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. Finally, she challenges each of the
field tests and the PBT administration. The State, not surprisingly, argues the facts
of this case follow Delaware precedent and meet the required legal standards of each
step in the interaction.
Legal Standards
Both reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause are considered
under a totality of the circumstances framework. 1 Starting with reasonable
articulable suspicion: an individual is seized when they are stopped in connection
with a traffic violation. 2 This Court assesses reasonable articulable suspicion “as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar
circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officer’s subjective
interpretation of those facts.”3 “The duration and execution of a traffic stop is
necessarily limited by the initial purpose of the stop.”4 Investigation by law
enforcement beyond the initial traffic stop is a separate seizure, which requires
factual support to “justify the additional intrusion.” 5
“An arrest ‘requires probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime.’” 6
“Probable cause to arrest for a DUI offense exists when an officer possesses
‘information which would warrant a reasonable man in believing that [such] a crime
1
Lefebvre v. State, 19 A.3d 287, 295 (Del. 2011); Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999).
2
Houston v. State, 251 A.3d 102, 108–09 (Del. 2021); Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045–
46 (Del. 2001).
3
Jones, 745 A.2d at 861 (citations omitted).
4
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1047 (Del. 2001).
5
Id. at 1050.
6
Swanson v. State, 351 A.3d 496, 514–15 (Del. 2025) (citations omitted) quoting Flowers v.
State, 195 A.3d 18, 24 (Del. 2018).
ha[s] been committed.” 7 The State bears the burden of proof when a warrantless
arrest is challenged.8 Delaware courts have considered probable cause to arrest for
driving under the influence in various factual scenarios, because each case is unique.
A traffic violation coupled with the odor of alcohol is insufficient to establish
probable cause; more is required. 9 In Bease, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined rapid speech, odor of alcohol, admission to drinking the night before,
bloodshot and glassy eyes, and a moving violation established probable cause.10 In
Lefebvre, a case with unique factual circumstances,11 the Supreme Court clarified
“[t]hat hypothetically innocent explanations may exist for facts learned during an
investigation does not preclude a finding of probable cause.” 12 More recently, the
Supreme Court held that “speeding, failing to pull over, bloodshot and glassy eyes,
an admission to drinking coupled with a smell of alcohol emanating from [the
defendant] and the vehicle, mumbled speech, and a refusal to perform field sobriety
7
Lefebvre, 19 A.3d at 292 (alterations in original) quoting Clendaniel v. Voshell, 562 A.2d 1167,
1170 (Del. 1989).
8
Hunter v. State, 783 A.2d 558, 560 (Del. 2001) (citations omitted); State v. Adams, 13 A.3d
1162, 1166 (Del. Super. Ct. 2008) (citations omitted).
9
Lefebvre, 19 A.3d at 293 (citation omitted).
10
Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 499–500 (Del. 2005).
11
Lefebvre’s counsel conceded there was probable cause to arrest her before field tests were
administered. Lefebvre, 19 A.3d at 293. She passed the field tests—but the Court ruled
favorable results on field tests are “of insufficient evidentiary weight to eliminate probable cause
that had already been established by the totality of the circumstances before the performance of
the field sobriety tests.” Id. at 294, 295 (emphasis in original).
12
Id. at 293 (citation omitted).
tests” was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest for driving under the
influence.13
Analysis
As Ms. Williams does not challenge her initial stop for failing to signal, the
Court will begin its analysis with the extension of her detention, prior to being asked
to exit. The Court finds there was factual support to justify the additional intrusion.
Putting aside any moving violations, Ms. Williams was overwhelmed and confused.
At the outset, she provided inconsistent statements about whether she was looking
for a gas station, or someone was coming to bring her gas. She gave inconsistent
statements about her direction of travel. At the hearing, there was some questioning
that suggested innocent explanations for her confusion, but officers need not
discount indicators of impairment because of hypothetically innocent explanations.
Beyond her demeanor, her eyes were glassy. The officer detected an odor of
alcohol. She admitted to drinking earlier. That is sufficient factual information to
extend the duration of the stop and inquire further about her ability to safely drive.
This Court finds the facts known to the officer were sufficient to ask Ms. Williams
to step out of the car. 14
13
Bowie v. State, 307 A.3d 327, at *2 (Del. 2023) (citations omitted).
14
Ms. Williams successfully completed the alphabet test but counted too far on the number
inquiry. This mixed result can be considered under Bease v. State, but is not necessary given
what was known to the officer at the time for extending the duration of the stop.
As to probable cause, the Court finds it significant that Ms. Williams had
significant difficulty keeping her head straight during the HGN administration. After
some time, she was able to comply, and Trooper Gallo noted six clues on this test.
While there was no statistical testimony as seen in other cases, there was testimony
from Trooper Gallo that he has been trained this is an indicator of impairment. The
State did not meet its burden in establishing that Ms. Williams was physically able
to conduct the Walk and Turn test—but observation of her inability to count from
one to nine also suggests impairment. As for the One Leg Stand test, she was
specifically asked if she could do the test—and she tried. But her performance was
another indicator of impairment as she merely rested her heel on the pavement.
The Court finds Trooper Gallo took steps to ensure he could maintain attention
on Ms. Williams as a foundation for PBT administration. This Court, in connection
with a challenge to the 20-minute observation period for the Intoxilizer
administration has noted “numerous other jurisdictions have held that an officer need
not ‘stare fixedly’ at a suspect or satisfy an ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ rule throughout the
observation period…” 15 Here, Trooper Gallo moved the car and conducted a
computer check, but kept Ms. Williams within his line of sight. He kept the door to
his car open so that he could hear. Her telephone conversation would make it easier
for him to hear if she drank, chewed gum, spit, or belched. His testimony that he
15
Webb-Buckingham v. State, 2009 WL 147020 *4 (Del. Super.).
could hear her talking on the phone is supported by the BWC footage as she is still
on the phone when he reapproaches. After considering the testimony and viewing
the recording, the Court is satisfied that the 15-minute observation period was
properly observed. Thus, the PBT result will be considered and is another factor in
the totality of the circumstances establishing probable cause.
In sum, there was confusion and inconsistency in Ms. Williams’ responses to
questions, an admission to drinking (again with inconsistent responses), glassy eyes,
an odor of alcohol, an inability to keep her head straight despite repeated correction,
an indicator of impairment based on the result of the HGN, an indicator of
impairment on the One Leg Stand, and a failed PBT. Even if this Court did not
consider her difficulty in counting from one to nine on the Walk and Turn test, there
is sufficient factual information based on the totality of the circumstances to
establish probable cause. For the forgoing reasons, the Motion to Suppress is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Sonia Augusthy
Judge Sonia Augusthy