United States v. Gregneisha Pressley
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-10620
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-10620
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GREGNEISHA PRESSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00073-TPB-TGW-1
____________________
Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregneisha Pressley appeals her 92-month sentence for one
count of bank robbery. She first argues that the district court erred
by applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G.
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10620
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). That section provides for an enhancement if a
“threat of death” was made in conjunction with a robbery.
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Second, she argues that the district court
erred by applying another two-level enhancement pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) for physically restraining a victim. In light
of a recent amendment to the sentencing guidelines, we VACATE
Pressley’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
I
This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th
1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). When reviewing sentences
for errors in a Guideline calculation, this Court considers factual
findings for clear error and the application of those facts to justify a
sentencing enhancement de novo. United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th
830, 854 (11th Cir. 2023).
II
We first consider whether the district court erred in applying
a two-level enhancement to Pressley’s sentence pursuant to
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). That section provides for an enhancement if the
defendant threatened death in the course of committing a robbery.
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). The district court must use “an objective
test to determine whether a defendant’s conduct qualifies for the
enhancement.” United States v. Perez, 943 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.
2019). “Whether the defendant intended to threaten death is not
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25-10620 Opinion of the Court 3
determinative.” Id. Nor is “the actual victim’s subjective fear,” alt-
hough “it may be indicative of whether a reasonable person would
have feared death based on the defendant’s conduct.” Id.
On the one hand, we held in United States v. Murphy that a
defendant had threatened death within the meaning of
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) when he handed a bank teller a note stating, “You
have ten seconds to hand me all the money in your top drawer. I
have a gun.” 306 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2002). We reasoned
that a reasonable teller would have thought that if he did not hand
over the money quickly, he might be killed. Id. On the other hand,
we held in United States v. Perez that a defendant who didn’t state
or imply that he had a weapon hadn’t threatened death—“some-
thing more” would have been required to transform the “general
threat of harm inherent in every bank robbery” into a threat of
death. 943 F.3d at 1335 (quotation marks omitted). And we ex-
plained that a statement or implication that a person had a weapon
could constitute that “something more.” Id. at 1333.
This case is akin to Murphy. The parties do not dispute that
Pressley passed a note to the bank teller stating, “I want cash.
$10,000 and I have a gun.” Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 8.
The district court did not err in applying a two-level sentencing en-
hancement for using a threat of death in the commission of the
robbery.
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10620
III
Next, we consider whether the district court properly ap-
plied a physical-restraint enhancement in calculating Pressley’s sen-
tence. When Pressley was sentenced, § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) provided for
a two-level sentencing enhancement “if any person was physically
restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate es-
cape.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (2024). Our cases interpreting the
old version of § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) construed the term “physically re-
strained” broadly, holding that it applied whenever “a defendant
creates circumstances allowing his victims no alternative but com-
pliance.” United States v. Deleon, 116 F.4th 1260, 1263 (11th Cir.
2024) (citation modified). But last year, the Sentencing Commis-
sion amended § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) to clarify that its scope is narrower
than this Court had initially thought. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)
(2025). Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) now applies only when “any per-
son’s freedom of movement was restricted through physical contact
or confinement, such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” Id. (empha-
sis added).
Although the amendment to § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) postdates
Pressley’s sentencing, it applies here. As we explained in United
States v. Brown, the 2025 amendment “was clarifying rather than
substantive,” and clarifying amendments “appl[y] retroactively.”
United States v. Brown, No. 23-13326, 2026 WL 3023730, at *7 (11th
Cir. Oct. 8, 2026); see also United States v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905,
908 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that clarifying amendments to the
Sentencing Guidelines are “to be given retroactive effect”). Be-
cause the amendment applies retroactively, the district court—
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25-10620 Opinion of the Court 5
through no fault of its own—erred in failing to consider it. We
therefore vacate Pressley’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
IV
Because the district court erred in applying § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)’s
two-level sentencing enhancement, we VACATE Pressley’s sen-
tence and REMAND for resentencing.