Full Opinion

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 25-CO-0184 NATHANIEL WALDRON, APPELLANT, V. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2006-CF1-021916) (Marisa Demeo, Judge) (Argued October 1, 2026 Decided November 19, 2026) Jennifer Williams, Public Defender Service, with whom Mikel-Meredith Weidman and Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant. Sean Belanger, with whom Jeanine Ferris Pirro, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Christopher Macomber, and Indraneel Sur, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and DEAHL and HOWARD, Associate Judges. BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge: Nathaniel Waldron appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under the Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act (IRAA). On February 4, 2009, Mr. Waldron pleaded 2 guilty to one count of first-degree murder while armed and one count of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, in connection with a homicide he committed in 2006, when he was eighteen years old. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Mr. Waldron was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison. In April 2024, after serving more than fifteen years of his sentence, Mr. Waldron moved to reduce his sentence under IRAA. The Superior Court denied Mr. Waldron’s motion, reasoning that under the IRAA factors and statute, he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating non- dangerousness and that the interests of justice did not warrant a sentence modification. On appeal, Mr. Waldron argues that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) failing to engage with two expert opinions explaining that Mr. Waldron was not dangerous despite his disciplinary history while incarcerated; (2) improperly analyzing IRAA’s ninth factor by neglecting the roles of others in Mr. Waldron’s commission of the crime; (3) relying too heavily on Mr. Waldron’s juvenile criminal record in contravention of IRAA’s second factor; (4) heavily weighing Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions while incarcerated in its IRAA factor five analysis; and (5) analyzing the nature of his offense and District of Columbia voluntary sentencing guidelines (VSG) in its IRAA interests of justice analysis. 3 We agree with Mr. Waldron’s first argument, so we vacate the trial court order denying IRAA relief and remand the case. We also take this opportunity to briefly address each of Mr. Waldron’s remaining four arguments and to clarify this court’s updated IRAA case law that the trial court should consider on remand. I. Factual Background and Procedural History In July 2007, a grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against appellant Nathaniel Waldron, charging him with first-degree murder of Davion Holt while armed, first-degree murder of Michael Lucas while armed, two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, carrying a pistol without a license, possession of an unregistered firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Mr. Waldron subsequently was offered and accepted a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to two counts of the indictment—first-degree murder of Davion Holt while armed and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence—in exchange for dismissal of the remaining five counts. The trial court sentenced Mr. Waldron to thirty-two years in prison. 4 While incarcerated, Mr. Waldron was disciplined for 24 infractions: 9 100- level infractions, 5 200-level infractions, and 10 300-level infractions. 1 The bulk of Mr. Waldron’s 100-level infractions were for possession of a dangerous weapon and use of drugs and alcohol, with another infraction for assault with a serious injury. The majority of Mr. Waldron’s 200-level infractions were for assault without serious injury. His 300-level infractions included refusing a work assignment, refusing to obey orders, and possessing unauthorized items. Mr. Waldron’s most recent infraction was in 2020. In April 2024, Mr. Waldron filed a motion to reduce his sentence under IRAA, requesting that the trial court reduce his sentence to time served. Early the following year, the trial court held an IRAA hearing at which Mr. Waldron and the victims’ families provided statements. Neither Mr. Waldron nor the government called witnesses during the IRAA hearing. In February 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Mr. Waldron’s motion. In rejecting Mr. Waldron’s request for relief under IRAA, the trial court “f[ound] it challenging to overlook the significant number of disciplinary infractions he accumulated during his sentence” and accordingly concluded that Mr. Waldron continued to pose a current danger. Similarly, in its 1 Offense levels refer to their severity; they range from 100-level, the most severe, to 400-level, the least severe. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. 5 interests of justice determination, the trial court stated that Mr. Waldron failed to meet his burden under IRAA “[g]iven the number, severity, and recency of Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions, his role as the sole actor in the offenses, the recommendation from the United States Attorney, and the fact that he received an appropriate sentence under both Rule 11(e)(l)(C) and the D.C. Voluntary Guidelines.” Mr. Waldron timely appealed. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review This court “review[s] the denial of an IRAA motion for abuse of discretion . . . but consider[s] questions of statutory construction de novo.” Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 641 (D.C. 2024) (citing Williams v. United States, 205 A.3d 837, 848 (D.C. 2019); Eaglin v. District of Columbia, 123 A.3d 953, 955 (D.C. 2015)). In reviewing for abuse of discretion, this court “must determine whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the decision maker] relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The abuse-of- discretion standard includes review—generally described as de novo review—to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Welch v. United States, 319 A.3d 971, 975 (D.C. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 But even where this court finds that the trial court was “‘guided by erroneous legal conclusions’ . . . ‘we may find that the fact of error in the trial court’s determination caused no significant prejudice and hold, therefore, that reversal is not required.’” Doe v. United States, 333 A.3d 893, 898 (D.C. 2025) (first quoting Welch v. United States, 319 A.3d 971, 975 (D.C. 2024) and then quoting Stone v. Alexander, 6 A.3d 847, 851 (D.C. 2010)). B. IRAA Statutory Structure The D.C. Council (Council) enacted IRAA in 2016 to give juvenile offenders the opportunity to obtain release if they demonstrate, among other things, maturity and rehabilitation. See Williams v. United States, 311 A.3d 308, 311 (D.C. 2024). For an IRAA motion, “the burden of proof is on the movant.” Davidson v. United States, 349 A.3d 709, 715 (D.C. 2026) (citation modified) (quoting Doe, 333 A.3d at 900). IRAA, as amended, requires that the trial court grant a defendant’s petition to reduce their term of imprisonment if the defendant meets certain requirements. There are three threshold requirements: (1) the defendant committed the violation(s) that led to their imprisonment before they were 25 years old; (2) the defendant has served at least 15 years in prison; and (3) the defendant was sentenced pursuant to Section 24-403 (the indeterminate sentencing scheme that applied to all felonies committed prior to August 5, 2000), Section 24-403.01 (the determinate sentencing 7 scheme that applies to all felonies committed on or after August 5, 2000), or Section 24-903 (the Youth Act). D.C. Code § 24-403.03(a)(1). If the defendant meets these threshold requirements, the trial court must reduce their sentence if it finds “that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any person or the community and that the interests of justice warrant a sentence modification.” Id. § 24-403.03(a)(2). In making this finding, the trial court must consider the following enumerated factors: (1) The defendant’s age at the time of the offense; (2) The history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) Whether the defendant has substantially complied with the rules of the institution to which the defendant has been confined, and whether the defendant has completed any educational, vocational, or other program, where available; (4) Any report or recommendation received from the United States Attorney; (5) Whether the defendant has demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and a fitness to reenter society sufficient to justify a sentence reduction; (6) Any statement, provided orally or in writing, provided pursuant to § 23-1904 or 18 U.S.C. § 3771 by a victim of the offense for which the defendant is imprisoned, or by a family member of the victim if the victim is deceased; (7) Any reports of physical, mental, or psychiatric examinations of the defendant conducted by licensed health care professionals; 8 (8) The defendant’s family and community circumstances at the time of the offense, including any history of abuse, trauma, or involvement in the child welfare system; (9) The extent of the defendant’s role in the offense and whether and to what extent another person was involved in the offense; (10) The diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as compared to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, which counsel against sentencing them to lengthy terms in prison, despite the brutality or cold- blooded nature of any particular crime, and the defendant’s personal circumstances that support an aging out of crime; and (11) Any other information the court deems relevant to its decision. D.C. Code § 24-403.03(c). In 2019, the Council amended IRAA to remove “the nature of the offense” as a standalone consideration under factor two, while noting that courts still “consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the underlying offense through their review of the various factors and evidence.” Davidson, 349 A.3d at 715-16 (D.C. 2026) (quoting Report on Bill No. 23-0127 before the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety, Council of the District of Columbia, at 18-19 (Nov. 23, 2020)); see also Doe, 333 A.3d at 906-11. 9 As it is undisputed here that Mr. Waldron is eligible for IRAA relief, we turn to the merits of his arguments on appeal. C. Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s Mitigating Expert Reports Mr. Waldron’s primary argument is that the trial court erred by rejecting, “without explanation,” two expert reports opining that Mr. Waldron is not dangerous despite the disciplinary record that he accrued while incarcerated. These expert reports were written by Dr. Carole Giunta, who has thirty years of experience in forensic evaluation of adults and juveniles, and Jack Donson, a former Bureau of Prisons (BOP) correctional treatment specialist with extensive experience in “discipline, BOP classification, correctional programs, and treatment.” Dr. Giunta and Mr. Donson—who reviewed Mr. Waldron’s BOP records, medical records, and letters of support 2—concluded respectively that Mr. Waldron was “low risk for future violent conduct” and that his disciplinary history was “typical,” rendering him “rehabilitat[ed].” In reaching these conclusions, both experts sought to “place Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary record in context and explain why these infractions did not undercut more recent evidence of rehabilitation.” These two expert reports, Mr. 2 Both experts independently reviewed Mr. Waldron’s BOP records. Dr. Giunta additionally reviewed Mr. Waldron’s medical records, letters of support, and conducted an interview with Mr. Waldron as well as two of his aunts. 10 Waldron argues, “went to the heart of the issue most confounding the court—Mr. Waldron’s prison disciplinary record and its relevance to his current dangerousness.” As such, Mr. Waldron contends that when the trial court denied his motion for IRAA relief “without acknowledging Mr. Donson’s affidavit at all, and without engaging with Dr. Giunta’s thorough analysis . . . or explaining its apparent rejection of her opinion,” the trial court abused its discretion. The government counters that the trial court did, in fact, give attention to both expert reports and referenced their findings in various places throughout its order. For example, “[i]n applying Factor Seven, the court quoted Dr. Giunta’s opinion . . . that Waldron has a ‘low risk of future violent conduct.’” Additionally, the government contends that elsewhere in its order, the trial court referenced certain findings from Mr. Donson’s report, including Mr. Waldron’s role as a Suicide Watch companion and his culinary coursework. According to the government, this discussion was sufficient because the court was not required to itemize and inventory each piece of evidence in its reasoning. Because, the government argues, the trial court had discretion to balance Mr. Waldron’s submissions however it saw fit, Mr. Waldron’s argument about the expert reports “essentially boil[s] down to a contention that the court” should have weighed more favorable factors, which is “not a basis for reversal” under this court’s case law. See Sharps v. United States, 246 11 A.3d 1141, 1159 n.90 (D.C. 2021). Additionally, the government asserts that as in Henny v. United States, 321 A.3d 621 (D.C. 2024), Mr. Waldron could have emphasized both experts’ opinions by calling them as witnesses at the IRAA hearing, but that he did not do so, making it “apparent that th[is] opinion evidence . . . was not nearly so” important as he claims. The government adds that ultimately, any supposed error was harmless because Mr. Waldron “cannot show that more exhaustive discussion of his submissions would have changed the motion court’s assessment of the disciplinary history and its implications under the IRAA factors.” In reviewing a trial court’s findings for an abuse of discretion, this court looks to whether the findings are “detailed enough” such that “the decision followed rationally from the findings of fact.” Henny, 321 A.3d at 629 (citation modified). Although a trial court need not “inventory all the evidence and explain how it weighed each evidentiary item,” it must provide a “basis for rejecting evidence that is central to the issues before it.” Id. (citation modified). Without such a basis, this court cannot “determine whether the decision-maker’s choice was both reasonable and proper in the specific factual context of the case.” Id. (citation modified); accord Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979) (a trial court abuses its 12 discretion when its “stated reasons . . . do not rest upon a specific factual predicate.”). In this case, because the two expert reports were “central to the issues before” the trial court, Henny, 321 A.3d at 629, the trial court was required to engage with them to assess the mitigation impact of the evidence. As a result, this court lacks a sufficient basis to determine whether the trial judge’s overall decision considered the mitigating impact of the expert testimony and was therefore “both reasonable and proper.” Id. In Henny, this court vacated the trial judge’s order and remanded the case because the judge failed to provide “some explanation for why it seemingly rejected [expert] testimony” regarding Henny’s compliance with the rules of various BOP institutions. Henny, 321 A.3d at 629. The expert testimony in Henny went to a “central issue in the IRAA proceedings—how to interpret Henny’s disciplinary records.” Id. at 630. Additionally, this court noted that the testimony in Henny “appear[ed] to offer compelling, comprehensive, and unrebutted context for interpreting Henny’s disciplinary record as a factor in favor of his release.” Id. at 629. In light of this, the Henny court observed that it was not obvious whether the trial court “generally credited” the expert’s testimony and found that it was outweighed by the seriousness of Henny’s disciplinary infractions, or whether the 13 trial court instead “discredited [the expert’s] testimony for some reason.” Id. at 631. As a result, in Henny, this court concluded that it lacked sufficient detail to engage in meaningful appellate review of the trial judge’s findings and remanded the case for the trial court to explicitly consider the expert testimony. The facts in Mr. Waldron’s case are similar to those in Henny. Here, too, the trial judge made no mention of Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s reports when analyzing IRAA factor three. While it is true that the trial court elsewhere referenced certain findings in both experts’ reports, nowhere did it engage with these findings in the context of Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions. These findings, like those in Henny, offered compelling, mitigating context regarding Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary history while incarcerated. For example, Dr. Giunta opined that Mr. Waldron’s lack of infractions over the past five years is attributable to Mr. Waldron having learned to “communicate effectively, have a conversation and use neutral body language to not trigger aggression.” In explaining Mr. Waldron’s five prior infractions for possession of a dangerous weapon, Dr. Giunta explained that Mr. Waldron “learned in subsequent programming to dismantle the beliefs that supported his persistent choice to carry a weapon.” Mr. Donson’s affidavit contained similar findings, noting that “[m]ost of the greatest severity reports were for possessing weapons which is one of the most common behaviors [he sees] for D.C [sic] offenders in U.S. Penitentiaries.” Mr. Donson further explained that Mr. Waldron’s 14 disciplinary record was not an outlier and that he had a prison experience typical of that of many incarcerated young adults from D.C. Both experts concluded in some fashion that Mr. Waldron has demonstrated rehabilitation and poses a low risk for dangerousness. The trial court here did not engage with these findings in its opinion. The trial court’s statement, for example, that Mr. Waldron’s “non-compliance has been substantial both in terms of quality and quantity” seemingly disregards Mr. Donson’s finding that Mr. Waldron’s prison experience was not atypical compared to that of other incarcerated young adults. Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions were central to the trial court’s determination to deny IRAA relief under both the dangerousness and interests of justice prongs. The record is unclear whether the trial court credited Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s findings regarding Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions but found them outweighed by the seriousness of Mr. Waldron’s infractions, or whether the trial court instead “discredited [the expert’s] testimony for some reason.” Henny, 321 A.3d at 631. Without such an explanation, our appellate review is hindered. Further, we are not persuaded by the government’s attempt to distinguish this case from Henny. It does not matter, as the government claims, that the expert in Henny was called as a witness at the IRAA hearing, while Dr. Giunta and Mr. 15 Donson were not. Henny instead stands for the general proposition that trial courts must explain their “reasons for [rejecting expert testimony]” when such testimony is “so critical to the issues” before them. Henny, 321 A.3d at 631. Indeed, this interpretation of Henny is consistent with this court’s recent opinion in Davidson v. United States, 349 A.3d 709 (D.C. 2026). There, relying on Henny, this court vacated and remanded the trial court opinion denying IRAA relief where the trial court failed to account for an unrebutted expert report opining that the defendant did not require sex offender treatment. Davidson, 349 A.3d at 716-18. Davidson, then, which dealt with a non-testifying expert, undercuts the argument that Henny compels a different result in this case. In a related vein, the government’s contention that Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s testimony was not truly “critical to the dispositive issues” falls flat. Though Mr. Waldron made “strategic decisions concerning what evidence to emphasize at his hearing,” his failure to call Dr. Giunta and Mr. Donson to testify at his IRAA hearing is irrelevant and signals nothing about the objective importance of these experts’ testimony. While true that the trial court retains broad discretion to credit only certain evidence in its IRAA relief determination, this exercise of discretion is predicated on a reasoned consideration of the evidence in the record. This is especially important when the proffered evidence is critical to the trial court’s ultimate decision to deny IRAA relief. Because this is exactly what happened here, the trial court 16 abused its discretion by not engaging with the expert reports of Dr. Giunta and Mr. Donson. We cannot say that this error—which went to the heart of the trial court’s determination to deny Mr. Waldron IRAA relief—was harmless, and as a result, we vacate the trial court order denying IRAA relief and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion. D. Involvement of Others Under IRAA Factor Nine Mr. Waldron asserts that the trial court erred in its factor nine analysis when it failed to acknowledge certain facts surrounding Mr. Waldron’s commission of his offense. First, Mr. Waldron argues that the trial court failed to properly acknowledge that Mr. Waldron “was with a friend at the time of the offense.” Second, he contends that the trial court failed to engage with evidence showing “that Mr. Waldron’s prior history with the decedents gave him reason to expect violence from them when they followed him that night.” The government’s threshold argument is that Mr. Waldron’s factor nine contention is unpreserved because he did not explicitly advance it in his IRAA motion. Alternatively, the government asserts that there was no factor nine error because Mr. Waldron “failed to adduce facts in the record adequate to sustain the comparison” he makes to our decision in Bryant v. United States, which was issued after the trial court’s order in this case. 341 A.3d 586 (D.C. 2025). 17 In the IRAA factor nine analysis, “attackers, provocateurs, instigators, and other similar actors can be involved in a criminal offense.” Id. at 594 (citation modified). Trial courts should therefore account for “mitigating evidence” under IRAA factor nine as it relates to the “defendant’s culpability for the underlying offense.” Id. at 593-94. Failing to do so constitutes reversible error. Id. As an initial matter, we have not held—and decline to do so here—that to preserve an argument on appeal, defendants must style their IRAA motions to explicitly address each of the enumerated factors. Indeed, the government does not cite to any authority for this proposition in contending that Mr. Waldron’s factor nine argument is unpreserved. Nonetheless, because we remand this case on the issue of Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s expert reports and given the trial court will have the benefit of Bryant on remand, we opine no further on the merits of Mr. Waldron’s factor nine argument. E. Mr. Waldron’s Juvenile History and IRAA Factor Two Mr. Waldron next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by placing outsized emphasis on his juvenile criminal history. In particular, Mr. Waldron contends that the trial court viewed his interactions with the juvenile and criminal justice systems as an “aggravating factor” based on “an erroneous factual premise.” 18 We have held that trial courts err when they give “hefty weight” to a defendant’s juvenile criminal history or otherwise “treat[] [it] as dispositive under factor two.” Bryant, 341 A.3d at 596-97. This is because “[i]t would invert [IRAA’s] logic to say that teenage criminal history should play a substantial role in denying someone IRAA relief.” Id. at 596. At the same time, however, this court acknowledges that “the text of IRAA’s factor two . . . is broad and provides some textual basis for a trial court to at least consider a movant’s criminal history, even during their teen years.” Id. (citing Bishop v. United States, 310 A.3d 629, 646 n.11 (D.C. 2024)). “[M]ere arrests,” however, “are not to be taken as any proof of guilt in the IRAA calculus.” Id. at 597. Here, we conclude that the trial court erred in its factor two analysis. In making its factor two determination, the trial court stated that Mr. Waldron’s numerous arrests “weigh[] on the negative side of the analysis.” Because this conclusion appears to conflict with Bryant’s admonition that “mere arrests” cannot be counted against an IRAA movant, the trial court committed error. Bryant, 341 A.3d at 597. As we remand this case on other grounds, we decline to address the question of whether the trial court’s factor two analysis was harmful to Mr. Waldron. 19 F. IRAA Factor Five Analysis of Disciplinary Infractions Mr. Waldron also asserts that the trial court focused too heavily on his disciplinary infractions while incarcerated under factor five by “discounting evidence of Mr. Waldron’s current maturity and rehabilitation and instead placing decisive weight on his disciplinary history up until 2020.” Under the abuse of discretion standard, “an argument that the trial court should have given more weight to” favorable factors “is not a basis for reversal.” Long v. United States, 312 A.3d 1247, 1271 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified). In the context of disciplinary infractions, this court has held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it “wishe[s] to see a more sustained period of compliance” following the defendant’s most recent disciplinary infraction. Id. (citation modified). At the same time, however, this court has recognized that a trial court’s deficient analysis of an IRAA movant’s disciplinary infractions can implicate multiple IRAA factors. See Davidson v. United States, 349 A.3d 709, 716-17, 721 (D.C. 2026) (remanding where the court discounted unrebutted expert evidence under both factors three and five); Henny v. United States, 321 A.3d 621, 625, 628 (D.C. 2024) (remanding where petitioner’s disciplinary record, which the trial court assessed without addressing the expert’s interpretation of it, was the “one overriding basis (affecting two statutory factors)”—three and five). 20 The trial court’s factor five analysis concluded that Mr. Waldron’s record was “mixed,” stating that his recent progress toward rehabilitation was offset by his disciplinary infractions while incarcerated. In so concluding, the trial court appeared to reference its factor three determination that Mr. Waldron had not substantially complied with the rules of the institutions in which he was confined. As described in Part II.C., however, the trial court’s factor three analysis requires remand because it failed to account for Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s expert reports, which contextualized these disciplinary infractions and bore directly on the issue of Mr. Waldron’s rehabilitation. We therefore observe that on remand, the trial court’s renewed factor three analysis might also affect its factor five analysis. G. “Interests of Justice” Analysis Mr. Waldron’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court’s interests of justice analysis was “infected by two flaws.” First, Mr. Waldron argues that the trial court impermissibly evaluated the nature of his offense as a “standalone factor under the catch-all provision.” Second, Mr. Waldron contends that the trial court improperly relied on the Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines (VSG) in analyzing Mr. Waldron’s sentence. In support of these arguments, Mr. Waldron cites to this court’s opinions in Doe v. United States, 333 A.3d 893 (D.C. 2025) and Riley v. United States, 338 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2025)—both decided after the motions court ruled on Mr. 21 Waldron’s petition—as jointly establishing that a “court may not rely on authorities outside of IRAA . . . to guide the interests-of-justice analysis.” This court has noted that “the dangerousness prong and the interests of justice prong are separate analyses” that are fact specific. Rice v. United States, 362 A.3d 471, 480 (D.C. 2026). In conducting both analyses, a trial court is constrained by “the eleven enumerated factors.” Doe, 333 A.3d at 910; accord Riley, 338 A.3d at 8-9. As a result, when a trial court “look[s] exclusively to other authorities to inform its interests of justice calculus,” it commits reversible error. Riley, 338 A.3d at 9 (emphasis added) (citation modified). Even if a trial court considers extraneous factors in its interests of justice analysis, however, its ultimate determination is harmless error when “multiple enumerated factors weigh[] against relief.” Doe, 333 A.3d at 912; accord Rice, 362 A.3d at 482-83. Here, the trial court’s interests of justice determination was explicitly linked, in part, to Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary infractions. As a result, we note that on remand, after considering Dr. Giunta’s and Mr. Donson’s expert reports, the trial court’s interests of justice analysis—and its ultimate conclusion as to this prong— may change depending on any revised weight it assigns to Mr. Waldron’s disciplinary history while incarcerated. In conducting this analysis, the trial court 22 should account for recent cases like Rice, Doe, and Riley, which outline the permissible factors that may be considered in the interests of justice calculus. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court order denying IRAA relief and remand for reconsideration. On remand, the trial court should also consider the IRAA cases that this court has decided since the trial court entered its February 2025 order. 3 So ordered. 3 See Euceda v. United States, No. 24-CO-0432, 2026 WL 2945575 (D.C. Oct. 1, 2026) (discussing IRAA factors one and three); Rice v. United States, 362 A.3d 471 (D.C. 2026) (clarifying permissible factors that may be considered as part of overall IRAA analysis); Dobie v. United States, 357 A.3d 318 (D.C. 2026) (discussing IRAA factors two, three, and eight, and the interests of justice analysis); Davidson v. United States, 349 A.3d 709 (D.C. 2026) (articulating role of expert reports in dangerousness analysis); Jackson v. United States, 346 A.3d 656 (D.C. 2025) (discussing IRAA factors nine and ten); Bryant v. United States, 341 A.3d 586 (D.C. 2025) (discussing IRAA factors two, eight, and nine); Walls v. United States, 340 A.3d 22 (D.C. 2025) (clarifying scope of IRAA enumerated factors and sentencing regime); Riley v. United States, 338 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2025) (same); Doe v. United States, 333 A.3d 893 (D.C. 2025) (same).