Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ________________ No. 25-3081 ________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DONTAE JAMAR DEVERO, Appellant ________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:23-cr-00246-001) District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon ________________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on July 10, 2026 Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: November 18, 2026) ________________ OPINION* ________________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. ROTH, Circuit Judge Dontae Devero appeals the denial of his motion to modify the conditions of his supervised release to permit him to use marijuana during Rastafari religious rituals. Because the District Court did not evaluate Devero’s request under the framework required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),1 we will VACATE the District Court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with the RFRA. I. In May 2013, Devero pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, and 851. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Devero to 120 months of incarceration followed by 96 months of supervised release. Devero began his term of supervised release in October 2022 and, in November 2023, jurisdiction over his supervision was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. In September 2024, Devero filed a motion seeking to modify the conditions of his supervised release and requested that the court allow him to smoke marijuana during Rastafarian religious ceremonies and for religious purposes. Devero asserted that he is a practicing Rastafarian and argued that the restrictions preventing him from using marijuana substantially burdened his sincere religious practice and violated his right to the free exercise of his religion. Relying on the RFRA, which prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless it can “demonstrate[] that 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 2 application of the burden to the person” represents the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest,2 Devero argued that a blanket ban on marijuana use was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s interest in regulating the illegal drug market. Instead, Devero offered to self-report every time he used marijuana for a religious purpose, submit to regular testing for other controlled substances, report to his supervised release officer on a monthly basis, and comply with all other terms and conditions of his supervised release. The District Court denied Devero’s motion in a short and succinct opinion, which is reproduced below without citations or footnotes: Defendant’s Motion to modify conditions of supervised release will be denied. Mr. Devero asserts that he is a practicing Rastafarian, and he wishes to consume marijuana while on supervised release. His renewed Motion for a hearing will be denied. The Court assumes, for the sake of his request, that Defendant’s desire for religious observation is sincere. The Court recognizes, and appreciates, Defendant and his counsel’s good faith conduct in making the request. Mr. Devero reports, and there is no reason to doubt, that he has refrained from consuming marijuana. His counsel has acknowledged the case law, favorable and unfavorable, to his position. They have done things the right way. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the reported case law rejects Defendant’s position. And, although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not spoken in this specific context, its rulings in like scenarios do not bode well for Defendant. Defendant is commended for approaching his request in the best ways possible, and the Court takes no pleasure in denying it. Based on existing legal authority, however, the undersigned cannot in good conscience predict that the Third Circuit will endorse his exception.3 2 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)). 3 Appx. 6–8 (citations and footnotes omitted). 3 Devero now appeals. II.4 We agree with Devero that the District Court did not engage in the proper analysis under the RFRA. To establish a prima facie case under the RFRA, Devero must allege that “the government (1) substantially burdened (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise.”5 If he does so, then the government must “show that the offending policy is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.”6 Because the “RFRA centers on the intersection between the specific conduct in which the objector is forced to engage and [his] religious exercise,” the District Court was required to consider Devero’s specific circumstances.7 And although the District Court assumed without deciding that Devero’s religious request was sincere, reliance on former cases with differently-situated defendants is insufficient under the RFRA’s framework, even if “an overwhelming majority” of those cases do in fact reject Devero’s position.8 4 Initially, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida had jurisdiction of Devero’s underlying criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. After Devero’s case was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania for oversight of his supervised release, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3605 (transfer of jurisdiction over a releasee) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (modification of supervised release conditions). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review challenges to the district court’s decision to modify the terms of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2012). 5 Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 304 (3d Cir. 2016). 6 Davis v. Wigen, 82 F.4th 204, 211 (3d Cir. 2023). 7 Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 359 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 436 (“But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions to ‘rule[s] of general applicability.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). 8 Appx. 6. 4 Especially considering that we “ha[ve] not spoken in this specific context,” the District Court’s duty was not to “predict” whether we would endorse his exception; 9 rather, it’s duty was to conduct the analysis in the first instance. Accordingly, we VACATE the order and REMAND for the District Court to consider Devero’s motion under the proper RFRA analysis.10 9 Appx. 7–8. 10 We do not reach any conclusion concerning the merits of Devero’s RFRA claim. 5