Full Opinion

22-3211-cr United States v. Blanco UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNY CHIN, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, -v- 22-3211-cr BUSHAWN SHELTON, AKA Shelz, ARTHUR CONDER, AKA Feddi, AKA Fetty, AKA Feddi Bossgod, AKA Fetty Boss, AKA Scary, KALIK McFARLANE, ALFRED LOPEZ, AKA Aloe, BRANDEN PETERSON, AKA B, AKA Mur B, JULIAN SNIPE, AKA Biz, AKA Bizzzy, JASON CUMMINGS, AKA The Hat, AKA Stacks, ANTHONY ZOTTOLA, SR., AKA Anthony Zottola, HIMEN ROSS, AKA Ace, Defendants, HERMAN BLANCO, AKA Taliban, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FOR APPELLEE: Andrew M. Roddin, Assistant United States Attorney (Amy Busa, Kayla C. Bensing, Devon E. Lash, Emily J. Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Michael K. Bachrach, Law Office of Michael K. Bachrach, New York, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dearie, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order. Defendant-appellant Herman Blanco appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Dearie, J.) entered on December 16, 2022, sentencing him to 264 months' imprisonment followed by three years' supervised release. Blanco pleaded guilty to two counts of an eight-count Superseding Indictment -- one count of murder-for-hire conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a) and 3551, and one count of murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a), 2, and 3551. On November 10, 2025, we granted the Government's motion to dismiss Blanco's challenge to the aspects of his sentence as to which he had waived his right to appeal. Dkt. 188. We denied the motion, however, with respect to the conditions of supervised release that are now before us. Id. -2- Blanco argues that the district court erred by failing to orally impose the thirteen standard conditions of supervised release at sentencing, failing to conduct an individualized assessment before imposing the conditions, and improperly imposing Standard Condition 12, also known as the "risk" condition. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. "We generally review the imposition of conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion." United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95, 111 (2d Cir. 2019). "'When a challenge to a condition of supervised release presents an issue of law,' however, 'we review the imposition of that condition de novo, bearing in mind that any error of law necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Id. (quoting United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 2013)). I. Pronouncement of the Standard Conditions Blanco and the Government agree that the district court improperly imposed the thirteen standard conditions of supervised release by failing to pronounce them at sentencing. We agree as well. In United States v. Maiorana, which was decided after the sentencing in this case, we held that "a sentencing court intending to impose non-mandatory conditions of supervised release, including the 'standard' conditions described in § 5D1.3(c) [of the Sentencing Guidelines], must notify the defendant during the sentencing proceeding." -3- 153 F.4th 306, 314 (2d Cir. 2025) (en banc). We held that the sentencing court "need not read the full text of every condition on record," but it must, at minimum, "expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a notice adopted by the court." Id. This "new rule of criminal procedure" applies to cases, such as this one, that were on direct review when Maiorana was decided. Id. at 314 n.11. At Blanco's sentencing, the district court failed to explicitly pronounce or incorporate by reference the thirteen standard conditions of supervised release. Accordingly, we agree that remand is appropriate. On remand, the district court shall vacate the conditions. If it considers reimposing the standard conditions, it must conduct an individualized assessment in line with our recent decision in United States v. McClain. No. 22-1691-cr, 2026 WL 3023189 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2026). If the district court does reimpose these conditions, it must provide the defendant with notice in accordance with the procedures outlined in Maiorana. Alternatively, the defendant may also "request a written notice of the conditions the district court intends to impose on remand and, upon review, elect to waive his right to be present during the imposition of the conditions and permit the district court to impose them without convening a hearing." United States v. Harris, 164 F.4th 181, 193 n.8 (2d Cir. 2026). -4- II. Standard Condition 12 Although Standard Condition 12 is covered by our holding above, Blanco and the Government agree that the district court also erred in imposing Standard Condition 12, the "risk" condition, because it adopts language that we have previously held to be unlawful. We agree. Standard Condition 12 provides: If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk, and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk. App'x at 111. In United States v. Boles, we held that an identically-worded "risk" condition (which was also set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2)(L)) was "vague and afford[ed] too much discretion to the probation officer." 914 F.3d at 111; see also United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, on remand, if the district court chooses to reimpose such a condition, it should ensure that the condition is consistent with Boles and Peterson.1 * * * 1Since our decision in Boles, the Eastern District of New York has issued an administrative order modifying the standard risk condition. See Admin. Ord. No. 2021-03 (E.D.N.Y.) (Feb. 10, 2021); United States v. Corbett, No. 22-2932, 2026 WL 1425556, at *2 n.4 (2d Cir. May 21, 2026) (summary order). -5- For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND this matter to the district court with instructions to vacate the portions of the judgment imposing the standard conditions of supervised release, including Standard Condition 12. If the district court decides to reimpose the standard conditions, it must do so in a manner consistent with this order. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk -6-