United States v. Michael Angelo Tollen
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-12640
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 1 of 17
FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-12640
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL ANGELO TOLLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cr-00216-CEM-RMN-1
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, Circuit Judges, and BECERRA,∗ Dis-
trict Judge.
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
∗ The Honorable Jacqueline Becerra, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 2 of 17
2 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
For over a year, Michael Tollen sexually abused his fourteen-
year-old autistic granddaughter. 1 But one day, Tollen’s wife re-
turned home earlier than Tollen expected. She caught Tollen in
the act.
Because he lived on a military base at the time, his actions
were federal crimes. And a federal grand jury charged Tollen with
four counts of sexual abuse of a minor between twelve and sixteen
years old, who was at least four years younger than Tollen, all in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a). Tollen pled guilty to all four
counts.
At his sentencing hearing, the court found that Tollen’s
granddaughter was “incapable of appraising the nature of [Tol-
len’s] conduct.” As a result, Tollen’s base offense level was 30, in-
stead of 18, which it would have been in the absence of the district
court’s finding. Tollen now appeals that determination.
After careful consideration and with the benefit of oral ar-
gument, we affirm. The record amply supports the district court’s
conclusion that this enhancement applies.
I. BACKGROUND
At Tollen’s change-of-plea hearing, the government recited
the facts supporting Tollen’s guilty plea. These included the fol-
lowing.
1 In the interest of protecting the identity and confidential information of the
victim, we share as few details about the underlying offense as are necessary
to resolve this dispute and explain the applicable law.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 3 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 3
On the charged date, the victim’s grandmother went out for
a walk, leaving the victim home alone with Tollen. Tollen woke
the victim after the grandmother left, and he told her to take off
her pants. After she did, Tollen performed sexual acts on her.
When the grandmother returned unexpectedly early from her
walk, she discovered Tollen and the granddaughter naked.
It turned out that Tollen had been sexually abusing the
granddaughter for over a year. He had done so repeatedly, never
purporting to ask for permission and never using a condom. The
conduct went on for so long because Tollen had instructed his
granddaughter not to tell anyone about his actions. He said they
were “a secret.” If she told anyone, Tollen explained, she would no
longer be able to see her grandparents.
Besides being only fourteen years old, the government as-
serted during its factual proffer at Tollen’s change-of-plea hearing
that Tollen’s victim granddaughter was “autistic” and had “limited
mental capacity.”
Tollen did not object to the government’s factual proffer.
And the district court accepted his guilty plea.
In preparation for Tollen’s sentencing, the probation office
prepared a presentencing investigation report (“PSR”). Because
Tollen pled guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), the PSR be-
gan its guideline calculation by turning to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, the
guideline generally applicable to such offenses. The base offense
level under Section 2A3.2 is 18.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 4 of 17
4 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
But Section 2A3.2(c)(1) directs the court to apply Section
2A3.1 instead if the offense involved, as relevant here, criminal sex-
ual abuse, as 18 U.S.C. § 2242 defines it. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(c)(1). Sec-
tion 2242(2)(A), in turn, makes it a crime for anyone within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States to “engage[] in a sexual act
with another person if that other person is—(A) incapable of ap-
praising the nature of the conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A). For
this type of offense, the base offense level under Section 2A3.1 is
30. U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(a)(2). 2
The probation office recommended a finding that Tollen’s
offense conduct violated Section 2242(2)(A), so a base offense level
of 30 applied. In support of the recommendation that the victim
was “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct,” the PSR
reported that the victim’s father said the victim had “multiple men-
tal diagnos[e]s[] including mental retardation with an IQ in the six-
ties,” “obsessive compulsive disorder, attention deficit disorder,
anxiety, and autism.” Indeed, the victim’s father explained that, de-
spite her age, the victim read on a third-grade level and didn’t start
speaking until she was seven or eight years old. Based on this and
2 The government also invites us to apply Section 2A3.1’s base offense level
based on one of Section 2242’s other definitions of criminal sexual abuse, “en-
gag[ing] in a sexual act with another person without that other person’s con-
sent.” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(3). Because we conclude that the district court did not
commit clear error when it found the victim was “incapable of appraising the
nature of the conduct,” id. § 2242(2)(A), we decline to address the applicability
of Section 2242(3).
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 5 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 5
other information the probation office obtained, the PSR con-
cluded that the victim “suffers from [a]utism and a developmental
delay with the mental capacity of a young child.”
Tollen objected to the PSR’s recommended application of
Section 2A3.2(c)(1)’s cross-reference to Section 2A3.1. 3 He took is-
sue with the PSR’s statement that the victim’s “maturity level is that
of a young child.” Though he conceded that the victim was diag-
nosed with autism, he complained that “there is nothing in the rec-
ord indicating where she is on the Autism Spectrum.” And he ar-
gued that “no objective evidence” supports the statement that the
victim was “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct.”
At the sentencing hearing, to support the cross-reference,
the government presented a video recording of two interviews of
the victim. Among other statements, the victim said she “was con-
fused” and “didn’t know what [Tollen] was doing” the first time he
sexually abused her. And she explained that after her grandmother
caught her grandfather engaging in sexual acts with her and
screamed, “That’s not okay!,” the victim looked up on the internet,
“Is penetrating a child illegal?”
After reviewing the recordings and listening to counsel’s ar-
gument, the district court found that the victim was incapable of
appraising the nature of Tollen’s conduct. The court explained,
3 Tollen also objected to the application of another enhancement that the PSR
recommended and the district court applied. But he does not challenge that
enhancement on appeal.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 6 of 17
6 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
The video recordings here are the smoking gun. . . .
The victim described what her biological grandfather
had done to her, absent any emotion, concern, or
shame. She could have been describing the process
of purchasing a pack of gum at a convenience store.
That’s the takeaway. She remembered what hap-
pened and could describe body parts, but there’s no
way she understood the gravity of what the defend-
ant had done and was doing to her. There’s simply no
way the person in that video could appraise the na-
ture of the conduct committed against her . . . .
As a result, Tollen’s base offense level was 30.
After accounting for other enhancements and a reduction
for acceptance of responsibility, the court determined that Tollen’s
offense level was 38. With a criminal-history category of I, his of-
fense level corresponded to a sentencing range of 235–293 months’
imprisonment. The district court sentenced Tollen to a total term
of imprisonment of 235 months.
Tollen now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the sentencing court’s factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Little, 864 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2017). In
doing so, we will find clear error only if, “after reviewing all the
evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. Philossaint, 141 F.4th
1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 7 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 7
As for the district court’s application of the sentencing
guidelines to the facts, we review that de novo. United States v.
Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 992 (11th Cir. 2008).
III. ANALYSIS
As we’ve explained, Tollen pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a),
which prohibits sexual abuse of a minor. But his base offense level
under the Sentencing Guidelines depended on whether his conduct
also qualified as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242. That’s so because
Section 2A3.2, which applies to violations of Section 2243(a), di-
rects the court to apply the base offense level that Section 2A3.1
imposes if the defendant’s conduct also violated Section 2242. Re-
call that Section 2242(2)(A), as relevant here, makes it a crime to
“engage[] in a sexual act with another person if that other person
is—(A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct.” 18
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A).
Tollen asserts that the district court clearly erred in finding
that his granddaughter was “incapable of appraising the nature of
the conduct.” In support, he makes three arguments. First, he con-
tends that “diagnosis alone is not evidence of an inability to ap-
praise the nature of sexual conduct.” Second, he urges that “[t]he
absence of tears, shame, or visible distress is not evidence of in-
comprehension.” And third, he points to the victim’s internet
search as evidence that she had “the capability to appraise the na-
ture of the conduct.”
Tollen’s arguments require us to construe Section
2242(2)(A). And “[o]n a question of statutory interpretation, we
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 8 of 17
8 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
begin with the statutory text.” United States v. Leahy, 152 F.4th 1356,
1373 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).
So we consider the meaning of “incapable of appraising the
nature of the conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A). Because Con-
gress did not define these terms, we look to their “common usage.”
CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.
2001). Congress originally enacted this language in 1986. See Sex-
ual Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-654, § 2, 100 Stat. 3660, 3661.
That means we consult the meaning of the words “incapable,” “ap-
praise,” and “nature” at that time. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC,
576 U.S. 121, 128 n.2 (2015).
As relevant here, each of the keywords in the phrase meant
the same thing in 1986 as they do now. “Incapable” meant “lacking
capacity, ability, or qualification for the purpose or end in view.”
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 608 (9th ed. 1985). “Appraise”
meant “to evaluate the worth, significance, or status of . . . .” Id. at
97. And “nature” meant “the inherent character or basic constitu-
tion of a person or thing.” Id. at 789.
We start with “incapable.” Tollen argues that “the victim’s
online research into child sexual abuse” after her grandmother dis-
covered the conduct “shows that she has . . . the capability to ap-
praise the nature of the conduct.” This argument may suggest that
no temporal limitations apply to assessing a victim’s “capability.” 4
4 Even if we accepted Tollen’s temporal argument about the meaning of Sec-
tion 2242(2)—we don’t, as we explain—we also disagree with Tollen’s pre-
sumption that, alone, the fact that the victim looked up whether penetrating
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 9 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 9
In other words, if a victim can be made to appreciate the nature of
the abuse she suffered—even after the abuse occurred—she was ca-
pable of appraising the nature of the conduct for purposes of Sec-
tion 2242(2)(A).
We disagree. The statute uses the present tense: it criminal-
izes engaging in a sexual act with a person who “is incapable of
appraising the nature of the conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A) (em-
phasis added). This suggests that the relevant time for assessing the
victim’s capability is the time of the sexual act.
The structure of the legislation confirms this reading. As
we’ve mentioned, Congress enacted Section 2242(2) as part of the
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986 (the “Act”). See United States v. Brugier,
735 F.3d 754, 758–59 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citing Sexual Abuse
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–646, § 87, 100 Stat. 3592, 3620–24 (cod-
ified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–44, 2246)). So in construing
Section 2242(2)(A), it helps to consult the other parts of the accom-
panying legislation. See Savage Servs. Corp. v. United States, 25 F.4th
925, 933 (11th Cir. 2022) (identifying the “language and design of
the statute as a whole” as relevant).
Reviewing other parts of the legislation teaches that the
proper reading of Section 2242(2) considers the victim’s state at the
time of the abuse. Consider Section 2241, which the cross-refer-
a child is illegal necessarily means that she was capable of appreciating the na-
ture of Tollen’s conduct.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 10 of 17
10 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
ence in Guidelines Section 2A3.2(c)(1) includes in addition to Sec-
tion 2242. A person violates Section 2241(b) when he “knowingly
(1) renders another person unconscious and thereby engages in a
sexual act with that other person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(1). A person
can also violate the statute when he “knowingly (2) administers to
another person by force or threat of force, or without the
knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or
other similar substance and thereby (A) substantially impairs the
ability of that other person to appraise or control conduct and (B)
engages in a sexual act with that other person.” Id. § 2241(b)(2).
Like Section 2242(2), both these provisions in Section
2241(b) are in the present tense. Yet it’s clear that they refer to the
condition and competence of the victim at the time of the sexual
conduct. Put simply, that the victim awakens or regains control
after the defendant has rendered them unconscious or has drugged
them and begun raping them does not mean the defendant hasn’t
violated these provisions. Any other interpretation defies common
sense. And we see no basis for construing Section 2242(2)’s lan-
guage differently.
To be sure, construing both Sections 2241(b) and 2242(2) to
consider the victim’s status at the time of the defendant’s conduct
means many violations of Section 2241(b) will also be violations of
Section 2242. But for two reasons, this overlap doesn’t affect our
interpretation of Section 2242(2).
First, the legislative sequence of amendment to these provi-
sions explains away any appearance of redundancy. Section 2242(2)
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 11 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 11
as Congress originally drafted it was not redundant of Section
2241(b). Rather, Section 2241(b) originally carried stronger penal-
ties than Section 2242(2). When Congress enacted the Act, it set
the maximum imprisonment at twenty years for Section 2242(2)
and life for Section 2241(b). See Pub. L. No. 99-654, § 2, 100 Stat.
3660, 3660–61 (1986). The difference in penalty reflects the legisla-
tion’s treatment of a Section 2241(b) violation, in which the defend-
ant’s affirmative action causes the victim’s vulnerability, as espe-
cially pernicious—more so than when a defendant takes advantage
of his victim as he finds her. See United States v. Brame, 997 F.2d
1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that “an offense punishable by
life in prison is generally a more serious act than one with a lesser
maximum sentence”).
The sections’ headings reinforce this reading: Section 2241 is
called “Aggravated sexual abuse,” while Section 2242 refers to “Sex-
ual abuse.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2241 with 18 U.S.C. § 2242; see Yates
v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 539-40 (2015) (discussing section head-
ings as “[f ]amiliar interpretive guides”); see also Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and
the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a
doubt about the meaning of a statute.”). So the original more se-
vere penalty means Section 2241(b) is not redundant of Section
2242(2) even on our reading of Section 2242(2).
True, Congress amended Section 2242(2) in 2006 to raise the
maximum imprisonment to life. See Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 205, 120 Stat. 587, 613 (2006).
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 12 of 17
12 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
But by then, courts had already construed Section 2242(2) to look
to the victim’s status at the time of the defendant’s conduct, not in
absolute terms. When Congress reenacts a statute without change,
it is “presumed to be aware of [a] . . . judicial interpretation” of that
statute. Savage Servs. Corp., 25 F.4th at 945 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). Here, though Congress changed the max-
imum penalty for a violation of Section 2242(2), it made no amend-
ments to its substance. So we presume Congress agreed with the
judicial interpretations of that statute. See id.
Second, even if Sections 2241(b) and 2242(2) were redun-
dant, it wouldn’t affect our analysis. That’s so because “redundan-
cies are common in statutory drafting—sometimes in a congres-
sional effort to be doubly sure. . . . [Indeed,] the better overall read-
ing of a statute sometimes contains some redundancy.’” Pugin v.
Garland, 599 U.S. 600, 609 (2023) (cleaned up).
That’s the case here. In fact, 18 U.S.C. § 2242 is necessarily
redundant on its face. Someone who is “incapable of appraising
the nature of the conduct,” id. § 2242(2)(A), or “physically incapa-
ble of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness
to engage in, that sexual act,” id. § 2242(2)(B), is generally incapable
of consenting, see id. § 2242(3). So Section 2242 itself shows that
the Act contains redundancies to “avoid unintended gaps.” Pugin,
599 U.S. at 609.
Our sister circuits have also interpreted Section 2242(2) to
gauge the victim’s capabilities at the time of the defendant’s con-
duct. In United States v. Morgan, for instance, the defendant engaged
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 13 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 13
in sexual intercourse with an “extremely intoxicated” victim who
tried to decline. 164 F.3d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the defendant had violated Section 2242(2).
Id. at 1238–39. And it did so even though the victim’s temporary
inebriated state provided the only basis. See id.
More recently, the Eighth Circuit implicitly reached the
same conclusion. In United States v. Vivier, the victim testified that
she was intoxicated, dizzy, and nauseated, and that, “immediately
before the incident, [she] felt like she did not have control over her
body.” 145 F.4th 892, 895 (8th Cir. 2025). As the court held, “[t]his
evidence [was] sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that [the victim] was incapacitated.” Id. That’s so
even though the court mentioned no evidence that the victim
lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the defendant’s actions af-
ter she became sober and otherwise felt better. Id.
The Tenth Circuit also concluded, on facts similar to those
here, that Section 2242(2) requires looking to the victim’s capabili-
ties at the time of the defendant’s conduct. United States v. Earls,
129 F.4th 850, 859 (10th Cir. 2025). There, a jury had convicted
Earls of three counts of violating Section 2242(2)(a) for sex with his
long-time girlfriend’s eighteen-year-old daughter. Id. at 855–56.
The victim “ha[d] a mild to moderate intellectual disability and suf-
fer[ed] from, among other things, schizophrenia affective disorder
and bipolar disorder with psychotic features.” Id. at 856. The gov-
ernment presented testimony from her great aunt and guardian, a
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 14 of 17
14 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
clinical psychologist who assessed her, a licensed professional coun-
selor who had counseled her, and a nurse practitioner who exam-
ined her. Id. at 856–58.
The victim also testified. She was able to identify the body
parts involved in sex and describe what the defendant had done to
her. Id. at 858. She knew that the defendant had told her to keep
the conduct secret so they would not get in trouble, but didn’t re-
member what kind of trouble that would be. Id. And she testified
that she didn’t know what sex is, but knew that it could in general
result in pregnancy, even though she herself could not get preg-
nant. Id. The Tenth Circuit explained that “what the jury had to
determine [under Section 2242(2)(A)] . . . was not whether [the vic-
tim] can ever consent to sex, but instead whether she was ‘incapa-
ble of appraising the nature of the conduct’ that occurred between
her and [the defendant] specifically.” Id. at 860 n.3.
We join our unanimous sister circuits that have construed
Section 2242(2). Section 2242(2)(A) requires a showing that the vic-
tim was “incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct” at the
time the conduct occurred.
Next, we consider “appraising” and “nature.” In doing so,
we conclude, like the Tenth Circuit recently has, that “appraising”
(or “evaluat[ing] the worth, significance, or status of ”) the “nature”
(or “inherent character or basic constitution”) of the defendant’s
sexual conduct means “more than simply being able to describe the
physical act of sex.” Earls, 129 F.4th at 859.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 15 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 15
Rather, “[i]t also requires, for example, the ability to judge
and analyze the consequences of the sexual conduct on the vic-
tim.” Id. So it requires the victim to understand that sex can cause,
for instance, pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and emo-
tional responses, and to appreciate the ramifications, in the victim’s
particular circumstances, of having sex, becoming pregnant, and
dealing with any other physical or emotional consequences. See id.
These circumstances may include considerations like, among other
things, the defendant’s status as a close relative or the age difference
between the victim and the defendant when the victim is a minor,
or other special status of the offender compared to the victim that
allowed the offender to leverage the relationship to abuse the vic-
tim. See id. at 860. After all, “[d]eciding whether a person is unable
to judge and analyze the ‘nature’ of the charged sexual conduct . .
. must include consideration of the context in which that conduct
occurred.” Id.
These characteristics of what it means to “appraise” the “na-
ture” of the sexual conduct suggest that a victim’s intellectual abil-
ities and mental-health diagnoses alone don’t necessarily tell us
whether she is capable of doing so. See id. at 860. Rather, other
evidence that indicates a victim’s failure to grasp and appreciate the
consequences of a defendant’s sexual conduct towards her is nec-
essary. Still, objective evidence of the sort here—a low IQ and au-
tism—may, in conjunction with more individualized evidence
about the victim’s capabilities, be relevant. See id. at 860–61.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 16 of 17
16 Opinion of the Court 24-12640
Tollen notes that, in explaining why it found the enhance-
ment applicable, the district court said that the victim told her story
to investigators “absent any emotion, concern, or shame.”5 And he
argues that “[t]he absence of tears, shame, or visible distress is not
evidence of incomprehension.”
We agree that a victim’s failure to display emotion or distress
doesn’t necessarily mean the victim lacked the capacity to appreciate
the nature of the defendant’s sexual conduct. After all, people deal
with trauma in different ways. So by itself, a victim’s failure to
show emotion or distress may not be enough to establish a victim’s
failure to grasp the nature of a sexual attack against her. But along
with other evidence that tends to reveal the victim’s understanding,
it can be relevant. As we explain below, this is one of those cases in
which it is.
We start with the fact that the victim searched the internet
only after her grandmother caught Tollen and said, “This is not
okay!” This incident shows that, throughout the more than a year
while the grandfather was sexually abusing the victim, the victim
didn’t know Tollen’s conduct was wrong. In fact, it didn’t even oc-
cur to her to question his conduct. In other words, she did not ap-
preciate the nature of her grandfather’s acts.
But that’s not the only evidence this record contains. Rather,
as we’ve discussed, it also reflects that the victim’s IQ was low and
5 We agree with Tollen that the victim has nothing to be ashamed of here.
She’s not the one who engaged in the criminal acts; she was the victim.
USCA11 Case: 24-12640 Document: 55-1 Date Filed: 11/19/2026 Page: 17 of 17
24-12640 Opinion of the Court 17
she was autistic. Indeed, both could help explain why, as the district
court found, she recounted the abuse “absent any emotion, con-
cern, or shame.”
And then there are the video recordings of the victim’s state-
ments. Like the district court, we have closely reviewed these video
recordings. After doing so, particularly given the other evidence
we have described, we are not “left with the definite and firm con-
viction,” Philossaint, 141 F.4th at 1339 (citation omitted), that the
district court erred in finding the victim could not appraise the na-
ture of Tollen’s conduct at the time he abused her.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons we’ve explained, we affirm the district
court’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.