Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0429n.06 No. 25-3530 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Oct 22, 2026 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) v. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) OHIO ) DAVID P. GREULICH, ) OPINION Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges. JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. David Greulich pleaded guilty to seven child- exploitation offenses, most stemming from two trips during which he sexually abused a fourteen- year-old girl and recorded the abuse. The district court calculated a Guidelines sentence of 2,040 months but imposed a sentence of 360 months. Greulich argues that the district court miscalculated his Guidelines range. But because the errors he asserts, even if they occurred, would not have changed that range, we AFFIRM. I. David Greulich met the fourteen-year-old girl on Snapchat and knew her age. In April 2024, he drove from Ohio to New York, took her to a hotel, and sexually abused her over two days. He recorded the abuse. In May 2024, he traveled from Ohio to New York again and did the same. No. 25-3530, United States v. Greulich In August 2024, police searched Greulich’s home. They found child pornography on his digital devices and in his Google account, including recordings of him abusing the victim. He later admitted that in July 2023, he had also emailed child pornography to another account. A grand jury indicted Greulich on seven counts, and he pleaded guilty to all of them without a plea agreement. Here are the counts: Count Offense Statute Conduct 1 Production of child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) April trip 2 Production of child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) May trip 3 Travel to engage in illicit sexual 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) April trip conduct 4 Travel to engage in illicit sexual 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) May trip conduct 5 Transportation of child 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) Emailing pornography child pornography in July 2023 6 Possession of child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) Digital devices 7 Possession of child pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) Google account We refer to Counts 1 and 2 as the “production counts,” Counts 3 and 4 as the “travel counts,” and Counts 5, 6, and 7 as the “possession and transportation counts.” After Greulich pleaded guilty, the probation office prepared a presentence report (PSR). It divided the counts into two groups, one for each of Greulich’s trips to New York. Group 1 contained the April counts: Count 1 (production count) and Count 3 (travel count). Group 2 contained the May counts: Count 2 (production count) and Count 4 (travel count). The PSR grouped the counts in each group under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(b). It also grouped the possession and transportation counts under § 3D1.2(d) and then placed them in Group 2. 2 No. 25-3530, United States v. Greulich The PSR applied § 2G2.1, the guideline for production offenses, to the production counts. Section 2G1.3 ordinarily governs the travel counts, but the PSR applied § 2G2.1 to those counts too, through a cross-reference contained in § 2G1.3(c)(1). That cross-reference instructs courts to apply § 2G2.1 “if the offense involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1). Under § 2G2.1, each of Greulich’s offense groups received an offense level of 42: a base offense level of 32 plus 10 levels of enhancements. Because the groups’ offense levels were equal, the PSR added 2 levels under § 3D1.4, for a combined offense level of 44. It then added 5 levels under § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s pattern- of-sex-crimes enhancement and subtracted 3 for acceptance of responsibility, bringing the total offense level to 46. The Guidelines treat a total offense level above 43 as 43. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2. Greulich raised three objections to the PSR that bear on this appeal. First, he argued that the PSR should have formed three groups: one for production counts, one for travel counts, and one for possession and transportation counts. Second, he argued that § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross- reference did not apply to the travel counts because producing visual depictions was not the primary purpose of his offenses. Third, he argued that the § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement was impermissible double counting. According to Greulich, sustaining those objections would yield group offense levels of 42, 28, and 40; a combined offense level of 44 under § 3D1.4; and, after the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, a total offense level of 41. At criminal history category I, level 41 yields a range of 324 to 405 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. The district court overruled each objection. It found that the PSR properly grouped the counts by trip under § 3D1.2(b). It also explained that § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross-reference made no 3 No. 25-3530, United States v. Greulich difference because a group’s offense level is the highest offense level of any count in the group, § 3D1.3(a), and in each group the production count scored higher under § 2G2.1 than the travel count would have scored under § 2G1.3 alone. Alternatively, the court found that the cross- reference applied because Greulich traveled to New York to produce a visual depiction of the abuse. Finally, the court agreed with the PSR and applied § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s 5-level enhancement because Greulich’s two trips to New York demonstrated a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. The district court therefore used the PSR’s total offense level of 46, which it treated as 43. With a total offense level of 43, the Guidelines recommended life imprisonment. But because no count authorized a life sentence, the Guidelines sentence became 2,040 months. After weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a 360-month sentence. And the district court noted that even if it “had fully adopted each and every one of the defense’s arguments,” it would have imposed the same 360-month sentence. R.35, Sentencing Tr., PageID 336. Greulich timely appealed. II. We review a sentence’s procedural reasonableness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). In doing so, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. An error that does not change the applicable Guidelines range is harmless. United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2019). 4 No. 25-3530, United States v. Greulich III. Greulich argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court erred in grouping the production counts with the travel counts and in applying § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross-reference to the travel counts. We need not decide whether he is correct on either point. Greulich’s own calculation differs from the district court’s in only one respect: it omits the 5-level enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1). Greulich does not challenge that enhancement on appeal, and adding it to his calculation produces the same Guidelines range the district court used. Therefore, even if the district court erred in grouping his counts and applying the cross-reference, any error was harmless. We begin with Greulich’s calculation. He argues that the district court should have placed his counts into three groups: one for the production counts, one for the travel counts, and one for the possession and transportation counts. Without applying § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross-reference to the travel counts, those groups would have offense levels of 42, 28, and 40, respectively. As Greulich calculates, those offense levels would yield a combined offense level of 44 under § 3D1.4. That is the same combined offense level the district court calculated from its two groups, each with an offense level of 42. From there, both Greulich’s calculation and the district court’s subtract 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility. They differ only in that the district court also added 5 levels under § 4B1.5(b)(1), for a total offense level of 46, treated as 43, while Greulich stops at 41. That difference does not help Greulich, because he has abandoned any challenge to the 5- level enhancement. An appellant who raises an objection below but omits it from his opening brief abandons it. Kuhn v. Washtenaw Cnty., 709 F.3d 612, 624 (6th Cir. 2013). Here, Greulich objected to the enhancement at sentencing. But neither his opening brief nor his reply mentions it, even though the government’s brief argues that it applies. And his remaining arguments do not bear on 5 No. 25-3530, United States v. Greulich the enhancement, which turns on the nature of his offenses and his pattern of conduct, not on how his counts are grouped or whether § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross-reference applies to the travel counts. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1). Regardless, the enhancement applies here. Section 4B1.5(b)(1) adds 5 levels when (1) the defendant’s offense of conviction is a covered sex crime, (2) neither § 4B1.1 nor § 4B1.5(a) applies, and (3) the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. Id. Greulich satisfies all three conditions. First, his production and travel counts are covered sex crimes. Id. § 4B1.5 cmt. n.2; United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 481 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining that § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s enhancement applies “as long as one count is a covered sex crime”). Second, Greulich is not a career offender under § 4B1.1, and he has no prior sex-offense conviction that would trigger § 4B1.5(a). Third, Greulich engaged in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor on two separate occasions, his April and May 2024 trips, which establishes a pattern. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt. n.4(B)(i). Adding § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s enhancement to Greulich’s calculation yields a total offense level of 46, treated as 43. That is the total offense level the district court calculated, so the Guidelines range is the same. Accordingly, even if Greulich is correct that the district court erred in grouping his counts and in applying § 2G1.3(c)(1)’s cross-reference, those errors did not change his Guidelines range and were therefore harmless. Faulkner, 926 F.3d at 275. IV. For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 6