People v. Farias CA6
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketH053547
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Farias CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053547
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19CR000900)
v.
JORGE ALBERTO FARIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2018, defendant Jorge Alberto Farias and his codefendant Michael
James Bloom attacked a fellow inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison
(Salinas Valley). In 2024, a jury convicted Farias of attempted premeditated
murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and assault with a deadly weapon
by a prisoner (§ 4501, subd. (a)).2 The trial court sentenced Farias to an
indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life plus eight years for sentence
enhancements based on the infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The jury also convicted Bloom of attempted premeditated murder.
This court is considering Bloom’s pending appeal separately. (See People v.
Bloom (H053589, app. pending).)
(a) (section 12022.7(a)) and prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)
(section 667(a)(1)).
On appeal, Farias claims the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to dismiss the sentence enhancements under section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) (section 1385(c)(2)). Alternatively, Farias contends that his
defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to argue all applicable
factors supporting dismissal of the enhancements under section 1385(c)(2).
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment and direct the
trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to correct an error regarding
Farias’s sentencing under the Three Strikes law.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges
In September 2024, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a
second amended information (information) charging Farias and Bloom with
attempted premeditated murder of G.R.3 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and
assault on G.R. with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4501, subd. (a); count
2). Attendant to both counts, the information alleged that Farias and Bloom
personally inflicted great bodily injury upon G.R. (GBI enhancement)
(§ 12022.7(a)).
The information further alleged that Farias had suffered two strike
prior convictions (strike prior) (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and two
prior serious felony convictions (§ 667(a)(1)), based on convictions in 2012 of
3 We refer to the victim by his initials to protect his privacy interests.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) All further unspecified rule references
are to the California Rules of Court.
2
attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192) with a firearm-use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).4
As to Bloom, the information alleged that he had suffered four strike
priors (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and four prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667(a)(1)), based on convictions in 2007 of first degree robbery
(§§ 211, 213) with a firearm-discharge enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c))
and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), attempted first degree robbery
(§§ 211, 664), and two assaults with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).5
As to both Farias and Bloom, the information alleged an aggravating
circumstance for sentencing under rule 4.421(b)(3).
In October 2024, a jury heard evidence on the charges against Farias
and Bloom.
B. Evidence Presented at Trial
1. Prosecution Evidence
On December 10, 2018, Correctional Officer Jason Moore was stationed
in a control booth monitoring an inmate housing unit at Salinas Valley.
Farias and victim G.R. were housed in adjacent cells in the unit.
Bloom entered the housing unit to collect meal trays from his fellow
inmates. Bloom asked Officer Moore to unlock the door to G.R.’s cell for tray
collection. From the control booth, Officer Moore remotely unlocked G.R.’s
cell door, and the door opened. Although Officer Moore believed that Farias’s
4 The record indicates that Farias committed his prior offenses in 2008
and received an aggregate sentence of 30 years in prison for his convictions
by plea.
5 The record indicates that Bloom committed his prior offenses in 2005
and received an aggregate sentence of 28 years eight months in prison for his
convictions by plea.
3
cell door was locked (given that an indicator light on the control booth’s panel
was unlit), Farias’s cell door also opened when G.R.’s cell door opened.6
Farias exited his cell and immediately ran into G.R.’s cell. Bloom
“instantly” followed Farias into the cell. Officer Moore could not see into
G.R.’s cell from his position inside the control booth, but Moore heard
“scuffling” and “yelling.” Moore activated an alarm.
G.R. ran out of his cell, followed by Bloom and Farias. Officer Moore
saw Farias and Bloom punching G.R. in his torso and face with “balled” fists.
When Farias and Bloom did not heed Moore’s commands to stop fighting and
lie down on the floor, Moore fired rubber bullets at them. The shots caused
Farias and Bloom to stop fighting and lie down. As Moore let responding
prison staff into the housing unit, Farias ran back into his cell and shut the
cell door. Moore heard a toilet flushing from the direction of Farias’s cell.
Bloom remained prone on the floor.
G.R. suffered 28 stab wounds to his chest, back, and arms. He also
suffered injuries to his head and neck. G.R.’s lungs collapsed, and he had air
in his stomach.
Correctional officers did not find the weapon that was used to attack
G.R. A correctional officer who investigated the incident saw that Farias had
cuts and blood on his hands and traces of blood on his shoelaces and shirt.
Bloom had a small abrasion and a “little bit” of blood on his right palm.
Bloom also had traces of blood on the soles of his shoes.
6 On cross-examination, Officer Moore testified that the door to Farias’s
cell had malfunctioned. Moore acknowledged that that circumstance posed a
security risk. Moore stated that, based on this incident, he submitted a work
order regarding Farias’s cell.
4
2. Defense Evidence
Farias called one witness in his defense, the custodian of records for
Salinas Valley’s plant operations department. The custodian testified that
the department’s records from around and after the stabbing incident
included five work orders concerning issues with Farias’s cell. There was no
work order regarding Farias’s cell door.
Bloom did not call any witnesses at trial.
C. Jury Verdicts and Court Findings on Strike Priors, Prior Serious
Felony Enhancements, and Aggravating Circumstance
The jury found Farias guilty as charged of attempted premeditated
murder (count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (count 2).
The jury found true the GBI enhancement attached to each count.
The jury also found Bloom guilty as charged of attempted premeditated
murder (count 1) and found true the attached GBI enhancement. The jury,
however, found Bloom not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon by a
prisoner (count 2).
At a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true the allegations
concerning Farias’s two strike priors and two prior serious felony convictions.
The court likewise found true the allegations concerning Bloom’s four strike
priors and four prior serious felony convictions. As to both Farias and Bloom,
the court found not true the aggravating circumstance for sentencing.
D. Sentencing Hearing
On August 6, 2025, the trial court held a joint sentencing hearing.
The trial court denied Farias’s request for sentencing relief under
section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero motion). The court likewise denied Bloom’s Romero motion.
5
The trial court sentenced Farias on count 1 to a term of 25 years to life
(pursuant to the Three Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI
enhancement (§ 12022.7(a)) and five years for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)). On count 2, the court imposed (but
stayed under section 654) a term of 25 years to life (pursuant to the Three
Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI enhancement and five years for the
prior serious felony conviction enhancement.
The trial court sentenced Bloom on count 1 to a term of 25 years to life
(pursuant to the Three Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI
enhancement (§ 12022.7(a)) and five years for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)).
II. DISCUSSION
Farias raises two claims of error: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion by declining to dismiss the sentence enhancements under section
1385(c)(2); and (2) alternatively, Farias’s defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to argue all applicable dismissal factors
under section 1385(c)(2). We address Farias’s claims concurrently.
A. Additional Background
1. Farias’s Romero Motion
In February 2025, Farias’s defense counsel filed a motion pursuant to
section 1385 and Romero requesting that the trial court “dismiss the prior
violent felony conviction that the People have alleged as an enhancement
pursuant to . . . section 1170.12[, subdivision] (c)(2).”
In an accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, defense
counsel asserted that, notwithstanding People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
237, 242 (Burke) (which held that section 1385(c) applies only to sentence
enhancements, not strike priors), the mitigating circumstances set forth in
6
section 1385(c)(2)(D) (regarding mental illness7) and (H) (regarding the
remoteness of the prior conviction8) apply in this case to the “enhancement”
alleged under the Three Strikes law. Counsel also urged the trial court to
consider Farias’s youth as mitigation, explaining that Farias’s 2012
convictions resulted from crimes committed in 2008, when he was about 21
years old.
Defense counsel noted that the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had deemed Farias to be “developmentally
disabled.” Counsel further asserted that “Global Developmental Disability is
a recognized mental illness within” the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Assn.,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM-
5)).9 Counsel submitted prison records that indicate Farias needed “ADA
7 Section 1385(c)(2)(D) provides: “The current offense is connected to
mental illness.” Section 1385(c)(5) defines “mental illness” as “a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM). Section 1385(c)(5) further
provides: “A court may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was
connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible
evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing
transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health
treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical
experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with
the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, the court
concludes that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the
defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.”
8 Section 1385(c)(2)(H) provides: “The enhancement is based on a prior
conviction that is over five years old.”
9 Our review of the DSM-5 and its more recent version, the DSM-5-TR
(American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022)), reveals that neither manual
includes a mental disorder titled global developmental disability. Rather, the
DSM-5 and DSM-5-TR identify a mental disorder called “global
developmental delay” (italics added). (DSM-5 at p. 41; DSM-5-TR at p. 46.)
We assume for the purposes of this opinion that Farias’s defense counsel
7
[a]ccommodations” because he is “[d]evelopmentally [d]isabled” with “[l]ow
cognitive functioning requiring minimal services.” The records also show
that Farias (who is “a second language learner”) attained reading scores on
the Test of Adult Basic Education ranging from 0 to 3.3 and, for a time,
received educational services through the CDCR’s “Developmental [sic]
Disabled Program.” Counsel argued that, as a developmentally disabled
person, Farias has impaired cognitive skills, executive functioning, mental
skills for managing daily life, and inhibition control.
In a declaration filed in support of the Romero motion, defense counsel
averred that, in April 2014, Farias’s mother had told CDCR staff the
following: “Mr. Farias was born with hydrocephalus (excessive cerebrospinal
fluid in the brain) and experienced developmental delays as a result. [¶] As
a minor, Mr. Farias suffered from cognitive and motor impairments,
paralysis for a time and seizures that abated over time. Doctors in Mexico
advised Mr. Farias’s mother that he would have permanent brain damage
and that he would probably not function beyond the level of a five-year-old.
Mr. Farias dropped out of school before the age of 10 and began working in
fruit orchards in Mexico picking fruit.”
Defense counsel additionally submitted a letter from Farias’s mother
stating, inter alia, that Farias “was born with anencephaly (a fatal birth
defect) where parts of the brain and skull don’t develop[] properly”
(capitalization omitted) and Farias “f[o]ught hard for his life and he survived
it.”10 Farias’s mother also wrote that Farias’s “comprehension is not at the
made a typographical error in his pleading and meant to invoke the DSM-
recognized mental disorder called global developmental delay.
10 “Anencephaly is a neural tube defect that occurs when the cephalic
end of the neural tube fails to close.” (Doe v. United States (9th Cir. 2005)
419 F.3d 1058, 1060.) “Anencephaly is an ultimately and unequivocally fatal
8
level that it should be and it makes [her] sad that because people see him and
see normality they don’t quite understand or see the reality that he really
suffers from lack of understanding and comprehension leaving him to speak
and answer questions that will later affect him in a bad way.”
Defense counsel “suggested that the [present] case is one where Mr.
Farias’s mental health issues played a significant part. There is no
background as to the motive behind the attack on [G.R.], but it is common in
the prison system for certain incarcerated people who have a specific desire to
hurt someone, to pressure another incarcerated person to do their
bidding. Mr. Farias would certainly fit the fungible prototype in that regard
given that his weakened mental state made him someone who would be prone
to such pressure from a third party. Alternatively, a lack of impulse control,
something that has a direct link to Mr. Farias’s mental illness, could also
serve as a through line from the actions that he was convicted for and the
illness from which he suffers.”
In the concluding paragraph of the memorandum of points and
authorities, defense counsel asked the trial court to, inter alia, “dismiss the
prior strike convictions” and impose an indeterminate term of seven years to
life on count 1 (rather than 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law).
Counsel also referenced the prior serious felony conviction enhancements
under section 667(a)(1), stating: “[I]n consideration of the foregoing, it is also
respectfully requested that the [c]ourt impose the [five] year term pursuant
to [] section 667(a)(1) as to [c]ounts 1 and 2, but stay both terms pursuant to
birth defect. Approximately one-third of anencephalic fetuses carried to term
are born alive. Fewer than two percent that are born alive survive more than
seven days. There is no cure for anencephaly and even extensive medical
intervention and continuous life support will not prolong the life of an
anencephalic infant more than two months.” (Ibid.)
9
[] section 1385. Alternatively, if the [c]ourt imposes the [five] year term as to
[c]ount 1, then the [five] year term should also be imposed as to count 2 but
stayed pursuant to [] section 654.”
The prosecutor opposed Farias’s Romero motion. The prosecutor
asserted that Farias and Bloom planned to murder G.R., and “[t]here is no
basis in this case to conclude that [Farias] has rehabilitated enough from his
life of crime to treat his prior strike offenses as having never occurred.” The
prosecutor claimed that “[t]he interests of justice are best served by holding
[Farias] accountable for his past and present offenses as defined by law.”
In a separate sentencing brief, the prosecutor noted that the trial court
has discretion to strike any prior serious felony conviction pursuant to section
1385, but “if an enhancement or its punishment is stricken under section
1385 by the [c]ourt, the prior strike cannot be used to increase any aspect of
punishment. (People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368, 383.)” The
prosecutor conceded that section 654 applied to Farias’s sentencing on counts
1 and 2 and requested that the court impose the maximum sentence of 25
years to life (under the Three Strike law) plus eight years for the sentence
enhancements.
2. Trial Court’s Ruling
As mentioned ante (pt. I.D.), at the joint sentencing hearing, the trial
court considered and denied Farias’s and Bloom’s Romero motions.
Regarding Farias’s Romero motion, the trial court noted its careful
review of “all of the documents in this case,” including “the documents that
pertained to [Farias’s] mental health.” The court characterized the present
offense as “very serious and very violent” and reiterated that Farias did not
initially follow Officer Moore’s commands to stop the attack on G.R. and get
down on the floor. The court acknowledged that Farias’s prior offenses of
10
attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter occurred when he was only
21 years old. However, the court explained that it “does not appear that
[Farias] has become any less violent since that time even in a very controlled
[prison] environment.” The court also considered Farias’s history of
incarceration when addressing the remoteness of his prior offenses. The
court explained that Farias’s present conviction for another attempted
murder “is an indication that [his prior crime] is not a single aberrant
period.” The court further noted that Farias appeared to be “the initiator” of
the instant crime.
Regarding potential dismissal of the enhancements under section
1385(c), the trial court stated that it had “also considered” the specific
mitigating factors set forth in section 1385(c)(2)(A)–(I), “which if found by the
[c]ourt, would strongly support exercise of the [c]ourt’s discretion to dismiss
one or more enhancements or strikes.” The court noted that defense counsel
had cited the mitigating circumstance concerning mental illness
(§ 1385(c)(3)(D)). The court explained that it “has some evidence [] of a
mental issue. However, it was not presented as a defense. There was no
evidence that it would have been a defense, and the [c]ourt also does not see
any particular evidence that the offense, which was quite violent, was
connected to perhaps the fact that he may not have the same IQ as another
individual.”
Regarding the mitigating circumstance asserted under section
1385(c)(2)(H), the trial court explained: “[O]nce again, the [c]ourt has
considered the fact that the prior conviction is over [five] years old, but
[Farias] has been in custody in a controlled environment, and nonetheless
has committed a very violent offense. [¶] Again, the [c]ourt has nonetheless
afforded great weight to that factor but does find that the countervailing
11
considerations outweigh any factors in mitigation in the furtherance of
justice.”
The trial court denied Farias’s Romero motion “and the invitation to
strike any of the prior convictions.” The court imposed the maximum
sentence on Farias. (See pt. I.D., ante.)
B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
As summarized by our Supreme Court, section 1385(c)(1), “as added by
Senate Bill No. 81, provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,
except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.’ (Italics added.) Section [1385(c)(2)] provides in pertinent part, ‘In
exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and
afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof
of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor
of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (Italics added.)” (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker).)
Under section 1385(c), “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss
enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1029.) “This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence
of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the
dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize
12
even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of
the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.)
We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to strike
a sentence enhancement under section 1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
215, 225.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People
v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 93 (Torres).)
“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as
here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise
of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
(Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; see also People v. Myers (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“It is not enough to show that reasonable people might
disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the defendant’s] prior
convictions.”].) Because we examine a trial court’s legal ruling, not its
reasoning, we affirm the ruling if it was correct on any theory or ground
applicable to the case. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39; People v.
Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)
C. Analysis of Farias’s Claims
Farias contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to
dismiss his sentence enhancements because four mitigating circumstances
under section 1385(c)(2) applied and there was “no basis to conclude that
dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety and be contrary
to the interests of justice.” As he did at trial, Farias asserts that the present
offense was connected to his mental illness (§ 1385(c)(2)(D)) and the prior
serious felony convictions enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) was based on convictions
13
that were over five years old (§ 1385(c)(2)(H)). Farias also asserts that two
additional mitigating circumstances (which he did not raise in the trial court)
apply—namely, the mitigating circumstance regarding multiple
enhancements (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)11) and the mitigating circumstance about an
enhancement whose application could result in a sentence of over 20 years
(§ 1385(c)(2)(C)12). Farias alternatively contends his defense counsel was
prejudicially ineffective for failing to raise those two additional mitigating
circumstances when requesting dismissal of the enhancements.
The Attorney General responds that the trial court reasonably
concluded Farias’s mental illness was not connected to the present offense
and it was not in the interest of justice to dismiss the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) due to its age. The Attorney General
further contends that Farias forfeited his claim regarding the additional
mitigating circumstances under section 1385(c)(2)(B) and (C) by failing to
raise those circumstances in the trial court, and Farias’s alternative IAC
claim fails because Farias has not shown deficient performance and
prejudice.
We begin our analysis of Farias’s contentions by examining the trial
court’s ruling on the mental illness mitigating circumstance (§ 1385(c)(2)(D)).
As an initial matter, and notwithstanding the trial prosecutor’s or
Attorney General’s failure raise this issue, we are not persuaded that the
information Farias provided to the trial court sufficiently supports that he
11 Section 1385(c)(2)(B) provides: “Multiple enhancements are alleged
in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.”
12 Section 1385(c)(2)(C) provides: “The application of an enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.”
14
has or had the DSM-recognized mental disorder called global developmental
delay.
The DSM-5-TR states that global developmental delay is a diagnosis
“reserved for individuals under the age of [five] years when the clinical
severity level cannot be reliably assessed during early childhood. This
category is diagnosed when an individual fails to meet expected
developmental milestones in several areas of intellectual functioning, and
applies to individuals who are unable to undergo systematic assessments of
intellectual functioning, including children who are too young to participate
in standardized testing. This category requires reassessment after a period
of time.” (DSM-5-TR at p. 46; see DSM-5 at p. 41 [same]; see also DSM-5-TR
at p. 35 [“Global developmental delay, as its name implies, is diagnosed when
an individual fails to meet expected developmental milestones in several
areas of intellectual functioning. The diagnosis is used for individuals
younger than [five] years who are unable to undergo systematic assessments
of intellectual functioning, and thus the clinical severity level cannot be
reliably assessed.”].)
In his Romero motion, Farias did not direct the trial court to any
evidence that he had been diagnosed with global developmental delay (or a
similar pre DSM-5 disorder) before age five (i.e., before June 1992, given that
Farias was born in June 1987). Although the CDCR identified Farias as a
developmentally disabled adult with low cognitive functioning who needed
services and accommodations, Farias did not point the court to any mention
of the mental disorder global developmental delay within Farias’s CDCR
records or any other document submitted in support of the Romero motion.
Moreover, Farias provided few specifics regarding any failure on his part “to
meet expected developmental milestones in several areas of intellectual
15
functioning” before age five, as required for a diagnosis of global
developmental delay. (See DSM-5-TR at p. 46; DSM-5 at p. 41.)
As detailed ante (pt. II.A.1.), Farias’s defense counsel asserted to the
trial court that Farias’s mother had told CDCR staff that Farias was born
with “hydrocephalus,”13 “experienced developmental delays as a result” of his
hydrocephalus, and “suffered from cognitive and motor impairments.”
Counsel further asserted that doctors in Mexico had told Farias’s mother that
Farias “would have permanent brain damage and that he would probably not
function beyond the level of a five-year-old.” Farias’s mother, likewise,
asserted in her letter to the court that Farias “suffers from lack of
understanding and comprehension.” These broad, conclusory assertions do
not provide substantial evidence that Farias suffered the mental disorder
global developmental delay, as defined by the DSM. (See § 1385(c)(5).)
Even assuming Farias suffers or suffered from global developmental
delay, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that
the record lacks “any particular evidence” that Farias’s present offense was
connected to his impaired intellectual functioning.
The record includes evidence of Farias’s illicit planning (at least, in
obtaining a weapon), his leading role in the attack on G.R., and his disposal
of the weapon immediately after the attack. When that evidence is
considered against Farias’s generalized assertions about his impaired
cognitive skills, executive functioning, mental skills for managing daily life,
and inhibition control, the trial court could reasonably have decided that the
record lacks the degree of evidence that would compel a court to find Farias’s
13 By contrast, Farias’s mother wrote in her May 2025 letter to the trial
court that Farias “was born with anencephaly.” (Capitalization omitted.)
16
global developmental delay substantially contributed to his involvement in
the present offense.
“In the universe of cases where a defendant suffers from mental illness,
the strength of the connection between the mental condition and the
commission of the current offense will vary widely depending on a host of
factors such as the character of the mental illness, the nature of the
symptoms exhibited near the time of the offense, the defendant’s amenability
to treatment, and the nature of the particular offense.” (People v. Ortiz
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1097 (Ortiz).) On this record, the trial court
reasonably concluded that any connection between the crime and Farias’s
mental condition was unduly speculative.
We decide the court did not err by declining to find Farias’s global
developmental delay as a mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(D)
and (c)(5). (See Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [no error in the trial
court’s determination that mental illness did not substantially contribute to
the commission of the offense notwithstanding defendant’s schizophrenia
diagnosis].)
Turning to the second mitigating circumstance considered by the trial
court (i.e., the remoteness of Farias’s prior serious felony convictions
(§ 1385(c)(2)(H))), we likewise conclude that Farias has not shown an abuse of
discretion in the court’s refusal to strike the five-year prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)). The court afforded great weight to the
fact that Farias’s convictions were from 2012 (six years before the present
offense in 2018). The court, however, declined to strike the five-year
enhancement for several reasons: (1) Farias was incarcerated between 2012
and 2018, which limited his ability to commit further offenses; (2) Farias’s
17
prior convictions for attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter involved
violence; and (3) Farias’s present offense was a “very violent offense.”
Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s refusal
to strike the five-year enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) because (in its words) the
“countervailing considerations outweigh any factors in mitigation in the
furtherance of justice” was irrational or arbitrary. (See Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1033 [“notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating
circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement
based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of justice”
inquiry’ ”]; see also id. at p. 1029; Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.)
Regarding the two additional mitigating circumstances that Farias’s
defense counsel failed to raise in the trial court (i.e., multiple enhancements
(§ 1385(c)(2)(B)) and the application of an enhancement that could result in a
sentence of over 20 years (§ 1385(c)(2)(C))), we agree with the Attorney
General that Farias forfeited any appellate claim of error based on those
mitigating circumstances by failing to raise them. (See Torres, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 92; People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724; see
also People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375–376; People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 353.)
Given Farias’s forfeiture on the two additional mitigating
circumstances, we turn to his alternative IAC claim. To make out that claim,
Farias “ ‘must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Second, [Farias] must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
958; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “There is a strong
18
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” (People v. O’Bannon (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974,
979 (O’Bannon).) We can reject the claim on either element of the standard.
(People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1008, disapproved on another
ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
We begin our review of Farias’s IAC claim by examining defense
counsel’s failure to assert the mitigating circumstance under section
1385(c)(2)(C). A few days before Farias’s sentencing hearing was held, the
Third District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Torres, which interpreted
the meaning of section 1385(c)(2)(C). In that case, the trial court sentenced
the defendant to 25 years to life for first degree murder and 25 years to life
for a firearm enhancement attached to the first degree murder count, to be
served consecutively. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 91.) Torres made
an argument akin to that advanced by Farias in this appeal: “ ‘The use of the
word “result” [in section 1385(c)(2)(C)] indicates that courts look to the
aggregate term once the sentence on the substantive offense and the sentence
on the enhancement are accounted for.’ In other words, [Torres] interpret[ed]
[section 1385(c)(2)(C)] to apply whenever an enhancement is a component of a
sentence that exceeds 20 years.” (Id. at p. 92.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Torres’s “interpretation
is at odds with the clear text of the statute.” (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 93.) The court reasoned that “[a] sentence exceeding 20 years could
result from an enhancement where a sentence of that length arises as a
consequence of the enhancement.” (Ibid.) In other words, the application of
the enhancement must “itself lead[] to a sentence exceeding 20 years.” (Ibid.,
italics added; ibid. [“The word result denotes a causal relationship between
the enhancement and a sentence exceeding 20 years.”].)
19
We agree with the Torres court’s interpretation of the statutory
language, and Farias cites no subsequent decision that has questioned the
Torres court’s interpretation.
Here, as in Torres, Farias’s sentences (under the Three Strikes law) on
counts 1 and 2 already exceeded 20 years without the application of the
three-year GBI enhancement or the five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancement. The application of those enhancements did not result in a
sentence of over 20 years. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.) Thus, as
a matter of law the mitigating circumstance set forth in section 1385(c)(2)(C)
does not apply.14 (Torres, at p. 93.)
“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless
objections.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463.) We conclude that
Farias’s defense counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to argue that
the mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(C) supported dismissal
of the sentence enhancements. (See O’Bannon, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 984.)
Additionally, we are not persuaded that Farias has shown any
prejudicial IAC as to defense counsel’s failure to raise the mitigating
circumstance regarding multiple enhancements (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)). Assuming
counsel should have asserted section 1385(c)(2)(B), on this record, it is not
reasonably probable that doing so would have led to a more favorable
14 The Attorney General has filed an unopposed request for judicial
notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).
The Attorney General’s request for judicial notice is denied because the
legislative history of Senate Bill No. 81 is not relevant to our analysis and
conclusion regarding the inapplicability of section 1385(c)(2)(C). (See
Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 609, fn. 10 [“[A]
court will take judicial notice of the legislative history of a statute to
ascertain the statute’s purpose and meaning if the statute is ambiguous.”].)
20
outcome for Farias. In deciding not to strike Farias’s strike priors or
sentence enhancements, the trial court highlighted that the present offense
was “very serious and very violent.” The court also found that Farias
appeared to initiate the instant crime, failed to cooperate with Officer
Moore’s commands, and had continued to act violently after committing his
prior violent offenses, even while incarcerated. Further, the court rejected
Farias’s claim that the present offense was connected to mental illness and
decided that the remoteness of the prior serious felony convictions was
outweighed by “the countervailing considerations,” particularly Farias’s
continued violence.
The trial court’s ruling on Farias’s Romero motion and decision to
impose the maximum sentence on Farias indicate that the court was
disinclined to find that the interests of justice would be furthered by
dismissing either the GBI enhancement or the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Farias has failed
to satisfy his burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting from defense
counsel’s failure to raise the mitigating circumstance set forth in
section 1385(c)(2)(B).
D. Error in Abstract of Judgment
Alt