Full Opinion

Filed 11/18/26 P. v. Farias CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT THE PEOPLE, H053547 (Monterey County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 19CR000900) v. JORGE ALBERTO FARIAS, Defendant and Appellant. In 2018, defendant Jorge Alberto Farias and his codefendant Michael James Bloom attacked a fellow inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison (Salinas Valley). In 2024, a jury convicted Farias of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4501, subd. (a)).2 The trial court sentenced Farias to an indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life plus eight years for sentence enhancements based on the infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. 1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 The jury also convicted Bloom of attempted premeditated murder. This court is considering Bloom’s pending appeal separately. (See People v. Bloom (H053589, app. pending).) (a) (section 12022.7(a)) and prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1) (section 667(a)(1)). On appeal, Farias claims the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the sentence enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) (section 1385(c)(2)). Alternatively, Farias contends that his defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to argue all applicable factors supporting dismissal of the enhancements under section 1385(c)(2). For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment and direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to correct an error regarding Farias’s sentencing under the Three Strikes law. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Charges In September 2024, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a second amended information (information) charging Farias and Bloom with attempted premeditated murder of G.R.3 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) and assault on G.R. with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4501, subd. (a); count 2). Attendant to both counts, the information alleged that Farias and Bloom personally inflicted great bodily injury upon G.R. (GBI enhancement) (§ 12022.7(a)). The information further alleged that Farias had suffered two strike prior convictions (strike prior) (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667(a)(1)), based on convictions in 2012 of 3 We refer to the victim by his initials to protect his privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) All further unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court. 2 attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and voluntary manslaughter (§ 192) with a firearm-use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).4 As to Bloom, the information alleged that he had suffered four strike priors (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)) and four prior serious felony convictions (§ 667(a)(1)), based on convictions in 2007 of first degree robbery (§§ 211, 213) with a firearm-discharge enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), attempted first degree robbery (§§ 211, 664), and two assaults with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).5 As to both Farias and Bloom, the information alleged an aggravating circumstance for sentencing under rule 4.421(b)(3). In October 2024, a jury heard evidence on the charges against Farias and Bloom. B. Evidence Presented at Trial 1. Prosecution Evidence On December 10, 2018, Correctional Officer Jason Moore was stationed in a control booth monitoring an inmate housing unit at Salinas Valley. Farias and victim G.R. were housed in adjacent cells in the unit. Bloom entered the housing unit to collect meal trays from his fellow inmates. Bloom asked Officer Moore to unlock the door to G.R.’s cell for tray collection. From the control booth, Officer Moore remotely unlocked G.R.’s cell door, and the door opened. Although Officer Moore believed that Farias’s 4 The record indicates that Farias committed his prior offenses in 2008 and received an aggregate sentence of 30 years in prison for his convictions by plea. 5 The record indicates that Bloom committed his prior offenses in 2005 and received an aggregate sentence of 28 years eight months in prison for his convictions by plea. 3 cell door was locked (given that an indicator light on the control booth’s panel was unlit), Farias’s cell door also opened when G.R.’s cell door opened.6 Farias exited his cell and immediately ran into G.R.’s cell. Bloom “instantly” followed Farias into the cell. Officer Moore could not see into G.R.’s cell from his position inside the control booth, but Moore heard “scuffling” and “yelling.” Moore activated an alarm. G.R. ran out of his cell, followed by Bloom and Farias. Officer Moore saw Farias and Bloom punching G.R. in his torso and face with “balled” fists. When Farias and Bloom did not heed Moore’s commands to stop fighting and lie down on the floor, Moore fired rubber bullets at them. The shots caused Farias and Bloom to stop fighting and lie down. As Moore let responding prison staff into the housing unit, Farias ran back into his cell and shut the cell door. Moore heard a toilet flushing from the direction of Farias’s cell. Bloom remained prone on the floor. G.R. suffered 28 stab wounds to his chest, back, and arms. He also suffered injuries to his head and neck. G.R.’s lungs collapsed, and he had air in his stomach. Correctional officers did not find the weapon that was used to attack G.R. A correctional officer who investigated the incident saw that Farias had cuts and blood on his hands and traces of blood on his shoelaces and shirt. Bloom had a small abrasion and a “little bit” of blood on his right palm. Bloom also had traces of blood on the soles of his shoes. 6 On cross-examination, Officer Moore testified that the door to Farias’s cell had malfunctioned. Moore acknowledged that that circumstance posed a security risk. Moore stated that, based on this incident, he submitted a work order regarding Farias’s cell. 4 2. Defense Evidence Farias called one witness in his defense, the custodian of records for Salinas Valley’s plant operations department. The custodian testified that the department’s records from around and after the stabbing incident included five work orders concerning issues with Farias’s cell. There was no work order regarding Farias’s cell door. Bloom did not call any witnesses at trial. C. Jury Verdicts and Court Findings on Strike Priors, Prior Serious Felony Enhancements, and Aggravating Circumstance The jury found Farias guilty as charged of attempted premeditated murder (count 1) and assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (count 2). The jury found true the GBI enhancement attached to each count. The jury also found Bloom guilty as charged of attempted premeditated murder (count 1) and found true the attached GBI enhancement. The jury, however, found Bloom not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (count 2). At a bifurcated court trial, the trial court found true the allegations concerning Farias’s two strike priors and two prior serious felony convictions. The court likewise found true the allegations concerning Bloom’s four strike priors and four prior serious felony convictions. As to both Farias and Bloom, the court found not true the aggravating circumstance for sentencing. D. Sentencing Hearing On August 6, 2025, the trial court held a joint sentencing hearing. The trial court denied Farias’s request for sentencing relief under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero motion). The court likewise denied Bloom’s Romero motion. 5 The trial court sentenced Farias on count 1 to a term of 25 years to life (pursuant to the Three Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI enhancement (§ 12022.7(a)) and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)). On count 2, the court imposed (but stayed under section 654) a term of 25 years to life (pursuant to the Three Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The trial court sentenced Bloom on count 1 to a term of 25 years to life (pursuant to the Three Strikes law) plus three years for the GBI enhancement (§ 12022.7(a)) and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)). II. DISCUSSION Farias raises two claims of error: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the sentence enhancements under section 1385(c)(2); and (2) alternatively, Farias’s defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) by failing to argue all applicable dismissal factors under section 1385(c)(2). We address Farias’s claims concurrently. A. Additional Background 1. Farias’s Romero Motion In February 2025, Farias’s defense counsel filed a motion pursuant to section 1385 and Romero requesting that the trial court “dismiss the prior violent felony conviction that the People have alleged as an enhancement pursuant to . . . section 1170.12[, subdivision] (c)(2).” In an accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, defense counsel asserted that, notwithstanding People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke) (which held that section 1385(c) applies only to sentence enhancements, not strike priors), the mitigating circumstances set forth in 6 section 1385(c)(2)(D) (regarding mental illness7) and (H) (regarding the remoteness of the prior conviction8) apply in this case to the “enhancement” alleged under the Three Strikes law. Counsel also urged the trial court to consider Farias’s youth as mitigation, explaining that Farias’s 2012 convictions resulted from crimes committed in 2008, when he was about 21 years old. Defense counsel noted that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had deemed Farias to be “developmentally disabled.” Counsel further asserted that “Global Developmental Disability is a recognized mental illness within” the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) (DSM- 5)).9 Counsel submitted prison records that indicate Farias needed “ADA 7 Section 1385(c)(2)(D) provides: “The current offense is connected to mental illness.” Section 1385(c)(5) defines “mental illness” as “a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM). Section 1385(c)(5) further provides: “A court may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, the court concludes that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.” 8 Section 1385(c)(2)(H) provides: “The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” 9 Our review of the DSM-5 and its more recent version, the DSM-5-TR (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022)), reveals that neither manual includes a mental disorder titled global developmental disability. Rather, the DSM-5 and DSM-5-TR identify a mental disorder called “global developmental delay” (italics added). (DSM-5 at p. 41; DSM-5-TR at p. 46.) We assume for the purposes of this opinion that Farias’s defense counsel 7 [a]ccommodations” because he is “[d]evelopmentally [d]isabled” with “[l]ow cognitive functioning requiring minimal services.” The records also show that Farias (who is “a second language learner”) attained reading scores on the Test of Adult Basic Education ranging from 0 to 3.3 and, for a time, received educational services through the CDCR’s “Developmental [sic] Disabled Program.” Counsel argued that, as a developmentally disabled person, Farias has impaired cognitive skills, executive functioning, mental skills for managing daily life, and inhibition control. In a declaration filed in support of the Romero motion, defense counsel averred that, in April 2014, Farias’s mother had told CDCR staff the following: “Mr. Farias was born with hydrocephalus (excessive cerebrospinal fluid in the brain) and experienced developmental delays as a result. [¶] As a minor, Mr. Farias suffered from cognitive and motor impairments, paralysis for a time and seizures that abated over time. Doctors in Mexico advised Mr. Farias’s mother that he would have permanent brain damage and that he would probably not function beyond the level of a five-year-old. Mr. Farias dropped out of school before the age of 10 and began working in fruit orchards in Mexico picking fruit.” Defense counsel additionally submitted a letter from Farias’s mother stating, inter alia, that Farias “was born with anencephaly (a fatal birth defect) where parts of the brain and skull don’t develop[] properly” (capitalization omitted) and Farias “f[o]ught hard for his life and he survived it.”10 Farias’s mother also wrote that Farias’s “comprehension is not at the made a typographical error in his pleading and meant to invoke the DSM- recognized mental disorder called global developmental delay. 10 “Anencephaly is a neural tube defect that occurs when the cephalic end of the neural tube fails to close.” (Doe v. United States (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 1058, 1060.) “Anencephaly is an ultimately and unequivocally fatal 8 level that it should be and it makes [her] sad that because people see him and see normality they don’t quite understand or see the reality that he really suffers from lack of understanding and comprehension leaving him to speak and answer questions that will later affect him in a bad way.” Defense counsel “suggested that the [present] case is one where Mr. Farias’s mental health issues played a significant part. There is no background as to the motive behind the attack on [G.R.], but it is common in the prison system for certain incarcerated people who have a specific desire to hurt someone, to pressure another incarcerated person to do their bidding. Mr. Farias would certainly fit the fungible prototype in that regard given that his weakened mental state made him someone who would be prone to such pressure from a third party. Alternatively, a lack of impulse control, something that has a direct link to Mr. Farias’s mental illness, could also serve as a through line from the actions that he was convicted for and the illness from which he suffers.” In the concluding paragraph of the memorandum of points and authorities, defense counsel asked the trial court to, inter alia, “dismiss the prior strike convictions” and impose an indeterminate term of seven years to life on count 1 (rather than 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law). Counsel also referenced the prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667(a)(1), stating: “[I]n consideration of the foregoing, it is also respectfully requested that the [c]ourt impose the [five] year term pursuant to [] section 667(a)(1) as to [c]ounts 1 and 2, but stay both terms pursuant to birth defect. Approximately one-third of anencephalic fetuses carried to term are born alive. Fewer than two percent that are born alive survive more than seven days. There is no cure for anencephaly and even extensive medical intervention and continuous life support will not prolong the life of an anencephalic infant more than two months.” (Ibid.) 9 [] section 1385. Alternatively, if the [c]ourt imposes the [five] year term as to [c]ount 1, then the [five] year term should also be imposed as to count 2 but stayed pursuant to [] section 654.” The prosecutor opposed Farias’s Romero motion. The prosecutor asserted that Farias and Bloom planned to murder G.R., and “[t]here is no basis in this case to conclude that [Farias] has rehabilitated enough from his life of crime to treat his prior strike offenses as having never occurred.” The prosecutor claimed that “[t]he interests of justice are best served by holding [Farias] accountable for his past and present offenses as defined by law.” In a separate sentencing brief, the prosecutor noted that the trial court has discretion to strike any prior serious felony conviction pursuant to section 1385, but “if an enhancement or its punishment is stricken under section 1385 by the [c]ourt, the prior strike cannot be used to increase any aspect of punishment. (People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368, 383.)” The prosecutor conceded that section 654 applied to Farias’s sentencing on counts 1 and 2 and requested that the court impose the maximum sentence of 25 years to life (under the Three Strike law) plus eight years for the sentence enhancements. 2. Trial Court’s Ruling As mentioned ante (pt. I.D.), at the joint sentencing hearing, the trial court considered and denied Farias’s and Bloom’s Romero motions. Regarding Farias’s Romero motion, the trial court noted its careful review of “all of the documents in this case,” including “the documents that pertained to [Farias’s] mental health.” The court characterized the present offense as “very serious and very violent” and reiterated that Farias did not initially follow Officer Moore’s commands to stop the attack on G.R. and get down on the floor. The court acknowledged that Farias’s prior offenses of 10 attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter occurred when he was only 21 years old. However, the court explained that it “does not appear that [Farias] has become any less violent since that time even in a very controlled [prison] environment.” The court also considered Farias’s history of incarceration when addressing the remoteness of his prior offenses. The court explained that Farias’s present conviction for another attempted murder “is an indication that [his prior crime] is not a single aberrant period.” The court further noted that Farias appeared to be “the initiator” of the instant crime. Regarding potential dismissal of the enhancements under section 1385(c), the trial court stated that it had “also considered” the specific mitigating factors set forth in section 1385(c)(2)(A)–(I), “which if found by the [c]ourt, would strongly support exercise of the [c]ourt’s discretion to dismiss one or more enhancements or strikes.” The court noted that defense counsel had cited the mitigating circumstance concerning mental illness (§ 1385(c)(3)(D)). The court explained that it “has some evidence [] of a mental issue. However, it was not presented as a defense. There was no evidence that it would have been a defense, and the [c]ourt also does not see any particular evidence that the offense, which was quite violent, was connected to perhaps the fact that he may not have the same IQ as another individual.” Regarding the mitigating circumstance asserted under section 1385(c)(2)(H), the trial court explained: “[O]nce again, the [c]ourt has considered the fact that the prior conviction is over [five] years old, but [Farias] has been in custody in a controlled environment, and nonetheless has committed a very violent offense. [¶] Again, the [c]ourt has nonetheless afforded great weight to that factor but does find that the countervailing 11 considerations outweigh any factors in mitigation in the furtherance of justice.” The trial court denied Farias’s Romero motion “and the invitation to strike any of the prior convictions.” The court imposed the maximum sentence on Farias. (See pt. I.D., ante.) B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review As summarized by our Supreme Court, section 1385(c)(1), “as added by Senate Bill No. 81, provides that ‘[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.’ (Italics added.) Section [1385(c)(2)] provides in pertinent part, ‘In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (Italics added.)” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker).) Under section 1385(c), “absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) “This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize 12 even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1036.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.) We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (People v. Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 88, 93 (Torres).) “The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; see also People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“It is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of [the defendant’s] prior convictions.”].) Because we examine a trial court’s legal ruling, not its reasoning, we affirm the ruling if it was correct on any theory or ground applicable to the case. (See People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39; People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) C. Analysis of Farias’s Claims Farias contends the trial court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss his sentence enhancements because four mitigating circumstances under section 1385(c)(2) applied and there was “no basis to conclude that dismissal of the enhancements would endanger public safety and be contrary to the interests of justice.” As he did at trial, Farias asserts that the present offense was connected to his mental illness (§ 1385(c)(2)(D)) and the prior serious felony convictions enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) was based on convictions 13 that were over five years old (§ 1385(c)(2)(H)). Farias also asserts that two additional mitigating circumstances (which he did not raise in the trial court) apply—namely, the mitigating circumstance regarding multiple enhancements (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)11) and the mitigating circumstance about an enhancement whose application could result in a sentence of over 20 years (§ 1385(c)(2)(C)12). Farias alternatively contends his defense counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to raise those two additional mitigating circumstances when requesting dismissal of the enhancements. The Attorney General responds that the trial court reasonably concluded Farias’s mental illness was not connected to the present offense and it was not in the interest of justice to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) due to its age. The Attorney General further contends that Farias forfeited his claim regarding the additional mitigating circumstances under section 1385(c)(2)(B) and (C) by failing to raise those circumstances in the trial court, and Farias’s alternative IAC claim fails because Farias has not shown deficient performance and prejudice. We begin our analysis of Farias’s contentions by examining the trial court’s ruling on the mental illness mitigating circumstance (§ 1385(c)(2)(D)). As an initial matter, and notwithstanding the trial prosecutor’s or Attorney General’s failure raise this issue, we are not persuaded that the information Farias provided to the trial court sufficiently supports that he 11 Section 1385(c)(2)(B) provides: “Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” 12 Section 1385(c)(2)(C) provides: “The application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.” 14 has or had the DSM-recognized mental disorder called global developmental delay. The DSM-5-TR states that global developmental delay is a diagnosis “reserved for individuals under the age of [five] years when the clinical severity level cannot be reliably assessed during early childhood. This category is diagnosed when an individual fails to meet expected developmental milestones in several areas of intellectual functioning, and applies to individuals who are unable to undergo systematic assessments of intellectual functioning, including children who are too young to participate in standardized testing. This category requires reassessment after a period of time.” (DSM-5-TR at p. 46; see DSM-5 at p. 41 [same]; see also DSM-5-TR at p. 35 [“Global developmental delay, as its name implies, is diagnosed when an individual fails to meet expected developmental milestones in several areas of intellectual functioning. The diagnosis is used for individuals younger than [five] years who are unable to undergo systematic assessments of intellectual functioning, and thus the clinical severity level cannot be reliably assessed.”].) In his Romero motion, Farias did not direct the trial court to any evidence that he had been diagnosed with global developmental delay (or a similar pre DSM-5 disorder) before age five (i.e., before June 1992, given that Farias was born in June 1987). Although the CDCR identified Farias as a developmentally disabled adult with low cognitive functioning who needed services and accommodations, Farias did not point the court to any mention of the mental disorder global developmental delay within Farias’s CDCR records or any other document submitted in support of the Romero motion. Moreover, Farias provided few specifics regarding any failure on his part “to meet expected developmental milestones in several areas of intellectual 15 functioning” before age five, as required for a diagnosis of global developmental delay. (See DSM-5-TR at p. 46; DSM-5 at p. 41.) As detailed ante (pt. II.A.1.), Farias’s defense counsel asserted to the trial court that Farias’s mother had told CDCR staff that Farias was born with “hydrocephalus,”13 “experienced developmental delays as a result” of his hydrocephalus, and “suffered from cognitive and motor impairments.” Counsel further asserted that doctors in Mexico had told Farias’s mother that Farias “would have permanent brain damage and that he would probably not function beyond the level of a five-year-old.” Farias’s mother, likewise, asserted in her letter to the court that Farias “suffers from lack of understanding and comprehension.” These broad, conclusory assertions do not provide substantial evidence that Farias suffered the mental disorder global developmental delay, as defined by the DSM. (See § 1385(c)(5).) Even assuming Farias suffers or suffered from global developmental delay, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the record lacks “any particular evidence” that Farias’s present offense was connected to his impaired intellectual functioning. The record includes evidence of Farias’s illicit planning (at least, in obtaining a weapon), his leading role in the attack on G.R., and his disposal of the weapon immediately after the attack. When that evidence is considered against Farias’s generalized assertions about his impaired cognitive skills, executive functioning, mental skills for managing daily life, and inhibition control, the trial court could reasonably have decided that the record lacks the degree of evidence that would compel a court to find Farias’s 13 By contrast, Farias’s mother wrote in her May 2025 letter to the trial court that Farias “was born with anencephaly.” (Capitalization omitted.) 16 global developmental delay substantially contributed to his involvement in the present offense. “In the universe of cases where a defendant suffers from mental illness, the strength of the connection between the mental condition and the commission of the current offense will vary widely depending on a host of factors such as the character of the mental illness, the nature of the symptoms exhibited near the time of the offense, the defendant’s amenability to treatment, and the nature of the particular offense.” (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1097 (Ortiz).) On this record, the trial court reasonably concluded that any connection between the crime and Farias’s mental condition was unduly speculative. We decide the court did not err by declining to find Farias’s global developmental delay as a mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(D) and (c)(5). (See Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 [no error in the trial court’s determination that mental illness did not substantially contribute to the commission of the offense notwithstanding defendant’s schizophrenia diagnosis].) Turning to the second mitigating circumstance considered by the trial court (i.e., the remoteness of Farias’s prior serious felony convictions (§ 1385(c)(2)(H))), we likewise conclude that Farias has not shown an abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)). The court afforded great weight to the fact that Farias’s convictions were from 2012 (six years before the present offense in 2018). The court, however, declined to strike the five-year enhancement for several reasons: (1) Farias was incarcerated between 2012 and 2018, which limited his ability to commit further offenses; (2) Farias’s 17 prior convictions for attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter involved violence; and (3) Farias’s present offense was a “very violent offense.” Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s refusal to strike the five-year enhancement (§ 667(a)(1)) because (in its words) the “countervailing considerations outweigh any factors in mitigation in the furtherance of justice” was irrational or arbitrary. (See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [“notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of justice” inquiry’ ”]; see also id. at p. 1029; Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.) Regarding the two additional mitigating circumstances that Farias’s defense counsel failed to raise in the trial court (i.e., multiple enhancements (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)) and the application of an enhancement that could result in a sentence of over 20 years (§ 1385(c)(2)(C))), we agree with the Attorney General that Farias forfeited any appellate claim of error based on those mitigating circumstances by failing to raise them. (See Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 92; People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724; see also People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375–376; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) Given Farias’s forfeiture on the two additional mitigating circumstances, we turn to his alternative IAC claim. To make out that claim, Farias “ ‘must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, [Farias] must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958; see also People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “There is a strong 18 presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. O’Bannon (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974, 979 (O’Bannon).) We can reject the claim on either element of the standard. (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1008, disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) We begin our review of Farias’s IAC claim by examining defense counsel’s failure to assert the mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(C). A few days before Farias’s sentencing hearing was held, the Third District Court of Appeal issued its decision in Torres, which interpreted the meaning of section 1385(c)(2)(C). In that case, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 25 years to life for first degree murder and 25 years to life for a firearm enhancement attached to the first degree murder count, to be served consecutively. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 91.) Torres made an argument akin to that advanced by Farias in this appeal: “ ‘The use of the word “result” [in section 1385(c)(2)(C)] indicates that courts look to the aggregate term once the sentence on the substantive offense and the sentence on the enhancement are accounted for.’ In other words, [Torres] interpret[ed] [section 1385(c)(2)(C)] to apply whenever an enhancement is a component of a sentence that exceeds 20 years.” (Id. at p. 92.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, concluding that Torres’s “interpretation is at odds with the clear text of the statute.” (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.) The court reasoned that “[a] sentence exceeding 20 years could result from an enhancement where a sentence of that length arises as a consequence of the enhancement.” (Ibid.) In other words, the application of the enhancement must “itself lead[] to a sentence exceeding 20 years.” (Ibid., italics added; ibid. [“The word result denotes a causal relationship between the enhancement and a sentence exceeding 20 years.”].) 19 We agree with the Torres court’s interpretation of the statutory language, and Farias cites no subsequent decision that has questioned the Torres court’s interpretation. Here, as in Torres, Farias’s sentences (under the Three Strikes law) on counts 1 and 2 already exceeded 20 years without the application of the three-year GBI enhancement or the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The application of those enhancements did not result in a sentence of over 20 years. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.) Thus, as a matter of law the mitigating circumstance set forth in section 1385(c)(2)(C) does not apply.14 (Torres, at p. 93.) “Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463.) We conclude that Farias’s defense counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to argue that the mitigating circumstance under section 1385(c)(2)(C) supported dismissal of the sentence enhancements. (See O’Bannon, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) Additionally, we are not persuaded that Farias has shown any prejudicial IAC as to defense counsel’s failure to raise the mitigating circumstance regarding multiple enhancements (§ 1385(c)(2)(B)). Assuming counsel should have asserted section 1385(c)(2)(B), on this record, it is not reasonably probable that doing so would have led to a more favorable 14 The Attorney General has filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). The Attorney General’s request for judicial notice is denied because the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 81 is not relevant to our analysis and conclusion regarding the inapplicability of section 1385(c)(2)(C). (See Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 609, fn. 10 [“[A] court will take judicial notice of the legislative history of a statute to ascertain the statute’s purpose and meaning if the statute is ambiguous.”].) 20 outcome for Farias. In deciding not to strike Farias’s strike priors or sentence enhancements, the trial court highlighted that the present offense was “very serious and very violent.” The court also found that Farias appeared to initiate the instant crime, failed to cooperate with Officer Moore’s commands, and had continued to act violently after committing his prior violent offenses, even while incarcerated. Further, the court rejected Farias’s claim that the present offense was connected to mental illness and decided that the remoteness of the prior serious felony convictions was outweighed by “the countervailing considerations,” particularly Farias’s continued violence. The trial court’s ruling on Farias’s Romero motion and decision to impose the maximum sentence on Farias indicate that the court was disinclined to find that the interests of justice would be furthered by dismissing either the GBI enhancement or the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Farias has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting from defense counsel’s failure to raise the mitigating circumstance set forth in section 1385(c)(2)(B). D. Error in Abstract of Judgment Alt