Full Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 1 of 43 PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 23-7201 OMARI KEISAUN MASON, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. KEVIN TALLEY, Lieutenant; FRANK MACK, Major; LARRY LEABOUGH, Superintendent; BINNS, Sergeant; MCKELVIN #81, Sergeant; JONES, Correctional Officer, Defendants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virgina, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:21-cv-01118-LMB-JFA) Argued: September 9, 2025 Decided: September 28, 2026 Before RICHARDSON, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Richardson joined. Judge Benjamin wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. ARGUED: JD Mireles, Nicholas Field, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, New York, New York, for Appellant. Brian Peter Ettari, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel S. Harawa, Adam B. Murphy, Federal Appellate Clinic, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, New York, New York, for Appellant. Leslie A. Winneberger, John USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 2 of 43 P. Dunnigan, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. 2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 3 of 43 RUSHING, Circuit Judge: Omari Keisaun Mason sued officials at Riverside Regional Jail (RRJ) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by placing him in restrictive housing for five months and by shackling him to a telephone on two occasions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. We affirm. I. A. At all relevant times, Mason was an inmate at RRJ. 1 On July 8, 2021, Mason pleaded guilty to multiple state criminal offenses. For three of those offenses, he was sentenced to multiple years in prison, with all but one year suspended for each offense. Mason also had federal charges pending during this time. On July 14, 2021, Mason was found with a cell phone and suspected drug paraphernalia in his cell at RRJ. He was charged with possession of contraband and moved to prehearing detention housing in RRJ’s Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU). 2 On July 19, Mason was served with a disciplinary hearing notice, which informed him that he was charged with a rule violation for possession of contraband and that he had a right to a 1 “Because this appeal follows the award of summary judgment, we recount the facts below in the light most favorable to [Mason], the non-moving party.” Robinson v. Williams, 59 F.4th 113, 115 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 “The RHU is a specialized housing unit for inmates who, for one reason or another, cannot be housed in the regular general population at RRJ. Three classes of inmates are housed in the RHU: those in restricted confinement (often known as ‘administrative detention’), those in disciplinary detention, and those in pre-hearing detention while awaiting the resolution of a disciplinary charge.” J.A. 135. 3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 4 of 43 disciplinary hearing, during which he had the right to call witnesses and present evidence. On the notice, Mason indicated that he had been advised of and understood his rights and that he wished to have a hearing. That same day, Mason had his disciplinary hearing, was found guilty, and was sanctioned with five days of disciplinary detention, beginning on July 15, 2021. 3 After being advised of the appeals process, Mason chose not to appeal. On July 20, 2021, Mason was released from disciplinary detention and relocated to restricted confinement within the RHU pursuant to a determination from RRJ’s Restrictive Housing Review Committee. 4 The Committee reevaluated Mason’s placement on July 27, August 10, August 17, August 24, September 8, September 21, October 5, October 19, November 16, November 23, November 30, and December 21 of 2021. During the time Mason spent in the RHU, he experienced varying levels of restrictions and privileges and he incurred twelve infraction charges, at least six of which 3 Inmates housed in disciplinary detention “are held in lockdown,” which means that they are “housed in their cells for 23 hours per day, with one hour five days per week in which the inmate is allowed to move around the housing unit for exercise or to take a shower” or “to access the Recreation Yard, an outdoor area.” J.A. 135. These inmates “do not have access to the telephone, except for legal phone calls and emergencies,” “do not have access to the canteen for items other than hygiene products or personal stationary,” and “may have restrictions as to the types of property they may possess.” J.A. 135. 4 The “[c]onditions in restricted confinement can vary based on the security interests” that caused an inmate to be housed there. J.A. 136. Inmates in the “‘step down unit’” in restricted confinement “are housed under essentially the same conditions as inmates in the general population.” J.A. 136. The Committee “meets weekly to review each inmate housed in restricted confinement in the RHU to consider whether an inmate can be moved back into the general population, or whether he should be allowed additional privileges or fewer restrictions.” J.A. 136. 4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 5 of 43 resulted in sanctions. 5 On August 10, 2021, Mason assaulted another inmate and was charged with assault, “creating a security disturbance,” and “plotting and planning.” J.A. 157. Mason received a disciplinary hearing notice for those charges, was found guilty at a disciplinary hearing, and was sanctioned with twenty days of disciplinary detention. On August 22, Mason threatened to throw urine on an RRJ employee, claimed he had not received his dinner tray, and lied to an RRJ nurse about whether he had told an employee that he wanted to kill himself. The next day, he was charged with “[c]reating a security disturbance,” “[i]nsinuat[ing] [t]hreat or [b]ehavior,” and “[l]ying to staff.” J.A. 151. Although Mason received a disciplinary notice for these charges and indicated that he wished to have a hearing, there is no evidence in the record that a hearing occurred. On September 19, Mason refused to undergo a drug urinalysis test. He was charged with failing to obey staff instructions, received a disciplinary notice for this charge, and accepted an informal resolution. On September 21, Mason was charged with destroying RRJ property, possessing contraband, and “[h]oarding or attempting to hoard medication.” J.A. 204. He was found guilty of the first charge and sanctioned with seven days’ loss of recreation. On November 11, Mason twice assaulted another inmate, who sustained “a black eye, swollen nose and busted lip.” J.A. 202. Mason was charged with assault and entering another 5 Before Mason was moved to the RHU, he had incurred eight other infraction charges—not counting the charge that landed him in the RHU on July 14, 2021—including “[l]oitering, hiding, or being in an unauthorized area”; “[f]ailing to immediately lockdown when instructed to do so”; “[p]lotting and planning to break the law or [RRJ] rules”; “[f]ailing to follow the directions of staff thereby causing a security breach”; “[e]ntering the cell of another inmate with out the permission of an officer”; “[e]scape or attempt to escape”; “[i]nsinuat[ing] threat or behavior”; and “[a]ssault on staff.” J.A. 173, 175, 177, 179. 5 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 6 of 43 inmate’s cell, received a disciplinary notice for these charges, and indicated that he wished to have a hearing. Mason was found guilty at a hearing and sanctioned with twenty days of disciplinary detention. On December 21, 2021, Mason was released from the RHU and relocated to general population housing. On or about January 5, 2022, Mason was again charged with possessing contraband. He was relocated to Housing Unit 1CA in the RHU, where inmates are placed “due to their past RRJ incidents and violations,” for prehearing detention. J.A. 268. RRJ policy provides that all inmates in Housing Unit 1CA “are placed in restraints during their recreation hour and when they are outside their cell.” J.A. 268; see also J.A. 577 (stating that inmates are either “placed in full restraints or chained to the table anytime they are out to recreation”). On January 7, 2022, Mason asked to use the telephone during his recreation hour, so he was secured to a wall-mounted phone with one hand attached to a chain of some length that was attached to the phone. He was able to sit, stand, move his feet, and rotate his body. He could sit with his hands in his lap, hold and dial the phone or return it to the wall, and raise or lower his arms. Mason remained secured to the telephone for approximately six and a half hours. RRJ employees monitored Mason periodically during this period. About four and a half hours after he was secured to the telephone, Mason stood, turned toward the wall, and urinated on himself. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 7 of 43 On January 12, 2022, 6 Mason was again secured to the telephone during his recreation period and remained there between two and five hours. At some point, Mason “passed out [d]ue to dehydration” and received medical attention before returning to his cell. J.A. 295. B. In October 2021, Mason filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant here, Mason alleged that RRJ officers violated his due process rights by continuing to hold him in the RHU. He later filed a supplemental complaint alleging that the conditions of his confinement in the RHU and while shackled to the telephone on January 7 and 12 violated his constitutional rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment. Their motion included a Roseboro 7 notice notifying Mason of his right to respond and obligation to proffer either affidavits or sworn statements with his opposition. Mason filed a response containing his sworn statement. He indicated that he desired to subpoena an RRJ classification officer “to confirm [Mason’s] sworn statement” and a mental health professional who worked at RRJ during Mason’s incarceration “to confirm [Mason’s] facts.” J.A. 292, 331. The district court granted summary judgment before discovery on all of Mason’s claims except his conditions-of-confinement claim arising from the January 7 and 12 6 It is not clear from the record whether this incident occurred on January 11 or 12. We use January 12 because Mason’s medical records state “man down for patient ‘falling out at the phones’” on January 12. J.A. 446. 7 Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). 7 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 8 of 43 incidents and dismissed all Defendants except Sergeant McKelvin and Officer Jones. Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118, 2023 WL 2619160 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023) (Mason I). Defendants McKelvin and Jones filed a renewed motion for summary judgment with a Roseboro notice, and Mason moved to subpoena video footage of the telephone incidents. The court ordered Defendants to produce any existing surveillance videos of the incidents, and they produced footage for January 7 but none for the second incident. The district court subsequently granted Defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment on the remaining conditions-of-confinement claim. Mason v. McKelvin, No. 1:21-cv-1118, 2023 WL 6849982 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2023) (Mason II). Mason timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. On appeal, Mason first contends that the district court reversibly erred by granting summary judgment in Defendants’ favor without affording him discovery. We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment pre-discovery for abuse of discretion. Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023). “Generally, summary judgment must be refused where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “But a nonmoving party cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party attempted to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.” Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). A district court abuses its discretion by granting summary judgment when it has “fair notice of potential disputes as to the sufficiency of the summary 8 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 9 of 43 judgment record.’” Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). In Shaw, for example, the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment pre- discovery where the plaintiff had requested but not yet received video evidence “core” to plaintiff’s theory, in defendants’ “exclusive control,” and that “would likely bear profound consequences on the claims in th[e] dispute.” Id. at 129–130. The district court here did not abuse its discretion. Mason requested video footage of his restraint to the telephone on January 7 and 12 and also expressed a desire to subpoena two RRJ employees. The court ordered Defendants to produce “any video evidence that exists of the alleged [telephone] incidents,” and in response Defendants produced footage for January 7 but none for any other date. J.A. 357. Although any video of the January 12 incident would have been in RRJ’s exclusive control, it would not profoundly affect Mason’s claims. Mason asserted that “[v]ideo footage of the incident can verify [his] claims.” J.A. 601. But, as we will discuss below, even accepting Mason’s version of what transpired on January 12, the conditions of his confinement on that day do not amount to a constitutional violation, and even if they did, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. Cf. Boyle v. Azzari, 107 F.4th 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2024) (finding district court abused its discretion in an excessive force case when “the record present[ed] a potential dispute of material fact” because of directly conflicting “accounts of the moments immediately preceding the use of force, the core issue in every excessive force case”); Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2025) (noting that “‘premature summary judgment [i]s particularly disfavored’” when the plaintiff needs evidence to prove “the defendant’s subjective knowledge” (quoting Shaw, 59 F.4th at 128)). Additionally, 9 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 10 of 43 Mason’s desire to subpoena an RRJ classification officer and a former mental health professional did not suggest that the summary judgment record was insufficient because Mason indicated that those employees would merely “confirm” information that he had already provided and which the district court credited. J.A. 292, 331; see Shaw, 59 F.4th at 128. III. Having concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion, “we proceed to review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Shaw, 59 F.4th at 129. Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When making this determination, we view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 2020). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute is genuine “when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mason contends that Defendants violated his due process rights by keeping him in restrictive housing for five months and that they subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the RHU generally and when they twice shackled him to a telephone. We will address his claims in that order. A. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. 10 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 11 of 43 amend. XIV, § 1. To establish a procedural due process violation, “a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). Mason acknowledges that he received notice and a hearing each time before he was sent to disciplinary detention. His argument appears to be that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment by placing him in administrative detention, also known as restricted confinement, for all periods between July 20, 2021, and December 21, 2021, when he was not in disciplinary detention. Because we conclude that Mason has not established a protected liberty interest, we need not consider the sufficiency of the process he received regarding restricted confinement. “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement,” but “a liberty interest in avoiding particular conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–222 (2005). Of course, “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,” and “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a state-created liberty interest in avoiding certain confinement conditions implicates due process protection “only if the denial of such an interest ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 249 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 11 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 12 of 43 “Whether confinement conditions are atypical and substantially harsh in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life is a necessarily fact specific comparative exercise.” Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). In this Court, the analysis turns primarily on three factors: “‘(1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral consequences on the inmate’s sentence.’” Id. (quoting Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 530 (4th Cir. 2015)). “[A]ll factors should be considered ‘together’ when making the determination.” Cartegena v. Lovell, 103 F.4th 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224). Even assuming that RRJ policy creates a potential liberty interest in avoiding continued RHU confinement, Mason has not demonstrated that his restrictive detention constituted “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” which for Mason were the conditions in general population housing. Prieto, 780 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 253 (“[C]onditions dictated by a prisoner’s conviction and sentence are the conditions constituting the ‘ordinary incidents of prison life’ for that prisoner.” (citations omitted)). The first factor weighs in Mason’s favor under the summary judgment standard. Mason’s conditions varied during his time in the RHU, and there were occasions when he had a cellmate or had access to other inmates. However, there were also periods during which he was isolated in his cell for 23 hours per day, had restricted telephone and canteen access, and could not participate in visitation. In addition, at some point Mason was put 12 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 13 of 43 “behind double-doors and made . . . [to] wear[] [f]ull shackles” during his recreation hours. J.A. 293. The second factor weighs strongly in Defendants’ favor. When considering this factor, we “look[] to the indefiniteness of [the housing assignment], as well as its duration.” Smith, 964 F.3d at 277. At RRJ, inmates are placed in restricted confinement in the RHU “primarily to address security concerns,” and the Committee periodically reviews each inmate housed in restricted confinement “to consider whether an inmate can be moved back into the general population, or whether he should be allowed additional privileges or fewer restrictions.” J.A. 136. Between July and December 2021, the Committee reevaluated Mason’s RHU placement at least thirteen times. The Committee considered Mason’s rule violations, safety risk, and mental health. Each periodic review form in the record is signed by multiple officials and includes a written explanation for the Committee’s recommendation. 8 Notably, these reviews indicate that Mason’s own misconduct contributed to his loss of certain privileges and continued RHU placement. In this sense, he “held the keys to the conditions of his confinement,” because those conditions “could 8 Mason mischaracterizes the reviews when he asserts that he was kept in the RHU despite “some reviews not[ing] Mr. Mason’s ‘positive behavior’ or ‘no issues or concerns.’” Opening Br. 53. The review that notes Mason’s “positive behavior” states that he “will be removed from double doors due to positive behavior.” J.A. 221. And the review that notes “no issues or concerns” refers to his “mental health” and recommends that “with compliant behavior . . . [Mason should] be transitioned to general population.” J.A. 218. Less than a month after that review, however, Mason twice assaulted another inmate—which was duly noted in a subsequent review. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 14 of 43 be relaxed as time passed and . . . this was dependent on his own conduct.” Cartagena, 103 F.4th at 183. Moreover, the duration of Mason’s restrictive detention was briefer than those we have found indefinite in other cases. At least forty days of Mason’s five months in the RHU from July 20 to December 21 were spent in disciplinary detention, for which Mason appears to concede he received due process. Even considering the full five months, Mason’s confinement in the RHU was briefer than the six-month administrative confinement period in Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503–504 (4th Cir. 1997), which we held not to implicate a protected liberty interest. Mason’s time in the RHU was also far briefer than the four years and three months of segregation in Smith, 964 F.3d at 278, 281, where we found a genuine dispute about whether a protected liberty interest existed, and the “20-year stint in highly restrictive solitary confinement” in Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 531– 532, where we found a protected liberty interest. The third factor also favors Defendants. There is no evidence that Mason’s RHU placement had any collateral consequence on the sentences that Mason was serving for state offenses, such as limiting his ability to earn good-time credits or rendering him ineligible for parole. See, e.g., Smith, 964 F.3d at 279–280. This is yet another way in which Mason’s restrictive detention “does not present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [his] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. On appeal, Mason claims that “while confined to the RHU, he had no law library access and lost legal documents during cell shake downs, both of which prevented him from being adequately informed about his [pending federal] criminal case and ultimately ‘forced [him] to sign a plea agreement’” to 14 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 15 of 43 pending federal charges. Opening Br. 47 (quoting J.A. 298). But Mason fails to explain how a temporary restriction on law library access or loss of legal documents resulted in his guilty plea or differed significantly from the ordinary incidents of prison life. And “conclusory allegations . . . , without more, are insufficient to preclude granting [a] summary judgment motion.” Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. 2020). Weighing these three factors together, the evidence cannot support a conclusion that Mason’s restrictive detention imposed “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that Mason has not demonstrated a protected liberty interest in avoiding his continued RHU placement. Accordingly, his placement in the RHU does not implicate due process protections, and we affirm the district court’s summary judgment ruling on Mason’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. B. We turn next to Mason’s two conditions-of-confinement claims, one about conditions in the RHU and one about being shackled to a telephone on January 7 and 12. As an initial matter, the district court correctly analyzed these claims under the Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment, which forbids infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, “applies to claims by prisoners against corrections officials challenging conditions of confinement,” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019). By contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to conditions-of-confinement claims 15 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 16 of 43 brought by pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). A “pretrial detainee” is a person who has been “charged with a crime” but “has not been adjudged guilty of any crime.” Id. at 523, 536. After a pretrial detainee is convicted and sentenced, he is a prisoner whose claims are subject to the Eighth Amendment. Simmons v. Whitaker, 106 F.4th 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2024). At all relevant times, Mason was a convicted prisoner. On July 8, 2021, Mason was convicted of three state criminal offenses and received a one-year active sentence of imprisonment for each. Mason’s conditions-of-confinement claims arise from his placement in the RHU, which began on July 14, 2021, and ended on December 21, 2021, and incidents that occurred on January 7 and 12, 2022. Although the record does not establish whether his state sentences were to be served consecutively or concurrently, Mason admitted in a letter to the district court, dated December 5, 2022, that he was “at Riverside Regional Jail finishing [his] state time which is up on [D]ecember[] 27, 2022.” J.A. 332. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the Eighth Amendment to Mason’s conditions-of-confinement claims. The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” nor does it prohibit conditions that are “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981); see Cartagena, 103 F.4th at 181. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the alleged deprivation was “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” and (2) that the prison official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302–303 (1991)). 16 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 17 of 43 Under the first, objective element, “only those deprivations denying [a prisoner] ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ are sufficiently grave” to form the basis of a constitutional violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In other words, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). This determination is not left to “the subjective views of judges.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[t]o show the requisite extreme deprivation to support [this objective component of] an Eighth Amendment claim, ‘a prisoner must produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions.’” Jones v. Solomon, 90 F.4th 198, 209 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995)). Because we conclude that Mason has not satisfied this objective standard, we need not address the second element of his claim. 1. Mason has failed to demonstrate that being housed in the RHU for several months subjected him to “the deprivation of [a] basic human need [that] was objectively sufficiently serious” to establish a constitutional violation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). First, the conditions of Mason’s confinement in the RHU did not pose a “substantial risk” of serious physical or emotional injury. Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. We recognized in Porter v. Clarke that prolonged solitary confinement can create a substantial risk “of 17 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 18 of 43 serious psychological and emotional harm.” 923 F.3d at 361. There, inmates had for years been confined alone in their small cells for 23 to 24 hours a day, without access to recreation or “to congregate religious, educational, or social programming.” Id. at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). The inmates were placed in solitary confinement based solely on their sentences and were not offered any avenue out of segregation. Id. at 359. Neither the duration nor conditions of Mason’s detention in the RHU are like the confinement at issue in Porter. During the five months that Mason spent in the RHU, he experienced varying levels of restriction. He consistently had recreation hours out of his cell, and at some points he enjoyed phone privileges, had access to common areas, had a cellmate, and had the opportunity to interact with—and assault—other inmates. He was placed in the RHU based on his misconduct in prison. And RRJ policy provided Mason an avenue out of the RHU; it also provided that good behavior would result in the removal of certain restrictions within the RHU. Second, Mason has not “‘produce[d] evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.’” Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). This is unsurprising, given that Mason has not shown he was denied “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Mason claims “mental health issues from being in restricted confinement,” J.A. 296, and that he “see[s] and hear[s] things that[’]s not there,” a problem he says he didn’t have “before being in [restricted confinement] for so long,” J.A. 297. But “mere incantation of ‘physical and mental injury’” cannot survive a motion for summary judgment. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 n.9. “[A]n inmate must specifically 18 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 19 of 43 describe not only the injury but also its relation to the allegedly unconstitutional condition,” which Mason has failed to do. Id. Because he has not demonstrated the “extreme deprivation[] . . . required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim,” Mason’s claim based on the conditions in the RHU fails. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. 2. Mason also alleged that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by twice shackling him to a telephone for several hours, resulting in him urinating on himself the first time and losing consciousness the second. He relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), which he argues stands for the proposition that shackling a prisoner to a “stationary object” for longer than necessary “to quell a threat or restore order” violates the Eighth Amendment. Reply Br. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Contrary to Mason’s argument, the Supreme Court did not hold in Hope that securing an inmate to a stationary object absent an emergency situation is per se an Eighth Amendment violation. 9 See Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 262, 269 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining that Hope “involved a . . . length[y] detention under painful and dangerous conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment”). In Hope, prison guards in Alabama handcuffed an inmate to an outdoor hitching post in June for seven hours as punishment for disruptive conduct. 536 U.S. at 733–734. Hitching posts are 9 Our dissenting colleague repeats Mason’s error by declaring this supposed right “clearly established.” Diss. Op. 40. 19 USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 20 of 43 intended to be uncomfortable. Hope was handcuffed “in a standing position” with his arms “above shoulder height” and was forced to remain in that position for the entire seven hours. Id. at 733–734 & nn.1–2. The prison guards made Hope remove his shirt, so that he “remained shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin.” Id. at 734–735. The sun “heat[ed] the handcuffs” too, causing “substantial pain,” and whenever “he tried moving his arms to improve his circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrist, causing pain.” Id. at 734–735 & n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). During his seven hours on the outdoor hitching post, guards did not give Hope any “bathroom breaks,” offered him water “only once or twice,” and “taunt