Full Opinion

24CA1709 Peo v Goshon 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 24CA1709 Adams County District Court No. 23CR2580 Honorable Patrick H. Pugh, Judge The People of the State of Colorado Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Josiah Goshon, Defendant-Appellant. ORDER AFFIRMED Division II Opinion by JUDGE FOX Martinez* and Bernard*, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Lindsey Parlin, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2026. ¶1 Defendant, Josiah Goshon, appeals the district court’s order imposing $168,080.44 in restitution costs. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Then-sixteen-year-old Goshon and his juvenile companions robbed a man on July 7, 2023, in Commerce City, Colorado. The victim tried to escape, but Goshon hit him in the head with a gun and shot him several times. The juveniles then fled. The victim was paralyzed from the waist down as a result of the gun shots. ¶3 Goshon was later arrested and charged by direct filing in district court with attempted first degree murder, §§ 18-3-102(1)(a), 18-2-101, C.R.S. 2026; first degree assault, § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S. 2026; aggravated robbery, § 18-4-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2026; felony menacing, § 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2026; possession of a handgun by a juvenile, § 18-12-108.5(1), C.R.S. 2026; a crime of violence sentence enhancer for use of a deadly weapon, § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2026; and a crime of violence sentence enhancer for serious bodily injury to another person, § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(B). ¶4 On May 29, 2024, Goshon pleaded guilty to first degree assault, § 18-3-202(1)(a), with a crime of violence sentence enhancer for use of a deadly weapon, § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A). 1 Goshon agreed to a sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Corrections’ custody, suspended upon successful completion of a six-year Youthful Offender System (YOS) sentence. As part of the plea agreement, he also agreed to pay restitution. In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the remaining counts. ¶5 Before sentencing, the prosecution filed a motion for restitution under section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2026, to reimburse the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (the Department) for the victim’s Medicaid-covered medical care stemming from the incident. Goshon objected, arguing that (1) the juvenile restitution statute, § 19-2.5-1104, C.R.S. 2026 — rather than the criminal statute, § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2026 — governs; and (2) the district court could not order him to pay restitution to an insurance company (which is what Medicaid effectively is) due to his juvenile status. ¶6 The district court granted the prosecution’s request and ordered Goshon to pay $168,080.44 to the Department. The district court found that section 19-2.5-1104(3), which prohibits a court from ordering a juvenile to pay restitution to an insurance company, was inapplicable because it applied only to juvenile 2 delinquency adjudications, and Goshon was charged and convicted as an adult. ¶7 The district court granted the prosecution’s request and ordered Goshon to pay $168,080.44 to the Department. The district court found that section 19-2.5-1104(3), which prohibits a court from ordering a juvenile to pay restitution to an insurance company, was inapplicable because it applied only to juvenile delinquency adjudications, and Goshon was charged and convicted as an adult. II. Title 18 Applicability A. Standard of Review ¶8 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37. When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19. In doing so, we consider the statute’s language, assigning its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Id. Additionally, we “endeavor to effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme.” McCoy, ¶ 38. 3 B. Applicable Law and Analysis ¶9 Colorado law distinguishes between criminal convictions and juvenile delinquency adjudications and their corresponding sentences and restitution rules. Restitution is a mandatory component of a defendant’s sentence. People v. Vasseur, 2016 COA 107, ¶ 17. Under section 19-2.5-801(1)(c) and (5)(a)(I)-(II), C.R.S. 2026, certain juveniles may be convicted under title 18 — the adult Criminal Code —via direct filing and sentenced as an adult or to the YOS. Even when sentenced to the YOS, these juveniles are “sentenced as adults” and subject to all laws pertaining to adult inmates. § 18-1.3-407(1)(d), C.R.S. 2023.1 As relevant here, those convicted under title 18 have a “legal obligation to make full restitution to those harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3- 601(1)(b). ¶ 10 Under title 19 — the Children’s Code — juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over any juvenile ten years of age or older who 1 The statute was amended effective August 12, 2026, and the relevant language was moved to a different part of the statute. See Ch. 15, sec. 5, § 18-1.3-407(1)(b)(III), 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws 62-64. Accordingly, we cite the version of the statute in effect when Goshon was sentenced. 4 has violated state law. § 19-2.5-103(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2026. A juvenile “who receives a deferral of adjudication or who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent” may be subject to restitution requirements under title 18, but juveniles cannot be ordered to pay insurance companies. § 19-2.5-1104(1), (3) (“[T]he court, in addition to any other sentence or commitment that it may impose on the juvenile pursuant to section 19-2.5-1103, shall enter a sentencing order requiring the juvenile to make restitution as required by . . . [the title 18 restitution statute].”). ¶ 11 Here, the prosecution direct filed the charges against Goshon and charged him as an adult — not as a juvenile. Section 18-1.3- 407(1)(d) makes clear that juveniles sentenced in adult court are subject to title 18. Because Goshon was sentenced to the YOS under title 18, section 18-1.3-601(1)(b) controls his restitution obligation. See also Flakes v. People, 153 P.3d 427, 431 (Colo. 2007) (recognizing that “direct filing subjects certain juveniles to adult criminal prosecution and sentencing, based on age and the nature of the allegations” (emphasis added)). ¶ 12 Also, title 19 clearly does not apply here. Title 19’s restitution provision affects only juveniles who receive a deferral of 5 adjudication or who are “adjudicated a juvenile delinquent,” neither of which applies to Goshon. § 19-2.5-1104(1). ¶ 13 Further, a division of this court held in People v. Rivera, 968 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Colo. App. 1997), that once a district court acquires jurisdiction over a juvenile following a transfer from juvenile court, the Children’s Code does not govern restitution. Though Goshon’s case was direct filed and not transferred, the same principle applies because the statutory language is clear. Goshon was convicted in criminal court and sentenced under title 18. Thus, title 18 governs his restitution obligations. ¶ 14 Because we affirm the district court’s application of title 18, we need not decide whether Medicaid is an “insurance company” under title 19’s exception for juveniles. § 19-2.5-1104(3). Because “it is not necessary to decide more, [we will] not . . . decide more.” People v. Curtis, 2014 COA 100, ¶ 12 (quoting PDK Lab’ies Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45. III. Disposition 6 ¶ 15 The order is affirmed. JUDGE MARTINEZ and JUDGE BERNARD concur. 7