Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00095-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG JHOANNA MURILLO-BAUTISTA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF BRAZOS COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca A jury convicted appellant Jhoanna Murillo-Bautista of reckless driving, a misdemeanor, and the trial court assessed a fine and sentenced her to two days of jail time. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a), (b). Murillo-Bautista appeals on the basis that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm because the evidence was sufficient. 1 I. BACKGROUND On March 9, 2024, Murillo-Bautista was driving in College Station at around 2:30 a.m. At that time, she engaged in a race with two other vehicles. Despite driving in a forty- miles-per-hour zone, one of the drivers, possibly Murillo-Bautista, was measured driving at ninety-two miles-per-hour with the other two drivers keeping pace. Police conducted a traffic stop and initially arrested Murillo-Bautista for racing on a highway. She was later charged via information of driving with a “willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, by driving 92[ ]mph in a 40-mph zone along with two other vehicles in close proximity.” See id. § 545.401(a). Pretrial proceedings occurred wherein discovery was exchanged and several motions were filed. Trial commenced on December 8, 2025. Samuel Humphreys, an officer with the Texas A&M University Police Department (A&M PD), testified he was on night shift on March 9 in the north district and driving eastbound on University Drive. At around 2:42 a.m., he observed three motor vehicles at a stoplight on University Drive and Bizzell Street revving their engines. After the light turned green, all three vehicles accelerated and Officer Humphreys pursued in the center lane. A Mustang traveled in the left lane, a Challenger in the center lane, and a Camaro in the right lane. Using radar, Officer Humphreys registered one of the vehicles, which he believed to be the Challenger, traveling at ninety-two miles per hour in a forty-miles-per- hour zone. He conceded during cross-examination he could not be sure which vehicle the 1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket- equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are bound by the precedent of the transferring court to the extent that it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 radar logged. The trial court admitted a photo of the radar noting the speed into evidence. He observed there was another vehicle in the far-right lane behind the three racing vehicles, a couple of vehicles traveling westbound down University Drive, and a traffic stop occurring on University Drive and Texas Avenue in the opposite lane. After the vehicles reached Polo Road, Officer Humphreys activated his lights and initiated a traffic stop on the Challenger, which was driven by Murillo-Bautista. He was not able to stop the other two vehicles. The trial court admitted videos of the incident showing that at the time of the incident, there was one vehicle in the right lane not involved in the racing, and the Challenger “fishtailed” when the light turned green due to lack of traction. During his discussions with Murillo-Bautista, she stated she did not know how fast she was going or what the speed limit was. Officer Humphreys further testified that Murillo-Bautista’s Challenger was in close proximity to other vehicles and there was potential for damage to property or other persons due to the way she drove the vehicle. He stated this area of College Station was busy with people, even at that time of night, because it’s located in a bar and nightlife district. He further described the area as having an apartment building and that all of the areas where Murillo-Bautista drove were public areas. During cross-examination, he conceded he did not observe any vehicles ahead of the three racing vehicles or see any pedestrians walking around during the traffic stop that were visible on the camera footage. Officer Humphreys also admitted he did not observe the vehicles weaving or making unsafe lane changes, going through red lights, tailgating, or committing any other traffic violations. He also acknowledged he did not arrest Murillo-Bautista for reckless driving. 3 Spenser Harden, a detective with the A&M PD, testified he was Officer Humphreys’ field training officer on the night of the incident and was in the vehicle with Officer Humphreys. They were performing regular patrol duties at the time of the incident. The trial court entered his body camera footage into evidence. Detective Harden testified the initial audio captured the Challenger fishtailing and making a squealing noise. The video depicted Murillo-Bautista claiming she was not racing and was unaware of the speed limit in College Station. However, Detective Harden testified there were posted speed limit signs similar to other signs in Texas. She acknowledged during the stop she was not driving fast due to an emergency. The camera also depicted other cars driving on the roadway. Murillo-Bautista also commented to Detective Harden “that she paid $100,000 for the car, don’t I think that she has the right to rev it.” Her car was a Hellcat which had up to 700 horsepower. Detective Harden stated the area where the race occurred was still a well-traveled area at that time of night. He testified that Murillo-Bautista never disputed the speed she was traveling. On cross-examination, Detective Harden admitted there were “lighter” traffic conditions at that time of night and that he did not notice pedestrians walking on the road on the camera footage. He also conceded the two outside vehicles accelerated quicker than the Challenger and that none of the vehicles exited their lane of travel, ran through a red light, or made any other traffic violations. He stated they pursued the Challenger because it was the fastest vehicle, moving past the other two vehicles after it initially fell behind. He did not initially pursue reckless driving charges because racing was a higher charge, but stated there was still probable cause for reckless driving due to the squealing 4 tires, the excessive speed in the middle of a city, other people driving on the roadway, and the risk to others. Detective Harden elaborated that while there was less traffic that time of day, the roadway was not empty, and he observed other vehicles drive by during the traffic stop. He also stated there were other structures and buildings around subject to damage if someone lost control of their vehicle. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court issued its charge instructing the jury that the offense of reckless driving constitutes driving “a motor vehicle on a public roadway with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” On December 8, 2025, the jury found Murillo-Bautista guilty of the above-described offense. The trial court then sentenced her as described above per the parties’ agreement. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law To determine if a conviction is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we review “whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979)). “The relevant question ‘is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edwards v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in 5 establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. [T]he essential elements of a crime “are defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge” which “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense” the defendant is being accused of. Lang v. State, 664 S.W.3d 155, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). Here, Murillo-Bautista was convicted of reckless driving, which is driving a vehicle “in wil[l]ful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a). The offense is committed regardless of whether the driving causes any harm. Zuliani v. State, 383 S.W.3d 289, 299 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref’d). Showing willful or wanton disregard requires proof that the person had “deliberate and conscious indifference to the safety of others.” Nava v. State, 480 S.W.3d 759, 766 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Dixon v. State, 358 S.W.3d 250, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d)). This is more than a momentary judgment lapse and requires showing the act the driver committed is one they knew or should have known posed a high degree of risk of serious injury. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Zakir, 665 S.W.3d 884, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (quoting City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 531 (Tex. 2022)). 6 B. Discussion While she concedes she was speeding, Murillo-Bautista’s primary argument is that she could not be convicted of reckless driving because there was no other traffic on the road, no pedestrians, and no evidence that she posed a danger to the safety of persons or property. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a). However, her argument not only fails to properly comport with the record but also misapplies the law regarding the necessary evidence to support a conviction for reckless driving. Given the record, and relevant caselaw, we find the jury could have found the essential elements of reckless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. See Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 303. First, Murillo-Bautista’s argument that there was no other traffic on the road is factually incorrect. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the record indicates she engaged in a street race as she revved her engine and sped from a red light simultaneously with two other vehicles, with all of the vehicles keeping a pace around ninety-two miles-per-hour. Murillo-Bautista appears to suggest that the willing participation of these drivers means she cannot be convicted of reckless driving based on posing a danger to them, but she cites no authority for that proposition. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). In any event, the jury was entitled to determine driving in close proximity to two other vehicles at high rates of speed displayed “disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.401(a). Moreover, Officer Humphreys testified this type of driving posed potential for damage to property or other persons, which the jury was entitled to consider in reaching its verdict. See id.; Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Murillo-Bautista also asserts there were no cars ahead of the racing vehicles, but that is not relevant as the jury had evidence these three vehicles were on the roadway 7 together, and we must defer to their resolution of this evidence as reckless driving. See Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Additionally, there was video evidence of other traffic on the roadway including a vehicle behind the three racing vehicles and other “incidental traffic” as Murillo-Bautista states in her brief. That she did not get into an accident with these vehicles is not relevant as the offense is committed regardless of actual damage and it is based on whether the driving posed a high degree of risk of serious injury or property damage. See Zakir, 665 S.W.3d at 892; Zuliani, 383 S.W.3d at 299. Next, the fact there were no pedestrians on the sidewalk in the immediate area of the incident is not controlling. The question is not whether there were actual pedestrians but whether driving ninety-two miles-per-hour in a downtown area with property and potential persons in the immediate vicinity displayed a “deliberate and conscious indifference to the safety of others.” Nava, 480 S.W.3d at 766. Both officers testified this area typically has pedestrians even late at night, and it is quite telling it was her belief “she has the right to rev it.” The jury determined Murillo-Bautista’s conduct reflected indifference, and while this Court will not speed to conclusions, it is readily apparent that driving ninety-two miles-per-hour in this area supports the jury’s findings especially given the deference we are to show the jury’s determinations. See Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Murillo-Bautista also contends there was not sufficient evidence because the cars maintained their own lanes, did not weave in and out of traffic, and did not run a red light. While the fact further danger was not posed is of some relief, these facts do not mean this driving lacked a high degree of risk of serious injury or that Murillo-Bautista did not show a “deliberate and conscious indifference to the safety of others.” See Nava, 480 8 S.W.3d at 766; Zakir, 665 S.W.3d at 892. The jury here determined her driving was reckless and the mere lack of weaving or other traffic violations does not make that evidence insufficient. See Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 303; Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Of further note, Murillo-Bautista accelerated quickly enough that she lost traction and the back of her vehicle fishtailed, which is a fact the jury was entitled to consider to reach its verdict, regardless of whether the back swerved into another lane or not. See Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 303; Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Finally, Murillo-Bautista contends without citation to authority that there must be more evidence than speeding to support a reckless driving conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). We believe exceeding the posted speed limit by over fifty miles per hour is by itself a manifestly reckless act. See Bartholomew v. State, 871 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc.) (holding speeding can be a lesser included offense of reckless driving); City of Houston v. Green, 672 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Tex. 2023) (suggesting certain types of high-speed travel alone can support finding of reckless disregard). In any event, as illustrated above, there is plenty of evidence beyond the mere fact of the exorbitant speed to support her conviction. See Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 303; Edwards, 635 S.W.3d at 655. Accordingly, we overrule Murillo-Bautista’s sole issue. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 12th day of November, 2026. 9