Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D20-882 _____________________________ DENNIS CHARLES SCHMIDT II, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County. Wade Mercer, Judge. December 30, 2020 PER CURIAM. Dennis Charles Schmidt II appeals his judgment and sentence after the trial court revoked his probation. He argues that after revoking probation, the trial court had to modify or continue his probation under section 948.06(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2019). But because Schmidt did not qualify for sentencing under the statute, we affirm. Schmidt pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine. The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced Schmidt to four years of probation. But two months after sentencing, Schmidt violated three conditions of his probation: (1) failing to report to the probation office, (2) changing his residence without consent of his probation officer, and (3) failing to successfully complete or remain in a rehabilitation program. The State then moved to revoke Schmidt’s probation. Before the revocation hearing began, Schmidt’s counsel urged the trial court to sentence Schmidt under section 948.06(2)(f). Because this was Schmidt’s first time violating probation, his three violations were low-risk technical violations, and he was a non- violent felony offender sentenced to probation, his counsel argued that Schmidt qualified for sentencing under the statute. But the trial court found that Schmidt did not qualify because he violated three conditions of probation. The court found that a probationer charged with violating more than one condition of probation could not qualify for sentencing under the statute. Based on this finding, Schmidt admitted to violating probation and waived his right to an evidentiary hearing. But he preserved his right to appeal the trial court’s ruling that he did not qualify for sentencing under section 948.06(2)(f). The court then revoked probation and sentenced Schmidt to eleven months and twenty- nine days in county jail. This timely appeal follows. Schmidt argues that the trial court erred when it found that he did not qualify for sentencing under section 948.06(2)(f). We review questions involving statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Peraza, 259 So. 3d 728, 730 (Fla. 2018). Section 948.06(2)(f) provides: (f) . . . the court shall modify or continue a probationary term upon finding a probationer in violation when any of the following applies: a. The term of supervision is probation. b. The probationer does not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern, as defined in paragraph (8)(b). c. The violation is a low-risk technical violation, as defined in paragraph (9)(b).5 2 d. The court has not previously found the probationer in violation of his or her probation pursuant to a filed violation of probation affidavit during the current term of supervision. A probationer who has successfully completed sanctions through the alternative sanctioning program is eligible for mandatory modification or continuation of his or her probation. To qualify for sentencing under the statute, Schmidt had to meet all four conditions described in subsections a-d. See Owens v. State, 303 So. 3d 993, 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (holding that whether section 948.06(2)(f), Florida Statutes, applies to a defendant who committed an offense before the statute was amended, when imposing sentence for a violation of probation, a trial court is limited under subsection 948.06(2)(f)1. to modifying or continuing probation or imposing a sentence of up to 90 days in county jail only when a defendant “meet[s] all four conditions of subsection 948.06(2)(f)1.”). Schmidt satisfied the conditions described in subsections a, b, and d: he was on probation, he did not qualify as a violent felony offender of special concern, and the court had never found Schmidt in violation of his probation. The question is whether Schmidt, who had multiple low-risk technical violations, satisfied the condition described in subsection c—that “the violation is a low-risk technical violation.” To answer the question, we begin with the language of the statute. See Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. State, 278 So. 3d 545, 547 (Fla. 2019). A statute’s plain language controls if the language is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning. Valleycrest Landscape Maint., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 213 So. 3d 992, 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). The language of section 948.06(2)(f)1.c. is unambiguous. The statute provides that “[t]he violation is a low-risk technical violation, as defined in paragraph (9)(b).” The use of the noun “violation” along with the indefinite article “a” before the second mention of the word “violation” requires a reading of “violation” as a singular noun. A, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“a” is “used as a function word before singular nouns”). The statute thus limits the probationers eligible for sentencing under the 3 statute to probationers with only one technical violation. And so, we conclude that the plain language of the statute conveys a clear and definite meaning to exclude from its applications probationers who have more than one low-risk technical violation. And when read in context with other provisions of the statute, our conclusion that the statute is limited to probationers with single violations finds additional support. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 24, at 167 (2012) (stating that when interpreting a legal text, courts should “consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts”). Section 948.06(2)(f)1.c. refers to paragraph 9(b) of the statute for the definition of the term “low-risk violation. ” Paragraph (9)(b) in turn provides that “the term ‘low-risk violation,’ when committed by a probationer, means any of the following” and then enumerates eleven types of violations. The use of the singular noun in Paragraph (9)(b) supports our interpretation that section 948.06(2)(f)1.c. pertains only to a single technical violation of probation. In sum, we hold that the plain language of 948.06(2)(f)1.c. is clear and unambiguous and applies only to probationers with a single violation of probation. Because he had multiple violations, Schmidt did not qualify for sentencing under the statute. And so, the trial court did not err in revoking his probation and sentencing him to county jail. Schmidt’s judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. ROWE, WINOKUR, and NORDBY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Megan Long and Kacey Lacey, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant. 4 Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 5