Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0428n.06 No. 25-2173 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Oct 22, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR v. ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ) MICHIGAN CAR’DON OMOEFE OZOMARO, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) ) Before: SILER, MOORE, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges. KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Car’Don Ozomaro (“Ozomaro”) appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an encounter with police officers, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On July 3, 2024, police in Kalamazoo, Michigan received a call reporting that shots had been fired near a local apartment building. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 5) (Page ID #302); see also R. 24-1 (Call for Serv. Rep. at 1) (Page ID #54). At the time, Officer Christian Harris was working nearby as part of a local patrol. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 5) (Page ID #302). He responded quickly to the dispatch about the shooting and began canvassing the area. See id. at 5, 13, 26 (Page ID #302, 310, 323); R. 24-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 00:30–06:25). A few No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro minutes later, Investigator Patterson took to the police radio to tell responding officers that “if [he] were to guess where the shots came from it would be . . . the corner of Gilbert and Sherwood.” R. 24-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 06:25–06:35); see R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 6–7, 26–27) (Page ID #303–04, 323–24); R. 28-1 (Supp. Rep. of Off. Harris at 1) (Page ID #100). Patterson had been conducting surveillance near the apartment building at the time the shots were fired and heard the shots firsthand. See R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 6–7) (Page ID #303–04); R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 4) (Page ID #76). Officer Joshua Pena also used the radio to advise responders that he saw three young men walking away from the area where shots were fired, near a local housing complex roughly two blocks north. He further indicated that the trio was actively avoiding police contact. See R. 24-3 (Supp. Rep. of Off. Visser at 18) (Page ID #70); R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 4) (Page ID #76); R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 7, 15, 26–27) (Page ID #304, 312, 323–24); see also Appellant Brief at 4 (attaching a map of the relevant area). Officer Harris drove to the complex and immediately noticed three young men who “appeared to be loitering” in front of a dwelling and evading him. R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 4) (Page ID #76); see also R. 24-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 08:32–09:02) (showing Harris talking into his radio, stating that he saw “three guys down on Bridge Street [on the] side of the [housing complex]” and that “they saw [him] and turned around and started walking off”). The individuals in question were Vontavion Jackson, Larry Wilson, and Car’Don Ozomaro. R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 4) (Page ID #76). Harris testified that he recognized Ozomaro and Wilson “almost immediately” as individuals who had been the subject of “crime 2 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro reduction notes.”1 R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 7–8, 30–32) (Page ID #304–05, 327–29). He further testified that the notes identified Ozomaro as a member of a local “gang” known to be “part of the gun violence issue in Kalamazoo,” and an individual who “had been involved in previous gun violence related incidents.” Id. Harris admitted that the most recent crime reduction note identifying Ozomaro individually was published “roughly ten months” prior to the July 2024 incident. Id. at 22–23, 30–32 (Page ID #319–20, 327–29). However, he also testified that there were other reports discussing the gang that “Ozomaro [was] known to associate with” more generally. Id. at 23 (Page ID #320). He further attested that it was “very common [for Ozomaro’s gang] to be involved” in firearms offenses, and that as a result, the gang and its members were “discussed often” and “c[a]me up” frequently in conversation amongst officers. Id.; see also R. 28-2 (Crime Reduction Notes at 2–4) (Page ID #102–04) (indicating that Ozomaro was “involved in [the] gang,” that he had “been involved in shootings,” and that he had prior “gun violations” on his record including arrests for concealed carry); R. 15 (Pretrial Servs. Rep. at 3–5) (Page ID #25– 27) (detailing Ozomaro’s arrest history). As Harris approached the three men, he called out to them and asked whether they had heard any gunfire nearby. R. 24-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 09:10–09:19) (“Hey fellas, did y’all hear any gunfire near here? . . . [Did] you hear anything like that?”). Jackson moved towards Harris and answered him in the negative. “If [they] had [heard gunfire],” Jackson said, “[they] wouldn’t be [outside].” Id. at 09:19–09:21. Ozomaro and Wilson remained on the stoop of the 1 Harris describes “crime reduction notes” as collections “of information [about] recent events [related to] gun violence” in Kalamazoo. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 8, 30–32) (Page ID #305, 327–29). 3 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro dwelling during this initial encounter but also denied hearing gunfire. Id. at 09:16 (capturing one of the young men responding “hell nah” to Harris’s inquiry). Harris continued to question the men, but each maintained that he had no knowledge of any shooting. Id. at 09:23–09:37. At one point, though, Ozomaro remarked that any shots would have probably been fired “up the street [if] anything.” Id. at 09:34–09:36. To Harris, this indicated that Ozomaro may have been aware of the shooting even though he repeatedly denied having any knowledge of the incident. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 16–17) (Page ID #313–14). During this interaction, Harris also became suspicious that Ozomaro was armed. See id. at 7–9, 16–17 (Page ID #304–07, 313–14). Accordingly, Harris moved closer to Ozomaro and asked if he had a weapon on him. R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 09:40–09:53). Ozomaro replied that he did not. Id. at 09:53–09:54. Nevertheless, Harris grew increasingly suspicious that Ozomaro was in possession of a firearm. According to the officer’s testimony, Ozomaro exhibited “strange” behavior suggesting that he was “very concerned with his right side.” R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 9) (Page ID #306). For example, when Ozomaro would talk “his right arm barely moved at all while his left moved freely” and gesticulated. Id.; R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77). The fact that his right arm remained “along his right side” and “against his person continually” led Harris to believe that Ozomaro “was guarding something.” R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77); see, e.g., R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 09:55–10:15). Harris decided to investigate further and began walking around Ozomaro. As he did so, Ozomaro “maintained . . . a bladed position” and “would only present his left side to [Harris].” R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 9, 27–28) (Page ID #306, 325–25). Harris found it “unnatural” that Ozomaro “didn’t turn and face [him]” and instead “continually look[ed] over his left shoulder” to 4 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro talk to him, keeping his right side out of view. Id.; see, e.g., R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 10:25–10:40). This again suggested to Harris that Ozomaro was “very concerned about [his] right side,” which furthered his suspicion that Ozomaro was attempting to conceal a firearm. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 9, 26) (Page ID #306, 323). As Harris moved behind Ozomaro, three other officers arrived on the scene and positioned themselves around him and Wilson. Id. at 16 (Page ID #313).2 Harris assured Ozomaro that he was “not accusing [him] of anything,” that he did not “want somebody out here to get hurt,” and that he was just trying to do his “due diligence.” R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 11:00– 11:15). Ozomaro then mumbled something to himself and bent forward to spit on the ground. Id. at 11:10–11:15; R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 10) (Page ID #307). When he did so, Harris saw a “bulge” on Ozomaro’s right side with “distinct right angles” reflecting a “hard . . . metallic object” that “protruded away from his body in an unnatural way.” R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77); R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 10, 19, 28–29) (Page ID #307, 316, 325–26). Harris immediately recognized the bulge as a firearm and moved in to perform a Terry frisk. See R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 11:15–11:18); R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77); R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 10, 19, 28–29) (Page ID #307, 316, 325–26). As Harris reached for Ozomaro’s right hip, however, Ozomaro attempted to flee. R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 11:17–11:25). A struggle ensued during which a firearm fell from Ozomaro’s person. Id.; R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77). 2 This included at least one officer who could see Ozomaro’s right side. See, e.g., R. 25-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 10:46, 10:59–11:05); see also R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 18) (Page ID #315) (Harris acknowledging that if Ozomaro was “blading away from [him],” he must have also been “facing another officer” at least “[p]artially”). 5 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro B. Procedural History Ozomaro was arrested and ultimately indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). R. 2 (Indictment at 1–2) (Page ID #3–4). In June 2025, he moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the above-described encounter. See R. 24 (Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Evid. at 1) (Page ID #40). In support of this motion, Ozomaro argued that he was seized when Harris and his fellow officers “surrounded” him, id. at 8 (Page ID #47), at which point Harris lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Ozomaro was involved in criminal activity, id. at 9–13 (Page ID #48–52). He further argued that the subsequent frisk was unlawful, and that any evidence obtained as a fruit of that search should be suppressed. Id. The district court disagreed and denied the motion. The court concluded that “circumstances change[d]” when Harris saw the “bulge” in Ozomaro’s waistband and that Ozomaro was subject to search and seizure “simultaneous[ly]” when Harris leaned in to grab the “bulge.” R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 53, 57) (Page ID #350, 354). At that moment, the court determined that Harris possessed “reasonable suspicion . . . that [Ozomaro] was involved in criminal activity,” as well as “reasonable suspicion that [he was] armed and dangerous.” Id. at 57 (Page ID #354). Accordingly, the court held that the search and seizure were lawful and declined to suppress the derivative evidence. Id.; see R. 33 (Order at 1) (Page ID #124) (denying the motion to suppress “for the reasons stated on the record”). Shortly thereafter, Ozomaro pleaded guilty to the charge of being a felon in possession. See R. 43 (Order Adopting Rep. & Recommendation at 1) (Page ID #175). In so doing, he reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. R. 37 (Plea Agreement at 1) (Page ID #130) (“This guilty plea is conditional, in that Defendant reserves the right, on appeal from the 6 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro judgment, to seek review of the adverse determination of his motion to suppress.”). Ozomaro timely exercised that right and appealed the district court’s decision thirteen days after the entry of judgment against him. See R. 56 (Judgment at 1) (Page ID #360); R. 59 (Notice of Appeal at 1) (Page ID #375). II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review When a motion to suppress has been denied, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2022). “The ultimate question of whether [a] search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 922– 23 (6th Cir. 1998); see United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2010). In conducting our review, we “must give due weight to the factual inferences and credibility determinations of the district court,” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 528 (citation modified), and “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,” Johnson, 620 F.3d at 690. Accordingly, the “denial of a motion to suppress will be affirmed on appeal if the district court’s conclusion can be justified for any reason.” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 528 (quoting United States v. Trice, 966 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2020)). B. Legal Standard The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right to be free from all searches and seizures, but it does protect against those that are unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). Searches and seizures are typically presumed to be unreasonable when they are not supported by a warrant and probable cause. See Bambach v. Moegle, 92 F.4th 615, 7 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro 628 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)); United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993). But there are “several well-established exceptions” to that general rule. United States v. McMullen, 103 F.4th 1225, 1229 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372–73 (1993)). “One such exception appears in Terry v. Ohio,” which “authorizes police officers to conduct temporary investigative stops without a warrant or probable cause,” id., provided that the officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, giving rise to reasonable suspicion “that [a] person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity,” Johnson, 620 F.3d at 692 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 (1983)). “[A]n inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ is not sufficient.” United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 536–37 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). “Instead, the officer must be able to articulate some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop based upon specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. at 537 (citation modified) (quoting United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 2004)). Nevertheless, we have described “the degree of suspicion required” in this context as “quite low.” United States v. McCallister, 39 F.4th 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)). Whereas probable cause requires a “fair probability” or “substantial chance” of criminal activity, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.13 (1983)), reasonable suspicion requires only “a moderate chance of finding evidence of 8 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro wrongdoing,” id., based on the “totality of the circumstances,” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). Incident to a lawful Terry stop, officers may also “perform protective searches for weapons if they reasonably suspect that the stopped individual is ‘armed and dangerous.’” McMullen, 103 F.4th at 1229 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26–27). Under certain circumstances, the facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity may also give rise to reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. See United States v. McMullin, 739 F.3d 943, 945–46 (6th Cir. 2014). In these cases, the same facts thus justify both the search and the seizure. See id. at 946. C. Seizure Analysis On appeal, Ozomaro argues that Officer Harris lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in criminal activity at the time he was seized, such that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. See Appellant Brief at 13–23. All agree that the encounter between Ozomaro and Harris was consensual at its inception and escalated into a Terry stop. See id. at 19; Appellee Brief at 12; see also United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 953–54 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that consensual encounters are not seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). But the parties disagree on the precise moment that line was crossed. Ozomaro argues that he was seized “no later than when the fourth officer arrived and further surrounded” him, Appellant Brief at 19, whereas the government argues that he was not seized until Harris reached for the bulge in his waistband, see Appellee Brief at 12. Because a Terry stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, it is typically important for courts to address any disputes over the precise moment a suspect was 9 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro seized. See United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2012). This is especially so in rapidly evolving situations where facts supporting reasonable suspicion may be absent one moment and present the next. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 2022 WL 35406, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022). Here, new facts supporting reasonable suspicion emerged between the moment officers allegedly “surrounded” Ozomaro (the point of seizure he posits), and the moment Harris reached for him (the point of seizure the government posits). It was during that time that Ozomaro bent down, revealing a bulge in his waistband that Harris recognized as a firearm. See United States v. Lewis, 843 F. App’x 683, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “a bulge in [the suspect’s] waistband at his right hip” contributed to “reasonable suspicion that [he] was engaged in criminal activity at the time of the seizure”); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977) (concluding that where an officer observes a bulge on a suspect’s person and believes it to be a weapon, the observation provides reasonable suspicion that the individual may be armed and dangerous); United States v. Stennis, 457 F. App’x 494, 499–500 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Nevertheless, we need not determine the precise moment of seizure in this case. Even if the encounter ripened into a seizure sometime before Harris saw the bulge, the seizure would have been supported by reasonable suspicion. D. Reasonable Suspicion The government suggests that the following facts supported reasonable suspicion at the time Ozomaro was surrounded by officers: (1) the fact that Ozomaro was encountered in close proximity to the suspected site of the shooting, (2) the fact that Ozomaro sought to avoid the police and maintained his distance when Harris first approached, (3) the fact that Harris recognized Ozomaro as a member of a gang known to be involved in gun violence and as an individual with 10 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro prior arrests for firearms offenses, and (4) the fact that Ozomaro moved in a way that suggested he was trying to conceal his right side. The question before us is whether all these facts and circumstances, taken together, amount to reasonable suspicion that Ozomaro was engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 665 (6th Cir. 2012). In assessing whether a given set of facts supports reasonable suspicion, we must resist the urge to ignore the less probative factors or give them “no weight,” as the “evaluation and rejection of . . . factors in isolation from each other [would] not [properly] account [for] the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as Terry itself makes clear, it is entirely possible for a series of independently innocent acts, “taken together,” to support reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Proximity. First, we consider the fact that Ozomaro was encountered near the site of a reported shooting. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g at 7) (Page ID #304); see also Appellant Brief at 4 (attaching a map of the relevant area). We have repeatedly observed that an individual’s temporal and geographic proximity to a “reported crime can be a salient factor giving rise to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Chambers, 638 F. App’x 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 350–51, 353 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop, in part based on the “location of [the suspect’s] car [relative to the reported robbery] and the time of the encounter relative to the time of the reported robbery”); United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop suspects in part because their car was seen “at a location consistent with the time needed to travel to that point from” the scene of the crime); United States v. Thornton, 621 F. App’x 324, 327–29 (6th Cir. 2015) (collecting additional cases). 11 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro However, we have also recognized the dangers of placing too much weight on this factor. In United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2006), for instance, we warned that relying too much on contextual factors like proximity could, taken to the logical extreme, mean that officers have probable cause to stop and detain “[a]ny person who happened to wander into [an] area . . . in the immediate aftermath of a serious crime[.]” Id. at 467 (quoting United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000)). Moreover, we have indicated in several cases that an individual’s “mere presence” at the scene of a reported crime “is not enough to trigger reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Johnson, 428 F. App’x 616, 620 (6th Cir. 2011); see United States v. McElrath, 786 F. App’x 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[P]resence in a high-crime neighborhood—or even general proximity to the site of suspected criminal activity—is not alone sufficient to justify a stop.”); King v. United States, 917 F.3d 409, 424 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect who “was several blocks away from the relevant intersection”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021). We have likewise acknowledged that proximity is most probative of involvement in criminal activity when there are additional facts and circumstances suggesting that proximity should yield a strong inference of culpability—for example, in cases where police officers encounter an individual near the scene of a crime alone, with no other potential suspects in the area. See, e.g., Thornton, 621 F. App’x at 328 (“Here, the officers encountered Thornton (and only Thornton) in close proximity to the location that they suspected was the origin of the gunshots[.]” (emphasis in original)); Chambers, 638 F. App’x at 440 n.4 (affirming reasonable suspicion where the officer “observed Chambers and Collins—and only Chambers and Collins—in close proximity 12 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro to the scene mere moments after the call” (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the defendant “was the only person in the vicinity . . . who fairly matched the description of a man who reportedly had been shooting at passing cars just minutes before police arrived”); United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that reasonable suspicion was supported by the fact that the defendant “was the only person in the vicinity” of a recently committed crime); United States v. Baldwin, 114 F. App’x 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Moore on the grounds that in that case, “the defendant was the only person in the vicinity of the suspected burglary” (emphasis in original)). Here, however, the proximity inference is relatively weak. Not only were there other individuals gathered outside the same complex where Harris encountered Ozomaro, but also there were many individuals who were even closer to the suspected scene of the crime, all of whom were equally disinterested in cooperating with the police. See R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 13) (Page ID #310). Accordingly, even though Ozomaro was found just two blocks away from the site of the shooting ten minutes after shots were fired, we give the fact of proximity little independent weight in our reasonable-suspicion analysis. Evasive Behavior. The second factor—Ozomaro’s evasive behavior—is likewise entitled to only minimal weight on its own. To be sure, evasive conduct can, and often is, “a pertinent factor” in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). But evasive behaviors exist on a spectrum, and the weight they receive in a reasonable-suspicion analysis varies accordingly. Indeed, we have held that details like “the speed of the suspect’s movements,” Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 466 (quoting United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 757 (11th Cir. 2000)), and “the abruptness . . . of a suspect’s departure upon noticing the police” affect 13 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro the degree to which an evasive behavior contributes to the totality of the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion, Johnson, 620 F.3d at 694. On one side of the spectrum is unprovoked, “[h]eadlong flight.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (deeming “[h]eadlong flight . . . the consummate act of evasion”). On the other are more ambiguous behaviors like moving out of officers’ line of sight, looking twice at officers, or walking away from them. Johnson, 620 F.3d at 695 (citing United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2009); United Sates v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2003)). Ozomaro’s behavior here is far closer to the latter than the former. Ozomaro did not engage in “headlong flight” upon noticing Harris, or even “hurr[y] away” from him. Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 466 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). Rather, he simply “turned around and started walking off” when he saw a police car approaching, and maintained distance while another individual approached and spoke with Harris. See R. 24-5 (Body Cam. of Off. Harris at 08:32–09:21). Therefore, Ozomaro’s evasive behavior also provides only modest support for the stop. In spite of the above, we conclude that, by the time officers purportedly “surrounded” Ozomaro, reasonable suspicion existed to believe that Ozomaro was involved in criminal activity. Although neither Ozomaro’s proximity nor evasive behavior support reasonable suspicion on their own, two additional factors are more probative of wrongdoing and “cast a suspicious light” on these “seemingly innocent behavior[s]”: (1) Ozomaro’s criminal history and gang membership, and (2) the fact that he kept his right side guarded and out of Harris’s view. Stepp, 680 F.3d at 667 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2020)). When all four factors are taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Johnson, 620 F.3d at 690, they establish reasonable suspicion to believe that Ozomaro was involved in criminal activity. 14 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro Criminal History. The first of these factors is Ozomaro’s history of involvement in “gun violence related incidents” and membership in a local gang known to be “part of the gun violence issue in Kalamazoo.” R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 7–8) (Page ID #304–05). To be sure, the fact that a suspect has a criminal history cannot independently establish reasonable suspicion that the individual is presently engaged in criminal activity. See Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir. 2003). But here, Harris was investigating a nearby shooting. And he recognized Ozomaro and Wilson “almost immediately” as members of a gang involved in gun violence and recalled that Ozomaro was the subject of “crime reduction notes” which, in turn, identified him as someone who had been “involved in shootings” and arrested for gun violations. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 8, 30–32) (Page ID #305, 327–29); see R. 28-2 (Crime Reduction Notes at 2–4) (Page ID #102–04). Ozomaro’s “criminal history [was thus] related to the same suspicions that [Officer Harris] was developing.” Stepp, 680 F.3d at 667. This sort of relevant criminal history can support reasonable suspicion both independently and by “cast[ing] a suspicious light on the otherwise weaker indicators” when appropriate. Id.3 Because Harris was developing gun-related suspicions, Ozomaro’s membership in a gang known to be involved in gun violence likewise contributes to reasonable suspicion in this case. Our sibling circuits have concluded as much. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 45 F.3d 1070, 3 Against this conclusion, Ozomaro suggests that his criminal history and gang membership are not proper considerations because the crime reduction notes that Harris had seen were “stale” at ten months old. See Appellant Brief at 20. However, Ozomaro has not discussed any factors relevant to this analysis or cited cases related to staleness. And a party forfeits any “issue[] adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by [at least] some effort at developed argumentation.” United States v. Persaud, 866 F.3d 371, 385 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument. 15 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro 1074 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 906–08 (10th Cir. 2018); see also, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 276–78 & n.2 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2006). And we have suggested the same. See United States v. Howard, 815 F. App’x 69, 76–77 (6th Cir. 2020) (concluding that an officer’s observation that the defendants had facial tattoos “consistent with gang membership” carried “weight” and “support[ed] a finding of reasonable suspicion”); McMullen, 103 F.4th at 1230 (concluding that, “[t]aken together,” factors including knowledge that the defendant “was in a high-crime neighborhood known for gang activity and gun violence” and an observation that he was “parked close behind . . . a known gang member” supported reasonable suspicion). Suspicious Movements. Lastly, we consider the behaviors that led Harris to believe that Ozomaro was concealing a firearm. As noted above, throughout the encounter Harris observed Ozomaro gesticulating with his left arm, while his right arm “barely moved” and remained “against his person” like he “was guarding something.” R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77). Harris further noted that Ozomaro “maintained . . . a bladed position,” such that his right side remained out of Harris’s view. R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 9, 27–28) (Page ID #306, 325–25). Both observations suggested to Harris that Ozomaro was “very concerned about [his] right side,” and heightened his suspicions that Ozomaro was attempting to conceal a firearm. Id. at 9, 26 (Page ID #306, 323). Ozomaro suggests that Harris’s observations cannot support reasonable suspicion because his behavior was ambiguous and susceptible to innocent explanation. See Appellant Brief at 21. Although we must take care not to criminalize innocent conduct, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts need not “rule out the possibility” of an innocent explanation before concluding 16 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro that certain conduct supports reasonable suspicion. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014) (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277). Moreover, the Court has repeatedly instructed that reviewing courts like ours must give “due weight” to the inferences drawn by local law- enforcement officers based on their experience and specialized training. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273– 74 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). Here, Harris’s experience reasonably led him to conclude that Ozomaro’s behavior was consistent with concealing a firearm, which in turn supports reasonable suspicion to believe that he was engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Faught, 2022 WL 2813240, at *5 (6th Cir. July 19, 2022) (“We have recognized that if a suspect stands in a ‘bladed’ position by turning away from an officer as if to conceal something, that positioning can add to the reasonable suspicion that the suspect might have a weapon.” (citing United States v. Moberly, 861 F. App’x 27, 31 (6th Cir. 2021); Lewis, 843 F. App’x at 691; Johnson, 428 F. App’x at 618, 621)).4 In sum, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Harris had reasonable suspicion to believe that Ozomaro was involved with criminal activity by the time officers “surrounded” him, as there was at least a “moderate chance” that Ozomaro had engaged in wrongdoing. Safford, 4 Ozomaro briefly argues that his “blading” cannot contribute to reasonable suspicion because Harris’s own conduct impacted his observations. See Appellant Brief at 21–22 (contending that it would be “unfair to find behavior that was induced by the officer suspicious”). But Ozomaro does not contend that Harris acted unreasonably in walking around during the conversation. Therefore, his interpretation would resuscitate a variant of the “police-created exigency” rule rejected by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011). See United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009, 1017 (6th Cir. 2020) (“The Supreme Court addressed whether an officer can create exigency or the circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify a warrantless search in Kentucky v. King. It determined that ‘the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting King, 563 U.S. at 462)). 17 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro 557 U.S. at 371; cf. Stepp, 680 F.3d at 664–67 (finding reasonable suspicion based on several factors including nervous and evasive behavior, criminal history, and suspicious movements). E. Search Analysis Having concluded that any seizure at the time Ozomaro was surrounded would have been lawful, we must ask whether Officer Harris had the attendant suspicion necessary to search Ozomaro. As noted above, officers may “perform protective searches for weapons” incident to a lawful Terry stop if they have reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual is “armed and dangerous.” McMullen, 103 F.4th at 1229 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 26–27). Such searches are generally “pat-down[s] of the suspect’s outer clothing,” and are often referred to as Terry frisks. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, the facts giving rise to suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity may also give rise to suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. See McMullin, 739 F.3d at 945–46. For example, we have noted that reasonable suspicion to believe that a suspect was involved in crimes like drug trafficking or burglary is often “sufficient to [also] justify a frisk of the suspect” because it is reasonable to think that individuals engaged in these types of criminal activities are armed and dangerous. Id. at 946–47 (collecting cases). This logic plainly applies to cases, like the present one, involving reasonable suspicion that a suspect was engaged in criminal activity directly related to firearms. Most significantly, we have also noted that before Officer Harris moved in to conduct the Terry frisk at issue, he saw a “bulge” on Ozomaro’s right side with “distinct right angles” reflecting a “hard . . . metallic object” that “protruded away from his body in an unnatural way.” R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77); R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 10, 19, 28–29) (Page ID 18 No. 25-2173, United States v. Ozomaro #307, 316, 325–26). Based on his training and experience, Harris testified that he immediately believed the bulge to be a firearm. See R. 24-4 (Rep. of Off. Harris at 5) (Page ID #77); R. 54 (Suppression Hr’g Tr. at 10, 19, 28–29) (Page ID #307, 316, 325–26). This observation independently establishes reasonable suspicion to believe that Ozomaro was armed and dangerous. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112 (concluding that where an officer observes a bulge on a suspect’s person and believes it to be a weapon, the observation provides reasonable suspicion that the individual may be armed and dangerous); Stennis, 457 F. App’x at 499–500 (same).5 III. CONCLUSION For the above-discussed reasons, we conclude that, at the relevant times, there was both reasonable suspicion to believe that Ozomaro was involved in criminal activity and reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed and dangerous. Accordingly, Ozomaro’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated during the encounter with Officer Harris. We AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Ozomaro’s motion to suppress. 5 Against this conclusion, Ozomaro argues that Harris’s tone of voice and decision to grab at the suspected firearm both demonstrate that he did not actually believe Ozomaro was armed and dangerous. See Appell