Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals The State, Respondent, v. Fanotti Nacier Neal, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2023-001791 Appeal From Horry County William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-487 Submitted October 2, 2026 โ€“ Filed November 18, 2026 AFFIRMED David E. Rigney, of Surfside Beach, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway, all for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Fanotti Nacier Neal appeals his conviction for murder and sentence of forty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Neal argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying Neal's motion for a new trial because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of Neal's guilt under the theory of accomplice liability. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Neal's motion for a new trial because there was evidence to support the jury's verdict. See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11, 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) ("A trial [court] has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and [its] decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion."); State v. Smith, 363 S.C. 111, 115, 609 S.E.2d 528, 530 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Where there is any evidence supporting the jury's verdict, the court commits no error in denying the motion." (emphasis added)); id. ("In considering a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court is concerned with the existence of evidence rather than its weight."); S.C. Code Ann. ยง 16-3-10 (2015) ("'Murder' is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479-80, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) ("Under accomplice liability theory, 'a person must personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some overt act.'" (quoting State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 648-49, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999))); State v. Condrey, 349 S.C. 184, 194, 562 S.E.2d 320, 325 (Ct. App. 2002) ("A formally expressed agreement is not necessary to establish the conspiracy. It may be shown by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the parties." (citations omitted)). AFFIRMED.1 WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur. 1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.