Full Opinion

Filed 11/13/26 P. v. Williams CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, G066143 v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF127041-2) MARTEL CHARROD WILLIAMS, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Joshlyn R. Pulliam, Judge. Affirmed. Martel Charrod Williams, in pro. per.; Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * * Defendant Martel Charrod Williams was convicted of numerous crimes in 2007, including home invasion robbery. For the robbery count he received a sentence of 30 years to life in prison. In December 2024, Williams filed a petition to recall his sentence and for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.1 (the petition).1 In the petition, he claimed his sentence for the robbery count was incorrect. The petition was denied. On appeal, Williams’ counsel filed a no-issue brief requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently review the record for error under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Williams then filed a supplemental brief raising several issues for review. We have considered his arguments and have independently reviewed the record but have found no arguable issues on appeal. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. WILLIAMS’ SENTENCE In 2007, a jury convicted Williams of the following counts: • Count one: burglary under section 459; • Count two: robbery under section 211; • Count three: unlawful possession of marijuana for sale under Health and Safety Code section 11359; • Count four: attempting to transport more than 28.5 grams of marijuana under Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a); • Count six: felon in possession of a firearm under section 12021, subdivision (a); and 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. With the exception of sections 1172.1 and 1172.6, citations to statutes refer to the versions in effect when Williams was convicted and sentenced. 2 • Count seven: participation in a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (a). The jury also found several enhancements to be true, including certain firearm and gang enhancements. At Williams’ sentencing in 2008, the court noted that he had a prior strike and “sentenced [him] pursuant to [section 667, subdivision (e)(1)].” It imposed an aggregate sentence of 47 years to life, consisting of the following: • For count three, which was deemed the principal count, a term of four years plus a three-year gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); • For count two, a consecutive term of 30 years plus a 10-year firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); • The sentences for counts one and four and the related enhancements were stayed under section 654; • For count six, a concurrent term of four years plus a three-year gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); and • For count seven, a concurrent term of four years. Williams appealed various aspects of his conviction and sentence. This division rejected most of his arguments but agreed that his sentence for count three should have been stayed under section 654. It reversed this portion of Willliams’ sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. On remand, the trial court stayed the sentence on count three and the related enhancement. This resulted in an aggregate sentence of 40 years to life in prison. In June 2017, the court vacated Williams’ sentence for count three due to the passing of Proposition 64. In 2022, Williams’ convictions on counts three and four were dismissed and sealed. 3 II. REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION In July 2017, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) sent the trial court a letter (the July 2017 letter) stating that Williams’ abstract of judgment may contain an error or may be incomplete. The July 2017 letter explained that the abstract of judgment “reflect[ed] Count 2 as [section] 211, 1st Degree Robbery, at 30-years-to-life imposed, sentenced pursuant to [section] 667(b)(i)/[section] 1170.12. The Amended Felony information reflects ‘while voluntarily acting in concert with two and more [sic] . . . other persons, [Williams] did willfully and unlawfully in an inhabited dwelling house and by means of force and fear take personal property from the person, possession, and immediate presence of [the victim], within the meaning of . . . [s]ection 213, subdivision (a)[(1)(A)].’ Please clarify if defendant is sentenced pursuant to [section] 213 on Count 2. [¶] Please review your file to determine if a correction is required.”2 It does not appear that the trial court made any response or took any action with regard to the July 2017 letter. In December 2024, Williams filed the petition, which requested “rehearing, reconsideration and/or re-sentencing” under section 1172.1. Williams argued that he had never been charged or convicted under section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A). He also claimed that the sentencing scheme for a violation of section 213, subdivision (a), “does not carry an indeterminate and/or life sentence.” The petition also noted that the Department had sent the July 2017 letter to the court seeking clarification on Williams’ sentence 2 In November 2017, the Department also sent a letter to the Office of the District Attorney for Riverside County, which enclosed the July 2017 letter and stated that the court had not responded to it. 4 but had not received a reply. The petition included a copy of the July 2017 letter. In response, the prosecution argued that Williams had no standing to make a motion under section 1172.1, and there was no error in his sentence even if he had standing. The prosecution attached verdict forms from his trial showing that the jury (1) convicted Williams of first degree robbery under section 211; (2) found that in the commission of the robbery Williams violated section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A); (3) found that Williams committed the robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang under section 186.22, subdivision (b); and (4) found that Williams used a firearm during the commission of the robbery under sections 12022.53, subdivision (b), and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). III. THE RULING The trial court denied the petition. It found no error in Williams’ sentence but agreed to clarify the abstract of judgment as requested by the Department. The court explained that section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A) is not a separate crime of robbery but “an additional finding that a jury has to make.” It observed, “the jury had to first decide whether or not Mr. Williams was guilty of robbery, which it looks like they did under Penal Code 211. Then under that same count, Count 2, they had to decide if it was done in concert with two or more people under [section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A)], and then they had to make an additional finding, under still Count 2 of robbery, whether or not it was done for the benefit of the gang under [section] 186.22, subdivision (b).” 5 The trial court also noted that the July 2017 letter was “not stating that [Williams] was sentenced incorrectly.” It “simply ask[ed] for clarification . . . what type of robbery. . . . [T]hey’re just asking for explanation. Is this robbery in concert? Is this second degree robbery? First degree robbery?” The trial court ordered that the abstract of judgment be amended to clarify that Williams’ robbery conviction in count two was “within the meaning of [section] 213.” The court expressly noted that it was “not finding that the abstract is in error,” and it was “not changing [Williams’] sentence whatsoever [on count two].” Rather, the court would “correct its own abstract based on the [July 2017 letter] asking for clarification . . . to cure any ambiguity.”3 Williams appealed the trial court’s denial of the petition. His counsel then filed a no-issue brief requesting that we independently review the record under Delgadillo. His counsel submitted a declaration stating, “I have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and found no arguable issues. An attorney at Appellate Defenders, Inc., has also reviewed this case.” On April 10, 2026, this court issued an order granting Williams 30 days to submit a supplemental brief. Williams filed a supplemental brief on May 8, 2026. 3 On August 25, 2025, the court issued an amended abstract of judgment, which specified that for count two, section “211 . . . is within the meaning of [section] 213.” 6 DISCUSSION I. DELGADILLO PROCEDURES Under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 221.) Wende review does not apply to appeals of postconviction orders (id. at p. 226), but our Supreme Court provided some guidance on this issue in Delgadillo. In the context of section 1172.6 resentencing petitions, it explained, “[w]hen appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be pursued on appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send . . . notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.” (Delgadillo, at pp. 231–232.) “If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues. . . . While it is wholly within the court’s discretion, the Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent review of the record in any individual section 1172.6 appeal.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) Unlike Delgadillo, this appeal does not involve a section 1172.6 resentencing petition. Nor has Williams explained why Delgadillo’s 7 procedures should be applied to appeals of postconviction orders outside this specific context. Nonetheless, we will consider the arguments raised by Williams’ supplemental brief in the interests of justice. We also note that other courts have applied Delgadillo’s procedures in cases involving section 1172.1. (People v. Rosemond (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 667, 673–674.) II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “Under section 1172.1 the court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant ‘at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary’ of the [Department] or other designated officials, or within 120 days of the date of commitment on the trial court’s own motion.” (People v. Craig (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1170.) The statute also “authorizes the court to recall a sentence and resentence the defendant on its own motion ‘at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.’” (Ibid.) “‘A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to respond.’” (Id. at p. 1171.) “Because a court’s decision to recall and resentence on its own motion pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a) is discretionary, we review a court’s ultimate decision to recall and resentence for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Lopez (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 1171, 1191.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi 8 v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.) As other courts have explained, an abuse of discretion may only be found where no reasonable judge could have made the challenged order. (People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306, 319–320.) III. THE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF Williams contends “the trial court’s reliance on count 3s [sic] gang enhancement sentence to support a sentence of a gang enhancement violation of [section] 186. 22 on count 2 is misplaced and was a legal error.” The court did not rely on a gang enhancement from count three when analyzing Williams’ sentence on count two. Based on the verdict forms, the court determined that the jury found true a gang enhancement as to count two. It did not discuss count three at all. Next, Williams asserts “that the trial court’s position that violation of [section] 213 does not have to be reflected on the abstract of judgement [sic] because there was a jury true finding was misplaced and a legal error.” We see no error. Courts have inherent power to correct clerical errors at any time, including errors in an abstract of judgment. (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.) Thus, if the court determined the abstract of judgment did not properly reflect Williams’ sentence, it could correct that error. Williams also argues that the oral pronouncement of judgment controls over the abstract of judgment and that, in pronouncing sentence on count two, the court only referenced section 211, not sections 213 or 186.2. We find no error. The record contains no transcript from Williams’ sentencing hearing. Indeed, Williams acknowledges that this transcript is no longer 9 available and appears to have been destroyed. The record only contains a minute order that states, “[a]s to count 2 the court imposes the Indeterminate sentence of 30 years to Life.” The minute order does not explain how this sentence was calculated, but it does specify that Williams was sentenced “pursuant to [section] 667(e)(1).” The trial court found that Williams’ sentence of 30 years to life on count two is correct, and this finding is supported by substantial evidence. The verdict forms show that the jury found Williams guilty of robbery under section 211. It also found true that he committed that robbery (1) in concert with two more persons in violation of section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and (2) “for the benefit of, or at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with specific intent to promote, or further or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of . . . section 186.22, subdivision (b).” When Williams was sentenced, a conviction for felony home invasion robbery under section 213, subdivision (a)(1)(A), was punishable for 15 years to life in prison if done for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4)(B).) Williams also had a prior strike under section 667, subdivision (e)(1), which would have allowed his 15-year-to-life sentence to be doubled to 30 years to life. (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)4; People v. Lopez (2022) 12 Cal.5th 957, 961 [defendant’s sentence for conspiracy to commit home invasion robbery “consisted of 15 years to life as a so-called alternate penalty under section 186.22(b)(4)(B), doubled for a prior strike”]; People v. Jefferson 4 In 2008, section 667, subdivision (e)(1) stated, “[i]f a defendant has one prior felony conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” 10 (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101 [“section 186.22(b)(4) establishes the punishment for the ‘current felony conviction’ within the meaning of section 667(e)(1), and it is subject to sentence-doubling under section 667(e)(1)”].) Finally, Williams contends that the trial court “add[ed] a violation of [section] 213 as to count 2,” which activated the “‘full sentencing rule.’” But the court did not add any such violation. The jury found that Williams had violated section 213. Further, the “full resentencing rule” only “allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant.” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425.) Here, the court clarified the abstract of judgment, which is not a sentence recall. (People v. Humphrey (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 371, 379.) Since the court never recalled or resentenced Williams, this rule was inapplicable. IV. REMAINING ISSUES Williams’ counsel also asked that we review whether the trial court recalled Williams’ sentence and, if so, whether it should have considered certain amendments to section 186.22 when resentencing him. As set forth above, the trial court never recalled Williams’ sentence, so we need not address these issues. Nor have we located any other arguable issues in our review of the record. 11 DISPOSITION We affirm the trial court’s postconviction order denying the petition. MOORE, ACTING P. J. WE CONCUR: DELANEY, J. SCOTT, J. 12 13